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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis is a tentative application of Foucault’s archaeological 
method to the English common law. The project is an attempt at 
explaining and demonstrating the specific attributes of the 
method in terms of a contribution to an understanding of “the 
law” as both continuous and discontinuous. 
 
From the understanding applied in this thesis, an application of 
the archaeological method requires a careful examination of the 
monuments of a discourse. The monuments that are examined in 
this project are a number of negligence law judgments. The 
“authors” of the monuments are seen as the sum of the practices 
that constitute them. That is, in this application of the method to 
the law, the judges are not considered as authors, instead, the 
judgments they write are seen as  reflecting the practices of the 
legal discourse. 
 
The most fundamental of these discursive practices, from the 
perspective applied in this thesis is the repetition of past legal 
statements in the production of judgments. In the understanding 
of law adopted in this project, cases are treated as sites within 
which judges choose from a number of possible legal statements 
made by preceding judges. The common law, then, is seen as 
representing a process in which statements by particular judges 
in specific cases are valorised, primarily through repetition, until 
the alternative utterances are largely, but never completely, 
excluded.  
 
The application of the archaeological method to these negligence 
decisions demonstrates the operation of the discursive practice of 
repetition. The application provides a framework for appreciating 
the way in which “the law” can change without losing its 
continuity and legitimacy. The project examines cases between 
1750 and 1972 and demonstrates that, despite apparently radical 
changes in the articulations of liability, from the writ system to 
the “duty of care”, “the law” has maintained its structure through 
the reproduction of the discursive practices that constitute 
members of the legal profession.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The main aim of this project is to use and explore Foucault’s archaeological 
method. This method involves a close examination of the “monuments” of a 
particular societal institution in order to gain a fresh perspective on what is 
known as the history of that institution. The product of an archaeology is a 
history, not the history, as the result may be a different story from the traditional 
history of the body. The institution that will be the focus of the archaeological 
method in this thesis will be “the law”. The story that is produced, another 
history of “the law”, highlights “the law” as being simultaneously continuous 
and discontinuous. This story stresses the contingent nature of the legal past and 
rejects any teleological telling of the story of “the law”. 
 
The legal texts that will be excavated in this archaeology are a number of 
decisions from the general area of negligence law produced by English common 
law judges between the years of 1750 and 1972. The writings of the judges 
provide an ideal set of monuments for an archaeology. Judicial decisions reflect 
the specific legal training of judges and are used according to the specific 
training of the legal profession. The legal training of members of the profession 
will be examined in order to show the relationship between “the law”, in the 
form of written judgments, and the profession. 
 
This application of the method is not a definitive application, it could even be 
described as a “tentative” one. It is an attempt at using the method in order to 
demonstrate the benefits (and constraints) of this particular style of historical 
examination. The understanding of the method reflects a particular reading of 
Foucault’s work and his discursive understanding of society and its members. 
This project is the first attempt at a detailed application of the archaeological  
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method to the law. It is not the first to use Foucault’s works in a study of the 
law. In order to appreciate the specific nature of the project, the next section 
will look at other uses of Foucault’s work in relation to the law. 
 
FOUCAULT, LAW AND THIS THESIS 
 
Foucault’s ideas and theories have informed many other writers in a wide 
variety of fields. I feel, however, that this project is using one of his ideas in a 
way that has not been done before. One of the purposes of this section is to 
indicate the manner in which this thesis is novel in terms of the use of 
Foucault’s work. Another purpose is to establish the relationship between his 
ideas, the work of others who have used his ideas and his ideas as they are used 
in this project. 
 
The basic idea behind this thesis is to examine, using a Foucaultian “eye”, a 
sequence of judgments produced in English courts of appeal over the past three 
centuries. These judgments are from an area of law that is loosely termed 
negligence law - although many of the decisions predate the introduction of the 
label “negligence law”. The key elements of the thesis, then, are documents of 
“the law” and the Foucaultian method, the “archaeology” that allows for the use 
of the Foucaultian “eye”. 
 
Foucault’s work has been used in a variety of contexts across a number of 
academic disciplines. His methods have been used before and his ideas have 
been discussed in relation to the law before. There has not been, however, an 
application of his methods to a series of legal decisions in which the goal of the 
application has been the application itself. It is in this space that this project 
seeks to sit.   
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Academic research projects in which Foucault’s ideas were used have included 
the construction of the medical discourse and an examination of the relationship 
between the individual and the wider community. Writers such as Alan 
Petersen
1 have continued Foucault’s own work
2 in the former category. In the 
latter category, Nikolas Rose, in Governing the Soul,
3 uses Foucaultian ideas in 
his analysis of the way citizens are constituted in today’s society. In particular, 
Rose uses Foucault’s ideas relating to the processes of subjectification. That is, 
Rose uses Foucault in order to show how our senses of “self” are created in the 
day-to-day interactions with the structures of society. This notion of 
subjectification will be picked up on and explored further in Chapters One and 
Two of this thesis.  
 
A number of writers have also looked specifically at Foucault’s historical 
methods, the “archaeological” and the “genealogical” methods. The particular 
Foucaultian “eye” that I will be using in this project is the one produced from 
the archaeological method. Theorists who have written on Foucault’s methods 
include Gary Wickham, Gavin Kendall and Mitchell Dean. Indeed, Kendall and 
Wickham’s Using Foucault’s Methods
4 was significant in the development of 
the archaeological method used in this project and will be relied upon to explain 
my interpretation of the archaeological method. Their work, and that of Dean,
5 
is predominantly theoretical. That is, their focus is an explanation and 
discussion of the methods in the abstract. Using Foucault’s Methods, for 
example, has, central to its structure, a hypothetical class of students. The book 
is aimed at teaching the method to those who do not understand it. Their 
                                                 
1 Petersen, A. and Bunton, R. (eds), Foucault, Health and Medicine, London, Routledge, 1997 
2 One of Foucault’s earlier works was Birth of the Clinic – An Archaeology of Medical 
Perception, Vintage, New York, 1975, a history of the medical “gaze”. 
3 Routledge, London, 1992 
4 Sage Publications, London, 1999 
5 For example, Critical and Effective Histories – Foucault’s Methods and Historical Sociology, 
Routledge, London, 1994  
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discussion is of the methods “in theory” rather than in practice. Their intention, 
unlike mine, is not to apply the method to a particular discursive structure but to 
explain how the method might be applied. 
 
Many other writers have used Foucault’s ideas in practice but none have 
undertaken a “simple” application of Foucault’s methods. One context in which 
his ideas have been used is that of “the law”. “The law” has often been used an 
example in the examination of the structures and limits of society by many 
academics. The Foucaultian writers that have used the law in this way can be 
seen as falling into two camps. The first group sees “the law” as a meta-
narrative, as an over-arching story that “explains” society as we now know it. 
The second camp uses the idea of “law as discourse”, applies it to the world and 
uses one of Foucault’s historical methods to provide evidence for this 
application of the “law as discourse” theory to the world. My project is an 
attempt to take this idea a step further. The thesis rests on a discursive 
understanding of the world, but the prime focus of the project is a “simple” 
application of the method.  
 
To illustrate the relationship between my project and those of these other writers 
I will offer a few examples of their work. In terms of the first camp, theorists 
such as Ian Hunter, W. T. Murphy, Costas Douzinas and Peter Goodrich
6 are 
significant. These people write of the law as “meta-narrative”, they write of the 
law as a way of explaining how society “works”. The work of these writers has 
gone a long way in terms of providing explanations of the way the law can be 
seen to work in society, yet their stories are different in style and application 
from the story in this project. 
 
                                                 
6 The work of Goodrich will be used in Chapter Two of this thesis.  
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For example, Hunter, Saunders and Williamson, in On Pornography: 
Literature, Sexuality and Obscenity Law,
7 link Foucault’s writing with a history 
of the law. Hunter’s writings deal with trying to understand law as it is now, as 
a complete institution, as a complete discourse. He uses the “objects” of 
pornography and sexuality and their regulation via the law to examine the way 
law operates in our society and the that way in which society is, in turn, 
regulated by the law.  
 
W. T. Murphy’s The Oldest Social Science
8 discusses the importance of 
tradition to the law. Murphy engages with the traditional aspect of legal practice 
in terms of a discussion of Christian philosophies, Max Weber, hermeneutics, 
ethics and, of course, Foucault. This text is a discussion of law in terms of a 
grand narrative, it looks to explaining the law as it is today in wider society and 
is an exploration of some of the mechanisms that might have produced the law 
as it is today.  
 
One significant writer in the second of my two broad classifications of 
Foucaultian theorists of the law is Les Moran. In The Homosexual(ity) of Law,
9 
Moran engages in a Foucaultian history of the law. That is, he applied 
Foucault’s genealogical method to the law and the documents of the law. The 
focus of his project, however, was a description of the law as a grand narrative. 
The law was seen as a grand narrative in which its in-built biases were evident 
through the documents that were produced by those who were part of the law. 
That is, the focus of Moran’s text is a narrative of law in the context of the 
broader regulation of sexuality by the law. This narrative is supported with 
                                                 
7 Hunter, I., Saunders, D. and Williamson, D., Macmillan, Basingstoke, Hampshire, 1993 
8 Clarendon, Oxford, 1997. Some of Murphy’s work will be included as examples in Chapter 
Two below. 
9 Routledge, New York, 1996  
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reference to judicial decisions, but the central story was about sexuality rather 
then the law itself. Moran uses the genealogical method to discuss judicial 
decisions but his discussion provides evidence for the discussion of the law as 
grand narrative. The focus of Moran’s work is the law and not the application of 
the method itself. 
 
Douzinas’ Justice Miscarried: Ethics, Aesthetics and the Law,
10 with Ronnie 
Warrington, is, in some ways, a crossover between the two broad camps I have 
described. That is, it deals with the law in terms of a grand narrative, but also 
engages with some of the texts of the law. The central argument of their book 
relates these texts to the notion of justice, a meta-narrative that is used to 
describe the world. They use texts of the law to demonstrate this “justice”, but 
they do not use a Foucaultian method to examine these texts. Further, their 
focus is not on the individual texts as monuments in themselves but on what the 
individual texts have to add to the meta-narrative of justice. 
 
My intention in this project was to draw on the work of theorists such as the 
above writers in order to try “something new”. The sheer weight of academic 
interest in Foucault’s ideas suggests that there is something valuable in his 
works. This thesis would not be possible without the extensive work of the 
authors who have taken Foucault’s writings and built on his themes.  
 
The “something new” of this thesis is two-fold. First, it is an attempt to develop 
the archaeological method through an application of the method to a “discourse 
in action”. The second aspect of the thesis is that it offers a new perspective on 
the “discourse in action”, a new perspective on “the law”. Through the use of 
the application of the method, I hope to shed light on the manner in which the 
                                                 
10 Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, 1994  
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law operates. In particular, I hope to show how such an important discourse in 
the community is able to change drastically over time while maintaining its 
structure and practices. 
 
The primary objective of this project is to illustrate and develop the method. 
The application is not done for the purpose of providing evidence to prove a 
different explanation of the cases discussed or of the law itself. However, this 
attempt is only possible because of the work of theorists like those I have 
mentioned above. I have taken their work and hope to add something to the 
body of Foucaultian literature by taking a tentative step toward a greater 
understanding of the possibilities opened up by Foucault’s historical methods. 
 
The small step that this project is taking involves the application of Foucault’s 
archaeological method to a sequence of documents, a series of discursive 
monuments. The end product of the application may be a new story but it is one 
that is derived from the documents themselves. The legal decisions, the 
documents that I will be “excavating”, are to be examined not as evidence that 
reinforces a separate argument, but as monuments in themselves. These 
decisions are products of the common law and their examination, hopefully, 
will enable more to be said about the common law.  
 
The set of documents that are to be examined have been chosen from a 
discourse that is readily seen as a cohesive body of statements. This was done 
both in order to make the application of the method as clear as possible and to 
provide a new approach to the study of law. The application of the method 
involves an examination of the law from within the law itself. This, necessarily, 
must produce a different story of the law from those of writers such as those 
mentioned above, as it could be said that they examined the law from without.  
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For the purposes of this thesis, the law can be seen as a set of texts produced by 
a relatively independent body of writers who, for centuries, have been 
responsible for the education of the next generation of writers. That is, the texts 
of the common law have been produced by a self-regulating, self-perpetuating 
body of lawyers and judges. These documents are the monuments of the 
discourse as they are produced through the practices of the discourse.  
 
This brings in the other aspect of Foucault’s work that is to be used in this 
project, this is his notion of subjectification. Subjectification refers to a process 
in which the subjects of a discourse are created by the discourse. That is, those 
people who are subjects of a discourse are trained in the practices of the 
discourse and behave according to these practices. This process of repetition of 
practices perpetuates the practices themselves and the discourse as a whole. The 
texts of the law are written with an eye on “precedents” Judicial decisions are 
written, and read, in the context of previous writings of this body of writers. 
This self-regulating, self-referential body of work seems an ideal discourse 
upon which to base an application of the archaeological method. 
 
This thesis is a tentative attempt at an application of the archaeological method. 
As it is a tentative attempt I have made the task as simple as possible by 
choosing a discourse that lends itself to an application of the method. The 
attempt is only possible because of the large body of work that has been built up 
around Foucault’s ideas. This thesis is “something new” but it is a small “extra 
step” that is investigating how a well-discussed, but under-utilised, method can 
be applied to a set of texts produced by those who belong to a specific discourse 
in society. 
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THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL METHOD 
 
Broadly speaking, an archaeology is a process in which the monuments of a 
discourse are excavated. An archaeology is an exploration of texts that form a 
discourse, a discursive formation or set of discursive practices. The excavation 
is done in a particular manner and with a particular eye. The practices of the 
method are more specific than traditional histories and the results that can be 
gained from using it also may be different from those of a more traditional 
history. The method used in this thesis is based on Foucault’s The Archaeology 
of Knowledge,
11 but has been modified in light of his later writings. As 
mentioned above, the understanding gained from Foucault’s work is expanded 
upon with, in particular, the aid of Kendall and Wickham’s work on Foucault’s 
ideas. 
 
These authors considered the central elements of Foucault’s archaeological 
method to be that it ‘describes statements’ produced by a discourse. These 
‘statements cover the sayable and the visible’. The method also ‘describes 
regularities of statements in [a] non-interpretive’ and a ‘non-anthropological 
manner’; and it ‘analyses the relation between one statement and other 
statements’.
12 The focus of the method, therefore, is the statements that are 
produced by a discourse. The focus is not on the authors of statements. The 
method is non-interpretive, in the sense that there is no second order analysis 
that is part of the method. That is, the statements are taken at face value. This 
means the discourse can be known by an examination of the statements, as there 
is no need to “peer” behind the statement to guess at what is “really there”. 
 
                                                 
11 Routledge, London, 1994 
12 Kendall and Wickham, Using Foucault’s Methods at 33  
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As described above the method is simple and straightforward. The results are 
also simple and straightforward. The more difficult aspect of the method is to 
accept what is not part of, or produced by, the method. For example, an 
archaeology does not deal with grand narratives. There is no argument about the 
importance or relevance of larger stories, such as those associated with justice 
or morality. An archaeology of the law, at least one in which judicial decisions 
are examined, looks at the words of the judges themselves. There is no re-
interpretation of the words on the page to argue that the judge really meant 
something that was not written down. One particular grand narrative that is 
found in some of the traditional legal histories is that of the inexorable progress 
in the law from feudal forms to modern forms.
13 Such a teleological assumption 
has no place in a post-structuralist reading of the law and the legal profession. 
 
The continuities and changes described in this thesis are not meant to suggest 
progress. The forms of liability evident in the twentieth century are not held to 
be better than the forms of liability evident in the eighteenth century.
14 There is 
simply change: change in the legal practices, change in the legal profession and 
change in the recognition and articulation of liability. These changes are evident 
through the changes in the legal decisions that deals with relationships and 
forms of liability between legal subjects. 
 
Another “lack” associated with the method is that there is no recourse to stories 
of causation in an archaeology. The statements are as they are, when they are. 
The connections between the statements are described by the method and these 
connections are the practices of the discourse that created the statements. There 
                                                 
13 For example, one text used in this thesis includes a chapter called “A General Sketch of Legal 
Development”, in which the author refers to ‘our legal evolution’ (Potter H., An Introduction to 
the History of English Law, 2
nd edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1926 at 8). 
14 It is easy, however, to see it as better, but perhaps only because we are “modern”.  
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is no factor “external” to the discourse that “caused” one statement to follow 
any other statement. This also means that the method is equally at home in 
describing both continuities and discontinuities amongst a group of statements. 
The events that are described are taken at face value. All that an archaeology 
can record is that the statements were produced. 
 
THE LAW ITSELF 
 
The archaeological method must focus on a set of statements. These statements 
can be described as the “monuments” of a discourse. The monuments excavated 
in this project are a set of judicial decisions from the English common law. One 
of the purposes of this thesis is to apply the archaeological method. The focus, 
therefore, is on the method, and the set of statements chosen are simply 
“objects” to which the method is applied. The writings of the judges, however, 
were chosen for two very strong reasons. First, the words and the practices of 
the English judiciary have been important in the continuation of our society, so 
a new historical perspective may produce interesting results relevant to the 
functioning of our community. Second, the judgments discussed seem to be 
ideal monuments for an archaeological examination, as the rules for the their 
production are so dependent upon the law and the judges’ legal training. 
 
A term that will crop up repeatedly in this project, not surprisingly, is “the law”. 
The project is an application of the method and the statements chosen are 
judicial decisions that discuss negligence. It could be argued, therefore, that any 
broader notion of “the law” plays no part in the thesis. These statements, 
however, are produced by the legal practices which constitute the legal training 
of the judges. Therefore, the notion of “the law” that I am using in this thesis is  
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wider than the understanding of “the law” as just the totality of recorded judicial 
decisions.  
 
If I am looking at legal practices, the legal profession and legal decisions it is 
hard, and indeed awkward, to avoid using the term “the law”. “The law”, 
therefore, needs definition, or at least an explanation of what it means in terms 
of this project. The term is used very broadly in the general community, in the 
academic community and even in the community of Foucaultian scholars. But 
“the law” has a wide, but precise, meaning for the purposes of this thesis.  
 
The statements that are to be excavated in this project are produced as a result 
of the legal practices ingrained in the judges who wrote the decisions. The 
judges represent “the law”. The decisions they wrote function as “the law” and 
to produce their reasons the judges repeated previous statements of “the law”. In 
this thesis, then, “the law” is that which judges, and the legal profession as a 
whole, do. In other words, lawyers and judges, in their capacity as members of 
the profession act according to the ways in which they were and are trained. The 
end product of their actions is “the law”. The rules, opinions and judgments that 
construct proceedings in the courtroom are created by the forms of legal training 
undertaken by members of the legal profession. There is nothing outside these 
legal behaviours that can be considered to be law. There is no “law” that is 
separable from the actions, and therefore the training, of lawyers and judges.  
 
This perspective is not without precedent. Llewellyn, for example, argued that 
what the agents of the law ‘do about disputes is… the law itself’.
15 His category 
of “legal agents” included judges, sheriffs, clerks, jailers and lawyers, in other 
                                                 
15 Llewellyn, K., Bramble Bush – On Our Law and its Study, Ocean Publications, New York, 
1960 at 3  
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words, all people who function in a professional capacity on behalf of the law. 
This category is wider than the category of lawyers and judges that I use, but, 
again, this description is only for the purposes of this project. That is, the 
definition I use is intended to operate as shorthand for the body of legal 
statements, practices and actions. 
 
With this understanding of “the law” it is useful to consider how, again for the 
purposes of this thesis, the law functions within the community. The law can be 
seen to operate differently with respect to two different bodies of people in 
society. First, the law “binds” all citizens. All members of society are limited by 
law and all are expected to behave according to the law. Second, the law can be 
seen to have a different “relationship” with that body of people who “speak” for 
the law, the legal profession. Lawyers and judges are bound by the law, yet they 
also speak of, and for, the law.  
 
This can be re-stated in the language necessary to use the archaeological 
method, that is, it can be re-worded in the terms of the post-structuralist 
framework of the method. The law binds all citizens because the law is a 
discourse that creates those citizens as subjects of the legal discourse. That is, 
the law is a broad discourse that affects and constructs everybody within 
society. Members of the legal profession, too, are legal subjects but they also 
are a relatively cohesive body of people who use a special group of legal 
practices to speak of, and for, the law. In order to differentiate between the 
specifics of this smaller group and the generalities of wider legal discourse, the 
legal profession can be termed the “legal discursive formation”. 
 
More fully, all members of society are legal subjects. All legal subjects have 
been trained to behave in certain ways in certain circumstances in order to  
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comply with the law. Sometimes this training is very specific; for example, a 
juror is given specific tasks to carry out in their capacity as a juror. Sometimes 
the training is more general; for example, legal subjects are trained to adopt and 
observe norms of behaviour that are not subject to criminal sanctions. People 
are trained from a young age about road rules and the legal consequences of 
interfering with the property of others. Legal subjects are trained in these 
behaviours and by carrying them out and repeating them, the behaviours are 
perpetuated and the legal discourse is maintained. 
 
A subset of these legal subjects is the legal profession. These are legal subjects 
who have undergone specific forms of training that allow them to express and 
act on behalf of “the law”. These forms of training are a part of the discursive 
practices that constitute the legal profession. The English legal profession is a 
self-perpetuating, self-regulating institution of governance. That is, the 
profession is an independent body, at least for the period covered by this 
project. It is this independence that guided the choice of the endpoints for this 
archaeological excavation. 1750 is a time after which judges ceased to be 
dependent on the Crown and 1972 is the year in which the English legal system 
was provided with a higher Court of Appeal than the House of Lords, the 
European Court of Justice. 
 
After applying the archaeological method to the legal judgments it will also be 
seen that the law is a discourse that operates through the repetition of legal 
statements. That is, when judges write their legal judgments their arguments are 
based on the repetition of previous legal statements. This process of repetition 
resembles, but differs from, the usual understanding of stare decisis, the 
doctrine of precedent. In terms of a discursive understanding of the operation of 
the law in our society, the use and repetition of past legal statements is  
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absolutely fundamental to the legal profession and the law.
16 The use of these 
statements extends beyond the repetition of the ratio decidendi (more 
commonly referred to as the ratio) of previous decisions. 
 
To repeat the ratio of a decision is to repeat a specific statement contained in 
that decision. That is, before anything can be repeated, something has to be 
found. That something has to represent a ‘rule or principle of decision for which 
a given precedent is the authoritative source’.
17 In other words, the repetition of 
a ratio includes an act of selection and interpretation on the part of the judge.
18 
A judge has to read the previous decision and then extract the ratio from the 
words of the judgment. Once this selection has been made the judge then has to 
consider whether that decision should be applied, followed or distinguished. 
 
These actions can be seen to be legal practices that all judges exhibit as a result 
of their education and “training”. It is also possible to consider that this is 
reading too much into their behaviour. It can be as simple as a judge reading a 
previous decision and then repeating statements from that decision in their own 
judgment. Seen in this manner, it is irrelevant whether they are repeating a 
ratio, a legal principle or a piece of obiter dicta. The legal practices of the 
profession allow for, and encourage, the repetition of legal statements because 
they are previous statements of law. The practice of repetition can either involve 
the repeating of specific phrases from specific cases, or it can be the repeating 
of a specific statement as a “legal principle”, a principle that needs no reference 
                                                 
16 I am neither the first to consider the law as an institution which operates through the 
repetition of past statements. Nor am I the first to discuss such an idea from a post-modern 
perspective. Margaret Davies, for example, engaged with that notion in Delimiting the Law, 
Pluto Press, London, 1996. Her project is different from mine inasmuch that her work was based 
in a Derridean analysis, rather than a Foucaultian analysis. 
17 MacCormick, N., ‘Why Cases have Rationes and what these are’, in Goldstein, Laurence (ed), 
Precedent in Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987 at 156 
18 In the language of Kendall and Wickham, discussed below, this interpretation can be seen as a 
“second order judgment” on the “underlying meaning” of a particular decision.  
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to a specific decision because all legally trained people “know” what it means 
and where it comes from. All judgements are statements of law because they are 
written by judges according to their legal training and are comprised of earlier 
statements of law. In short, the practice of repetition of legal statements that is 
evident after the application of the archaeological method to common law 
decisions is wider than the doctrine of stare decisis as it is usually understood. 
 
Another result of the archaeological excavation of judicial decisions in this 
thesis is that the law can be seen as both continuous and discontinuous. More 
specifically, there are legal practices that have remained relatively constant over 
the years while other aspects, in particular the statements themselves, of law 
have changed radically. The mechanism that produces change, the mechanism 
that has remained relatively constant, is the practice of repeating legal 
statements. Again, I emphasise that this process of repetition has similarities 
with, but is not identical to, the doctrine of stare decisis. The idea that the law 
changes through the use of precedent is not new. For example, Stone argued 
that change with continuity can be understood if we recognise that the structure 
of precedent law constantly produces and reproduces both new rules, and new 
areas for choice-making’.
19 The application of the archaeological method 
highlights the processes of repetition of legal statements through which the law 
can change. 
 
                                                 
19 Legal System and Lawyers’ Reasonings, Maitland, Sydney, 1968 at 209. These references to 
Llewellyn and Stone may suggest a connection between this thesis and the legal realist school of 
philosophy. My intention is not to build upon the work of these authors, nor is it to use the same 
perspective as they do. I recognise that there are similarities but my approach is different. I am 
not seeking to describe the law and the legal profession in terms of their relationship to the 
broader policy processes of governance (Cotterrell, R. The Politics of Jurisprudence, 
Butterworths, London, 1989 at 203). My goal is to characterise the legal profession in a 
particular way and using that characterisation as a basis for the application of the archaeological 
method. The results of the application then demonstrate, to a limited extent, the nature and 
operation of law in our society.  
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Another significant result of the use of the archaeological method to the 
sequence of negligence decisions is a new perspective on the relationship 
between the defendants and the law.
20 It is this perspective that has changed 
between 1750 and 1972. In the eighteenth century, liability in the area of law 
that came to be known as negligence was restricted to certain categories of 
defendants. That is, only certain people in restricted circumstances were “seen” 
by the law, the judges, as capable of being liable for damage suffered by 
another. In the latter part of the twentieth century, almost all people are capable 
of being “seen” by the judges as liable for negligent acts.  
 
This concept of defendants being “seen” is linked to Kendall and Wickham’s 
characterisation of the method as a description of “statements [that] cover the 
sayable and the visible” and to Foucault’s notion of “the gaze”. For Foucault, 
“the gaze” is concerned with issues of power and knowledge.
21 It is a technique 
of ordering and of control. In the context of the court room, “the gaze” relates to 
the categorisation of the citizens who enter it. In the field of negligence law, 
only certain categories of people could be considered to be liable (depending on 
the circumstances). If the previous statements of the law did not include a 
certain class of persons as being liable in a particular situation then that person, 
if they appeared in court as a defendant, would not be “seen” by the judge. 
 
                                                 
20 I acknowledge that to categorise all the decisions excavated in this thesis as negligence 
decisions could be misleading as negligence has not always been classed as a separate area of 
law. According to Baker, ‘even at the beginning of the twentieth century Sir John Salmond was 
denying the existence of a separate tort of negligence. In the practitioners’ book, Clerk and 
Lindsell on Torts, negligence did not reach the status of a separate chapter until 1947’ (Baker, J. 
H., An Introduction to English Legal History, 3
rd edition, Butterworths, London, 1990 at 455). 
All the decisions discussed in this project do relate to the potential apportionment of liability in 
circumstances where the defendant could be seen to be acting “without due care”. As a result, I 
refer, for simplicity, to the decisions as being from the general area of negligence law. 
21 See, for example, The Birth of the Clinic and Discipline and Punish – The Birth of the Prison, 
Penguin, London, 1977  
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Only certain classes of defendant were considered to be liable under the writ 
system in use in the eighteenth century. For example, common carriers were 
liable for damage to goods in their care. If property was damaged in 
circumstances in which a carrier would have been liable but the defendant was 
not a common carrier, then the defendant would not have been “seen” by the 
court as liable. The defendant would not have been “seen” at all as they were 
not in an appropriate category. After the advent of the “duty of care” in the 
twentieth century, almost all people who came before the court were capable of 
being “seen” as liable. The manner in which this project understands this 
change is different, however, from the understanding of the change that is 
evident in other legal histories. 
 
LEGAL HISTORIES 
 
The focus of this project is a tentative application of Foucault’s archaeological 
method to a series of judicial decisions written by English common law judges. 
The initial purpose of the thesis was to “simply” apply the method, however, for 
a number of reasons, it occurred to me that an ancillary purpose of the 
application could be to investigate whether the story told by the application is 
significantly different from the stories evident in more “traditional” legal 
histories. It is recognised that there is no “template” for legal histories. There 
are some characteristics, however, that have been highlighted as being generally 
attributable to other legal histories. This section will suggest a number of the 
distinctions that may be between an application of the archaeological method 
and alternative legal histories. 
 
Before understandings of legal history are discussed, an acknowledgement has 
to be made of a tension within understandings of law itself. Law as it is taught,  
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and as it is used in practice, centres on the application of past decisions. 
However, this use of past decisions does not necessarily reflect a historical 
understanding of, or perspective on, the law. For example, it has been argued 
that a ‘marked characteristic of most conventional accounts of the tort of 
negligence (and indeed of legal doctrine generally) is the complete absence of 
any historical perspective’.
22 The use of past decisions is to explain the law as it 
is now, not how it was then. That is, if a nineteenth century decision is 
introduced in a lecture hall or legal argument, the decision is included as a 
statement of law applicable now, rather than a historical description of the law 
or society of the time the decision was written. This treatment of law as being 
“ever-present” ‘robs’ law of its ‘context. At the same time it deifies law by 
making it immortal’.
23  
  
The use of past decisions in the practice of law is distinct from “traditional” 
histories of the law. This distinction is highlighted because the application of 
the archaeological method, as it is understood here, results in a description of 
cases that has similarities to the description of cases that can be developed in 
undergraduate course on negligence law. The argument here is that the 
understanding of law developed in a negligence unit is different to the 
understanding of law developed in a legal history course.  
 
In order to establish this difference, an understanding of legal histories need to 
be developed. Broadly speaking, there can be seen to be two forms of 
“traditional” legal history. The first understands law from within and creates a 
story that explains the changes highlighted. The second understands law to be 
                                                 
22 Conaghan, J. and Mansell, W., The Wrongs of Tort, Pluto Press, London, 1993 at 62 
23 Id  
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the product of wider society and therefore describes legal change in terms of 
phenomena external to law.
24 
 
An example of the first type of such histories in the context of negligence law is 
the works of Percy Winfield.
25 This style of history focuses on the outcome of 
cases to describe the law as it was. Central to this history, therefore, are the 
words of the judges, and more particularly, the words that can be seen as the 
ratios of these cases. These ratios were used to ‘in support of an argument’ that 
underlay the historical narrative; ‘what emerged was a long and meandering 
narration mapping out what he perceived to be the “relevant” cases’.
26 
 
The second form of “traditional” legal history uses outside forces to explain the 
changes that are evident in the law. One of the pre-eminent examples of an 
external history of negligence law is Morton Horwitz’s Transformation of 
American Law, 1780-1860.
27 For Horwitz, there was a ‘close and intimate 
connection between the emergence of negligence and the industrial 
revolution’.
28 According to Conaghan and Mansell, Horwitz adopts an 
‘instrumentalist’ approach to law in which he suggests that the law is an 
‘instrument in the hands of the judges, a tool for the promotion of certain 
interests and objectives’.
29 In other words, for Horwitz, judges are external to 
the law and have sufficient agency to direct the outcome of cases to cater to 
broader societal concerns. 
 
                                                 
24 This description of the two types of legal history, and the examples to follow, are taken from 
Conaghan and Mansell, ibid at 65-78 
25 For example, ‘The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts’ (1926) 42 Law Quarterly 
Review 184 and ‘The Foundation of Liability in Tort’ (1927) 27 Columbia Law Review 1 
26 Conaghan and Mansell, The Wrongs of Tort at 66, emphasis in original. 
27 Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1977 
28 Conaghan and Mansell, The Wrongs of Tort at 74.  As Conaghan & Mansell, however, point 
out Horwitz was not the first author to make this connection (id). 
29 Ibid at 72  
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I feel that an application of Foucault’s archaeological method adds a perspective 
to historical understandings of law not evident in the above two types of legal 
history. The application of the method, as understood in this project, examines 
the law from within the law in a manner distinct from the histories of Winfield. 
In addition, the use of the method in this thesis provides a description of change 
that does not require outside explanations or motivations for change, as is the 
case in histories such as those of Horwitz. 
 
In the understanding of the archaeological method adopted in this project the 
processes of the law itself are “responsible” for change and there is a movement 
away from the law as being represented as a series of “marker cases”. Past cases 
are not seen as being represented by a single ratio and the statements in the 
decisions are given at least a legal context. This legal context is the statements 
of law put forward by counsel in legal argument. Therefore, the history of law 
developed in this thesis is a more inclusive history in that it recognises the 
importance of other members of the legal profession other than judges. 
 
One particular feature of the use of the method developed here is that there is an 
explicit method being used. In most histories of law there is not an explicit 
engagement with a particular historical method.
30 The legal past is read in a 
manner considered appropriate by the historian without a discussion of the 
processes and assumptions involved in the reading. As a result, there is no 
consideration of how the manner of construction of the subject matter of the 
history, and the unarticulated method, affect the narrative produced by the legal 
                                                 
30 It would be impossible to undertake a complete literature review of legal histories to explore 
the use of articulated historical methods. Anecdotally, however, I attended the British Legal 
History Conference in Aberystwyth, Wales in 2001. My presentation was the only one that 
engaged with historical methods. In a later conversation, another attendee questioned the need, 
or purpose, of the explicit use of a historical method (conversation with Steve Hedley, Reader in 
Law at Cambridge University, 8 July 2001).  
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historian. The understanding of the discursive construction of lawyers, judges 
and the common law contained in this project is necessary to the use of the 
archaeological method as presented here. This discursive understanding also 
enables the application of other Foucaultian ideas to a discourse in action in a 
manner that may not have been attempted before.
31 
 
Another feature of applications of Foucaultian histories is that they are problem-
based. ‘Foucault’s approach to history is to select a problem rather than a 
historical period for investigation’.
32 This is true of application of Foucaultian 
methods to law. The purpose of the methods is not to describe how the past was 
but to produce an answer to a posed problem. In this manner they can be known 
as “histories of the present”. For example, the purpose of the application of the 
archaeological method in this thesis can be seen as attempting an answer to the 
problem of “how did a particular 1972 decision get to be decided in the manner 
it was”. The focus of the application, then, is not on the description of 
negligence law, or its antecedents, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
However, the description of law from that period is more complete than the 
ratio-based understanding that is included in the practice of law and in many 
legal histories. In addition, the manner in which this project is set out is 
designed to highlight the way the archaeological method, as opposed to a 
“traditional” legal history, deals with this change. 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 For example, the use of “resistance” and the intersection of discursive practices in legal 
argument by counsel and the application of the techniques of discursive control outlined by 
Foucault in ‘The Order of Discourse’, in Young, R. (ed) Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist 
Reader, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Boston, 1981. These Foucaultian ideas will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 2. 
32 Kendall and Wickham, Using Foucault’s Methods at 22, emphasis in original.  
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THE STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS 
 
This project is an application of the archaeological method to a set of decisions 
of the English common law between 1750 and 1972. The key points of the 
method were highlighted above, but before the cases themselves can be 
excavated the method has to be more fully explained. Before the characteristics 
of the method can be discussed, the law, its operation and its operators must be 
examined. In order that the law and the legal profession are seen from the 
appropriate perspective, the framework upon which that perspective is 
supported has to be described. This is the sequence (in reverse) that this thesis 
follows.  
 
There are two Parts to this thesis. The first, comprised of Chapters One and 
Two, provides the theoretical structure for the archaeology that forms the bulk 
of Part Two. Chapter One, “Post-structuralist Framework for Application of the 
Archaeological Method”, includes the theoretical grounding for this project. 
Broadly, the thesis is constructed upon a post-structuralist framework. Such a 
term needs explanation, as it can be, and is, interpreted very widely. This 
chapter, therefore, is largely stipulative. As this thesis operates within a 
discursive understanding of society, the use of terms such as “discourse”, 
“discursive formation” and “discursive practice” will be discussed, as will be 
the relationship between these concepts.  
 
These ideas are central to the understanding of the legal profession that I 
describe in this thesis. These concepts denote the relationships between 
individuals, the words they use and the behaviours they exhibit. The words and 
practices limit the behaviours and actions of the individuals, and the individuals 
repeat the words and actions that construct their behaviour. These relationships  
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are known within this discursive understanding as the processes of 
“subjectification”. Discursive functions (discourses, discursive formations and 
discursive practices are examples of discursive functions) act upon, and 
constitute, the subjects of discourses. It is in Chapter One that the processes of 
subjectification will be explained in order to show how the eighteenth century 
judges “saw” the citizens that came before them differently from the manner in 
which late twentieth century citizens were “seen” by the judges they appeared 
before. 
 
Also discussed in the first chapter are the processes and possibilities of 
discursive change. As the law is here understood to be both continuous and 
discontinuous, it is necessary to understand the mechanisms by which 
discourses and discursive formations can change while maintaining their 
validity. Briefly, discursive change is brought about by the interaction of 
discursive practices and discursive subjects. Therefore, the processes of 
subjectification are integral to discursive change. The details of how such 
change can, and does, occur will be examined here.  
 
The second chapter, “A Foucaultian Understanding of Law as Object for the 
Archaeological Method”, considers the theoretical concepts discussed in 
Chapter One in terms of the law and the legal profession. This will produce the 
necessary understanding of judges and their actions for the following 
application of the archaeological method. There are many ways in which the 
law and those who produce the law can be seen, as the large body of 
jurisprudential writing over the centuries attests. The archaeological method, 
however, requires a specific understanding of the relationship between the law, 
the legal profession and the legal practices that construct both categories. 
  
 
25
The second chapter includes a description of an understanding of the law that 
highlights the practices that, in the past, have allowed judges to produce the 
decisions in the manner that they do. Certain behaviours must be central to the 
training of lawyers and judges for the law to function through the repetition of 
past legal statements. It is these behaviours, these legal practices, that will be 
the focus of this chapter. There is also a brief discussion of the law as discourse 
and a history of the legal profession that emphasises its role as a self-educating, 
self-perpetuating, independent institution. I must stress that these “histories” are 
not exhaustive, but will be indicative of the various practices that constitute 
practitioners of the law and the law itself. Those practices that construct 
members of the legal profession perpetuate the legal profession, as the lawyers 
and judges repeat these practices in their legal activities. The repetition of the 
practices, in turn, forms the training of the next generation of the profession.  
 
The practices that relate to the written nature of the law are of particular 
importance in this chapter and for the thesis as a whole. The focus of the project 
is the analysis of judicial decisions. The practices that relate to the production of 
such decisions are central, therefore, to the understanding of the law and judges 
used in the thesis. The practice of repeating of past legal statements and the way 
in which this practice contributes to change in the law will round out the 
discussion in Part One. 
 
The second Part, Chapters Three to Six, is devoted to the application of the 
archaeological method to a set of negligence decisions. The first of these 
chapters is a more detailed discussion of the archaeological method. Chapter 
Three, therefore, includes a description of the method in abstract and a 
discussion of the characteristics of the analyses that might arise from the use of 
the method. The last section of the chapter will be an explanation of the  
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specifics of the application of the method to a set of legal practices or judicial 
decisions. This will include a discussion of the reception of judgments from 
other jurisdictions into the English system and the manner in which the cases to 
be examined in this thesis were selected. 
 
Briefly, the technique for selecting judgments for inclusion in this project also 
reflects the archaeological method. This “reflection” is based on two factors. 
First, it is understood that all statements in a discourse are connected and that 
one of the purposes of an archaeology can be to expose and discuss the 
relationship between statements. Second, the documents, the decisions, are 
taken at face value and treated as monuments of the discourse. The connection 
between these two factors is that the choice of cases examined in this thesis 
privileges the cases that are highlighted in judgments of judges. The choice of 
cases is based on the cited decisions used by judges in presenting their 
judgments. The choice of cases, however, is not limited to the decisions that a 
judge “affirms”, the process of choosing equally privileges the decisions a judge 
“distinguishes”, or disagrees with. 
 
One case was chosen to be the final decision to be examined in the project.
33 
This case is British Railways Board v Herrington.
34 Once this decision was 
selected, the cases that were cited in the five written judgments were, in turn 
examined, that is, all the precedents cited in British Railways Board v 
Herrington were examined, and the cases cited in the precedents in the 
judgments cited in British Railways Board v Herrington were also read and the 
precedents cited therein were examined. These decisions were read and the 
precedents noted. There was no categorisation of the cases into those cited by 
                                                 
33 The parameters of this choice were that decision had to be from a court of review, in the area 
of negligence law, and close in time to the end of the period covered by this thesis. 
34 [1972] AC 877  
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majority judges or those cited by minority judges. Also, there was no 
classification into precedents that were distinguished or affirmed. The names of 
the cases were taken at “face value” and the cases examined. This process was 
continued until the chain extended beyond 1750, the starting point for the 
archaeology presented in this thesis. The result of this process was a “web of 
decisions” that can be seen as associated with British Railways Board v 
Herrington. 
 
This method of selection was chosen in an attempt to “problematise the 
continuity” that is assumed in the training and practice of law today. As was 
noted above, there is a tendency to consider the change that is evident in the law 
over the past centuries to be a form of “development” or “evolution”. The 
intention behind the method of case selection in this thesis is to show that there 
is discontinuity behind this appearance of continuous “progress” in the law. 
That is, even in a “chain of precedents” that “leads” to a particular case there are 
multiple articulations of the law. There is no necessary development in the law. 
The judges perform the function of judges as they are trained to perform it. It is 
this consistency in practice and the use of previous statements of law that can be 
seen to allow for the change that becomes evident over time. 
 
In addition, the choice to focus on the web of decisions of a single case is an 
attempt to display some of the benefits of the archaeological method as 
understood in this thesis. According to Kendall and Wickham, a ‘good 
Foucaultian use of history’ involves the ‘suspension of… second-order 
judgments’.
35 To describe a history of “negligence” or the “duty of care” 
involves a judgment regarding the category of law of which a particular 
decision is a part. Therefore, it would seem more appropriate to apply the 
                                                 
35 Using Foucault’s Methods at 13   
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archaeological method to a series of documents that are not solely chosen on the 
basis of such a “second-order” judgment. The technique of selection for the 
decisions examined in this thesis was to limit the cases excavated to those in a 
series of decisions limited by a single case, rather than an arbitrary category.
36 
 
Chapters Four, Five and Six are the chapters in which the archaeology takes 
place. The format to be followed in these chapters reflects the priorities of the 
method. Each chapter will explore a number of judgments in detail. Primacy is 
given to the words of the constructed subjects of the profession, the judges, in 
these examinations. The opinions of each of the judges are examined 
individually. The specific words of all the judges are equally important. In 
addition, the words of counsel who appear before the judges and who put 
forward legal statements for repetition will also be examined because the 
statements counsel repeat in argument contribute to the statements repeated by 
judges in their judgments. Only after each judgment is fully explored are the 
similarities and differences with respect to the construction of the liability and 
the legal perception of the defendants highlighted. 
 
The grouping of the excavated judgments into the chapters also reflects the 
requirements of the archaeological method as understood in this project. As 
highlighted above, the application of the archaeological method includes an 
attempt to move away from a history of law as a series of “marker cases”. That 
is, in the understanding of legal change developed here, each decision is a site 
                                                 
36 I acknowledge, however, that of all the decisions (there are over 1000) contained in the “web 
of decisions” associated with British Railways Board v Herrington, one method of selection for 
inclusion in this project was that the decision related to inter-personal relationships of liability. 
That is, the primary selection criterion for inclusion was that a decision was in the “web”, 
however, one of the secondary criteria was that any decision would be considered to be part of 
“negligence law”. Given the number of decisions in the “web” and the fact that many judgments 
are not limited to single legal issue, many of the decisions in the “web” can be considered to be 
part of contract, probate or even admiralty law.  
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of both continuity and discontinuity in law. Therefore, every case is equally 
valid in terms of a description of the “legal past”. In can be seen, in this 
perspective, that either every case is a “turning-point” in law or there are no 
turning points in this history of law. As a result, the application of the method is 
broken into three periods that are not delimited by marker cases. The periods in 
Chapters Four to Six are arbitrarily categorised according to the date. That is, 
Chapter Four includes the eighteenth century cases, Chapter Five the nineteenth 
century cases and Chapter Six the twentieth century cases. 
 
This categorisation according to date, however, raises another concern. I 
recognise that to undertake the examination of the cases in chronological order 
increases the appearance of “continuity” or “evolution” in this “history” of the 
articulation of liability. I recognise that this is a risk given that one of the 
purposes of the archaeological method is to problematise standard histories. 
There are three reasons for the sequence that I have chosen. First, there has to 
be an order to the presentation of the cases. Any other ordering would have 
required a level of justification for the choice of order and there is no “right” 
order for an application of the archaeological method, as I understand it. 
Second, the order I have chosen seeks to give back the temporality of decisions 
that is missing in the use of cases in the law. The judgments were written at the 
time they are written. The judgments are not just a “resource” for twenty-first 
century legal argument or historical analysis.  
 
The third reason for the order I have presented is that one of the goals of the 
application of the method in this thesis is the privileging of discontinuity within 
apparent continuity. There was not a smooth transition from one form of 
articulation to another, particularly in the nineteenth century. There were 
changes and there were repetitions of earlier statements of liability. This  
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becomes more apparent if the chronological order of the decisions is 
highlighted. The analysis at the end of each chapter does not continue with the 
strict chronological ordering, it is only the transcription of the statements from 
the cases that is presented in a sequence that reflects the years that the cases 
were decided. 
 
Chapter Four covers the cases decided in the latter half of the eighteenth 
century. 1750 was chosen as the starting point as it is after the legal profession 
had gained its independence from the Crown. The legal practices of the time 
also meant that decisions were recorded regularly and in English. As the legal 
practices and procedures of the eighteenth century are less familiar to 
contemporary readers, I have provided a brief discussion of the writs and forms 
that are of interest for this project. The writs that were the forerunners to the 
modern tort of negligence were those of action on the case and trespass. The 
majority of the cases discussed in Chapter Four are founded on either a writ of 
trespass or case. 
 
Both of these writs relate to the responsibilities owed by particular legal 
subjects to others in the community. The writs, therefore, describe and limit the 
liability to injured parties of particular categories of legal subjects. Judicial 
decisions based on either of those writs, therefore, provide examples of the legal 
perception of particular classes of legal subjects as defendants. The judgments 
based on these writs demonstrate the legal construction of the legal subjects of 
that period as, in Foucault’s sense of the word, feudal.
37 The defendants who 
came before the court were categorised according to their station in life. If they 
were a member of a particular vocation or profession, then they were legally 
                                                 
37 “Governmentality”, in Burchell, G. et al (eds), The Foucault Effect - Studies in 
Governmentality, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1991. These terms, and Foucault’s discussion 
will be examined more closely in Section III of Chapter One of this thesis.  
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obliged to live up to the responsibilities of that vocation or profession. They 
were held legally liable if they failed in those responsibilities. However, if the 
defendant did not belong to such a category of legal subjects, the judges could 
not “see” them as being liable for any damage suffered by the plaintiff. 
 
Chapter Five covers the cases decided in the nineteenth century. The decisions 
examined in this chapter include discussions by the judges of the changing 
boundaries of the legal recognition of liability. That is, the judges do not limit 
themselves to the language of the perception of defendants that was evident in 
the eighteenth century, but they also do not extend the perception of defendants, 
and therefore the scope of legal liability, beyond the boundaries that was 
evident at the start of the moment of change. 
 
After the beginning of the nineteenth century there is less evidence of the 
members of the legal profession “seeing” legal subjects along feudal lines. The 
members of the profession, however, did not construct legal subjects in a 
manner that we might call modern. In this chapter it will just be shown that the 
judges of that time used different statements to the eighteenth century judges to 
determine and limit liability. The findings in terms of liability were not 
necessarily different to the earlier findings, but the articulations of liability were 
different. 
 
The process of change that is evident in the decisions in Chapter Five can be 
seen as the repetition of previous legal statements. In each judgment the judges 
refer to the words of earlier judgments and use them as the reasons for their 
decisions. The judges are not calling these previous statements the ratios of the 
earlier decisions. The judges are just quoting, or using, the phrases that they are  
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trained to repeat in the writing of their judgments. It is these repeated statements 
that will be highlighted, particularly in Chapter Five. 
 
Chapter Six is the application of the method to the cases decided in the 
twentieth century up until 1972. 1972 is the time of nominal removal of the 
independence of the English judiciary. It was in that year that a further avenue 
of appeal beyond the House of Lords was provided for English legal subjects. 
That is, under certain circumstances, if an English legal subject was dissatisfied 
with the legal statements of the Law Lords they could take their case to the 
European Court of Justice. 
 
The twentieth century articulations of liability suggest a shift to the construction 
of English legal subjects as “modern” subjects, in the sense that Foucault 
considers subjects to be modern. Judges no longer constructed the community 
as being made up of subjects who acted according to their station in life. Legal 
subjects were held to the standard of the “reasonable man”,
38 with this standard 
modified to reflect the particular demands of the knowledge and expertise of the 
particular defendant. That is, a wider group of subjects were “seen” by the 
profession as being potentially liable for damage done by their acts or 
omissions. 
 
The above reference to “feudal” articulations of liability in the eighteenth 
century and “modern” articulations in the twentieth is not meant to suggest that 
the turns of these centuries represented, or produced, changes in articulations. 
The descriptions of “feudal” and “modern” are general labels that can be 
ascribed to a number of decisions in all three centuries to varying degrees. The 
                                                 
38 The construction of the “reasonable man”, and its gendered nature, will be discussed in 
Chapter Two.  
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focus of this thesis, however, is on the application of the archaeological method 
and not on the production of arbitrary categories. 
 
The Conclusion of the thesis, after the archaeological excavations of Chapters 
Four to Six, draws together the differences in the articulations of liability that 
are evident over the three periods. The Conclusion discussed the changes that 
have taken place and the processes by which those changes took place. The 
English common law has maintained its integrity whilst reflecting both 
continuity and discontinuity. The law has fundamentally stayed the same, as the 
predominant legal practice is still the repetition of previous legal statements. 
The law has changed through this process of repetition. The change that is 
evident in the area of negligence law between 1750 and 1972 is the different 
ways in which the judges “see” the defendants that come before them. 
 
This is the result of the application of the archaeological method to legal 
judgments. The effectiveness of the application will also be discussed in the 
Conclusion of this project. That is, the differences, or similarities, between the 
application of the method, as understood in this thesis, and the narratives in 
other, more traditional, legal histories will be highlighted. Foucault’s own use of 
his methods produced challenging histories, the distinctiveness of the history 
produced in this thesis will be discussed as part of the process of assessing the 
value of Foucault’s work, or at least as I understand it, to the study of law.  
 
The application of method is only possible where the members of the legal 
profession, and the legal subjects in the wider community, are seen as subjects 
constructed by the practices that constitute their training. That is, the changes in 
the law are explained by the internal workings of a group of specifically trained 
people who are engaged in the process of perpetuating and regulating the  
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practices of both the legal profession and, what might be called, the discourses 
of governance. It is the processes of subjectification and the discussion of the 
post-structuralist notions of discourse, discursive formation and discursive 
practice that will be found in the first chapter of Part One of this thesis. 
 
It is the application of Foucault’s archaeological method that will follow in Part 
Two that represents the contribution of this project to the field of Foucaultian 
scholarship. There has not been an application of this method to a “discourse in 
action” before. Applying the method to the law as a “discourse in action” adds 
to the understanding of the law and the way that it operates in society. The use 
of the method illustrates how the law changes through the repetition of past 
legal statements. It is through the practices of repetition, an integral part of the 
training of judges and lawyers, that the law can change without losing its 
legitimacy.  
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PART ONE 
 
This Part provides the theoretical groundwork for the application of Foucault’s 
archaeological method that follows in Part Two. There are two significant aims for 
this thesis, and, in a sense, each of the two chapters in this Part provide the 
intellectual basis for one of these aims. That is, Chapter One includes a description 
of the post-structuralist ideas that support the archaeological method itself. Chapter 
Two includes a description of the law and the legal profession that highlights the 
characteristics of the law and the legal profession that makes sense of the 
application of the archaeological method. It is the application of the method to the 
judicial decisions that illustrates the second purpose of the project, a description of 
the law as changing through the repetition of past legal statements. 
 
The bulk of the material in this Part is a discussion of the legal profession and its 
relationship with the law. The law is seen as the sum of the legal judgments 
produced by judges trained to reproduce the law in particular ways. Therefore, this 
Part includes a description of the law as the legal documents that are produced by 
the members of the profession. This description focuses on the legal practices that 
produce both the judgments and the members of the profession (through the 
processes of subjectification). In order for the archaeological method to be 
understood and applied to legal documents, the judgments and the judges who 
wrote them have to be considered from a specific perspective.  
 
The description of the law contained in this thesis entails a more complex 
understanding of the role and the training of lawyers and judges than is usual. It is 
the construction of the profession, the legal discursive formation, as a self- 
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regulating, self-perpetuating system of practices that makes it possible to apply the 
archaeological method to legal judgments. This Part provides the theoretical 
background for such a construction and illustrates this perspective with a 
description of some of the key practices of the profession. 
 
This analysis of the legal profession is based on an understanding of lawyers and 
judges as products of their legal training. Their training constructs them to be 
subjects of the legal discursive formation. That is, legal practitioners, when they are 
acting as members of the profession, act in accordance with their training. From 
this perspective, lawyers and judges are not taken to be mindless automatons, but as 
professionals who are provided with a choice of allowed actions in each legal 
situation and are authorised by their training to choose from these allowed actions. 
This understanding is based in discourse theory, a category of post-structuralist 
theory. The first chapter in this Part provides an introduction to post-structuralist 
theory in general and discourse theory in particular.  
 
Chapter One focuses on the terminology of discourse theory that will be used in the 
remainder of the thesis and explores the mechanisms of allowable discursive 
change. The theory has a particular lexicon which helps to limit unhelpful 
interpretations of more common words. Words such as “discourse” have a variety 
of meanings in common usage. For a project like this, however, there needs to be a 
specific discussion of key words, like “discourse”, in order to be clear about their 
specific use and meaning in the remainder of this thesis.  
 
The specifics of the processes of discursive change are an area of the general theory 
not often considered. For a discourse to persist over time there have to be  
 
37
 
mechanisms that allow for change while maintaining the integrity of the discourse. 
All discourses that exist in our society must include practices that allow for such 
change. In order to give an account of the workings of a discourse in society, the 
theory must engage with the conditions and possibilities of change. This will be 
done in the last section of the first chapter. 
 
The archaeological method, as applied to the law in this thesis, excavates 
judgments written by judges. That is, my use of the method relies on the 
construction of legal decisions as monuments of the legal discourse. It is important, 
in this project, to establish the precise relationship between the judgments, the 
judges and the legal discourse as a whole. It is the discussion of these relationships 
that is the purpose of this Part. Chapter One is a discussion of the relationships in 
abstract, Chapter Two is a discussion in terms of the specific practices of the law 
and the legal profession. 
 
The focus of Chapter Two will be on the way that legal practitioners have been 
constructed by various legal practices to act as members of the profession. The 
chapter includes a history of the discursive formation that traces some of the key 
aspects of legal training and legal conduct. This history is not exhaustive but 
highlights the important practices that have been passed down through the years 
from legal generation to legal generation. I am not the first to consider the law as a 
discourse and to “prove” the discursive nature of the law is beyond the scope of a 
project of this size. I am indebted to authors such as Peter Goodrich for their work 
in this area. The examples I provide in Chapter Two are only intended to draw 
attention to the legal discursive practices that illustrate the relationship between 
judges and the judgments they write.  
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One of the most fundamental of such practices is the repetition of past legal 
statements. This practice extends further than an application of the doctrine of 
precedent, which is generally held to be only a tool of the profession. For the 
purposes of this thesis a broader practice of repetition is considered to be 
fundamental to the construction and perpetuation of the law and legal profession. 
The authorised use of previous legal statements helps create the hierarchical 
character of the discursive formation. The authorised use of previous statements is 
also the pre-eminent technique for discursive change within the law. The law is 
reproduced on a case by case basis, the law changes on a case by case basis. The 
practice of repetition of past legal statements is the mechanism through which both 
legal reproduction and legal change occur. The practice of repetition, therefore, is 
central to the processes of continuity and discontinuity in the law.  
 
An in depth discussion of the practice of repetition rounds out Chapter Two and 
Part One. The bulk of Part Two is the archaeological excavation itself. The 
discussion of the repetition of past legal statements provides the understanding of 
the law necessary for this application of the archaeological method to the law. The 
discussion of the repetition of past legal statements explains the relationship 
between the judgments and the judges who wrote them that will be central to the 
analysis conducted in this thesis. It is the practice of the repetition of past legal 
statements that is at the heart of the analysis of the judgments included in Chapters 
Four, Five and Six of this project.  
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CHAPTER ONE - POST-STRUCTURALIST FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
APPLICATION OF THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL METHOD 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The understanding of post-structuralism upon which this application of the 
archaeological method to the law is set out in this chapter. The discussion of 
discourse theory in general will explain the way that concepts will be used in the 
analysis of the legal profession that is to follow. The understanding of the 
profession applied in this thesis comes from the broad area of post-structuralism, 
and the first section of this chapter will identify themes and interpretations used in 
this thesis. The second section will develop this understanding and detail the 
understanding of basic concepts that arise from post-structuralism that will be used 
in the remainder of the thesis. These are “discourse”, “discursive formation” and 
“discursive practice”. The relationship between these concepts will be explored in 
order to develop a background against which to map the changes in the judicial 
decisions that make up this application of the archaeological method.  
 
The third section will discuss the processes of subjectification, the manner in which 
discourses, discursive formations and discursive practices construct human subjects 
and their behaviours. The construction of subjects is important, as it relates to this 
understanding of the training of lawyers and judges. The final section of this 
chapter details one way in which discourses can change over time. As the 
archaeological method is a form of historical analysis there is a need for an 
understanding of the mechanisms that allow for discursive change. The changes in 
the judgments between 1750 and 1972 demonstrated in this project illustrate the 
mechanism of change discussed in this chapter.  
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POST-STRUCTURALIST THEORY 
 
“Post-structuralism” is a broad, and unfortunately for me, ill-defined area of theory. 
This section provides a general description of the use of the term that is specific to 
this project. In this section, the work of two French theorists, Derrida and Foucault, 
will be considered. This will not be a complete account of the ideas of either of 
these theorists. It can only be a small sample of some of the key ideas that inform 
their work and are relevant to this thesis. The interpretation of the texts that are 
referred to in this project present one version of a Foucaultian analysis for which 
the ideas of Derrida have proved useful. That is, the thesis will use some of their 
concepts and understandings, but is not intended as a complete and definitive 
reading of either body of work. Three readings will be examined in this section, 
one by Derrida and two by Foucault.  
 
Another French theorist, Lyotard, described the ‘post-modern as incredulity toward 
metanarratives’.
1 While the relationship between post-modernism and post-
structuralism has never been clear, this sentiment is shared by most writers in both 
traditions. Post-structuralists and post-modernists refuse to accept as legitimate 
totalising theories that cover all aspects of human behaviour and institutions. In its 
place, there is, in Derrida’s words, an acceptance of the ‘irreducible singularity of 
each situation’.
2 All the “metanarratives” that have constructed society in the past, 
such as “democracy” or “capitalism”, are no longer considered to be either self-
evident or based on anything solid. The ‘origin of authority, the foundation or 
                                                 
1 The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 
1984 at xxiv 
2 ‘Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”’ in Cornell, Drucilla et al (eds), 
Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, Routledge, New York, 1992 at 51  
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ground… can’t by definition rest on anything but themselves’.
3 There is no Truth 
upon which to found such meta-narratives in a post-structuralist view of the world. 
 
Post-structuralists focus on the internal nature of what it is to be human, they focus 
on the questioning of the ‘boundaries that institute the human subject’.
4 However, 
for them, there is no absolute Truth. There are no metanarratives that relate to that 
which is central to “being human” that can be taken at face value. Human nature is 
not a given, it is an object of investigation. All behaviours are also “irreducibly 
singular”.  
 
With this lack of certainty as to the nature of the world, any post-structuralist 
endeavour reflects the desires of the inquirer. As such, these projects are neither 
neutral nor objective. Foucault provided a brief summary of some of the aims of 
post-structuralist writers in his preface to Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus.
5 
The context of Foucault’s piece, in relation to Deleuze and Guattari’s text, 
highlights one of the central principles of post-structuralism. That is, Foucault 
provides a description of the authors’ work. Foucault’s preface is a commentary on 
their work with his own, subjective, analysis clearly labelled as such.
6 As in the 
relationship between a preface and the text, post-structuralism can be understood to 
be a subjective commentary on the “objective” structures of human behaviour. 
Post-structuralism can be taken to be a privileging of subjective analyses over 
objective metanarratives. 
 
                                                 
3 Ibid at 14 
4 Ibid at 19 
5 Anti-Oedipus – Capitalism and Schizophrenia, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1983 
6 Foucault refers to himself with the use of the pronoun “I” no less than five times in the three pages 
of text.  
 
42 
 
Foucault’s post-structuralism, as defined by the ‘principles’ he highlights in the 
preface, can be seen to function at a political level. His ‘principles’ include the 
development of ‘action, thought, and desires by proliferation, juxtaposition, and 
disjunction’ and the withdrawal of ‘allegiance from the old categories of the 
Negative, which Western thought has so long held sacred’. He also encouraged the 
preference for ‘what is positive and multiple, difference over uniformity, flows 
over unities’. For the purposes of the understanding of the post-structuralism 
adopted within this thesis, the two most important principles are ‘Do not use 
thought to ground a political practice in Truth’ and ‘Do not demand of politics that 
it restore the “rights” of the individual… The individual is the product of power. 
What is needed is to “de-individualise” by means of multiplication and 
displacement, diverse combinations’.
7 
 
Post-structuralism can be seen to have two starting points. First, that there is no 
absolute groundings for the state and conduct of the society and, second, that there 
can be no assumption that there is such a thing as a person who exists prior to the 
action upon them of the practices and disciplines of society. There are multiple 
bodies, both physical and abstract, in many “diverse combinations” that produce 
the world. For Foucault, post-structuralists seek to describe the world favouring 
patterns of “proliferation, juxtaposition, and disjunction”, and prefer “what is 
positive and multiple, difference over uniformity, flows over unities”. Given this 
preference for multiplicity, there can be no single description of even post-
structuralism itself. There can be only individual perspectives on what post-
structuralism can mean, such as the one contained in this section, that are adopted 
for a specific purpose. 
                                                 
7 Ibid at xiii-xiv  
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A further discussion of post-structuralist thought can be found in Foucault’s piece, 
“Truth and Power”.
8 Here, he discusses some of the ideas behind his projects. He 
refers to himself as an ‘anti-structuralist’ in that, in his conceptualisation of the 
distinction between “structure” and “event”, he recognises that it is ‘not a matter of 
locating everything on one level, that of the event, but of realising that there are 
actually a whole order of levels of different types of events differing in amplitude, 
chronological breadth, and capacity to produce effects’. There is no single structure 
that can account for the multiplicities and complexities of the events that constitute 
society. ‘History has no “meaning”, though this is not to say that it is absurd… it is 
intelligible and should be susceptible of analysis down to the smallest detail – but 
this is in accordance with the intelligibility of struggles, of strategies and tactics’.
9 
Events, and society as a whole, can be understood, therefore, in terms of such 
struggles, strategies and tactics. 
 
One category used by Foucault in his discussion of society is that of relationships 
of “power”. His notion of power is not necessarily negative. For him, power 
‘induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered 
as a productive network which runs through the whole social body’.
10 No longer is 
power seen simply as a manifestation of the metanarrative of coercive governance 
or of domination. The power relation positively, or productively, effects all parties 
connected by that relationship. This conception of society informs the processes of 
the subjectification of humans that will be addressed in section III. Society is 
produced by these relations of power. ‘The important thing here, I believe, is that 
                                                 
8 in Gordon, Colin, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and other Writings 1972 – 1977, 
Pantheon, New York, 1980 
9 Ibid at 114 
10 Ibid at 119  
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truth isn’t outside power, or lacking in power… Truth is a thing of this world… and 
it induces regular effects of power’.
11 It is inter-relationships such as this that are 
indicative of a post-structuralist approach.  
 
For post-structuralism is a body of perspectives. An ill-defined body perhaps, but 
one that encourages an author to disentangle herself or himself, at least as much as 
is possible, from the assumptions that construct much of twentieth and twenty-first 
century Western thought. Post-structuralism is useful as a tool in the interpretation 
of society because it stresses the lack of a necessary, defining structure that 
underpins the whole of society. There is no absolute Truth, either internal or 
external to the human subject, in post-structuralist theory. There is a lack of belief 
in metanarratives, on the part of post-structuralists, but there is an acceptance of the 
multiplicity of events and power relations that form the networks of society. This 
produces multiple perspectives, each with its own strengths and weaknesses, that, 
when considered together, enhance any understanding of society. 
 
DISCOURSES, DISCURSIVE FORMATIONS AND DISCURSIVE PRACTICES 
 
This section deals with the specifics of discourse theory as they are understood in 
this thesis. Discourse theory falls into the broad category of post-structuralist 
theory that was described in the previous section. This section provides the 
vocabulary necessary to consider both the processes of subjectification discussed in 
the next section and the understanding of the legal profession that will be presented 
in Chapter Two. In particular, there will be a discussion of the notion of 
“discourses” and related “discursive functions” as they are to be used in this 
                                                 
11 Ibid at 129  
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project. This section will present an understanding of the relationship between a 
broad, all-encompassing “discourse”, a narrower, but more defined, “discursive 
formation”, and the specific forms of control that are termed “discursive practices”. 
In simple terms, discursive formations are treated as sub-categories of a discourse, 
and discursive practices are taken to be functions of both discourses and discursive 
formations. Yet these relationships can be understood to be symbiotic. Discursive 
practices construct discursive formations which, in turn, construct discourses; and 
discourses construct discursive formations which, in turn, construct discursive 
practices.  
 
In a general sense, a discourse can be understood to refer to a body of statements. A 
textbook, therefore, is an example of a discourse. But the significance of such a 
work goes beyond that. For this thesis, “discourse” has a more specifically 
“powerful” meaning. As Foucault put it: 
 
Discourse – the mere fact of speaking, of employing words, of using 
the words of others (even if it means returning them), words that the 
others understand and accept (and, possibly, return from their side) – 
this fact is in itself a force. Discourse is, with respect to the relation 
of forces, not merely a surface of inscription, but something that 
brings about effects.
12 
More simply, Foucault described discourses as ‘practices that systematically form 
the objects of which they speak’.
13 For example, a textbook has a variety of 
functions as part of the wider discourse that is “the education system”. The book is 
used to bring about an effect in those who read it, with its purpose being to educate 
readers, to train them. Also, a textbook serves to provide limits to specific areas of 
the discourse. A physics textbook helps to define the boundaries between what is 
                                                 
12 Cited in Davidson, A., ‘Structures and Strategies of Discourse’ in Davidson, Arnold I. (ed), 
Foucault and his Interlocutors, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1997 at 4-5 
13 Archaeology of Knowledge at 49  
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physics and what is chemistry. A discourse, then, can be treated as a group of 
statements that describes the world, constructs the world and brings about effects in 
the world. In this understanding, within society as a whole there exist discourses 
which act upon individuals and affect their relationships with each other and with 
the world as a whole. Discourses can be seen as a system of speech acts and speech 
positions that, through their “effectiveness”, produce the world and the subjects 
within it. 
 
This understanding of discourse is still very broad. It can be, and is, used to 
characterise a broad range of speech positions, such as the medical discourse.
14 
However, it provides an insufficiently detailed picture when it comes to the 
different speech positions available within a single discourse. That is, although the 
practices and procedures of health maintenance can be seen as a discourse, it does 
not explain how this single discourse produces a multiplicity of speech positions. 
The Western medical discourse can be understood to be a cohesive body of 
statements used to describe the world, its inhabitants and the relationships between 
inhabitants. However, merely considering the medical profession as a discourse 
does not, in itself, describe how the single discourse produces two very broad, yet 
distinct, sub-categories – those who provide the care (doctors, nurses) and those 
who receive the care (patients). 
 
The training undertaken by members of these sub-categories of a discourse should 
also operate discursively, as the subjects of the sub-categories need to be educated 
by the dominant group of statements. For the purposes of this thesis, the procedures 
that produce these sub-groups can be classified as “discursive formations”. It is 
                                                 
14 Foucault examined medicine as a discourse in The Birth of the Clinic.  
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worth noting that this phrase is not unique to this project. Foucault seems to use the 
terms “discourse” and “discursive formation” interchangeably.
15 For his purposes, 
and in the general discussion of the roles of speech positions and statements in the 
world, this lack of specificity is unproblematic. However, a greater degree of 
specificity is useful for an in-depth examination of particular relationships between 
subjects in society. 
 
Discursive formations can be used to describe instances where there is a separable 
education process evident for an identifiable section of the subject population. Most 
professional bodies, particularly those where the industry is largely self-regulated 
(accountancy, medicine, and law), can be viewed as discursive formations. That is 
not to say that the members of these bodies function exclusively as subject of their 
discursive formation. For example, engineers and doctors can be understood to 
operate under the broad scientific discourse, and the rules of science form much of 
the rules of engineering and medicine. However, when individuals act as doctors or 
engineers, they use the skills and practices authorised and perpetuated by their 
professional group. 
 
For Hunt and Wickham, a discursive formation is a ‘system of more or less stable 
elements of discourse that are linked or associated’.
16 That is, within a discourse, 
there can be seen smaller discursive entities which display a degree of cohesion 
beyond the sum of common elements of the discourse as a whole. A discursive 
formation, in other words, might be said to exist where there is a body of actors and 
disciplined actions, and where these rules represents a system of control. 
                                                 
15 See for example, ‘History, Discourse and Discontinuity’ (1972) 20 Salmagundi 225 
16 Hunt, Alan, and Wickham, Gary, Foucault and Law – Towards a Sociology of Law as 
Governance, Pluto Press, London, 1994, at 9  
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For Foucault, a discursive formation exists wherever a grouping of statements can 
be described in terms of a ‘system of dispersion’.
17 As mentioned above, Foucault 
uses “discourse” and “discursive formation” interchangeably, however, the key 
point for this reading is “control by a form of dispersion”. This is the connection 
between discursive formations and discursive practices upon which this thesis is 
based. The structures and patterns of dispersion are taken to be the discursive 
practices that control, limit and perpetuate a discursive formation. In Foucault’s 
words, discursive practices are a ‘body of anonymous, historical rules, always 
determined in the time and space that have defined a given period’.
18 Discursive 
practices are the rules that represent the limits of the dispersion, ‘the rules that 
delimit the sayable’,
19 and can be understood as the limits of the “allowed” actions 
of members of the discursive formation. 
 
In his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France in 1970, Foucault discussed three 
modes of control that operate to regulate and perpetuate discourses. These 
categories of control, which are applicable to any discourse or discursive formation, 
are ‘those which limits its power, those which master its aleatory appearances, 
[and] those which carry out the selection among speaking subjects’.
20 That is, 
controls that are external, internal and those that are neither fully internal, nor fully 
external to the discursive formation.
21 The discursive practices that form a part of 
any discourse can be seen to operate as these modes of control. These practices 
regulate the behaviour of the subjects within the discursive formation. When 
                                                 
17 Archaeology of Knowledge at 38 
18 Ibid at 117 
19 Kendall and Wickham, Using Foucault’s Methods at 43 
20 Foucault, ‘The Order of Discourse’ at 62 
21 These discursive controls will be discussed in greater detail in the final section of Chapter Two 
where the legal practice of repetition of past legal statements will be analysed in terms of its 
constitutive role in the legal discursive formation.  
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training the next generation of subjects these subjects pass on the discursive 
practices they have been trained to apply and thereby perpetuate the formation. 
 
Not all discursive practices demonstrate the three modes of control equally. For 
example, some discursive practices may be mechanisms of exclusion, restricting 
access to the discursive formation. Other practices may act as a mechanism for 
exclusion and also as a form of restricting access within the formation. That is, 
these discursive practices will apply unequally within the formation, producing a 
differentiation, another mode of control, within it.  
 
It should be noted that the category of “external discursive control” does not, as its 
name may suggest, refer to control from outside the discourse, nor does it act on 
those outside the discourse. External discursive controls are controls that exclude 
others from the discourse. That is, any discursive practice can only contribute to the 
construction of subjects of the particular discursive formations of which the 
discursive practice is a part. Someone outside a discursive formation can not be 
subject to, or constructed by, any of its discursive practices. 
 
Discursive practices, then, can be understood to be techniques utilised by sections 
of the population to carry out, maintain and perpetuate their specific knowledges 
and procedures. This is not to deny the importance that the rest of the society may 
place on these practices. Most people would consider that there are many benefits 
that accrue from the practices of those in the medical profession. The use of 
specific apparatuses (equipment or methods) for diagnosis, for example, is 
considered to have saved many lives. But the fact that it takes specialised  
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knowledge to use, and interpret the results from, the equipment maintains subjects 
of the medical discursive formation as a distinct sub-category of the population. 
 
This thesis presents an understanding of the nature of the law. One of the 
interesting aspects of that nature for this project is the manner in which the law can 
change over the centuries while maintaining its legitimacy. In other words, one 
aspect of the project is the description of the legal mechanisms that allow the law to 
perpetuate itself whilst still being capable of change. This description is based on a 
perspective that entails a different understanding of its subjects, the members of the 
legal profession, from the understanding that is taught in most law schools. This 
perspective reflects a particular understanding of the relationship between the law 
and its subjects, and how this relationship is maintained over time. Central to this 
understanding are the discursive practices that perpetuate the law. The most 
important of these practices for this project are the use of past judgments in legal 
argument and the recording of judgments in a particular written form. These will be 
examined specifically in Chapter Two.  
 
An analysis of these practices provides a particular perspective on the legal 
discursive formation itself and the construction of legal subjects. As shall be seen 
in the next section, the symbiotic relationship between these three categories of 
discursive analysis can be further extended. Discourses, discursive formations and 
discursive practices can be taken to inform and construct those individuals who 
operate within the discursive functions and these subjects, in turn, inform, construct 
and perpetuate discourses. 
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PROCESSES OF SUBJECTIFICATION 
 
This section presents a theory of subjectification, or, the roles of discourses in the 
creation or construction of subjects. The constructed subjects relevant to this thesis 
are general legal subjects, or ordinary citizens, and the subjects of the legal 
discursive formation, or legal profession. To establish the understanding of the 
relationship between the law and the legal profession that is central to this thesis, it 
is necessary to consider the members of the legal profession as constructed 
subjects. The processes of construction of the members of the legal profession by 
the legal discursive practices are similar, in form but not content, as the processes 
of construction that create the subjects of the wider community.  
 
This understanding of the legal profession rests on the theory that an examination 
of the discursive practices that form the training of the members of the profession is 
the best way to “see” lawyers and judges. That is, to understand this 
characterisation of the law it is necessary to examine how legal practices construct 
the profession that perpetuates them. The section will discuss these processes of 
construction as they apply to all discourses before the specific forms of legal 
construction are undertaken in Chapter Two. The discussion will rely heavily on 
the work of Foucault but it remains a ‘rude appropriation of text-fragments’.
22  
 
At the heart of the theory of subjectification is the contention that ‘the self is not 
given to us’,
23 that there is no acting/speaking subject that exists prior to the effects 
                                                 
22 Kennedy, Duncan, ‘The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault!’ (1991) 15 Legal Studies Forum, 
327 at 327 
23 Foucault, ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress’ in Dreyfus, Hubert L. 
and Rabinow, Paul, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1983 at 237  
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of discourses. But, ‘it is not enough to say that the subject is constituted in a 
symbolic system. It is not just in the play of symbols that the subject is constituted. 
It is constituted in real practices – historically analysable practices’.
24 The 
discursive practices of a given discourse, or discursive formation, can be 
understood to produce the permitted actions for the subjects of the discourse. These 
discursive practices act as norms of behaviour. These practices are not to be 
understood as commands from a higher authority. Instead they can be understood to 
operate as accepted and internalised patterns of action. These discursive practices 
are accepted, in this understanding, because they produce subjects who are 
constituted to accept them.  
 
These discourses and discursive practices are understood to operate throughout 
society. Each citizen, from this perspective, is constructed to behave according to 
internalised forms of behaviour. These practices are maintained, in part, because 
citizens know they are supposed to abide by them. In society, 
 
under the surface of images, one invests bodies in depth; behind the 
great abstraction of exchange, there continues the meticulous, concrete 
training of useful forces; the circuits of communication are the supports 
of an accumulation and a centralisation of knowledge; the play of signs 
defines the anchorages of power; it is not that the beautiful totality of 
the individual is amputated, repressed, altered by our social order, it is 
rather that the individual is carefully fabricated in it, according to a 
whole technique of forces and bodies.
25 
For Foucault, no individual exists prior to discursive inscription, for ‘discursive 
formations produce the object about which they speak’.
26 This is done through the 
web of power relations that permeate society, through the multiplicity of 
interpersonal relationships that exist in the rearing of children and adults. From this 
                                                 
24 Ibid at 250 
25 Foucault, Discipline and Punish at 217 
26 cited in Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics at 61  
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perspective, the mechanisms of discursive control ‘homogenise populations 
through knowledge, separation, observation, and experiment, but do so only by 
“individualising” people in cells and classroom desks, by examination and 
experimentation’.
27  
 
Foucault was interested ‘in the interaction between oneself and others and in the 
technologies of individual domination, the history of how an individual acts upon 
himself [sic] in the technology of self’.
28 Those of us who have been trained as 
students and patients, for example, actively participate in the discourses of 
education and medicine. That is, through our training as students and patients we 
behave as we should and in this way perpetuate these discourses. The practices 
necessary to learn, to control ourselves in the name of our own health (whether in 
the short term suffering the “indignities” of medical examination, or the longer 
term, healthy living patterns) are instilled in us for our own good. Western subjects 
have internalised the medical and educational discourses through a variety of 
means, including interpersonal interactions with teachers, doctors and other 
members of the discourses. That is, subjects are embedded in a web of power 
relations, a skein that is epitomised in the ‘equivocal nature of the term “conduct”. 
For to “conduct” is at the same time to “lead” others… and a way of behaving’.
29 In 
other words, ‘the myriad of bodies which are constituted as… subjects [are] as a 
                                                 
27 Bove, Paul, A., ‘The End of Humanism: Michel Foucault and the Power of Disciplines’ (1980) 3 
Humanities in Society 23 at 29 
28 Foucault, ‘Technologies of the Self’ in Martin, Luther H., Gutman, Huck and Hutton, Patrick, H. 
(eds), Technologies of the Self – A Seminar with Michel Foucault, University of Massachusetts 
Press, Amherst, 1988 at 19 
29 Foucault, ‘Afterword – The Subject and Power’ in Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault: 
Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics at 220  
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result of the effects of power’.
30 That is, in this understanding of society, power 
produces the subject. 
 
It is this connection between knowledge and power that is a central feature of 
contemporary Western culture. Teachers are given the “power” to train children 
through the transmission of knowledges. These knowledges include reading and 
writing and they include knowledges of behaviour within society. Doctors have the 
“power” to direct patients through the specialised knowledge they have been given 
in their training. ‘For power-knowledge produces “norms” against which specialists 
measure “individuals”. In fact, the very power of the representations of “normalcy” 
makes “individuals” conform to and thereby reinforce and replicate these 
“norms”’.
31 
 
This use of norms, as a system of both societal and self-governance, is fundamental 
to Foucault’s understanding of modern Western culture. He described his notion of 
governmentality, the predominant form of governance today, as meaning, in part: 
 
The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and 
reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this 
very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target 
population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, 
and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security. The 
tendency which, over a long period of time and throughout the West, 
has steadily led towards the pre-eminence over all other forms 
(sovereignty, discipline, etc.) of this type of power which may be 
termed government, resulting, on the one hand, in the formation of a 
whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, 
in the development of a whole complex of savoirs.
32 
                                                 
30 Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’ in Gordon, Power/Knowledge at 98 
31 Bove, ‘The End of Humanism’ at 29 
32 Foucault, ‘Governmentality’ at 102-103  
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Governmentality can be understood as the governance of the whole, through the 
internalised control and discursive constitution of the individual, for the benefit of 
the whole. The above quotation uses the translated term “security”. This has been 
otherwise translated by Hunt and Wickham as “welfare”.
33 Their interpretation is 
useful as it helps to convey a sense of the multifarious institutions, practices and 
tactics that protect and provide for the physical, spiritual and civic health of the 
target population. Welfare, from this perspective, reflects the duty of the state to 
protect and to provide good order for the population. 
 
A “population”, in this form of analysis, can be the entire body of citizens of a 
nation-state (constructed to be “British” or “Australian”), or a smaller body of 
people, such as the members of a particular educational discourse. The central point 
of this use of the term “population” is that there is a separable body of subjects
34 
that is constructed and transformed by the institutions and practices of a particular 
discourse. This separable body of subjects is “knowable” and can be the target of 
inquiry. In this thesis, it is the broader group of legal subjects and the narrower 
group of the legal profession that are the targets of inquiry. 
 
Each population has been constructed by the practices and procedures of 
governance that operate in this discourse. Each individual who comprise the 
population are taken as having been taught to function as a member of this 
governed population. They are continually observed and judged (both by 
themselves and other subjects of the discourse) in their performance as part of the 
                                                 
33 Hunt and Wickham, Foucault and Law at 54 
34 This body of subjects known as “lawyers” can be separable from the entirety of citizens of a 
nation, or the body of subjects known as “Australians” can be separable from the entirety of citizens 
of the “Western world”.  
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population, and they do what is expected of them, as that is their training. From this 
perspective, these internalised forms of behaviour become the “being” of the 
members of the population. “Normal” individuals are taken to behave appropriately 
because they have had the appropriate standards instilled into them and not because 
that is what they have been commanded to do. They find it difficult to do 
otherwise, because, from this perspective, they are produced by their training. 
 
From a Foucaultian perspective, these institutions, procedures and practices of 
governmentality all play a role in the process of subjectification - the ‘way a human 
being turns him- or herself into a subject’.
35 Foucault’s assertion that the ‘juridical 
mode of governance... is increasingly replaced by… a power that exerts a more 
positive influence on life, undertaking to administer it, multiply it, and impose upon 
it a system of regulations and precise inspection’
36 is based upon the more active, 
yet largely unrecognised, role that individuals are taken to play in their creation as 
subjects. Individuals are part of the process that gives them ‘the rules of law, the 
techniques of management, and... the practices of self’.
37 This shift in the 
understanding of governance represents a change from a conception of legal 
discourse as sovereign commands to that of a system of norms. This shift in the 
understanding of governance moves from one based on the notion of regal power to 
one based on practices of internalised self-regulation.  
 
The period covered by this thesis includes a time where law can be seen to have 
acted, in part, as a system of sovereign command. The law in the eighteenth century 
                                                 
35 Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’ at 208 
36 Ewald, F., ‘Norms, Discipline, and the Law’, (1990) 30 Representations 138 at 138 
37 Foucault, ‘The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom’, in Bernauer, J. & Rasmussen, 
D. (eds), The Final Foucault, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1988 at 18  
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can be seen to have operated on the basis that all legal subjects were characterised 
as belonging to specific categories. The members of the categories were guided by 
norms, the practices of behaviour they had internalised, in the carrying out of their 
duties. Many of these norms, however, were specific to particular categories of 
subjects and could not be used as society-wide criteria for regulation. At this point, 
then, the law can be understood as administered through a set of rules-as-sovereign-
command and not via internal self-regulation. 
 
In terms of the articulations of liability discussed in this project, members of the 
legal discursive formation grouped defendants into categories such as “common 
carrier” and “surgeon”. These categories were then connected to particular 
responsibilities and obligations. If the defendants did not comply with these 
responsibilities and obligations and the plaintiff suffered an injury, then the 
defendant had to compensate the plaintiff. A defendant was not constructed as an 
individual, but as a member of a category. If the legal subject was seen to belong to 
a particular category, then the law commanded a certain set of responsibilities.  
 
Feudal society was, for Foucault, governed along very practical lines. It was a 
‘society of laws – either customs or written laws – involving a whole reciprocal 
play of obligation and litigation’.
38 Subjects owed obligations to their immediate 
lords, and lords owed obligations to the monarch. The rulers of the society, for 
Foucault, were seen to be a part of the web of obligations. The notion that rulers 
occupied a ‘position of externality and transcendence’
39 relative to those they ruled 
represents, for Foucault, a characterisation of a form of governance evident after 
                                                 
38 Foucault, ‘Governmentality’ at 104 
39 Ibid at 91  
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the end of the feudal period in Western history. All feudal obligations were 
reciprocal. That is, the monarch owed them to the lords, the lords owed them to the 
monarchs, the subjects owed the lords obligations and the lords owed them to the 
subjects. The types and duties attached to the obligations were specific to the 
station in life of the person who was under the obligation. The duties owed by the 
monarch were different to the duties owed by lords, which were different to the 
duties owed by “commoners”.  
 
This effect of position on duty is also reflected in the fact that the obligations of 
“commoners” varied according to their station in life. All legal subjects owed 
duties of fealty to their overlords, they also owed specific duties to other legal 
subjects. These other responsibilities resulted from their vocation or profession. A 
person was a blacksmith, a serf, an apothecary or an inn-keeper. If a legal subject 
failed to live up to the expectations associated with their profession or vocation, 
then the injured party could seek compensation through the courts. The members of 
the legal discursive formation then appraised the actions of the defendant and 
judged them against the standard of the person from that trade or vocation. From 
this perspective, the members of the court did not construct the defendants as 
individuals who happened to practice as a surgeon or an apothecary. The members 
of the legal profession only saw the defendants in terms of their vocation. The 
station in life of the defendant dictated their responsibilities and, according to this 
understanding, how the members of the bench judged their actions.
40 
                                                 
40 This linking of the eighteenth century legal profession to characterisations of feudal subjects is 
not meant to be proof that England was still a feudal society in the late 1700s. All that is being 
claimed is that the lawyers and judges’ basing of their assessment of liability on the station of life of 
the defendant can be seen to be similar to a feudal system of societal organisation. One possible 
explanation that is consistent with the form of analysis used here is that, as this project shows, 
discursive practices change very slowly, and therefore, some of the societal habits that were 
dominant in feudal times took considerable time to die out completely.  
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The feudal characterisation of legal subjects changed slowly. By the early to mid- 
twentieth century the legal construction of legal subjects, from the perspective 
applied here, could be seen to be “modern”. In most of the cases examined in 
Chapter Six of this thesis, the members of the legal discursive formation can be 
considered to have constructed the legal subjects as self-aware, self-disciplined 
subjects who were expected to live according to the dictates of internalised norms 
generally applicable in the community. One particular set of expected behaviours 
were those embedded in the term “reasonable person”. If the legal subjects did not 
live up to the set of behaviours that was expected from a reasonable person in the 
position of the defendant, then compensation was payable to the injured party. In 
the modern period, as understood in this Foucaultian analysis, the members of the 
legal profession saw the members of society as reasonable, rational individuals. 
These individuals happened to act in a variety of roles in their working life, but, 
first and foremost, they were individuals. 
 
The importance of this, from a Foucaultian perspective, is that this means these 
individuals could be judged against a common standard of behaviour. They could 
all be judged against the standard of the reasonable person. This was possible, from 
this perspective, as they were all produced within their society by a substantially 
similar set of practices that imbued them all with a substantially similar set of 
internalised norms of behaviour. Modern legal subjects, as they are understood 
here, have been brought up and trained to be members of society under the 
governmentalist form of governance. One of the sets of practices that produced the 
legal subjects was the law. The members of the legal profession gave the legal  
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subjects guidelines of action in the form of past statements
41 and judged those legal 
subjects who appeared before them.  
 
From the perspective applied in this thesis, the practices of the law are part of the 
processes of the construction of the modern subject. Further, the practices of the 
law were part of the processes of construction of the feudal subject, and therefore, 
the practices of the law helped in the perpetuation of the feudal system. The 
practices of the law, and the statements of the judges were also part of the processes 
of change between the feudal and the modern.
42 Yet, in order for the law to fulfil 
these functions, from this perspective, it had to maintain its integrity and validity 
during the periods of stability and the period of change. In order to understand how 
the law can be understood to operate in this manner, it is necessary to understand 
how a discursive function can produce change whilst maintaining its integrity. The 
processes of change within a discourse or discursive formation will be addressed in 
the next section. 
 
DISCURSIVE CHANGE 
 
This section will present an understanding of the possibilities for, and practices of, 
change within discourses and discursive formations that is central to this thesis. 
                                                 
41 The subjects may not have read these statements, however, the effect of these statements are still 
felt and internalised by legal subjects. For example, legal statements, in the form of legal decisions 
that limit the construction of a legal contract are not read by all legal subjects, however, those 
contracts that are constituted legally dominate through the fact most contracts are drawn up by the 
legally trained and therefore, legal subjects “learn” the construction of legal contracts. 
42 I am not suggesting that I will be demonstrating in this thesis how subjectivities in England 
changed from the “feudal” to the “modern”. That is both beyond the scope of a project this size and 
beyond the scope of the archaeological method. The shift from the feudal to the modern would be 
better demonstrated through a use of Foucault’s genealogical method. The distinction between the 
archaeological and genealogical methods are discussed in Chapter 3 below.  
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One of the understandings of the law in this thesis is in terms of the 
continuous/discontinuous nature of the law. To understand how this is possible, it is 
necessary to consider how discourses can be understood to produce change. Like 
the rest of this chapter, the section will be a predominantly abstract discussion, with 
the specifics of change within the legal discursive formation being developed in the 
next chapter. There is no single model that can be used to describe and delimit 
discursive change, as every discourse or discursive formation is different. However, 
there are general mechanisms that can be taken to underlie any shift in the effects 
of a discourse or discursive formation. 
 
For a discursive formation or discourse to change, from this perspective, there must 
be discursive practices that allow for change. This is an obvious point, but one that 
cannot be over-emphasised. As understood from a Foucaultian perspective, any 
discursive function is only the sum of its practices, so unless the discursive 
practices include the capacity for change there cannot be any change. The subjects 
of a discourse reflect the practices that constitute them and do not have any 
capacity to bring about change unless they are enabled to do so. Only practices that 
allow for change can produce, within the subjects of the discursive function, the 
possibility of change. Without such practices, subjects will only repeat past 
practices. 
 
From a Foucaultian perspective, these discursive practices that allow for change 
may relate to any of three relationships. They may relate to the interaction of the 
discourse with other discourses. They may relate to the interaction between 
different discursive formations which operate within the larger discourse. Finally, 
they may relate to change within a single formation. Such practices could even  
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relate to changes in the perception of those events that may be considered to be 
non-discursive. As there is no set of rules that govern all discourses, there can be no 
general practice that can isolate any particular type of discursive practice. The 
descriptions of discursive control discussed by Foucault (internal, external and 
those neither fully internal or external) are not generally applicable rules, but are 
similarities between discursive functions. In these terms, discursive practices that 
allow for discursive change can function either as internal, external or neither fully 
internal nor external controls. 
 
As was discussed previously, in post-structuralist theory there is no essential Truth 
in any discursive function. There are no absolutes that are immune from processes 
of change. Therefore, every practice, theoretically, is subject to disruption. There 
may be basic relationships that seem to define a discourse, such as the relationship 
between the doctor and the patient in medical discourse, but there may be practices 
that appear to run counter to this relationship, such as euthanasia or medical 
experimentation without consent. Further, within any discourse or discursive 
formation there are a multiplicity of discursive practices that constitute the 
discursive function. Some of these practices specifically relate to conduct 
associated with other practices.  
 
This multiplicity of practices can be understood in the same way that a multiplicity 
of discursive subjects can be understood. That is, from this perspective, discursive 
practices can be seen as also functioning under a form of governance equivalent to 
governmentality. The “population” of practices within a discourse are subject to 
“various procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations and tactics”. This does 
not necessarily produce a hierarchy of discursive practices, though the basic  
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assessment that the set of discursive practices functions as “knowledge” can be 
seen to “govern” discursive change.  
 
This discussion of discourses reflects post-Enlightenment Western thought. One of 
the key aspects of this body of thought is that knowledge is not fixed. The body of 
knowledge in the world grows and changes. Therefore, any discourse or discursive 
formation is founded on the assessment that no knowledge is permanent. Scientific 
discourses, in which the belief that theories are valid, but still only theories, until 
they are disproved, illustrates this point. From the perspective applied here, many 
of the discursive practices in a discourse relate to the perpetuation of the knowledge 
of the discourse.
43 That is, the practices associated with education and construction 
of subjects are important. As the “knowledge” of the discourse is changeable, there 
have to be practices that allow for the transmission of knowledge of that which is 
no longer the same as that which was known before. 
 
This discussion of discursive change presents the danger of an introduction of a 
“Truth” about discourse, with that Truth being that all knowledge is subject to 
change. Derrida refers to the ‘paradox of iterability’. That is, ‘iterability requires 
the origin to repeat itself originarily, to alter itself so as to have the value of origin, 
that is to conserve itself’.
44 This notion of the discursive suggests that, in order for a 
discourse to maintain its constitutive power, it has to perpetually re-create this 
“value of origin” through repeated iteration. Every repetition of discursive 
                                                 
43 It is likely, but outside the scope of this thesis to demonstrate, that only discourses that have the 
capacity to change will reproduce over time. In other words, some knowledges may “die off” 
because they do not contain a discursive practice that allows for change within their body of 
discursive practices. 
44 Derrida, ‘Force of Law’ at 43   
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knowledge must have the power of origin. This is required in order to continue the 
production of discursive subjects and the production of discursive practices. 
 
Given this perpetual practice of origin, discourses and discursive formations can 
include discursive practices that enable discursive change.
45 These practices of 
change can maintain this value of origin. Every practice has to exhibit the 
characteristics both of repeatability and of origin. There is no value for this thesis, 
however, in considering the source of change, as it is outside the scope of the 
archaeological method. It is sufficient to discuss how the discursive functions can 
change, without compromising the validity of the discursive functions. The 
understanding contained in this section will be developed further, in the context of 
the legal discursive formation, in the next chapter. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to establish the theoretical background for the 
remainder of thesis. The goal of this project as a whole is to apply Foucault’s 
archaeological method to a number of judicial decisions. This entails an 
understanding of the relationship between the law and the legal profession. One 
aspect of the project is the examination of the mechanisms through which the law 
changes and yet maintains its integrity and continuity. The characterisation of the 
legal profession in this thesis can be considered to expand on Llewellyn’s claim 
that the law is what legal officials do. This expansion is only possible with a 
                                                 
45 A full Derridean understanding of iterability as it relates to law can be considered to be outside 
the scope of this project. From Davies’ perspective, ‘as a repetition of the law the case must already 
be other to it… it is always in itself distinct from the law’: Delimiting the Law at 112. In the 
Foucaultian understanding of the law as represented by this thesis, a case is not considered to be 
“distinct from the law”, it can never be “other to the law”. The law is understood as the sum of the 
practices of the legal profession, therefore, a decision is a necessary part of the law.  
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discursive understanding of the law and the legal profession. Some care must be 
taken, therefore, in explaining the basics of such a discursive understanding of the 
law, the profession and broader society itself. 
 
A Foucaultian discursive understanding of society differs from more traditional 
understandings in that it is ‘non-anthropological’.
46 There is no search for the 
author
47 or the individual actor with respect to any event. The removal of the 
concept of the “free-choosing” individual from the analysis of society provides a 
particular perspective on the relationships within a community. A history can be 
reduced to a study of the practices that a subject perpetuates. Or, it can be seen that 
a history can be expanded to a study of the practices that a subject perpetuates.  
 
If you hold that a discourse consists in the totality of what is said in 
some domain, then you go beyond reading the intellectual highs of 
the heroes of science and you sample what is being said 
everywhere… You inevitably have to consider who is doing what to 
whom.
48  
Such an understanding opens up the whole of society to examination. 
 
It was necessary in the first section of this chapter to provide an overview of the 
theoretical area of knowledge, of a discursive understanding, that is the foundation 
of the ideas used in the rest of the thesis. Post-structuralism resists definition and, 
therefore, the goal of the first section was to provide a broad description of some of 
the perceived commonalities of the post-structuralist perspective upon which this 
thesis is based. This background allowed for the discussion in the second section, 
                                                 
46 Kendall & Wickham, Using Foucault’s Methods at 33 
47 Foucault preferred to discuss the role of the “author function”, rather than the “author”, see ‘What 
is an Author?’ in Rabinow, P. (ed), The Foucault Reader, Penguin, London, 1991. This point is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
48 Hacking, I., ‘The Archaeology of Foucault’ in Hoy, D. C. (ed), Foucault – A Critical Reader, 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1986 at 34  
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an explanation of the relationships between the concepts of discourse, discursive 
formations and discursive practices.  
 
It is the understanding of discursive practices as constructing discourses and 
discursive formations that is central to the conception of the law and the profession 
used in this thesis. The archaeological method is also founded on a discursive 
understanding of the behaviours of the members of society. The method, to be 
discussed in detail in Chapter Three, will involve the exhumation of monuments 
that are constructed through such discursive practices. These practices constitute 
the subjects of the legal discursive functions. Therefore, the third section of this 
present chapter included a discussion of the processes of construction and 
subjectification that might be taken to be common to all discourses and discursive 
formations. That is, the processes of subjectification apply to the construction of 
legal personnel by legal discursive practices and the construction of legal subjects 
in the wider community.  
 
The final section of this chapter focussed on the possibility and practices of change 
included in discursive functions. The practices of legal change are important in this 
understanding of the processes of repetition of past legal statements. The specifics 
of such legal changes will be discussed further in the next chapter. However, the 
theoretical basis for discursive change needed to be addressed in abstract terms first 
to define the terms and to delimit the forms of analysis that are to follow. This 
chapter was necessary to provide a foundation for the discursive description and 
understanding of the legal discourse and discursive formation that is contained in 
Chapter Two. Chapter One is the first step to the application of the archaeological 
method to judicial decisions.  
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CHAPTER TWO - A FOUCAULTIAN UNDERSTANDING OF LAW AS 
“OBJECT” FOR THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL METHOD 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter will apply the theory discussed in Chapter One to a representation of 
the legal discourse and legal discursive formation. The representation relies on 
Goodrich’s contention that ‘the concept of discourse can be applied to any 
sequence of utterances at the level of the sentence or above’,
1 for it is this 
understanding of discourse that will be applied to the law. This chapter does not 
include proof of the claim that the law is a discourse, as such a proof would require 
establishing another meta-narrative about the nature of law. In order to apply the 
archaeological method, however, there does need to be an explanation of the 
understanding of the way in which certain legal practices construct the law and the 
members of the legal profession that underpins the analysis in Part Two.  
 
This chapter does include examples of how the subjects of the law and the legal 
profession are constructed discursively. The focus of this chapter, then, is not the 
“law as discourse”, but an examination of the legal practices that allow for the law 
to operate discursively. As Goodrich stated, ‘to study the common law historically 
is to study it as… a plural set of practices which developed over long periods of 
time’.
2 These examples include, in particular, those discursive practices that are of 
importance to this application of an archaeological method to legal decisions.  
 
                                                 
1 Goodrich, Peter, Legal Discourse – Studies in Linguistics, Rhetoric and Legal Analysis, St. 
Martin’s Press, New York, 1987, at 125 
2 Goodrich, P., ‘Poor Illiterate Reason: History, Nationalism and Common Law’ (1992) 1 Social & 
Legal Studies 7 at 8  
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This application requires an understanding of the relationship between the legal 
profession and the law that goes beyond the notion that the law is what legal 
personnel do. This understanding is based on a particular conception of the 
functioning of the law in society and the operation of the profession as a self-
regulating, self-perpetuating institution. To facilitate this discussion, the emphasis 
of this chapter will be on the functions of the legal discursive practices that 
continually recreate both the common law and the legal profession.  
 
One of the key discursive features of the common law, for this analysis, is that it is 
a predominantly written discourse. The use of preceding judicial decisions, the 
written words of lawyers and judges, can be seen as central to both law and the 
organisation of the profession. The fundamental discursive practice of the common 
law, for this project, is the repetition of past legal statements. This practice will be 
discussed in depth in this chapter, both as an example of the understanding of 
discursive practices that underpins this thesis, and as a demonstration of the 
fundamental importance that texts can be taken to have to the legal discursive 
formation. The use of previous legal statements is also important to this application 
of the archaeological method to the monuments of the legal discursive formation, 
as will be discussed in Chapter Three. 
 
The common law is at the centre of this thesis. More specifically, the focus is on 
the relationship between the legal profession and the common law. The law is taken 
to be the product of the practices that govern the behaviour of those who practice it 
within society. However, the law functions within the wider community. This 
project examines the statements of law that articulate the relationships of liability 
that are encouraged between members of the wider community. It is necessary,  
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therefore, to make clear the way that members of the legal profession are 
understood to see, and construct, individuals and their relationships through the 
processes of subjectification. This understanding will be examined in the first 
section, where the discursive processes of subjectification will be discussed in the 
specific context of the law.  
 
In Section Two I will present my understanding of the construction of the legal 
discursive formation, as it is now and as it has been since 1750. To describe the 
profession as it existed in 1750, the practices of legal training that existed before 
then also have to be examined. In a broad sense, this section represents a history of 
the legal profession and its practices, however, it is only a history, not the history. 
The focus of the “history” produced in this project is on some of the practices of 
the legal profession. The focus is not on the “facts and figures” that can constitute 
more “traditional” histories. Therefore, there is, in this thesis, an interpretation of 
the “past” that uses broad brushstrokes to characterise what can be seen as 
predominant legal practices of the past half millennium. The contention of the 
history contained here is that the practices of the legal discursive formation, in 
particular, the profession’s power of self-governance, have remained largely 
unchanged since the seventeenth century. 
 
One particular aspect of the legal discursive formation that will not function as part 
of this account is the relationship between different categories of legal practitioners. 
Over the centuries there have been classifications such as sergeants, benchers, 
attornies, solicitors, barristers, pleaders and proctors. For the purpose of this thesis, 
an analysis of these categories seems unnecessary. The understanding of the legal 
discursive formation presented here is of a self-contained, self-regulating  
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profession. All practitioners will be considered to belong to a single classification, 
“lawyers”, in order to promote this presentation. 
 
Section Three will present my understanding of the mechanisms of change that are 
present in the practices of the profession. It is the capacity of the legal discursive 
formation to change while maintaining its integrity that is the distinctive feature of 
the relationship between the law and the profession for this project. As was 
discussed in the last chapter, from the perspective applied in this thesis, a discourse 
or discursive formation can change only when it includes discursive practices that 
allow for change. This section will address the possibilities of change within the 
law in general, rather than focussing on the specific practices that allow for change, 
such as the practice of repetition of past legal statements. 
 
Section Four will focus on that group of the discursive practices which constitute 
the legal discursive formation that is most important for this thesis. This section 
will include an examination of the use of written texts as an integral part of legal 
procedure. This is expanded on in the fifth section which examines the practice of 
repetition, the specific aspect of the use of texts that, from the perspective adopted 
in this thesis, is the predominant form of discursive control within the legal 
discursive formation. It is this practice that is taken to organise the profession and 
maintain the continuity of the law. It is this practice that, from the perspective 
applied here, allows for change in the law. This discussion of the use of past legal 
statements will act as both an extensive summary of this chapter, and a specific 
grounding for Chapter Three. That is, a discussion of the understanding of the 
importance of written documents to the law adopted in this thesis provides the  
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background necessary for the discussion of the method, an archaeological analysis 
of legal judgments, that follows in Chapter Three. 
 
THE LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF LEGAL SUBJECTS 
 
This section has two purposes. First, it presents a brief “history” of the law and its 
operation in England over the past few centuries. Second, it begins an application 
of the theoretical framework established in Chapter One to the study of the English 
common law. This is done through an examination of the understanding of the 
relationship between the law as a whole and its legal subjects that is adopted in this 
thesis. In order to address the relationship between the law and the legal profession, 
as it is understood here, it is necessary to consider how the broader forms of 
governance have operated. That is, it is necessary for this explication, to consider, 
inter alia, the changing relationship between the monarch and the population and 
the changing relationship between the state and the population. Further, in order to 
explore this understanding of how members of the legal profession are discursively 
constructed as lawyers and judges, it is necessary to discuss how members of the 
community as a whole are constructed to act according to the law. 
 
This section is divided into two sub-sections. The first includes an application of 
the understanding of the processes of subjectification discussed in the last chapter 
to the constitution of legal subjects in the law since the eighteenth century. The 
second section will be the application of this understanding to the specifics of tort 
law. This requires an examination of the notion of the “reasonable person”. This 
legal construct will be used to illustrate “governance” through the administration of  
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norms as it is understood here. As discursive practices are taken to act as norms of 
behaviour, it is useful to illustrate the operation of such a norm in the law.  
 
* 
 
This sub-section presents the law as a discursive function that operates as an 
integral part of society. In short, it develops an understanding of the way that 
“citizens” are constituted as legal subjects. From this perspective, the law 
constructs the legal subjects to abide by the rules, and as they abide by these rules, 
the law is reinforced.
3 This sub-section will present a “history” of the forms of 
governance, from law as sovereign commands to governance through the 
administration of norms.  
 
In Foucault’s understanding of modern governance, governmentality appears to rest 
both on the notion of the population governing on behalf of the population and on 
the removal of the power of the monarch to command. This modern “normative” 
form of governance of England can be understood to have started in 1689.
4 Until 
the power of monarchs to command in their own right was removed, symbolically 
                                                 
3 Some legal subjects may “choose” to not abide by the rules. Such a “decision” may be the result of 
another set of internalised norms, a set that promotes “deviancy” or “rebellion”. The internalised set 
of norms that is the dominant form of governance in society is not the only such set, it is, however, 
the dominant set. An alternative interpretation of behaviour that can be described as “deviancy” is 
put forward by Jeff Malpas and Gary Wickham in ‘Governance and Failure: on the Limits of 
Sociology’ (1995) 31 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology 37. Their argument is that 
the failure, or the incompleteness of any system of governance. That is, no discursive practice 
totally governs the practices of a subject. 
4 1689 did not represent a total break in the forms of governance in society. As was mentioned 
above and will be demonstrated below, the eighteenth century legal system can be understood as 
still perpetuating the pre-modern, “feudal” system of categorising the legal subjects (for a discussion 
of Foucault’s understanding of “feudal” see the discussion in Chapter One above). 1689, however, 
can be seen as the point in time when the obvious symbols of governance, that is the relationship 
between the Crown and the Parliament, shifted.   
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and de jure, England could not be considered, from this perspective, to be governed 
in what can now be seen as a “modern” form.
5 The symbolic removal of the king’s 
head occurred with the English Parliament’s insistence on the signing of the Bill of 
Rights in 1689.
6 After James II fled the country, the legislature only agreed to the 
ascension to the throne of William III and Mary II if they accepted this document. 
A new age can be understood to have heralded, in which ‘sovereignty... was for 
practical purposes grasped by the nation’.
7 The Bill of Rights, a deed limiting the 
power of the monarchs in relation to the Parliament, prevented the King and Queen 
from ‘suspending… laws or the execution of laws by regall authoritie without 
consent of Parlyament’.
8 Parliament, therefore, can be understood to have 
destroyed the previous notion of ‘kingship by Divine Right’.
9 This “destruction” 
can be seen to have been produced through this Bill of Rights, the new oaths of 
regal office (to “govern according to the statutes in Parliament”), the Triennial Act 
of 1694
10 and the Act of Settlement of 1700.
11  
 
By the end of the seventeenth century there can be said to be a ‘relatively clear 
division of the functions of government’
12 with the powers of the monarch limited 
by the strength of the legislature.
13 With the Bill of Rights, the royal prerogative 
became a  
                                                 
5 For a discussion of Foucault’s understanding of the “modern” see Chapter One above. 
6 1 Will. & Mar. Sess. 2, c.2 (1689) 
7 Keir, D.L., The Constitutional History of Modern Britain Since 1485, 9
th edition, Adam & Charles 
Black, London, 1969 at 269 
8 1 Will. & Mar. Sess. 2, c.2 
9 Keir, The Constitutional History of Modern Britain Since 1485 at 271 
10 6 & 7 Will. & Mar. c. 2 
11 12 & 13 Will. III, c.2 
12 Vile, M. J. C., Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967 at 
67 
13 To the extent that the last time a monarch vetoed a Bill passed by Parliament was in 1707 
(Wilson, J. G., ‘Altered States: A Comparison of Separation of Powers in the United States and in 
the United Kingdom’ (1990) 18 Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 125 at 135  
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department of the Common Law, comprising those of its rules which 
were peculiar to the King and not shared by the subject... Its content 
is such as Parliament and the courts may define. Its justification is a 
purely utilitarian conception of the public good, laid down not by 
the King but by his subjects.
14 
The royal prerogative of the individual monarchs, the ‘political will of the 
sovereign’,
15 can be understood to have been rendered impotent. The underlying 
power to govern may be taken to have been created in the body of the people, and 
not in the King. The monarchs, at least formerly, were no longer separate from the 
people in terms of their possession of extra-legal rights. The monarchs can be 
understood to have been re-categorised as members of the population with certain 
symbolic, but not extra-judicial, powers. 
 
This “body of the people” that received the “political will” of the society seems to 
reproduce the “population” that was central to Foucault’s understanding of 
governmentality. From this perspective, the “people” self-govern through a system 
of communal measures, and these measures keep the community together. ‘The 
norm is the common measure [and] the modern form of the social bond’.
16 This 
“population”, or community, is understood to be constructed and constrained by the 
myriad of practices and procedures of governance. A population is taken to be 
made up of individuals created by the operation of discourses and discursive 
formations.  
 
These individuals may consider themselves to be in control of their own lives, 
destiny and well-being. But it is the processes of subjectification that is understood 
                                                 
14 Keir, The Constitutional History of Modern Britain Since 1485 at 271 
15 Murphy, W. T., ‘The Oldest Social Science? The Epistemic Properties of the Common Law 
Tradition’ (1991) 54 Modern Law Review 182 at 195 
16 Ewald, F., ‘Justice, Equality, Judgment: On “Social Justice”’ in Teubner, G. (ed), Juridification of 
Social Spheres, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1987 at 108  
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to construct what is meant by the term “liberty”. From this perspective, legal 
subjects are free to act according to their construction, to follow the standards set 
down by the internalised system of norms. This process of subjectification can be 
seen as creating an almost anarchic
17 society. ‘[T]he norm affirms the equality of 
individuals... [it] is not totalitarian but individualising... however, despite the 
strength of various individual claims, none of them can escape the common 
standard’.
18 
 
This understanding of the construction of legal subjects does not diminish the 
importance of the law for the community. Following the “decapitation” of the 
monarchs, the governance of society became the responsibility of the Parliament, 
Executive and judiciary. From this perspective, the law constructs all three, at least 
in part. The actions of all the branches of government, in this view, must be 
considered to be lawful in order to be legitimate. It is the legal practices that 
provide the mechanisms for this validation of governmental actions, including any 
suspect ones. 
 
In the modern system of governance, the Parliament can be seen to have taken on 
the figure-head role of the monarch, without being able to claim the power of 
sovereign command. From this perspective, Parliament does not establish ‘the 
fundamental principles of law; it can only set forth regulations’.
19 This can be 
understood to represent a shift from rule through command to rule through 
generally applicable internalised norms. Publicly accepted behaviour is now taken 
                                                 
17 In the sense that there is no overseeing governing body separate from society. This form of 
“anarchy” is, however, by no means chaotic. 
18 Ewald, ‘Norms, Discipline, and the Law’ at 154 
19 Ibid at 155  
 
76 
 
to be the benchmark, as the norm is understood to provide the basis for the 
measurement of the actions of individuals. The norm, then, can be seen as a ‘way 
for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a 
rigorous principle of self-referentiality’.
20 From this perspective, society functions 
as a set of self-created, self-referential individuals who are no longer taken to be 
controlled by the dictates of an external authority, but are seen to be guided by an 
internalised set of rules of behaviour. The courts, however, still function as the 
institution of adjudication and, from this perspective, it is within the legal 
discursive practices that the norms of the society are utilised. 
 
Legal subjects can be understood to be constructed to obey the requests of the 
police and to abide by the rules of the forums of adjudication. No innate Truth can 
be ascribed to these practices, they are simply the habits, or norms, of society. The 
role of the law in the community is continually reinforced, in this view, both 
through the continued acquiescence and co-operation of the legal subjects and, 
culturally, through the mass media. Officers of the law are respected; legal careers, 
whether in the police service or as lawyers or judges, are held in relatively high 
regard within the community. From the perspective adopted here, this respect is 
indicative of the power relationships that underlie the law. The legal subjects can be 
understood to defer to the authority of the legal professional. The law is considered 
the appropriate form of societal governance, and the legal professions have access 
to the forms and procedures of the law. 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Ibid at 154  
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* 
 
That legal norms are understood to have been introduced gradually since 1689 does 
not mean that they are taken to have remained unchanged since then. A ‘norm is a 
self-referential standard of measurement for a given group; it can make no pretence 
to bind anyone for an indefinite period’.
21 The norms that existed in the earliest part 
of the eighteenth century are not the same norms that construct legal subjects of 
today. One of the more recently generated norms is that of the “reasonable person”.  
 
The “reasonable person” can be understood to represent a point where norms and 
the practices of the legal profession interact. The “reasonable person” is a construct 
used by members of the legal profession to judge the actions of members of the 
general public. The general public are taken to have internalised the central tenet of 
the “reasonable person”, in that they “know” they are expected to consider others 
when they perform various actions in their lives. Even if they do not consider other 
people, legal subjects with this internalised norm are taken to know that they 
should regulate themselves in such a manner. It must be stressed that the 
“reasonable person” is being used only an example of normative governance and 
that the “reasonable person” is temporally specific. It is not taken to operate for the 
entire history of the common law and does not apply to the whole period covered 
by this thesis. Therefore, all references to legal subjects and “reasonable people” in 
this section apply only to mid-twentieth century legal discourse. 
 
                                                 
21 Ibid at 156  
 
78 
 
There is no precise definition of what constitutes a “reasonable person” in tort 
law.
22 A norm is understood to be a standard against which behaviour is judged and 
not a rule. Its function as a measure is only useful, and therefore only used, in 
specific contexts; hence it cannot be no completely described. What follows is an 
extract from a legal textbook: 
 
Lord Bowen visualised the reasonable man as “the man on the 
Clapham omnibus”; an American writer as “the man who takes the 
magazines at home, and in the evening pushes the lawn-mower in 
his shirt sleeves.” He has not the courage of Achilles, the wisdom of 
Ulysses or the strength of Hercules nor has he “the prophetic vision 
of a clairvoyant.” He will not anticipate folly in all its forms, but he 
never puts out of consideration the teachings of experience and so 
will guard against the negligence of others when experience shows 
such negligence to be common. He is a reasonable man but he is 
neither a perfect citizen nor a “paragon of circumspection”.
23  
 
Some of the characteristics attributed to the reasonable person, therefore, are 
rationality, self-governance, and a capacity for foresight.
24 These attributes are used 
                                                 
22 One of the features of current tort law is the concept of the “reasonable man”. It is a frequent 
criticism of the legal profession that it utilises gender specific language. In this thesis, there is a 
tension between the recognition of this privileging and the methodological need to engage with the 
exact terminology of the texts of the discursive formation. Therefore, the policy for this project will 
be to only use gender specific language in direct quotations from legal documents. For the rest of 
the thesis, the language will be gender neutral. This does not remedy the gender bias, but for the 
purposes of the integrity of the method, it seems an appropriate compromise. In terms of any other 
gender bias in the thesis, there is no apparent patriarchal nature in the articulation of the recognition 
of the legal relationships of liability. However, such an inquiry is beyond the scope of the 
methodology and the aims of the thesis for there to be a definitive position provided here. However 
it is noted that it could be possible to argue that the ethic of care evident in the “female” morality 
discussed by Carol Gilligan in In a Different Voice – Psychological Theory and Women’s 
Development (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1982) is more present in the reasonable 
person test of relationships of liability than to the more traditional “rights” based consideration of 
the legal discursive formation. 
23 Rogers, W. V. H. (ed), Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort, 14
th edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
1994 at 50-51, footnotes omitted. 
24 There has been extensive criticism of the gender bias in the “reasonable man”. See for example, 
Bender, L., ‘A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort’ (1988) 38 Journal of Legal 
Education 3 and Finley, L. M., ‘A Break in the Silence: Including Women’s Issues in a Torts 
Course’ (1989) 1 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 41. The debate over the level of bias seems is 
continuing with recent contributions being Schwartz, G. T., ‘Tort Law: Feminist Approaches to Tort 
Law’ (2001) 2 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 175 and Jacob, A., ‘Tort Law: Feminist Approaches to 
Tort Law Revisited – A Reply to Professor Schwartz’ (2001) 2 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 211. A  
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by the courts to determine what constitutes an appropriate action in any given 
circumstance. When a legal subject is sued in negligence, they are alleged to have 
failed to live up to the standard expected of the reasonable person when the action, 
or inaction, in question occurred. The ‘reasonable man can pose as the average 
man, as if all of us can be accurately measured and assessed by a single selected 
standard corresponding with average, reasonable behaviour’.
25 The reasonable 
person “can pose” as a standard against which legal subjects are measured and the 
construct is imposed on the lives of the litigants, as a technique of adjudication. 
The legal discursive formation uses this standard because it seems “reasonable” to 
use “reasonableness” as a standard and, according to the approach used here, 
because this is how legal subjects have been constructed. 
 
This is how the very term “reasonable” is significant in this project. Each legal 
subject is taken to be expected to live up to the standard of the reasonable person 
who thinks of others before they act. Thought itself, according to Foucault, is a 
constructed notion: 
“Thought”…can and must be analysed in every manner of speaking, 
doing, or behaving in which the individual appears and acts as subject 
of learning, as ethical or juridical subject, as subject conscious of 
himself and others. In this sense, thought is understood as the very form 
of action – as actions insofar as it implies the play of true and false, the 
acceptance or refusal of rules, the relation to oneself and others.
26 
Thought can be understood to be an attribute of legal subjects as they appear in a 
Foucaultian understanding. Constituted subjects “think” and are aware of the 
relationships between themselves and others. Modern subjects, constructed through 
                                                                                                                                        
recent book, Forell C. A. and Matthews, D. M., A Law of Her Own: The Reasonable Woman as a 
Measure of Man, New York University Press, New York 2000, has also argued for a “reasonable 
woman” test, though not in the area of tort law 
25 Conaghan & Mansell, The Wrongs of Tort at 37-38 
26 Foucault, ‘Preface to The History of Sexuality: Volume 2’, in Rabinow, Foucault Reader at 334-
335  
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the broad discourse of rationality, and understood to perceive themselves to be 
“thinking” subjects. They are taken to be aware of rules and of relationships 
between themselves and others.  
 
It is this constructed relationship with others that is central to this understanding of 
negligence law. There is nothing innate about a person’s consideration for others, 
but such relationships function as norms of behaviour for the legal subjects. 
Importantly for this conception of the notion of duty of care, the reasonable person 
acts within a network of “others”, deals with other people and considers them when 
carrying out any action. Legal subjects, according to this view, are constructed to 
consider others. From this perspective, the legal discursive formation is full of such 
legal subjects who, in turn, impose this norm of consideration for others as the 
standard of behaviour. This perpetuation of the behaviour reinforces the 
relationship as a norm of society. The reasonable person can be understood as a 
construction that reflects the accepted behaviours of twentieth century society. The 
use of this construction functions, from this perspective, as a discursive practice 
that perpetuates the law and the legal discursive formation. 
 
In this understanding of Foucault’s work, discourses and discursive formations 
produce subjects via the use of discursive practices. In English society since 1689, 
the legal discourse of governance is understood to have produced legal subjects. 
One of the key discursive practices that produce legal subjects, from this 
perspective, has been the use of norms. It is the internalisation of these discursive 
practices that is taken to maintain the subjects, the discursive formations and the 
discourses. The next section will focus on the discursive practices that are specific 
to the legal discursive formation. It is these discursive practices that are seen to  
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perpetuate the law and the legal discursive formation. It is these practices that are 
taken to produce, and allow for change in, the law. The examination of these 
practices will also further elaborate the understanding of legal practice that 
underpins the archaeology of legal judgments presented in the final three chapters 
of this thesis. 
 
LEGAL PERSONNEL AS CONSTRUCTED SUBJECTS OF THE LEGAL 
DISCURSIVE FORMATION 
 
This section presents a “history” of the legal profession and the construction of 
lawyers and judges within the legal discursive formation. This description will 
adopt a discursive perspective in providing an analysis of the legal profession itself, 
through a discussion of the training, education and professional organisation of 
lawyers and judges from the fifteenth century to the present day. Through the 
understanding of the relationship between lawyers, judges and the written law upon 
which this thesis is based can be more fully explained. From this perspective, it is 
the perpetuation of the discursive practices that are central to the methods of 
training. It is the repetition of these practices that produce a law that is central to 
the application of the archaeological method in this thesis. 
 
A sketch of the practices that are taken to be central to the constitution of legal 
practitioners and of legal practice will be provided in this section. This outline 
begins in the eleventh century, as it is necessary to discuss my understanding of the 
discursive practices that were being utilised prior to 1750 in order to present my 
conception of the practices that produced the judgments that were written in 1750.  
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Central to this presentation is a discussion of the profession and its forms of 
control. It was these forms of regulation that, from this perspective, were part of the 
conditions of possibility for the independent discursive formation that is taken to 
have come into existence in the eighteenth century.  
 
* 
 
This first sub-section provides a “history” of the profession as an independent 
discursive formation. Central to this is a discussion of the circumstances that 
existed during the seventeenth century that, from the perspective adopted here, 
created the possibility of the relationship between the crown and the judiciary 
evident in 1750. This “history” of the profession is focussed upon the power that 
monarchs had over judges and how this changed over time.
27 This sub-section 
provides a link between the “history” of the law and the particular “history” of the 
legal discursive practices that constitute the legal profession that will be discussed 
further in the next sub-section. 
 
My claim that since 1750 the legal profession constitutes a single independent 
discursive formation is not intended to suggest that there have been no changes 
since that time, however the basic features of the discursive formation are taken to 
have remained the same. The profession can be understood as a self-perpetuating, 
self-governing minority of the population who construct themselves within the 
practices of the legal discursive formation. How this self-governing minority 
                                                 
27 This is not the only way to approach the independence of the judiciary. For a more complete 
analysis of such independence, see Shetreet, S., Judges on Trial, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1976, 
in particular pp. 2-15.  
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gained the freedom and independence to work in the manner that they do and have 
done for 250 years is the focus of this sub-section. 
The seventeenth century can be understood to have been very disruptive for the 
governance of England. The tribulations of the Civil War, the execution of a 
monarch and the internal politics of the Parliaments resulted in both the actual and 
the symbolic removal of the king’s head. It reflected the beginning of the end of 
governance through, what I refer to as, sovereign command. This “chaos” extended 
to the judiciary. The judiciary was not independent prior to the “Glorious 
Revolution” as ‘the Judicature originally belongeth to the King’.
28 Judges were 
appointed by the Crown since before the times of the Tudor monarchs.
29 This 
changed during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries to the point where 
judges did not depend upon the reigning monarch for their office. 
 
The relationship between the monarch and the courts has had a long and chequered 
history. From the time of William the Conqueror, the feudal system of justice was 
represented as the King’s justice - ‘a system of royal justice’.
30 The law can be 
understood to have represented a form of governance dominated by a strong King 
or Queen. Over the centuries, this personal responsibility of the Crown began to 
spread beyond the Curia Regis.
31 During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the 
monarchs, seemingly content with this transfer of responsibility, rarely participated 
in the courts.
32 This loss of direct control over the events in the court-rooms can be 
                                                 
28 Hobbes, Thomas, A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of 
England, Cropsey, J. (ed), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1997 at 77  
29 Keir, The Constitutional History of Modern Britain Since 1485 at 28 
30 Holdsworth, W. S., A History of English Law, vol. 1, 7
th edition, Methuen, London, 1956 at 396 
31 The “Royal Court”, the ‘supreme central court where the business of government in all its 
branches was transacted’(ibid at 32). 
32 For example, it was noteworthy that during the reign of Elizabeth I, in a dispute between the 
Queen’s Bench of the Common Law and Chancery, the ‘dilemma was apparently resolved by the 
intervention of Queen Elizabeth herself.’ Dawson, ‘Coke and Ellesmere Disinterred: The Attack on  
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understood to have been confirmed in the 1611 Case of Proclamations
33 where Sir 
Edward Coke held that ‘the King did not have the power to create new crimes or 
new criminal penalties, [or] to define new royal prerogatives...’.
34  
 
Prior to the eighteenth century, any efforts to restrict the power of either the King 
or Parliament were potentially suicidal for the judiciary, as the judges retained their 
positions at the pleasure of the Crown. There were exceptions to this, however. 
There were brief periods when judicial life tenure was an option exercised by the 
Crown. However, even those judges were coerced with the threat, not of dismissal, 
but of permanent suspension.
35 It was only after the removal from office of James 
II (who had ‘removed twelve judges in four years, mostly for refusing to recognise 
his claim to dispense with statutes’
36) that Acts were passed that granted life tenure 
to the judges.  
 
The Act of Settlement
37 contained the provision that “judges’ commissions be 
made quamdiu se bene gesserint [so long as he should behave well] and that their 
salaries be ascertained and established but upon the address of both Houses of 
                                                                                                                                        
the Chancery in 1616’ (1941) 36 Illinois Law Review of Northwestern University 127 at 134. James 
I also endeavoured to practise the symbolism of the “King’s justice” at the beginning of the 
seventeenth century. He was given to sitting in the courts with the judges, but although justice was 
said to be the King’s, he was not ‘entitled to take any part in the administration of justice... [or to] 
determine any cause but by the mouth of his judges to whom he has committed the whole of his 
judicial authority’ (Marsh, A.H., History of the Court of Chancery and of the Rise and Development 
of the Doctrines of Equity, Fred B. Rothman & Co., Littleton, Colorado, 1985, at 2-3) 
33 12 Co. Rep. 74 
34 cited in Wilson, ‘Altered States’ at 149. The relationship between Chief Justice Coke and the non-
legal institutions was not one way, Coke was dismissed in 1616. According to Holdsworth, in the 
early seventeenth century ‘judges were frequently dismissed for political reasons (A History of 
English Law, vol. 5, 3
rd edition, Methuen, London, 1945 at 351) suggesting a greater level of 
political interference in the legal discursive formation than is evident today. 
35 Rubini, D.A., ‘The Precarious Independence of the Judiciary, 1688-1701’ (1967) 83 LQR 343 at 
344 
36 Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History at 192 
37 12 & 13 Will. III, c.2  
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Parliament it may be lawfull to remove them”. This cannot be taken to indicate 
complete judicial independence, however, as judicial office was still granted by the 
Crown, rather than Parliament. All judicial proceedings ended at the death of the 
monarch and were taken up under the Seal of the new monarch. On the death of a 
monarch, therefore, the new monarch had the option to refuse to renew the tenure 
of judges. In 1707 judicial office was extended and continued for six months after 
the death of the monarch.
38  
 
Despite this lack of total independence, the passage of the Act of Settlement meant 
that judges were not subject to summary removal or suspension. There was no 
longer any direct political interference, in terms of dismissal, in the outcomes of 
their decisions.
39 The independence of the judiciary meant that internal/self-
regulation increases in significance. The next sub-section is an examination of the 
way that judges and lawyers from this time, and since, have been trained. For, from 
the perspective adopted here, it is, and has been, the practices of the legal 
discursive formation that have been central to the self-constitution of the legal 
profession. 
 
* 
 
This sub-section addresses some of the discursive practices of the legal profession 
that are taken to constitute the legal practitioners and to perpetuate the profession as 
                                                 
38 The Regency Act, 6 Anne c.41 
39 The tenure of judges was secured ‘notwithstanding any demise of the Crown’ in 1760 (1 Geo. III 
c.23). Even given this change in the mid-18
th century, it is inappropriate to claim that there is 
absolutely no political interference in the careers of the judiciary, as judges are still promoted to 
office by the Crown (the processes of the appointment of judges as a discursive practice will be 
discussed further later on in this section). However, once judges have taken their place on the bench, 
there is a lack of direct interference as the threat of removal has been reduced almost to nil.  
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a discursive formation. The main focus of this sub-section will be on the techniques 
used in training members of the profession. The understanding of the profession as 
a self-regulating, self-perpetuating institution requires an appreciation of the 
relationship between the law as legal statements and the legal discursive formation. 
For, from this perspective, the discursive practices of the profession create the law 
in the form of legal judgments. It is the use of legal judgments, in this view, that is 
central to the application of the archaeological method. It is for this reason that 
judgments can be treated as monuments of the discourse. 
 
Historians of the legal profession often trace its origins back several centuries. 
Holdsworth considered that it was from the time of Edward I that the common law 
became a ‘special subject’, an area of expertise that required a specifically trained 
set of practitioners.
40 However, the shape and practice of the profession can be 
understood to have changed markedly since the late thirteenth century.
41 The 
contention to be expanded upon in this section is that after the Act of Settlement an 
independent judiciary headed a self-perpetuating institution of lawyers and legal 
professionals which presides over and valorises a consistent set of “normal” legal 
practices. 
 
                                                 
40 Holdsworth, W. S., A History of English Law, vol. 2, 4
th edition, Methuen, London, 1936, at 326. 
It was during the time of Henry II that it became possible for a litigant to appoint a third party to 
represent them in court (Brand, P., ‘The Origins of the English Legal Profession’ (1987) 5 Law and 
History Review, 31 at 45). 
41 There is some debate as to when the profession started as a profession; however, it was in the 
‘reign of Edward I… [that] the king’s court took its first steps toward regulating the profession’ 
(Palmer, R. C., ‘The Origins of the Legal Profession in England’ (1976) 11 Irish Jurist 126 at 
145).Whether or not the profession began before the 14
th century, the fact that the king, through his 
court, started to control the officers of the court is significant to the relationship between the Crown 
and the judiciary.  
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The judges who constituted the newly independent eighteenth-century bench can be 
understood to be products of that particular set of discursive practices that 
comprised their legal training. These practices were learned, in this account, 
initially at the Inns of Court and then reinforced in legal practice. As was discussed 
previously, the processes of subjectification within discourses and discursive 
formations can be understood to operate through the discursive practices that 
“train” the members of the discourse to act according to the standards of the 
discourse. 
 
[These] discursive practices are not purely and simply ways of 
producing discourse. They are embodied in technical processes, in 
institutions, in patterns for general behaviour, in forms for transmission 
and diffusion, and in pedagogical forms which, at once, impose and 
maintain them.
42 
 
The acceptance by members of society in general, and Parliament specifically, of 
judges as an appropriate vehicle for societal adjudication meant that the practices of 
judges, and therefore the techniques used to train judges to be judges, were 
accepted as “the” form of legal training.
43 This acceptance meant that the judges 
were “left to their own devices”, in terms of their training, so that their internal 
regulatory practices and legal education determined the nature of the common law.  
 
                                                 
42 Foucault, M., Language, Counter-memory, Practice, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1977 
at 200 
43 The term “accepted” may imply choice on the part of the executive, the legislature and the society 
as a whole. This is not intended. The members of those institutions were legal subjects and therefore 
were constituted by the discourses of governance to act according to the norms that produce the 
discourse. One of these norms was an “acceptance” of the power of the judiciary to adjudicate. 
Therefore the legal subjects considered the judiciary in that form to be a valid form of governance. 
Even when the monarchs disagreed with particular judges during the 17
th century, there was still an 
acceptance that the forms of governance as constituted by the judiciary were valid.  
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In the seventeenth century the principal institutionalised form of basic legal training 
was provided by the Inns of Court.
44 These institutions, these “powerful 
corporations”,
45 can be understood to have been constituted by the discursive 
practice of lawyers trained at the Inns who, in turn, trained later generations of 
upcoming lawyers at the Inns. The Inns were not separable from the legal 
discursive formation, as they were ‘subordinate’
46 to the judges of the time. Just as 
twenty-first century universities have to produce students whose training meets the 
requirements of the courts and the profession, so too did the Inns 400 years ago. In 
order to provide some sense of the nature of the legal discursive practices of the 
time, what follows is a brief discussion of the training provided by the Inns of 
Court. 
 
The chief techniques of instruction at the Inns involved ‘lectures and argument’.
47 
This included training in the language of the legal discursive formation and in the 
“legal” style of argument. As the language of the discursive formation tended to be 
different from the language of the rest of the population, specific training had to be 
instituted to teach the idiom.
48 The distinctive nature of the language can be 
understood to reflect the exclusive nature of the discursive formation and can be 
seen as a technique to prevent those outside the discursive formation from having 
access to legal knowledges. 
                                                 
44 From the 16
th century onwards, the degree of investment in education of the Inns varied. 
Therefore a certain proportion of practicing lawyers only ever experienced being educated at the 
hands of practitioners, without enjoying the benefits of life at the Inns. Whether lawyers learnt from 
the senior lawyers at the Inns or from senior lawyers in practice, it is particularly effective to have 
the next generation given hands-on practice by the successful practitioners of the previous 
generation as a means of perpetuating a discursive formation. 
45 Keir, The Constitutional History of Modern Britain Since 1485 at 28 
46 Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol. 2 at 485 
47 Ibid at 506 
48 The use of legal language as a discursive practice will be discussed in section Four of this 
Chapter.  
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The operation of the Inns promoted the ideal of a cohesive profession that was 
separate from the rest of the population. 
 
The legislation of the Inns of Court in the sixteenth century was 
explicit. Outsiders or “foreigners” were to be excluded, temperance 
was demanded, and every detail of diet, dress, religious observance, 
lifestyle, company and behaviour was regulated.
49 
This cohesion through common custom can be understood to relate to both the 
intellectual and cultural aspects of the Inns. That is, in this understanding, future 
lawyers were trained, via the techniques of norms of self-governance, to display the 
forms of conduct expected within the Inns and, therefore, expected by the courts 
and judges. Not only did students have to look and act the part, they had to learn 
the habits and techniques of past lawyers. This approach to legal training reflected 
the fact that ‘the common law of England is a Tradition and learned by Tradition as 
well as by Books’.
50 The legal discursive formation perpetuated itself through the 
creation of a specialised body of knowledge and specialised practices and, as a 
result, can be understood to have created its own specific history and tradition. 
 
It was recognised at the time that participating in the legal discursive formation 
required a perspective that was not produced in the rest of the population. For 
 
men are not born Common Lawyers, neither can the bare exercise of 
the faculty of reason give a man sufficient knowledge of it, but it must 
be gained by the habituating and accustoming and exercising that 
faculty by reading, study and observation.
51 
Listening to the lectures, participating in debates and observing the practices of 
those already at the Bar can be understood to have produced effective members of 
                                                 
49 Goodrich, P., ‘Twining’s Tower: Metaphors of Distance and Histories of the English Law School’ 
(Book Review) (1995) 49 University of Miami Law Review 901 at 907 
50 Davies, Sir John (1614), quoted in Goodrich, Peter, ‘Poor Illiterate Reason’ at 13 
51 Hales quoted in Murphy, ‘The Oldest Social Science?’ at 199  
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the legal discursive formation from within the confines of the Inns of Court. The 
training undertaken at the Inns, therefore, served the lawyers well in terms of their 
professional career. In this understanding, members of the discursive formation had 
been constituted by internalising the appropriate practices relating to choice of 
language, manner of argument and substance of writs and procedures. ‘The legal 
profession… strengthened its fabric by the mode in which they practised and taught 
it’.
52 From the perspective adopted here, the profession perpetuated and constituted 
itself through its discursive practices, including its means of training and education. 
 
The Inns of Court maintained their position as the primary mode of institutionalised 
legal education until the nineteenth century.
53 At that time universities began to 
offer courses in the common law for the benefit of students who sought to gain 
admission to the Bar. Prior to the middle of last century, the only legal courses 
taught at these institutions were of Civil, or Canon, law, for the benefit of the 
clergy.
54 Even when the major universities did teach the common law, the practices 
of instruction were not markedly different.
55 Legal education still revolved around 
                                                 
52 Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol. 2 at 511 
53 That does not mean that the Inns gave up their role in legal education. During the 19
th century, the 
four major Inns co-operated and formed several committees to address the issue of legal training. 
‘The most conspicuous of the [joint committees of the Inns of Court] is the Council of Legal 
Education, which directs the admission, instruction, and examination of students under the 
Consolidated Regulations approved by the four Inns’ (Pollock, F., ‘The Origins of the Inns of 
Court’, (1932) 48 LQR 163 at 167-168). The Inns still operate today and still teach law. Their 
position within the discursive formation, however, is not as strong as it was at the turn of the 18
th 
century. 
54 Blackstone did lecture on the topic of the common law in the middle of the 18
th century. His 
audience was not of prospective lawyers, however, but of gentry who wished to have a grounding in 
the law (Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History at 195). The practice of teaching law to 
students who never intended to practise was evident much earlier: ‘many sons of landed gentlemen 
went to one of the Inns of Court to gain a smattering of legal knowledge to help them in the 
administration of their estates.’ (Coward, B., The Stuart Age, Longman, London, 1994 at 68). 
55 There is some academic discussion that points to the 19
th century as a period of transition within 
the legal profession (for example Pue, W. Wesley, ‘Exorcising Professional Demons: Charles Rann 
Kennedy and the Transition to the Modern Bar’ (1987) 5 Law and History Review 135). The 
contention in this thesis, however, is that despite superficial changes, the discursive practices that 
perpetuate the legal discursive formation have remained predominantly the same.  
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lectures, usually given by practitioners, and included mooting, or the practice of 
argument and debate. This training can be taken to have maintained a separable 
language (the use of Latin maxims persists today) and the traditions of using set 
‘carefully delimited’,
56 ‘authorised’
57 texts, cases and commentaries in the 
operation and repetition of the common law.  
 
From the perspective adopted here, twenty-first century law students are still 
constituted to act appropriately within the legal discursive formation. The law 
school can be seen as a ‘rite of reproduction: an institutionally managed trauma 
gives birth to a conforming or believing soul’.
58 ‘Put at its simplest students are 
perpetually hit over the head with the iron fist of deference to authority’.
59 By the 
time they graduate, from this perspective, law students have been trained to accept 
the discursive formation as the appropriate form of communal adjudication. In 
other words, the practices instituted by the discursive formation to train future 
practitioners involves the dispersal (to a select group) of ‘a knowledge which… 
allows for the reproduction, the repetition, of established legal forms’.
60 
 
To complement the institutionalised communication of accepted legal knowledge, 
prospective lawyers have had to gain practical experience before they are 
considered to be fully trained. Irrespective of the means of formal education for the 
aspiring lawyers, it has been a requirement since the seventeenth century that they 
                                                 
56 Murphy, W. T., ‘Reference without Reality: A Comment on a Commentary on Codifications of 
Practice’ (1990) 1 Law and Critique 61 at 62 
57 Douzinas, C., McVeigh, S. & Warrington, R., ‘Postlegality: After Education in the Law’ (1990) 1 
Law and Critique 81 at 85 
58 Goodrich, ‘Twining’s Tower’ at 901 
59 Douzinas et al, ‘Postlegality’ at 89 
60 Goodrich, ‘Twining’s Tower’ at 902  
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complete a period of articled clerkship before they can practise in their own right.
61 
This further “hands-on” experience meant that, prior to beginning to practise on 
their own, prospective lawyers can be understood to be fully prepared to act as 
lawyers should in carrying out the law.  
 
The Attorneys’ and Solicitors Act of 1728 set out the requirements that had to be 
met by prospective members of the legal profession. No person was to act as an 
attorney unless they had acted as an articled clerk for five years, been examined by 
a judge of the court to which they were applying, and had taken the appropriate 
oath.
62 Just over a century later, section 3 of the Solicitor’s Act of 1843 is headed: 
‘No person to be admitted a solicitor unless he shall have served a clerkship of five 
years, and have been examined’. From the perspective adopted in this thesis, this 
meant that Parliament had accorded to members of the legal discursive formation 
the rights of self-regulation and self-education.
63 The rise of university-based legal 
education in the middle of the nineteenth century resulted in a statute being passed 
that recognised the validity of that form of training, but prospective solicitors were 
still required to serve as articled clerks, though in this case for a period of only 
three years.
64 
 
Another form of vocational training that was provided through the discursive 
formation can be seen to be evidenced in the practices associated with the 
                                                 
61 Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History at 197 nt. 50 
62 2 Geo. II c. 23 ss 1-8. As an aside, in terms of the discussion of legal language in the next section, 
it was specified in the Act that admission was to be written in the English tongue, instead of the 
possible alternatives of Latin or Law French. 
63 Again, this did not mean that members of Parliament exercised free will in the passing of this Act. 
Those legal subjects who constitute the legislature and the executive have been constructed in such a 
way so as to accept this as the appropriate manner for conducting the legal system. They had no 
“choice” but to pass the statute that allowed the legal profession to regulate itself. 
64 Solicitor’s Act 1860 s. 2  
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appointment of judges. In the Appellate Jurisdiction Act,
65 for example, the Law 
Lords of the House of Lords may only be appointed after holding ‘high judicial 
office’ in England for at least two years, or after fifteen years as a barrister.
66 The 
most obvious reason for this discursive practice is that in order for the courts to run 
smoothly, new judges must be aware of court practices. The most efficient way of 
ensuring that judges know the rules is if they have been operating within them for a 
significant period of time. However, it can be seen that such a requirement also acts 
as a discursive practice to perpetuate the discursive formation. The court system 
will change little if those in control of the courts accept the practices of the 
institution, and they are likely to accept the practices if these practices are normal 
for them. 
 
Another practice involved in the perpetuation of the profession relates to the choice 
of candidates for promotion to the bench. As has been mentioned above, judges are 
appointed by the Crown. However, the Crown can only make such appointments in 
Council, with the advice of a selection of senior judges. This minimises any 
possibility for “political taint” in the process
67 and, as the advice taken is from 
practising judges,
68 it can be understood to privilege legal “bias” in judicial 
appointments. Again, the use of this tradition can be seen as a discursive practice 
                                                 
65 (1876) s. 6 
66 For judges in the High Court, the requirement is only ten years practice as a barrister (Supreme 
Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act (1925) s. 11 (1)). 
67 According to Baker ‘most of the judges appointed… after the seventeenth century conducted 
themselves with complete propriety in office; if judgeships were occasionally given as a reward for 
past service or friendship, the tradition of judicial independence was strong enough to prevail over 
party sentiments once the patent was sealed’ (An Introduction to English Legal History at 193, 
emphasis added). 
68 ‘The reasons why one candidate, rather than another, has been recommended to the Queen remain 
hidden in the files of the Lord Chancellor’s Department or concealed within the breasts of those 
senior judges amongst whom “soundings” have been taken.’ Pannick, D., Judges, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1988 at 66  
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that perpetuates the legal discursive formation. The profession will maintain its 
position if the judges are not only trained within the discursive formation, but also 
selected by members of the formation. Members of the profession are also largely 
responsible for the regulation of the practitioners. These techniques of self-
regulation will be examined next. 
 
* 
 
This final sub-section is an examination of the processes of self-regulation 
undertaken by members of the legal discursive formation. As has been seen above, 
the Inns of Court played a significant role in the training (the perpetuation of the 
practices) and the organisation of the profession. A decline in the power of the Inns 
after the turn of the eighteenth century led to other practices being instituted to act 
as a form of professional regulation. Institutions, such as the Society of Gentlemen 
Practisers in the Courts of Law and Equity and the Incorporated Law Society, were 
formed specifically for the regulation of lawyers.  
 
By 1700, the Inns of Court were accepted as the appropriate institutions for 
overseeing the conduct of the profession. The self-regulating aspect of the 
discursive formation can be considered to have been reinforced by the discursive 
practice that allowed one section of the Inns, the “benchers”, to control both 
admission to the Inns themselves and admission to practise at the Bar.
69 In addition 
                                                 
69 ‘Prior to his admission as a student of an Inn of Court the candidate was required to furnish a 
statement signed either by a Bencher or by two barristers.’ (Manchester, A.H., Modern Legal 
History, Butterworths, London, 1980 at 53)  
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to their educative role,
70 the four Inns were the sole adjudicators for admission to 
the Bar.
71 An applicant had to be accepted by the Inns to be accepted as a lawyer 
authorised to practise in court. 
 
The regulation of the discursive formation by a body, or bodies, constituted by 
members of the profession continued on from the eighteenth century.
72 In 1728, the 
Attornies and Solicitors Act authorised judges to examine applicants in terms of 
their character before the applicants could practise as lawyers. In the 1730s, the 
Society of Gentlemen Practisers in the Courts of Law and Equity was formed, with 
the first record of the organisation indicating that ‘the Meeting unanimously 
declared its utmost abhorrence of all male and unfair practice, and that it would do 
its utmost to detect and discountenance the same’.
73 The Society was considered to 
have imposed ‘professional control’ on the body of lawyers, raising the status of 
lawyers in the eyes of society as a whole.
74 
 
Parliament did not recognise the Society of Gentlemen Practisers as an institution 
of professional control, but it can be taken to have acted as a form of self-regulation 
in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
75 These techniques for discursive 
self-regulation were enhanced later in the nineteenth century by the institution of 
                                                 
70 There is some debate as to how seriously the Inns took their training responsibilities, see for 
example Mellinkoff, D., The Language of the Law, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1963, at 
195-196 
71 Abel-Smith, B. & Stevens, R., Lawyers and the Courts – A Sociological Study of the English 
Legal System 1750 – 1965, Heinemann, London, 1967 at 63 
72 By the time of the nineteenth century, however, the ‘Victorians themselves spoke of a “many 
headed” profession’, Cocks, R., Foundations of the Modern Bar, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1983 
at 2. There was no single, independent body overseeing the profession, but the mechanisms of self-
regulation by the discursive formation were still in place. 
73 cited in Holdsworth, W. S., A History of English Law, vol. 12, 1
st edition, Methuen, London, 1938 
at 63 
74 Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History at 187 
75 During this time, the Society changed its name to the Law Society.  
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the Incorporated Law Society.
76 The Society (the ‘Society of Attorneys Solicitors 
Proctors and others…’
77) was introduced to maintain the register of Solicitors and 
the records of the Articles of clerkship.
78 It was constituted by practising members 
of the legal profession. The Society was given the responsibility for conducting the 
examinations undertaken by prospective solicitors and issuing certificates to those 
who passed the examinations.
79 As a result, the Incorporated Law Society can be 
taken to have assumed the role previously delegated to the judges of the individual 
courts. These practices still represented Parliament authorising practising lawyers 
to regulate and discipline all lawyers, which can be seen as meaning effective self-
governance for the profession. 
 
This discursive self-regulation continues today. The Solicitor’s Act of 1974 
provides that for a solicitor to practise they must possess a certificate issued by the 
Law Society.
80 The responsibility of the Law Society extends beyond the issue of 
these certificates and the maintenance of the register of the practising solicitors.
81 
The Society is also empowered to ‘make regulations… about education and 
training for persons seeking to be admitted’.
82 This power is not held by the Society 
alone, but must be undertaken with the concurrence of the Lord Chancellor, the 
Lord Chief Justice and the Master of the Rolls, thereby maintaining the role of 
members of the discursive formation in the constitution of future members of the 
discursive formation. 
                                                 
76 This organisation was not directly linked to the institution formerly known as the Society of 
Gentlemen Practisers. 
77 Solicitor’s Act 1888, s. 4 
78 Solicitor’s Act 1888, ss. 5, 7 respectively. 
79 Solicitor’s Act 1877, ss. 6, 5 respectively. 
80 Solicitor’s Act 1974, s. 1. 
81 s. 6 
82 s. 2  
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Before addressing the processes of change in the formation, it is worth emphasising 
the central theme of this section. Since the end of the seventeenth century, there can 
be understood to have been a separable institution, the legal discursive formation, 
that has perpetuated and maintained the legal system as an independent 
organisation involved in societal governance. The main discursive practices that 
have constituted this discursive formation can be taken to relate to the techniques of 
training and education and the practices of discipline within the profession. From 
this perspective, the legal profession has long acted as a discursive formation, as it 
has possessed control over how future lawyers are taught and how practicing 
lawyers are regulated. 
 
PROCESSES OF CHANGE IN THE LEGAL DISCURSIVE FORMATION 
 
As was discussed in Chapter One, the practices of repetition and reiteration are 
central to any discourse or discursive formation. However, for a discursive 
formation to persist despite variations in surrounding discourses and events, it must 
have the potential for discursive change. From the perspective adopted here, this 
potential will exist only when the discursive formation includes practices that allow 
for change. These practices that allow for change must operate, however, in a way 
that does do not affect the integrity or legitimacy of the discursive function itself. 
That is, for any discourse or discursive formation to persist it must be able to 
maintain its integrity while it incorporates change. The relationship between the 
law and the legal profession discussed in this thesis provides a particular 
understanding of the continuities and the discontinuities of the law. This section  
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includes a focus on the possibilities of change, of discontinuity, that, from the 
perspective adopted here, function within the legal discursive formation.  
The first issue that needs to be addressed concerns the nature of change within the 
legal discursive formation. One of the features of the common law system is its 
‘always/already’ nature.
83 The law does not provide itself with a point of origin. 
The ‘law and legal doctrine are presented as timeless and ageless’.
84 Each decision 
is, in a sense, ahistorical. The historical context of any legal statement is treated as 
immaterial, as long as it is still deemed to be applicable to the case at hand.  
 
The law has changed but has also remained unchanged as a form of adjudication. 
This is possible as the law can be understood to change incrementally, that is, on a 
case by case basis. From the perspective adopted here, the law changes slowly 
through the repetition of single legal statements, usually written in courts of review. 
These processes are examined in this section. 
 
The “always/already” nature of the law can be understood to co-exist with the 
practices of appeal that are a major part of the discourse. Every judicial decision, in 
the account developed here, involves a statement of law. Every appeal seeks to 
change the legal statement, every appeal seeks a new statement of the law. From 
this perspective, every appeal seeks to change the law. The appeal system itself, 
then, can be understood as the main discursive practice that enables change in the 
legal discursive formation. In more abstract terms, it can be seen as a restatement of 
the “paradox of iterability” described by Derrida and discussed in Chapter One. 
                                                 
83 ‘Objects of legal governance, like other objects of governance, are “always-already” there, they 
have a past, possibly with beginnings, but they do not have origins in the sense of a determining 
genesis’ (Hunt & Wickham, Foucault and Law at 109). 
84 Conaghan & Mansell, The Wrongs of Tort at 63  
 
99
 
The discursive practices “repeat themselves originarily, to alter themselves so as to 
have the value of origin, to conserve themselves”. That is, the law, through its 
constant repetition and re-statement, maintains this power of origin and, as a result, 
the validity of the discursive function. 
 
From this perspective, at the core of the legal discursive formation lies the 
discursive practice of the repetition of past legal statements. As I have indicated 
above, this practice is taken to be wider than the practice that is known as the 
doctrine of precedent. This will be examined in greater depth in the last section of 
this chapter. For the moment, however, it is worth noting that this practice is 
understood to contribute in substantial ways to the “always/already” nature of the 
law and legal discursive formation. The practice reflects the practices of argument 
in which previous decisions maintain their legal validity and are used in argument 
by lawyers and judges in their statements of the law. From this perspective, the 
principle also informs the relative authority of each legal statement. This practice 
has been part of the law for centuries. Whatever variations there have been in the 
practices of the legal discursive formation and the specifics of the application of the 
legal statements, the use of past judgments in legal argument has remained a 
constant. 
 
The use of past legal statements relies on the presumption that past decisions are 
repeatable. That is, words contained in previous judgments must be allowed, by the 
practices of the discursive formation, to be restated in later legal arguments and 
decisions. For this to be the case, the judgments have to fit criteria that, within the 
discursive formation, make them available for repetition. These criteria include the 
role of the speaker, and the context of the words spoken.  
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[F]or a decision to be just and responsible, it must, in its proper 
moment if there is one, be both regulated and without regulation: it 
must conserve the law and also destroy or suspend it enough to have 
to reinvent it in each case, rejustify it, at least reinvent it in the 
reaffirmation and the new and free confirmation of its principle.
85  
From this perspective, each judicial statement destroys and conserves the law.
86 
Each judgment is treated as a re-invention of the law. Each written decision is taken 
to constitute a site of both legal continuity and discontinuity. This re-creation, or re-
iteration, of legal decisions forms the basis of change in the law.  
 
When judges write judgments they have a choice as to which past legal statements 
they will use as reasons in their statement of the law. They have a choice as to 
which previous statements they repeat. This choice is not free. It is controlled by a 
variety of legal practices (including jurisdiction and the position of the court in the 
legal hierarchy). One of the significant practices, for the purposes of this project, is 
the presentation to the court of statements, usually in the form of precedents, by 
counsel.  
 
This offering of statements by counsel can be seen as an example of Foucault’s 
understanding of the productive nature of power.
87 For Foucault, the ‘individual is 
an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that 
effect, it is the element of its articulation’.
88 Therefore, opposing counsel can be 
considered to be sites of different articulations of power. Further, Foucault also 
                                                 
85 Derrida, ‘Force of Law’ at 23 
86 It has been argued that Derrida was suggesting that a ‘just, free and responsible decision cannot be 
made entirely without normative guidance’ (Davies, M., Asking the Law Question, 2
nd edition, Law 
Book Company, Sydney, 2002 at 348). From the perspective adopted in this thesis, the “normative 
guidance” can be understood to be the discursive practices in which the judges have been trained. 
87 Discussed above in Chapter One. 
88 ‘Two Lectures’ at 98  
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considered that ‘there are no relations of power without resistances; the latter are all 
the more real and effective because they are formed right at the point where 
relations of power are exercised’.
89 Argument by counsel can be considered to be 
sites of resistance and the exercise of power within the law. 
 
From the perspective adopted here, the common law is a process in which 
statements by particular judges in specific cases are valorised, primarily through 
repetition, until the alternative utterances are largely, but never completely, 
excluded. This process can be seen as an exercise of power. It is these statements 
that largely exclude all others that, in this view, come to be taken as the law.  
 
A decision, in which a “precedent” is followed, can be understood as a moment in 
which a judge chooses to repeat a specific statement of law by a preceding judge as 
the law. While their choice is affected by the structure of the discursive formation, 
a decision is as much a process of refusing other possible statements as it is one 
identifying the law. These other possible statements could have been refused on the 
grounds that they were not relevant, or the statements could have been rejected as 
the facts of the two cases were too different, or even that the legal statement in 
question had no legal weight as it was merely obiter. Another set of statements 
open to judges when they seek to resist past legal statements is those that relate to 
“public policy” or the “common good”. Such statements of resistance can be seen 
simply as a device through which judges can evade the effects of judicial 
hierarchies and make possible the restatement of otherwise distant or apparently 
less available statements of law. 
 
                                                 
89 ‘Powers and Strategies’ in Gordon, Power/Knowledge at 142  
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Some of the training techniques of the profession also provide practices that allow 
for and perpetuate change. The discursive formation can be seen to function as an 
hierarchical institution. The members of the legal profession have been trained to 
learn from senior members of the profession. The members of the profession are 
also trained to accept “new” legal statements from the most senior members of the 
judiciary. That is, the students, lawyers and lower order judges have been trained to 
accept re-formulations in the statements of the law from the courts of review, 
especially from the “peak” courts of review. The nature of the common law, as it is 
taught, includes a recognition that precedents, or more generally, statements of law, 
change and are expected to change. Members of the legal discursive formation are 
trained to expect, and accept, these changes. Lawyers and judges can be understood 
to be constituted to incorporate the latest statements of the law, as articulated by the 
courts of review, into the category of repeatable legal statements. This construction 
of the members of the legal discursive formation also applies to other relevant legal 
statements, such as new statutes or delegated regulations. 
 
Members of the legal discursive formation can be understood to be trained under a 
substantially similar set of discursive practices. This, however, does not mean that 
they practise law in an identical manner. This slight variation in the construction of 
the different members of the formation can also be taken to account for a degree of 
discursive change. Even during the processes of formal legal education, each 
student may develop an interest in different areas of law and will be exposed to 
different statements of law. When these students have graduated, the cases in which 
they may be involved will lead them to search through preceding statements of the 
law that might assist their clients. Therefore, a variety of responses and precedents 
will be sought when a legal argument is being constructed in any given fact  
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situation. This is particularly so if the legal point in question is a new one. These 
differences in legal experience and education may produce different legal 
arguments for any new set of circumstances, and may produce change in the 
discursive formation. 
 
Further, the education of future members of the profession will lead them to 
produce different legal arguments based on the same facts. The practice of mooting, 
of arguing from an arbitrary position in a hypothetical situation, can be understood 
to train students to search out various statements that might apply to a legal 
problem. The use of hypothetical fact situations in set papers for examination can 
also be understood to train prospective members of the discursive formation to 
develop different arguments for any particular fact situation. When these students 
become practitioners, therefore, they are already adept at seeking multiple legal 
statements for a given set of circumstances. From such statements, they choose the 
best statement for their purposes. This legal argument may result in the adoption of 
a different statement from the presiding judge from that which might normally be 
expected.
90 Such legal arguments reflect the discontinuous nature of the law. 
 
All these discursive practices mean that the law can change over time on a case by 
case basis. Each legal argument can be taken to present a new ordering of past legal 
statements. Each new judgment can be understood as a new valorisation of a legal 
statement. Each judgment will engage with and make a set of legal statements. 
Some of these will be referred to later as the ratio, some as obiter and some will be 
ignored. Each judge in a court of review has the opportunity to repeat any statement 
                                                 
90 One unexpected statement does not change the law, though.  
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of that past judgment, or they can ignore that judgment altogether. In this manner, 
the law can change incrementally.  
 
As the formation constructs the behaviours and words of its subjects, the judges 
and lawyers will repeat the statements available within the discourse in the manner 
in which they are trained. However, given the variation in the subjects’ education, 
there may be the occasional “maverick”, who, whilst complying to a large extent 
with the form and content of the formation, will be considered to be on the “fringe” 
of the discursive formation. These “mavericks” still function as members of the 
legal discursive formation, as they perpetuate the necessary discursive practices. 
They still sit on the bench and hand down decisions in the required manner. Their 
maverick status, however, stems from the statements that they repeat in their 
judgments.  
 
The words of these subjects will still be considered part of the formation. These 
mavericks, however, tend to be the judges who provide a more radical perspective 
on the case before them. These mavericks tend to be the judges who provide the 
possibility of the law heading in a “new” direction. The novelty of the direction is 
still entirely linked to the past legal statements upon which they are basing their 
judgment. As long as both the act and the content of the “maverick” statements are 
within the limits of the legal norms of behaviour, the statement will be repeatable 
by future judges. If the words are spoken in the appropriate context, the statements 
may be repeated and discursive change may take place as a result of this repetition. 
 
Most “maverick” statements are first introduced into the discourse in a dissenting 
judgment. Their status as “maverick” means that it is unlikely that they will be  
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repeated by a majority of judges in any judicial decision. These “maverick” 
judgments are still repeatable legal statements, however, as they still comply with 
the criteria for availability for repetition. A dissenting judgment remains a 
statement of the law produced by a discursively constructed judge. A dissenting 
judgment can be repeated as a legal statement by a later judge, and may be the ratio 
of a later judgment. These dissenting judgments cannot disappear and may come to 
be that which is repeated within the formation, as they are still permitted to be used 
in future legal argument. 
 
Change can occur in the law and legal discursive formation, from the perspective 
adopted here, because these discursive functions allow for change. The members of 
the formation are taken to have been constituted to accept, and participate in, 
practices of discursive change. Again, this is not a conscious decision on their part. 
Lawyers and judges are constructed to choose between two (or more) competing 
legal statements. “Normal” lawyers and judges are constructed to repeat the most 
often repeated statement or to repeat the statement that will most help their 
position, given the nature of the circumstances to which the legal statement is to 
apply. These competing statements may include statutes, majority or dissenting 
judgments or, occasionally, legal text books.  
 
Any such legal statement can be introduced into legal argument. Therefore, any 
legal statement can be used in order to win an appeal and this may contribute to 
legal change. Some judgments are considered more repeatable because of the 
succinctness of the legal expression or because they have been repeated on many 
occasions. In short, certain decisions are more “quotable”.  
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Every new legal statement can include the repetition of exact words or the 
paraphrasing of previous legal statements. Every paraphrasing of a preceding legal 
statement can be seen as minimal discursive change. A judge may paraphrase a 
previous legal statement for the purposes of clarity, or perhaps to include a specific 
reference to the details of the case for which the judgment is being written. Each 
example of paraphrasing can be understood to be both a restatement of the law and 
the production of a new legal statement that is open to be repeated by later lawyers 
and judges. 
 
Alternatively, a decision could reflect a major inflection in the discourse. The 
greater the perceived change in the statements of the law, the more likely the 
judgment will be appealed. The results of that appeal would provide more legal 
statements that might reinforce or diminish the degree of legal change. Irrespective 
of its degree, from this perspective, any legal change must be sought in the 
documents of the discursive formation, usually in the law reports. The practices 
that relate to the writing of such documents will be examined in the next section. 
This discussion will further illustrate the practices that are typical of the legal 
discursive formation and will provide a background for the later exploration of the 
practice of repeating previous legal statements. 
 
WRITTEN LAW AS DISCURSIVE PRACTICE 
 
This section deals with one of the dominant forms of discursive practice that, from 
the perspective adopted in this thesis, constructs both the law and the legal 
discursive formation. It describes the importance of the formation as a written form  
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of adjudication, as a ‘profession of words’.
91 The focus will be on the importance 
of the written in the practices of the legal profession because it is the written 
judgments that will become the monuments to be excavated in the application of an 
archaeological method. As Goodrich wrote, ‘to understand the common law… is to 
try to understand it as a form of inheritance and judgment, repetition and 
commentary’.
92 The written, whether it is in the form of judgment or commentary, 
is fundamental to an understanding of the law. 
 
* 
 
The archaeological analysis that is to follow in Chapter Four is, ‘as its name 
indicates only too obviously, the description of the record’.
93 Therefore, some 
discussion is required as to what constitutes the “record”, and more specifically, of 
what constitutes the written “record” in terms of the law. As in the previous 
sections, it will be necessary to undertake a “history” of the formation before 1750 
to characterise the discursive practices of legal writing that operated in 1750. 
Therefore, this section will provide a “history” of legal language, law reporting, 
and of the use of legal commentaries, both pre- and post-1750. This discussion of 
the practices of law reporting will lead into the last section of this chapter, a more 
detailed discussion of the practice of repeating past legal statements.  
 
The use of language in the history of the law and the legal discursive formation 
seems almost irrelevant in the study of law today. And, in the sense that English 
has been the dominant legal tongue for the past few centuries, it is not a contentious 
                                                 
91 Mellinkoff, The Language of the Law at vii 
92 Goodrich, ‘Poor Illiterate Reason’ at 8 
93 Foucault, ‘History, Discourse and Discontinuity’ at 234, emphasis in original.  
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issue. However, the regulation of the language of the courts, both written and 
spoken, can be seen as a particularly good example of a discursive practice. An 
examination of the changes in the languages of choice of the law seems to provide 
an insight into the discursive formation. 
 
1066 can be treated as a significant marker in the history of the common law. For 
the invasion of Britain by William of Normandy can be understood to have 
constituted a major disruption to previous forms of governance. Not only did 
William I centralise the administration of justice,
94 he also introduced the Norman 
language to the forms of governance in England.  
 
While the English law was developing, its main vocabulary was 
Anglo-Saxon... As a result of the Norman Conquest in 1066, 
Norman-French became substituted for Anglo-Saxon as the 
language of the law... The official language of records and Statutes 
after 1066 was Latin... Statutes came to be drafted later in French, 
and oral legal language became English in the fourteenth century. 
Having made their contributions, French died out by the sixteenth 
century, and Latin ceased to be used for the records in the 
eighteenth.
95  
The use of a language that was not that of the majority of the population limited the 
access that the general population had to the forms and practices of the law. The 
power that comes with access to the words of the law is unavailable to those who 
cannot communicate in that language. The autonomy of the legal discursive 
formation was enhanced by the separation of the language of the general population 
from the language of the law. This linguistic divide expanded with ‘[c]ourt hand’ 
becoming ‘more and more specialised until at last only those who had to write it 
                                                 
94 ‘Yet justice was a source of revenue and a sign of power; it was to the king’s advantage to have as 
many cases heard by his court [as opposed to the local, manorial courts] as possible. The solution 
was to send out circuit judges - delegates of the central court - armed with new and efficacious 
procedures’ Strayer, J. R., On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1970 at 39 
95 Kiralfy, A., ‘Law and Right in English Legal History’ (1985) 6 Journal of Legal History 49 at 50  
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could read it’.
96 The creation of a distinct group of practitioners can be understood 
to have been both promoted, and perpetuated, by the use of a language that was not 
shared by people outside the association. 
 
The birth of English nationalism in the sixteenth century resulted in an emphasis on 
the value of an “English” tongue.
97 There was pressure for change as ‘the law of the 
land should not be hidden in Latin and old French but should be in English so that 
“every Free-man may reade it as well as lawyers”’.
98 This position was not adopted 
immediately within the legal profession, however. The use of Latin and Law 
French was abolished for the period of the Commonwealth.
99 But these exclusive 
languages returned to use with the restoration of the monarchy.
100 The growth of 
new legal areas, which did not have a history of French or Latin terminology, and 
an increase in the number of reports translated into English, however, meant that 
lawyers who only knew their native tongue could still function relatively 
effectively as officers of the court.
101 The shift back to the use of English as the 
official language of the courts occurred in 1731.
102 
 
The greater use of the English language was encouraged by the invention of the 
printing press. The ability to mechanically reproduce texts had a marked effect on 
                                                 
96 Pollock, F., ‘The Origins of the Inns of Court’ at 166 n 2 
97 Greenfeld, L., Nationalism - Five Roads to Modernity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
1992 at 69-70 
98 John Lilburne quoted in Eisenstein, E., The Printing Press as an Agent of Change, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1979 at 362 
99 Holdsworth, W. S., A History of English Law, vol. 6, 2
nd edition, Methuen, London, 1937 at 571 
100 However, even in the early seventeenth century it was likely that the lawyers were thinking in 
English and translating to Law French just for the record (Bryson, W. H., ‘Law Reports in England 
from 1603 to 1660’ in Stebbings, C. (ed), Law Reporting in Britain, Hambledon Press, London, 
1995 at 121). 
101 Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol. 6 at 572 
102 An Act that all proceedings in courts of justice within that part of Great Britain called England, 
and in the court of exchequer in Scotland, shall be in the English language. 4 Geo. II c.26  
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legal practices. The introduction of the press can also be understood to have 
brought ‘more order and method’
103 to the organisation of public documents.
104 
Most importantly, it became possible to reproduce accurately the writings of 
reporters and judges on a larger scale.
105 At an even broader discursive level, it 
meant that the spelling of words began to be standardised
106 and a particular dialect 
was promoted, through publication, as the dominant dialect. This dialect was that of 
London, and with its connections with the dialect of the East Midlands,
107 it 
became what we now call English.
108 This is not to say that all who speak English 
can understand the language of the legal discourse of governance. Just as the 
members of the legal discursive formation are a subset of legal subjects, the legal 
language can be treated as a separable subset of English.
109 
 
* 
 
The nature and practices of legal education also changed after the advent of the 
printing press.
110 Future lawyers are, and have been for centuries, trained, in part, 
                                                 
103 Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change at 105 
104 For example, when John Rastell produced his “Great Boke of Statutes 1530-1533” he included a 
chronological register of the statutes from 1327 to 1523, the first time such a history had been made 
available to the public (id). 
105 It also created the possibility of books of standard legal forms and legal dictionaries (Graham, H., 
‘The Rastells and the Printed English Law Book of the Renaissance’ (1954) 47 Law Library Journal 
6 at 21-23). 
106 Bryson, B., Mother Tongue – The English Language, Penguin, London, 1990 at 118 
107 Ibid at 52 
108 Indeed, it is the shift in the language from Latin and Law French to English that provides another 
justification for the starting point of this thesis (that is, 1750). An archaeology requires an 
understanding of the texts in themselves as monuments and, therefore, a translation of a case from 
another language could diminish its value as a monument, diminishing the value of an 
archaeological analysis. 
109 ‘Only the lawyer can exploit the capabilities of the language of the law, he [sic] alone even 
recognise some of its limitations.’ Mellinkoff, The Language of the Law at 454 
110 Prest, W.R., ‘The Learning Exercises at the Inns of Court 1590-1640’ (1967) 9 The Journal of 
the Society of Public Teachers of Law 301 at 310, although ‘[d]espite the proliferation of printed 
texts, the aural exercises survived as an integral part of learning the law’ (ibid at 313).  
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through the analysis of judgments and commentaries. The use of the written word 
(in the form of cases and legal texts) is one technique for training lawyers in the 
differences between legal English and lay English. With the introduction of the 
printing press, the opportunity arose for written judgments, as well as legal 
commentaries, to be disseminated on a relatively large scale. Not only were these 
commentaries used in legal training, they also became available to all who could 
read.
111 It was not the first time that the written law spread beyond the narrow 
confines of the profession;
112 however, it was the first time, since the rise in the 
power of the legal profession, that legal texts became widely available.
113 
 
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, works by noted authors such as 
Fitzherbert, Coke and Hale, were printed.
114 The most famous set of legal notes, the 
Commentaries of Blackstone, were produced in the mid-eighteenth century. ‘The 
first edition appeared in 1765… the ease of its style and clearness of its exposition 
made it exceedingly popular’.
115 Blackstone ‘intended to teach law to laymen’
116 as 
well as providing instruction at Oxford. Within the context of the legal discursive 
formation, Blackstone’s work has been represented as the ‘first textbook of a new 
legal era’.
117 Its publication dealt a severe blow to the ‘view that law “cannot be 
taught out of books”’.
118 
                                                 
111 ‘Literacy was exceptionally widespread in sixteenth century England; only the bottom of the 
social ladder remained unaffected’ (Greenfeld, Nationalism at 54). 
112 ‘[Bracton’s] works…became very popular, so that it was translated into Anglo-Norman in the 
middle of the 13
th century’ (Potter, An Introduction to the History of English Law at 33). 
113 What is not known is the effect that this availability had on the wider population. Irrespective of 
any such effects, the practices of the profession meant that outsiders, even with some knowledge of 
the legal language, remained outsiders. 
114 These texts started to show a ‘shift of emphasis in legal science from common learning to 
authoritative case law’, Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History at 216 
115 Potter, An Introduction to the History of English Law at 39 
116 Hanbury, H. G., ‘Blackstone in Retrospect’ (1950) 66 Law Quarterly Review 318 at 321 
117 Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History at 220 
118 Hanbury, ’Blackstone in Retrospect’ at 324  
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Since that time, and particularly since the nineteenth century, legal education can 
be argued to have become more focussed on commentaries and case notes. From 
the perspective adopted here, such texts can be treated as the “authorised texts” of 
the discursive formation. At a practical level, the use of printed texts meant that 
larger groups of students could be taught efficiently. This can be argued to have 
suited the development of the university as a site of legal training. In terms of the 
legal discursive formation, legal education could then ‘deal in a vision of the 
reading of texts, without the distractions of giving legal discourse any materiality. 
In this process of reading it is assumed that it is the text, the written text as Holy 
Book’.
119  
 
The use of Commentaries by legal students and practitioners can be understood to 
be another exclusionary legal discursive practice.
120 This use of case notes and 
commentaries may be taken to create a separation, a ‘logical and strict divide 
between theory and practice, between education and the real world’.
121 This can be 
argued to have resulted in the removal of the “materiality” of the cases. Treated in 
this manner, cases and details of the cases can be understood to have taken on an 
immaterial, ahistorical, or contextless role in the discursive formation. The words, 
as presented in the cases and commentaries, became important in themselves, 
without reference to the lives of plaintiffs or defendants. From the perspective 
adopted here, the claims of the Commentaries became norms, the legal common 
                                                 
119 Douzinas at al, ‘Postlegality’ at 86-87 
120 Case law can be read by legal subjects who are not members of the legal discursive formation. 
The discursive practices of the legal profession do not encourage “outsiders” to read judgments 
however, and the language used by the judges assumes a level of understanding of the law that is 
greater than that possessed by most legal subjects. 
121 Douzinas at al, ‘Postlegality’ at 87. Of course, the “logical” nature of the divide is a construction 
of the discursive formation.  
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standards, against which future fact situations could be compared. For this 
technique to be effective there had to be a reliable record of the judgments 
delivered in past cases.  
 
The history of reported cases goes back several centuries, but the format, and 
reliability, of the earlier reports is markedly different from the law reports available 
today. The tradition of the legal profession maintaining a record of cases for their 
own use goes back to the reign of Edward I.
122 This practice produced the Year 
Books, a description of the events in the king’s courts based on eye-witness 
accounts. These texts were anonymous. There is no way, therefore, of knowing the 
degree of legal training possessed by their authors. Originally, they were in hand-
written form, but within a decade of the introduction of the printing press to 
England the Year Books began to be machine printed.
123 Further, according to 
Holdsworth, the ‘introduction of printing directly affected the accustomed modes of 
publishing the reports’ and the Year Books ‘ceased to appear in Henry VIII’s 
reign’.
124  
 
The end of the Year Books coincided with an apparent change in the practices of 
reporting cases. One of the more significant shifts was to the naming of the 
reporting authors. The reporters were now known to be ‘mostly eminent judges or 
practitioners’.
125 The legal background of the writers can be recognised to have 
contributed to the utility of the reports for the profession, and, from this 
perspective, to the perpetuation of the practices of the legal discursive formation as 
                                                 
122 Prior to that time there was the Record of Writs, but that was a product of both the Chancery and 
the legal profession (Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol. 2 at 525) 
123 Ibid at 528 
124 Ibid at 542. The last Year Book is of the Trinity Term 27 Henry VIII. 
125 Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol. 5 at 355  
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they existed then. There were no official reports at the time and the notes taken by 
the reporters were primarily for their own use.
126 This did not mean, however, that 
the collections of cases were not circulated or published.
127  
 
Early recording practices had limitations, particularly concerning the material that 
was recorded. There was a lack of a standard format in the presentation of the 
material, and no standardised approach to the choice of which cases to record. This 
is understandable given the purpose of their production, that is, the personal use of 
the recorder. As a result, the reports ‘may be taken as a faithful representation of 
the author’s personal opinions, and whether or not it was later accepted as an 
authoritative source of law, it is not necessarily to be relied on for any statements of 
fact it contains’.
128  
 
One of the first writers to change their approach to reporting was Sir Edmund 
Plowden. He, and in this he was followed by Coke, considered that a law report 
should be a ‘reasoned exposition of law’. On this basis he ‘selected for publication 
only those cases in which questions of law were raised for solemn argument upon 
demurrer, special verdict, or motion in banc’.
129 Coke also intended his Reports to 
be ‘instructional law books built around actual cases’.
130 The records of Plowden 
and Coke can be seen as part of a discursive formation that constituted its case law 
                                                 
126 ‘By the time of Elizabeth I many, if not most, of the judges were keeping reports of some kind’ 
(Baker, J. H., The Legal Profession and the Common Law – Historical Essays, Hambledon Press, 
London, 1986 at 450), suggesting that the judges took notes to assist them in their own future 
decision making processes. 
127 Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol. 5 at 364-365 
128 Baker, The Legal Profession and the Common Law at 441 
129 Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History at 210. A “motion in banc” was a procedure by 
which a question of law could be raised after a trial and be argued before the full bench of the court 
(ibid at 98-101). 
130 Id   
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to be an ahistorical and objective record of the legal discursive formation. James I’s 
appointment of two official reporters
131 can also be seen to be a recognition of the 
need for an accurate record of decisions in order to maintain the judicial practices 
and to maintain the procedures of precedent.
132 These practices did not guarantee 
the quality of the reports, however, particularly in the latter half of the seventeenth 
century.
133 
 
The quality, or lack of it, of the reports is not, in itself, important. The fact that 
reported cases from the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries can still be 
used in a court of law is, in this context, what is important. Any reported case used 
in counsels’ argument will tend to be assessed by the judges on a number of 
grounds. Any legal statement that can be drawn from any of the early reports is still 
considered available for repetition. One of the criteria used by judges in choosing 
between the available legal statements is the age of the statement. A judge will not 
refuse to “hear” legal statements, however, purely on the basis that the case in 
which they occur is two, three or four hundred years old. It must be noted, though, 
that the greater the age of a precedent, the greater the likelihood that it could be 
distinguished solely on its facts. 
 
In 1865, a new discursive practice for the official recording of decisions was 
instituted. The production and dissemination of the official reports were in the 
                                                 
131 Baker, The Legal Profession and the Common Law at 453 
132 The renewal of the royal practice of licensing printers for ‘all books concerning the common 
laws of this realm’ can be seen as a mechanism for controlling the number, and therefore the quality, 
of publications of cases, particularly as it was ‘by special allowance of the lord chancellor, or lord 
keeper of the great seal of England for the time being, the lord chief justices, and the lord chief 
baron, or one or more of them, by their, or one of their appointments’ (12&13 Car.2 c. 33 (1662)). 
133 ‘The reports of the period 1650-1750 were mostly of an inferior nature’ (Baker, An Introduction 
to English Legal History at 210); whereas, according to Bryson, ‘After 1660, the reports appear to 
be reasonably full and reliable’ (‘Law Reports in England from 1603 to 1660’ at 113).  
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control of the Incorporated Council of Law Reporting, assisted by the General 
Council of the Bar.
134 Again, this can be taken to illustrate the legal discursive 
formation controlling the discursive practices that construct, and perpetuate, the 
legal discursive formation and the law itself. 
 
That official reports have been available since 1865 does not mean that the 
practices of reporting have not changed. Between 1875 and 1940 there were 
significant changes in the style and content of the reported judgments. The average 
length increased and there were fewer references to sources outside the English 
common law.
135 Not all cases were included in the official reports, although all 
cases were recorded. Only those decisions that were considered to change, or add, 
something to the body of reported cases were included.  
 
These recording practices continue today. They mean that few magistrates’ 
decisions are repeated, but a large percentage of the cases taken to the House of 
Lords are officially reported. From the perspective adopted here, the Law Lords are 
members of the legal discursive formation who have undergone the most training, 
or “normalisation”, and who have been taken to have demonstrated particular 
ability in the legal practices. The recognition of this ability can be seen as another 
discursive practice of the profession that contributes to the hierarchisation of the 
discursive formation. Senior judges can be understood to have been given the 
privileged position to “speak” for the legal discursive formation. They are the 
judges whose judgments are most likely to be included in the law reports. In other 
                                                 
134 Veeder, Van Vechten, ‘The English Reports, 1537-1865’ in Select Essays in Anglo-American 
Legal History Volume 2, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1908 at 154 
135 These other sources had included ‘civilian writers, custom and citations from foreign 
jurisdictions’ (Hedley, S., ‘Words, Words, Words: Making Sense of Legal Judgments, 1875-1940’ 
in Stebbings, Law Reporting in Britain at 169-170).  
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words, from the perspective adopted here, the discursive practice of the reporting of 
judgments privileges the voices of senior judges.  
 
Most reported cases arise from courts of review. The majority of decisions used as 
precedents in the arguing of cases, therefore, are from courts of review. In the past 
hundred and fifty years, these courts have been known as appellate courts. There 
were no courts of this title prior to the mid-nineteenth century. However, earlier 
decisions of the courts of first instance were still open to review by higher courts. 
Therefore, the phrase “courts of review” is used in this thesis rather than the more 
contemporary “appellate courts”. 
 
The fact that most of the reported cases arise from courts of review produces a 
particular effect in terms of the importance of a judgment within the legal 
discursive formation. When a case is argued on appeal, there is no debate as to the 
interpretation of the evidence adduced at the original trial.
136 That is, cases can be 
appealed on findings of law, not fact. The findings based on evidence are as 
accepted by the courts of first instance; questions as to the facts in themselves are 
not asked on appeal. This means that the language heard in the appeal courts can be 
understood to be that of the legal discursive formation itself. No expert evidence is 
heard, no vernacular is used, no foreign languages are spoken (save for the residual 
Latin maxims that are part of the language of the courts). Therefore, the officially 
reported cases can be treated as “pure” law and, from this perspective, constitute 
another expression of the legal discursive formation qua the legal discursive 
formation. 
                                                 
136 While some appeals can be based on the introduction of fresh evidence, the reported cases that 
constitute shifts in the common law are, with few exceptions, those in which the grounds of appeal 
are legal rather than factual.  
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The written English common law can be understood to be a set of discursive 
practices that construct the subjects of the discursive formation and the discursive 
formation itself. Particularly since the eighteenth century, the English legal 
profession has used a fairly consistent range of writing practices that can be taken 
to have perpetuated the discursive formation as an independent body for judging 
defendants. The language used has remained fairly constant, and constantly 
separable from that of subjects who have not been constructed by the discursive 
formation. Whilst there have been changes in the specific techniques of training, 
the practices of education have maintained a focus on the use of written 
commentaries and the repetition of statements from past judgments. The practices 
of reporting may have changed over the centuries, but since the Renaissance, there 
has always been an acceptance of the relevance and validity of past decisions. The 
next section will focus on the constitutive qualities of the practice of repetition of 
past legal statements. This will further illustrate the relationship that is constructed 
through this reading of Foucault’s work between the legal profession and the law. It 
will also stress the importance of repetition and the utility of an archaeological 
method in an examination of a series of judgments. 
 
THE REPETITION OF PAST LEGAL STATEMENTS AS THE 
PREDOMINANT DISCURSIVE PRACTICE WITHIN THE LEGAL 
DISCURSIVE FORMATION 
 
This section is intended to provide an examination of the role of the legal practice 
of the repeating of legal statements from preceding judgments in the common law. 
It is intended to draw together many of the threads of the chapter. The use of 
previous legal statements can be understood to be a discursive practice that  
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constitutes and constructs the legal discursive formation. It also can be taken to 
reinforce the relationship between the discursive formation and the law. The 
practice is fundamental to that relationship as, from the perspective adopted here, it 
is constitutive of both the profession and the law.  
 
The role, and use, of past decisions in the operation of the legal discursive 
formation have been discussed and analysed since the time of Fitzherbert, if not 
Bracton.
137 The practice of referring to past legal statements can be argued to be as 
old as the profession itself. According to Holdsworth, the practice of following 
previous decisions dates back at least to 1304.
138 Whereas others have argued that it 
was after the advent of the printing press that ‘the judicial conscience was haunted 
by suggestions of what a predecessor might have decided’.
139  
 
Usually the practice has been considered in terms of the “doctrine of precedent” or 
stare decisis.
140 Those who have discussed these concepts previously have 
considered them only as interpretive techniques. This perspective, while useful, is 
inadequate for this understanding of the practice of the repetition of past legal 
statements. The aim of this section is to establish the importance, for this analysis, 
of the practice to the common law.
141  
                                                 
137 Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History at 225-227 
138 Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol. 2 at 541 
139 Mellinkoff, The Language of the Law at 140 
140 It was not until the eighteenth century that the terms “precedent” and “stare decisis” entered the 
English law dictionaries (Mellinkoff, id). It should be noted that I will be using the phrases “stare 
decisis” and “doctrine of precedent” almost interchangeably. I recognise that stare decisis is more 
precisely seen as a narrow, rigid subset of the wider doctrine of precedent. This distinction is less 
relevant, for the purposes of this sub-section, as I am seeking to compare these narrower 
characterisations with the wider practice of the repetition of previous legal statements. 
141 The variations in the interpretation of stare decisis over the years is well covered in Goldstein, 
Laurence (ed), Precedent in Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987. It is clear, however, that even in 
the eighteenth century, the courts considered themselves “bound” by certain decisions. In one of the 
judgments covered in Chapter Four, the court held that ‘If the plaintiffs had sustained the injury by  
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In this section, I seek to indicate the manner in which the practice of repetition 
functions as a discursive practice. When understood as a constitutive discursive 
practice, repetition can be treated as a mechanism of control within the legal 
discursive formation. The focus in this section is on the operation of the practice of 
repetition as a form of regulation which empowers judges to speak for, and on 
behalf of, the law. The argument can be understood to expand on Goodrich’s claim 
that ‘legal discourse’ is a ‘restricted set of hierarchically defined speakers, together 
with the internal shielding or valorisation of specific “authorised” texts and the 
strictly delimited rhetorical settings of legal communication’.
142 This section begins 
with a broad discussion of what I mean by the practice of the repetition of past 
legal statements and an analysis of why previous conceptions of the doctrine of 
precedent can be understood to be incomplete. This will be followed by a 
discussion of the way in which the application of the wider practice of repetition 
functions as a discursive practice.  
 
The practice of repetition can be analysed using the framework of Foucaultian 
discursive controls. Foucault argued for a breakdown of discursive controls into 
three categories. These are mechanisms internal to the discourse, external 
mechanisms and those mechanisms that are neither fully internal nor fully external. 
In this section, the three forms of control will be explored in turn. Each will be 
examined with specific reference to the practice of repetition. This will explain the 
centrality of the practice to the understanding of the perpetuation of law adopted in 
this thesis. In short, the use of previous legal statements is taken to constitute both 
                                                                                                                                        
the wilful act of the defendants, then this case must have been governed by that of Tripe v Potter’ 
(Ogle v Barnes (1799) 8 TR 188 at 191, emphasis added.) 
142 Goodrich, Legal Discourse at 174-5  
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the law and the legal discursive formation. That is, the constraints and controls of 
the practice are treated as the constraints and controls of the law. 
 
* 
 
This sub-section begins with a description of stare decisis. The understanding of 
the use of past legal statements adopted in this thesis appears to reflect the 
operation of the doctrine of stare decisis. However, the practice of repetition that 
will be illustrated in Part Two of this project needs to be understood as broader than 
the doctrine as usually considered. The distinction between stare decisis and the 
practice of repetition must be carefully delineated if the application of the 
archaeological method, as understood here, and the analysis of the examined 
judgements, are to make full sense.  
 
Explaining stare decisis has been made difficult as a result of the fact that the 
specific rules relating to the application of stare decisis have been expressed in a 
variety of ways.
143 However, a translation of the Latin phrase provides a starting 
point. Stare decisis (or more fully, stare rationibus decidendis) is the call for judges 
to ‘keep to the rationes decidendi of past cases’.
144 Though this practice is at the 
heart of the case law tradition, there is no readily available judicial interpretation of 
what constitutes the ratio decidendi (reason for deciding) of a case. Within the 
secondary literature, observations as to the nature of the ratio include: 
 
The ratio decidendi of a case is any rule of law expressly or impliedly 
treated by the judge as a necessary step in reaching his conclusion, 
                                                 
143 Cross, R. & Harris, J. W., Precedent in English Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991 at 5 
144 Ibid at 100  
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having regard to the line of reasoning adopted by him, or a necessary 
part of his direction to the jury.
145 
And 
The  ratio decidendi is the rule or principle of decision for which a 
given precedent is the authoritative source, whether that rule or 
principle is then to be treated as binding or only as persuasive in some 
degree for other later deciders of similar questions.
146 
These descriptions suggest that there is no simple formula for determining what, in 
general terms, constitutes the ratio of a case. That is, there is no readily available 
judicial interpretation of exactly what constitutes the application of stare decisis, as 
there is no specificity as to which parts of previous judgments must be followed. 
This creates a problem in the analysis of the law. 
 
It is only a problem for analysis, however, as the lack of rigour does not prevent the 
use of the practice. The lawyers and the judges see the rule of stare decisis, for 
example, only as a tool to reach an adjudication, an ‘object’
147 of the law, a thing to 
be used in order to discover the law. Using the doctrine of precedent as a tool 
allows a degree of flexibility with respect to the use of past decisions. The legal 
training of the members of the legal discursive formation produces law in such a 
way that all courts have to consider past decisions in coming to a decision in any 
area of law. The judges “have to consider” these past decisions.  
 
If the doctrine is only a tool that is to be used then some previous decisions can be 
distinguished on certain grounds, such as the relevance of the past decision to the 
                                                 
145 Ibid at 72 
146 MacCormick, Neil, ‘Why Cases have Rationes and what these are’ at 156 
147 Lord Mansfield, cited in Holdsworth, W. S., ‘Precedents in the Eighteenth Century’ (1935) 51 
LQR 441. More recent commentators have characterised stare decisis as a ‘proposition’ (Perry, S., 
‘Judicial Obligation, Precedent and the Common Law’ (1987) 7 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
215 at 235), ‘to preserve a measure of neutrality’ (ibid), however this does not help any quest for the 
ratio of a judgment.  
 
123
 
circumstances of the case before the court. The decision as to the relevance of a 
“precedent” is made by the judge, in part, on the basis of the competing legal 
argument of counsel. The citing of previous cases by barristers is accompanied by 
their justification for the citation. Justification could be based on a similarity of the 
facts of the case or by previous uses of the “precedent”. The judge then weighs up 
all the arguments, including the claims as to relevance of the cited cases, and 
produces a judgment. A previous decision is only binding if a judge has been 
“persuaded” by counsel who have argued for its relevance.  
 
This “flexibility of use” of the doctrine of stare decisis seems to go against the 
claim that the doctrine is a “rule” of law. The problem that arises with the 
theorising of the doctrine is that the law changes yet stare decisis suggests that the 
law is limited to what has gone before. It has been asked before “how this perpetual 
process of change can be reconciled with the principle of authority and the rule of 
stare decisis’.
148 Stone’s answer to this paradox was to recognise the indeterminacy 
of finding the ratio of a previous decision and to argue that it is the 
‘unacknowledged, and even unconscious, creativeness’
149 of judges that solves the 
problem. In other words, Stone privileges judicial choice over the strict application 
of an indeterminate principle. 
 
The problem with the “stare decisis as a tool” approach is that it moves the 
problem one step back. The approach does not deal with the nature of the “choice” 
of the judges. Stone recognises the indeterminacy of ratios and also recognises that 
the use of precedent produces change. Yet, his solution is not consistent with the 
                                                 
148 Lord Wright quoted in Stone, Legal System and Lawyers’ Reasonings at 230 
149 Ibid at 304-5  
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understanding of the manner in which precedents work in the law that is adopted in 
this thesis. Stone leaves it at the suggestion that the law operates and changes 
through the actions and choices of judges who appear as agents in change. Agency 
of this sort is not consistent with the understanding of Foucault adopted here. 
 
There is an alternative to this position that is more consistent with the reading of 
Foucault used in this project. This other position does not require a great shift in 
understanding. The two definitions for stare decisis that were listed above can be 
merged to produce a new definition. The new definition is a “statement of law, 
recognised within the discursive formation (whether in the body of the ‘writing’ 
judge or future judges) as a necessary step in reaching a legal conclusion”. This 
definition is not for the ratio of a case but for any previous statement of law that a 
judge may use in writing a judgment. The practice of the privileging, within the 
legal discursive formation, of certain written statements of judges can be seen to 
use such a definition of stare decisis. The statements that are privileged can then be 
repeated by others within the formation.  
 
These statements are not limited to, but do include, the ratios of judgments. 
Repeated statements may be legal principles and maxims that no longer require 
case citations. The phrase “duty of care” is one such statement. It can be repeated 
by any member of the legal profession without any case being linked to it. Other 
repeated legal statements include ones of definition, such as those statements 
describing the limits of particular writs. Any phrase that describes an aspect of the 
law is repeatable under this discursive legal practice. Stare decisis is a principle that 
deals with the repetition of the central “rules” of cases. The legal practice of  
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repetition discussed in this thesis is not limited to the specific citation of particular 
rules or ratios but to any statement contained within a preceding judgment. 
This practice of repetition is similar to the doctrine of precedent but can be seen as 
both being wider than the doctrine and as operating on a more fundamental level 
that seems more in keeping with a Foucaultian approach. When seen as a tool, stare 
decisis is seen as something to be applied. If the repetition of statements is seen as a 
practice it is easier to see the myriad of other practices associated with this one 
fundamental practice. The use of previous decisions is structured, from the 
perspective adopted here, according to other practices. Whether a decision is taken 
to be binding, for example, relies, in part, on the way it is brought to the court by 
counsel. The choice of which set of reports are used to gain the words of the 
previous statements is also limited by a set of practices. Choosing to see this 
practice of repetition solely in terms of the doctrine of precedent denies the 
constitutive power of the practice of repetition of past legal statements that is 
important for a Foucaultian understanding of the law. It disallows the view that the 
practice of privileging previous statements creates the legal system as we know it. 
The common law would not be the same, would not function in the same way, if 
the practice of repetition was not applied. 
 
Lawyers and judges cannot define the doctrine of precedent because it is 
“always/already” there. The practice of repetition of previous legal statements also 
pre-exists the practitioners’ understanding of law. The doctrine can be seen to 
construct the law to the extent that it cannot be defined, it cannot be explained 
without recourse to examples of it in practice. Cross and Harris, in the first chapter 
of their influential text, Precedent in English Law, do not include a section devoted 
to an analysis of the doctrine. This is not a criticism of this learned text, but an  
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illustration of the impossibility of rigorous definition of stare decisis. That doctrine, 
however, can be seen as an example of the practice of repetition of past legal 
statements, and is therefore comprehensible in terms of the framework adopted in 
this thesis. This understanding does not alter the fundamental role that the practice 
of repetition plays in law but widens the scope of that which can be repeated and 
denies to judges the role of agents,
150 which is required by the understanding of 
Foucault’s work adopted in this thesis. 
 
The constitutive strength of the doctrine of precedent can be understood to rest on 
its lack of definition - that which can be limited in word can be distinguished as 
irrelevant or inappropriate. The wider practice of repetition can be understood to 
operate on a much more practical level. It is because the assumptions underlying 
the use of previous statements can be understood to be so deeply ingrained into 
legal practitioners from the beginning of their training that they do not need to be 
repeated. The strength of the practice can be taken to be based on its width of 
application. In the following sub-sections the relationship between the practice of 
repetition and the common law will be examined. This will illustrate the depth of 
the relationship between the members of the legal profession and the statements of 
law they produce in the conduct of their work as lawyers and judges that is central 
to the understanding of the law that is at the heart of this thesis.  
 
* 
 
                                                 
150 At least the role of an agent that exercises complete free will is denied to judges in the 
perspective adopted here. The capacity, allowed to the judge by legal discursive practices discussed 
in this section, to “select” the most appropriate legal statement to repeat in a given judgment can be 
seen to reflect a limited form of “agency”.  
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This practice of repeating previous legal statements is, from the perspective 
adopted in this thesis, a discursive practice. It is a practice that constructs both the 
law and, through the processes of subjectification, the members of the legal 
discursive formation, the legal profession. This sub-section begins an examination 
of the practice as one of the Foucaultian discursive controls that is carried through 
the two following sub-sections. In this sub-section the consideration of the practice 
of repetition is as a practice of external control.  
 
Foucault identified three techniques as important to external control. These are 
‘forbidden speech, division of madness and the will to truth’.
151 For ‘it is the power 
of institutions and not the truth of the discourse that excludes its false 
competitors’.
152 That is, the claim to truth of a particular discourse or discursive 
formation is not based on an objective Truth, but on the strength of its discursive 
practices.  
 
These external techniques for management revolve around the capacity of members 
of the discursive formation to deny to “outsiders” the opportunity to be heard 
within that formation. The ability of those with perceived power to exclude people 
because of their utterance of the “forbidden”, or their lack of knowledge of the 
“right” speech is, in a ‘society like ours... well known’.
153 Categories such as “the 
insane”, “the young”, and, in less enlightened times, “women” and “the disabled” 
act as barriers for entry into discourses of power for people who fit into these 
categories. Even simple requirements, such as particular education levels, prevent 
access for some. Their lack of schooling denies them possession of the “right 
                                                 
151 Foucault, ‘The Order of Discourse’ at 55 
152 Shumway, D.A., Michel Foucault, Twayne, Boston, 1989 at 104 
153 Foucault, ‘The Order of Discourse’ at 52  
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speech”, which is considered essential for occupying certain positions in our 
society. The legal discursive formation is a good example of this. Children are not 
permitted to speak on behalf of the law, nor are others with an “insufficient” 
education. Even a person who has completed a Bachelor of Laws degree is not 
permitted to practise as a legal advocate, until they have proven their “value” to the 
profession through a clerkship. 
 
These external modes of control commence with “forbidden speech” and the 
“division of madness”. These techniques prevent those within the discursive 
formation from considering the words of those who are not constructed subjects of 
that formation. Their words are literally forbidden. Its exclusionary tendencies are 
perhaps the most obvious mechanism through which the practice of repetition can 
be understood to shape the discursive formation. The practice is the privileging of 
past legal statements. When judgments are written, the words of the temporary 
visitors to the formation, such as witnesses, the words of the permanent subjects, 
counsel, and the legal statements of past judges are considered. No other statements 
are included in the formulation of the decision. Even the words of visitors are 
limited. Witnesses can only provide information requested by counsel, certain types 
of evidence (hearsay, unqualified opinion) are also excluded from judicial 
consideration. 
 
An apparent exception could be made for secondary sources, such as academic 
works. However, even these secondary sources are not totally “outside” the 
discursive formation, as the writers are usually trained lawyers, or academics with 
legal qualifications. The end result, from the perspective adopted here, is that only 
those who have been recognised within the legal discursive formation as having the  
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ability to speak of the law are given the power to “speak” in legal judgments. The 
effect of this, for this analysis, is that those within the legal discursive formation 
are only allowed to pay heed to the words of sanctioned subjects. Outsiders are 
considered un-knowledgeable and, from a Foucaultian perspective, exhibit 
“unreason” or “madness” if they presume to speak of law. 
 
The third mechanism of external discursive control, the “will to truth”, is more 
subtle. Within the positivist discourse of Western culture ‘the division between true 
and false is neither arbitrary nor modifiable nor institutional nor violent’.
154 It 
simply “is”. This dichotomy between truth and falsehood is not “natural” in the 
world. It is a discursive construct. A construct that ‘rests on an institutional 
support… [on] whole strata of practices, such as pedagogy... books, publishing, 
libraries; learned societies… [and] laboratories’.
155 F r o m  t h i s  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  t h e  
discourses of the “human” and “natural” sciences constantly reinforce the notion of 
a truth and their processes further reinforce this will to truth.  
 
The pedagogy of the law, with its centuries of reports and writs, can be understood 
to preach a legal and juridical Truth. Justice will be found in the words of 
judgments. Any point of adjudication can be settled through recourse to previous 
recorded adjudications. The law reports hold the Truth to the law of the land; the 
discursive formation functions on the belief that the legal statements of past judges 
are Truth.
156 In the rare situation where a factual situation does not readily fit into a 
past judgment, the subjects of the discursive formation, the barristers and judges, 
                                                 
154 Ibid at 54 
155 Ibid at 55 
156 Except in cases where their statements are appealed. In that case, the words of the judges of the 
final court of review in that particular case are held to be the Truth.  
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will negotiate a suitable solution, still based on previous judgments. While the 
‘common law must expand to keep abreast of modern life’,
157 from the perspective 
adopted in this thesis, it only does so on the basis of past decisions, on previous 
legal statements. 
 
This “will to truth” is understood to extend further than just the “objective” truth 
claims of the discourse. ‘For Foucault… the ethical substance, the prime material 
of moral conduct, is the “will to truth”’.
158 This final mechanism of external 
discursive control produces the Truth of the legal discursive formation. From the 
perspective adopted here, this exclusionary practice has to be part of the 
constitution of the subjects for it to be effective. The practice of repetition, in this 
view, compels those within the discursive formation to behave according to the 
doctrine. Lawyers will seek out the appropriate precedents. Judges will expect to be 
told of the appropriate precedents and, in turn, will repeat some of the legal 
statements contained in these precedents. This is the “right”, or “truthful”, way to 
conduct the practice of judicial adjudication. In this way, the practice of repetition 
can be understood to function as an external form of control internalised by those 
within the law.  
 
* 
 
This sub-section deals with the internal modes of control of the discursive 
formation. The internal techniques of discursive control include, in Foucault’s 
                                                 
157 Hanson v Wearmouth Coal & Sunderland Gas [1939] 3 All ER 47 at 54 per Goddard LJ. 
158 Rabinow, P., ‘The History of Systems of Thought’ in Rabinow, P. (ed), Ethics – Subjectivity and 
Truth, The New Press, New York, 1997 at xxix  
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words, ‘principles of classification, of ordering and of distribution’.
159 These 
principles relate to the practices of assigning roles, or classifying individuals, and 
are particularly evident in the sciences (for example, Linnean categorisation). More 
broadly, categories in general are taken to have been formed through the histories 
of the discourses and have been kept as ‘ritualised sets... which are recited in well-
defined circumstances’.
160 This sub-section will make explicit the role of repetition 
of past legal statements in the perpetuation of this categorisation. It will describe 
the practice of repetition in terms of the processes of ordering within, and therefore 
underlying, the legal discursive formation as it is understood here.  
 
The practice of repetition includes the practices associated with the doctrine of 
precedent. This quotation by Lord Campbell in Beamish v Beamish exemplifies 
stare decisis as a mechanism of internal control: 
 
The law laid down as your ratio decidendi, being clearly binding on all 
inferior tribunals, and on all the rest of the Queen’s subjects, if it were 
not considered equally binding upon your Lordships, this House would 
be arrogating to itself the right of altering the law, and legislating by its 
own separate authority.
161 
The doctrine of precedent is a technique to place judges, at all levels, into an 
appropriate category, with each of these categories being assigned particular 
powers. Judges are considered to sit on inferior or superior benches.
162 While there 
is a category of judges, which represents the ultimate judicial authority, even that 
                                                 
159 Foucault, ‘The Order of Discourse’ at 56 
160 Id  
161 9 HLC 274 at 338-339 
162 The judicial hierarchy is another aspect of the discursive formation that has changed over the past 
250 years. However, from the 13
th century onwards, ‘every court of record was subject to the 
surveillance of some other tribunal to ensure that in giving judgment it did not err on the face of its 
record’ (Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History at 157-158). The procedures have 
changed, but there has been an internal structure to the discursive formation that allowed decisions 
to be revisited.  
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Court must abide by the processes of ordering by which all other Courts are 
regulated. It would appear that the hierarchisation of the judicial system would fit 
into this category of internal control, and to an extent it does. However, the 
hierarchy of courts fulfils another form of control which will be further explained 
in the next sub-section. 
 
The doctrine of precedent, understood here as the practice of repeating past legal 
statements, is a form of categorisation that goes beyond the labelling of the courts 
and their positions. Previous cases are also differentiated and this affects the 
treatment of past cases. In short, past judgments are not treated equally. Reported 
judgments are treated differently from unreported judgments and official from 
unofficial reports. Within the category of recognised precedents, there are also 
those that contain statements that cannot be overlooked and those that contain 
statements that can be overlooked (in legal discourse this can be understood in 
terms of the binding/persuasive dichotomy).  
 
The practice of repetition does not prohibit judges from using any past legal 
statements, but the internalised form of “forbidden speech” means that they have to 
explain their repetition of a statement from an unreported or unofficial judgment. 
No statements in preceding judgments are excluded from future adjudications. This 
limitation with respect to particular legal statements can be understood as an 
internal control, rather than an exclusionary external control, as it only affects the 
weight given to a particular statement of the law. In the case of the 
reported/unreported dichotomy, an oft-quoted reported judgment will be treated 
differently from an unreported judgment. In terms of the use of either official or  
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unofficial reports, it is the statements contained in the official reports that are more 
likely to be repeated. 
 
The decision as to whether a statement in a precedent is binding is to some extent a 
function of the specific decision event. A judge’s apparent “agency”,
163 from the 
perspective adopted here, will be constrained by the categories of the courts (their 
relative positions), the categories of evidence and facts (relative fact situations) 
and, perhaps most importantly, on the particular characteristics of the judge’s 
training. That is, the years of training provided by the discursive formation will 
substantially affect a judge’s decision. For example, a judge who worked as a 
barrister specialising in corporate law before reaching the bench may have a 
different perspective of the law from a judge who worked predominantly in 
criminal cases. This different perspective may affect their willingness to repeat 
certain legal statements in their writing of their judicial decisions. A judge will also 
make a decision in the knowledge that if her/his decision is “wrong” then 
procedures within the formation, the appeals process, will “correct” the “mistake”. 
 
It is the operation of procedures of organisation that are understood to produce 
discursive formations and institutions. In law, from this perspective, procedures 
organise, and therefore construct, the use of past decisions. If the practice of 
repeating past legal statements is the basis of adjudication, then mechanisms and 
procedures that control the selection of statements must be in place, which will also 
have the effect of limiting the number of past cases that have to be addressed. The 
                                                 
163 A judge’s agency cannot be taken, in the perspective adopted in this thesis, to be “true agency”. 
Given Foucault’s notion of subjectification, discussed above, a subject of a discourse does not have 
the capacity to make a “free choice”. A subject of a discourse is limited in their choice to actions 
made available by the practices of the discourse.  
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classification of law into criminal/civil/administrative/tort divisions and the 
division of decisions into reported/unreported/official/unofficial, then, are 
necessary for the regulating of the practice of repetition. As mentioned above, the 
hierarchisation of the judicial system is linked with this form of internal control. 
The hierarchisation that operates for internal control can also be seen as a process 
of what Foucault described as rarefaction. This mode of control will be more fully 
explained in the following sub-section. 
 
* 
 
This final sub-section explores those processes of discursive control that are neither 
fully internal, nor fully external forms of control. That is, those processes of 
‘rarefaction… of the speaking subjects’.
164 As Foucault put it: 
 
none shall enter the order of the discourse if he does not satisfy certain 
requirements or if he is not, from the outset qualified to do so. To be 
more precise: not all regions of the discourse are equally open and 
penetrable: some of them are largely forbidden (they are differentiated 
and differentiating), while others seem to be open to all winds and put 
at the disposal of every speaking subject, without prior restrictions.
165 
A principal technique for creating these restrictions is the hierarchisation of the 
court system. The “speaking subjects” mentioned above can be understood to 
comprise everyone in society who is capable of speech and not just those who are 
constructed within a particular discourse. Within the legal discursive formation 
only a few “speaking subjects” from the community at large are heard. Some claim 
a place as litigant. Some are encouraged to act as jurors. Some become witnesses. 
While these “speaking subjects” are not refused entry to the practices of the 
                                                 
164 Foucault, ‘The Order of Discourse’ at 61 
165 Ibid at 61-62  
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discursive formation, their access is limited. That is, subjects such as witnesses and 
jurors are allowed into the courts but not the law. 
 
There are some “speaking subjects” who, through their success within the 
educational discourse, have the option to participate directly in the legal discursive 
formation. That is, given sufficient academic achievement, these “speaking 
subjects” attend university,
166 graduate and then, after a period of further applied 
training, gain acceptance into the discursive formation as lawyers. Of these, a few 
“speaking subjects” are given certain privileges by those through whom power 
passes within the discursive formation (Queen’s Counsel, magistrates, judges, Law 
Lords). Positions within the legal discursive formation are not equally open and 
accessible, even to those within the formation. 
 
As was mentioned in the previous sub-section, the judicial hierarchy can be 
understood to represent a form of internal control – classification and ordering, but 
it can also be taken to represent a form of external control, as it limits the 
availability of contact with those outside the discursive formation. The regulation 
of the practice of repetition can be understood to be a manifestation of this 
privileging of positions. Given the written nature of the law, changes to the law can 
be understood to be brought about through the production of written legal 
statements, and the privileging of some of these writings reflects the authors’ 
positions within the law. Witnesses or jurors, whilst potentially integral to the 
outcome of the case in which they are involved, will not be included as individuals 
in the records of judgment, because, from the perspective adopted here, they are not 
                                                 
166 I recognise that it is still possible in most jurisdictions to enter into a five year clerkship, but it is 
less common. It still requires a certain level of education, the significant difference is in the focus of 
the training rather than its relationship with the discursive formation.  
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constituted as members of the formation. It should be noted that this, in part, is due 
to the Truth claim that the courts of review are the “speakers” of the law. However, 
this emphasis on the “higher” courts is indicative of the distribution of power 
within the law. It also can be seen to function as a mechanism for denying outsiders 
a direct voice in the law that is carried forward in judgments. 
 
Even statements from the officers of the court, the barristers, are rarely included in 
final judgments, and statements by those who provide the instructions to the 
barristers are even less likely to be included. At the court of review level barristers 
are very important to the content of a judgment, as they provide judges with the 
arguments and the citations which tend to form the basis of the final decision.
167 
Yet, the hierarchisation within the discursive formation and the methods of 
reporting severely limit any repetition of the statements of barristers. While some 
reports do include counsel’s arguments immediately preceding the judges’ 
decisions, in practical terms (and in definitional terms), the practice of repetition 
relates to past judgments, not past arguments. The regulation of the practice of 
repeating previous legal statements can be understood to dictate that the words of 
barristers are not taken into account in the practice. The power of the discursive 
formation, from the perspective adopted here, flows through the words of the 
judges alone. 
 
The difference between the amount of attention paid to the decisions of magistrates 
and to those of judges can also be taken to reflect the process of rarefaction to 
                                                 
167 Counsel who appear before courts of review are also a product of the processes of rarefaction. 
That is, such counsel tend to be “Queen’s Counsel” (or their equivalent). This “rank” is awarded 
only after the barrister has demonstrated her or his capacity to perform, to a high level, the 
discursive practices necessary to appear as counsel in a court.  
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which Foucault refers. The magistrates, even though superior in terms of numbers, 
are not usually amongst those adjudicators whose decisions are recorded in law 
reports. The “further up” the judicial hierarchy she or he is, the greater the potential 
for a judge’s decision to be included in the legal record for future availability as a 
“precedent”. The limiting of the potential for repetition of the words of magistrates 
also acts as a process of rarefaction of the language accepted into the discursive 
formation. Magistrates and the courts of first instance deal almost exclusively with 
questions of fact and the comparison of specific evidence with often repeated 
statements of law. Witnesses do not speak the language of law, but that of their 
own processes of subjectification.
168 
 
The practice of repetition is almost exclusively concerned with the judgments of 
the courts of review. Thus, the practice can be understood to generate “law” 
because questions of facts have been largely dispensed with by the time the case 
has passed the courts of first instance. The statements of witnesses are not included 
in a judgment. The statements of law that are repeated in later judgments becomes, 
from this perspective, the law. Thus, the discursive practice of privileging written 
statements generated within a delimited range of courts can be understood to be 
bound up with the hierarchisation of the court system. Through the processes that 
differentiate and assign values to different statements, the practice of repetition also 
functions as the third, and final, form of discursive control, that of rarefaction. That 
mode of control which is neither fully internal, nor fully external. 
 
                                                 
168 The defendant will speak the language of their upbringing, the police prosecution will speak the 
language learnt in the training of the officer and the expert witnesses will speak the language of their 
specialty.  
 
138
 
This exploration of the manner in which the practice of repetition functions within 
the legal discursive formation suggests that it is central to the construction, and the 
continuation, of procedures of adjudication. In particular, in this section I have 
attempted to show how the practice controls the interaction between different 
members of the legal discursive formation. These practices regulate judicial 
proceedings and limit the actions of the profession in terms of legal argument and 
legal judgment. 
 
It is now possible to view the practice of repetition as more than an interpretive tool 
of the legal profession. The practice of the repetition of past legal statements has 
contributed to the constitution of the law as we now know it. This section provides 
some understanding of the operation of precedent in the law, recognising the 
importance of the practice of repetition in the structure of the common law. The 
practice can be understood to derive its strength from its “always/already” nature. 
From the perspective adopted here, the practice of repetition is the aggregate of 
several discursive practices that constitute those people who operate as the legal 
profession. The legal discursive formation is understood to be the sum of its 
discursive practices, with the privileging of past judgments as the most 
fundamental of these practices.  
 
The fundamental nature of the practice seems evident in a number of ways. First, 
through the exclusionary technique of only recognising the voices of trained in the 
law, and the internalisation of this practice by members of the legal community. 
Second, through the internal control techniques of ordering and classification. 
Third, through the processes of rarefaction. The law is structured, in this account, 
according to the workings of practice of repetition. While no practitioner would  
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deny the importance of this practice, this section takes that assumption further and 
suggests that the practices that govern the repetition of previous legal statements 
provide the foundation of the law. The law would not exist in the same way if the 
practices associated with the repetition of past legal statements were of lesser 
importance. These practices can be understood to possess the power of legal origin 
and to be fundamental to the function of common law as law. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter applied the discourse theory developed in Chapter One to some of the 
specific features of the law and the legal discursive formation. The chapter 
provided a perspective on the law, legal profession and the relationship between the 
two based on the concepts of discursive practices and of subjectification. It is this 
understanding of legal discursive practices that will be used for the application of 
the archaeological method in Part Two. The focus of this thesis is an application of 
this method to a number of decisions from the English common law dealing with 
civil liability for acts in which property or a person is damaged. Part One was 
intended to provide the background needed to exercise the method in Part Two. 
Part Two will attempt to excavate relevant judgments and analyses the way in 
which the members of the legal profession “see” the defendants who come before 
them. 
 
In this chapter, the first section dealt with the law in general, with a closer look at 
the construction of the legal subjects. In short, legal subjects are understood to be 
constructed to behave in particular ways, according to particular norms. These 
norms are produced, in part, through the processes of subjectification. That is, the  
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subjects participate in their own processes of construction, and more importantly, 
they practise self-regulation. It was necessary to discuss this process of 
subjectification in order to explore the understanding of the impact of the law on 
the wider community and the impact of legal training on lawyers and judges that is 
adopted within this thesis. 
 
The second section was a “history” of the legal profession. In particular it was a 
“history” of some of the practices of the legal profession. From the seventeenth 
century, the profession can be seen as a self-regulating, self-perpetuating institution 
independent of the Crown and other procedures of governance. The particular legal 
discursive practices of the law are understood to construct and limit the institution 
as it is and as it has been. These practices relate to the processes of training and 
education of the members of the legal discursive formation. Lawyers and judges 
carry out their legal duties in the way they were constructed to carry them out. As 
the profession is a self-perpetuating institution, one generation of lawyers trains the 
next generation. In this way, practices can be preserved and the continuity of the 
law can be maintained. 
 
The legal discursive practices internalised by lawyers and judges dictate how they 
carry out their professional duties. The practices, therefore, can be understood to 
construct the legal judgments that members of the legal profession produce. These 
written judgments both perpetuate the law and are sites of rupture within the law. 
The third section of this chapter examined these processes of change in the legal 
discursive formation. The law can be understood to change incrementally on a case 
by case basis. Lawyers and judges are taken to have been trained to repeat single 
statements of the law in the form of precedents. The section also highlighted how  
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counsel, in their arguments to the court, act as sites of power and of resistance with 
respect to the perpetuation of the legal discourse. The legal statements that are 
repeated usually come from judgments of courts of review. Change can be seen to 
be accepted, as the members of the discursive formation are considered to be 
constructed to accept the new statements of law that arise from the decisions of 
higher courts.  
 
Section Four included an examination of certain legal practices associated with 
writing, focussing on the use of commentaries and law reports. The most important 
of the legal discursive practices is the construction of the law as a written 
discourse.
169 The efficacy of past legal statements may be improved if they are 
written down and made available for mass distribution. The technology of mass 
production can be understood to have encouraged the use of legal writings as the 
basis of legal education and production of law. Law students are trained through 
the use of past cases, textbooks and commentaries. Lawyers use books of 
precedents to construct legal documents. All statements produced in court are 
recorded in written form and the final decision is produced as a written judgment.  
 
The final section included a discussion of the importance of the use of previous 
statements in the practices of law. The practice of repetition involves the 
privileging and acceptance of past decisions as statements of “law”. This practice 
can be understood to contribute to the hierarchisation of the legal profession, which 
                                                 
169 This chapter was not aimed at “proving’ the law is a single discourse or a number of discourses. 
The purpose was to illustrate the discursive practices carried out by members of the legal discursive 
formation in such a manner as to enable an application of the archaeological method in the second 
Part of this thesis. There is an understanding, throughout this chapter, that there are similarities 
between the eighteenth and twentieth century practices. However, it will only be after the 
application of the method, as understood in this project, that there can be a discussion as to whether 
there existed one legal discourse since 1750 or a number of discourses.  
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determines the importance placed upon particular writings of particular judges. It is 
not a “natural” condition of society that the community accepts the words of a very 
select group when it comes to contemplating and possibly compensating for any 
damage to the person or goods suffered by a member of that community. It is the 
practices of the law and the processes of subjectification that can be understood to 
ensure the acquiescence of the population. The practice of repetition can be taken to 
show the intrinsic relationship between discursive practices and the perpetuation of 
a discursive formation and, therefore, the perpetuation of one of the principle 
structures of a society in which the rule of law exists. 
 
The practice of repetition can be seen as fundamental to the relationship between 
the law and the legal profession. The practice constructs and limits both the 
profession and the law. The practices of repetition, learned during the training of 
practitioners, limit the legal statements that are available to the judges in writing 
their decisions. The sum of these precedents, that is all written legal judgments, can 
be understood to be the law. The writing of these judicial statements can also be 
understood to be the “law”.  
 
The second Part is intended to provide a demonstration of the relationship between 
the law and the discursive formation through an application of the archaeological 
method as I understand it. This analysis of the past judgments is intended to show 
how certain key phrases have been carried forward and modified as the law. That 
is, the practice of repetition, as it has been described in this chapter, will be “teased 
out” of the judgments excavated in the later chapters of this project. 
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Further, drawing on the discussion of the processes of subjectification, Part Two 
will attempt to provide an illustration of how the members of the legal profession 
perpetuated a particular construction of the legal subject in the eighteenth century 
and how they perpetuated a different construction of legal subjects in the twentieth 
century.
170 Therefore, the nineteenth century can be broadly characterised as a 
period of change in terms of construction of legal subjects by the lawyers and 
judges.  
 
The law did not lose its legitimacy, despite this shift in the relationship between the 
profession and the wider society shown over the period covered by this thesis. 
Particularly in the nineteenth century the law can be seen as undergoing significant 
legal change whilst the fundamental practices of the law remained the same. The 
processes of discontinuity and continuity in the law and legal discursive formation 
can be understood to be possible because the legal practitioners are constructed 
subjects and behave as they are trained to behave. Part Two will highlight the 
change in the legal construction of liability through the legal practice of repeating 
past legal statements. That is, Part Two will illustrate how lawyers and judges can 
produce shifts in the law whilst maintaining the legal practices that are at the heart 
of their legal training. Part Two will provide these outcomes through the 
application of my understanding of Foucault’s archaeological method. 
 
                                                 
170 The point needs to be emphasised that these arbitrary classifications of centuries are not used to 
represent marker points with respect to specific changes in the law. The reference to centuries is 
only a technique of convenience to highlight broad practices that can be attributed to dominant 
features of the practices of law in that period.  
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PART TWO 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This Part provides something of a more practical application of the central ideas of 
the thesis. It is in this Part that the archaeological method, as it is understood in this 
thesis, is applied to a number of decisions in negligence law. This application 
builds upon the understandings, which were discussed in Part One, of the roles of 
discourses and discursive practices, the processes of subjectification and the 
centrality of the practices associated with the repetition of past legal statements in 
the law and legal profession. The analysis that accompanies the use of the 
archaeological method, as understood here, will pay particular attention to those 
legal statements that are repeated over time and those that are repeated for a while 
and then cease to be repeated. 
 
Both the law and the legal discursive formation change over time, but they change 
together, as they are produced through the same discursive practices. In this Part, 
the focus will be on how certain aspects have changed whilst maintaining the 
continuity of law that provides this form of governance with its legitimacy. The 
particular change that will be considered is the shift in articulations of liability for 
injury caused by the negligence of legal subjects that occurred between the 
eighteenth and twentieth centuries. This change in the legal construction of liability 
also suggests a change in the way in which the legal subjects of society come to be 
“seen” by the members of the legal profession. 
 
An application of the archaeological method may be one in which written 
documents are taken to be discursive “monuments”. These monuments are seen to  
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be worth excavating in their own right. There is no need to look, and no value from 
a Foucaultian perspective in looking, behind the words to the minds of the authors 
of the monuments. In this discursive understanding of the law, “authors” and 
documents are seen to be the products of the same discursive practices. Chapter 
Three will focus on the method, both in the abstract and in terms of its application 
to legal writing in this thesis. In that chapter the specific characteristics of the 
method, as understood in this project, will be highlighted and the selection of 
decisions to be excavated will be explored in depth. 
 
The archaeologies are presented in Chapters Four, Five and Six. Each chapter will 
include an excavation of judicial decisions from a particular century (Chapter Four 
deals with the eighteenth, Chapter Five with the nineteenth and Chapter Six with 
the twentieth century). These decisions will be analysed and discussed in 
chronological order. The “excavation” of each decision is intended to reflect the 
requirements of the method as understood in this project. Each excavation will 
involve a “sifting” of the judgments of the members of the legal discursive 
formation in order to isolate the statements of the law that have been repeated from 
earlier judgments.  
 
The aim of this archaeology is not to deduce the ratio of each decision, the aim is 
to highlight those statements that are repeated from earlier decisions. The bulk of 
the excavation, therefore, will be taken up with a thorough description of the words 
of the judges. However, the words of counsel are also important as, in many cases, 
statements are first introduced into the court by counsel. Therefore, in an 
examination of the use of legal statements by judges it seemed appropriate to look  
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at the statements of those members of the profession who, in many cases, provided 
the judges with statements to repeat. 
 
Given that they are not governed by a “truth” that determines their actions, each 
archaeologist may need to provide their own goal for their “dig”. In this 
archaeology, “the law” being examined, the judgments chosen, and the words 
privileged in my analysis of those judgments, reflects my interest in constructions 
of liability for negligent actions. It can be said that there is no “natural” articulation 
of this liability in the world. Any attribution of liability for negligent actions can 
therefore be seen as a construction. In law, members of the legal profession can be 
understood to be constructed so as to repeat specific articulations of liability. These 
articulations have changed. The processes of change in this context may be 
illustrated through the use of the archaeological method. At least, my desire is to 
generate an archaeology of cases that provides some insight into constructions of 
liability for negligence in the English common law of the eighteenth, nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries.  
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CHAPTER THREE - THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL METHOD AND ITS 
APPLICATION TO A HISTORY OF “THE LAW” 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Part One was an attempt to provide the theoretical basis for this thesis. This chapter 
will develop this discursive understanding in a description of important aspects of 
the method to be employed in Chapters Four, Five and Six. Foucault’s 
archaeological method is based on a discursive understanding of society. That is, 
the use of the method, at least as it is understood here, relies on the understanding 
that all citizens can be seen as being constructed by discourses and discursive 
formations. All interpersonal interactions are constituted, from this perspective, 
through the discursive practices of those discourses. An archaeology of the English 
common law, or an excavation of a section of it, may be founded, therefore, upon a 
discursive understanding of that law and its operation within society.  
 
This project is one of the first uses of the archaeological method outside the corpus 
of Foucault’s own work.
1 This project is also one of the first attempts at the 
application of the method to an active discourse.
2 That is not to say that the 
                                                 
1 In his first publication, Madness and Civilisation (Routledge, London, 1971), Foucault referred to 
the project as a “history”. The next two, The Birth of the Clinic and The Order of Things – An 
Archaeology of the Human Sciences (Vintage, New York, 1973), Foucault explicitly labelled 
“archaeologies”. The techniques used in the three are related, however those used in the latest, The 
Order of Things, were the most refined. His next book, The Archaeology of Knowledge, he 
considered to be an explication, a ‘clearly defined’ articulation of the method (The Archaeology of 
Knowledge at 15). 
2 The two other applications of the archaeological method that I have encountered – Giulianotti, R., 
‘Drugs and the media in the era of postmodernity: an archaeological analysis’ (1997) 19 Media, 
Culture & Society 413 and Dillon, S., ‘The Archaeology of Victorian Literature’ (1993) 54 Modern 
Language Quarterly 237 – did not have the same focus as this project. Dillon’s work was not an 
archaeology of a current discourse and Giulianotti’s did not examine the archive of the media over a 
period of time. In addition, neither of the authors undertook an in-depth discussion of the 
archaeological method itself.  
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academic world has ignored the method. Indeed, there have been many critiques of 
and commentaries on the method and its practices. Yet, this project is one of the 
first to try to examine the monuments of the law using Foucault’s archaeological 
techniques.
3  
 
This thesis is a point of inflection in the archaeological method as a discursive 
function in its own right. The starting point for the method described here is 
Foucault’s description of the method. The use of Foucault’s techniques in this 
thesis has also been affected by other writers’ interpretations of the archaeological 
method, in particular that of Kendall and Wickham.
4 Therefore, the method used 
here is not identical to Foucault’s and has been developed in the light of opinions 
and criticisms of the archaeological approach that were encountered in the 
preparation of this thesis.  
 
The method as presented in this chapter is not a “definitive” description of an 
archaeology. Nor is the application that follows in Chapters Four to Six a definitive 
application of the method. The explication, and application, of the techniques 
contained in this thesis are only one part of a web of documents relating to 
Foucault’s historical perspective. 
 
In both the Foucaultian and traditional sense, an archaeology is an excavation of 
monuments. From the Foucaultian perspective adopted here, an archaeology is an 
exploration of texts that form a discourse, a discursive formation or set of 
                                                 
3 As was noted in the Introduction, Les Moran undertook a genealogical exploration in his 
Homosexual(ity) of the Law, however this thesis is among the first to examine the common law with 
the archaeological method. 
4 Using Foucault’s Methods.   
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discursive practices. As the focus is on “formations and transformations” the 
examination necessarily takes place over time and takes into account the schisms 
and continuities that may be evident over an extended period of time.  
 
The description of the method that is provided in this chapter is divided into three 
sections. The first deals, in a more abstract fashion, with the practices that 
constitute the method as I understand it. The discussion will draw upon the 
understanding of discourses, discursive formations and discursive practices that 
was presented in Chapter One of this thesis. This section begins with an 
examination of the discursive basis of the method. This will be followed by a 
discussion of the discursive practices, as they apply to the production of written 
texts by subjects of the discourse, and of the documents that are written by these 
subjects. These documents become “monuments”, or objects to be excavated and 
described by an archaeologist. The role of archaeologists themselves, their 
constructed nature and the choices that must be made in the writing of an 
archaeology, will also be examined in this section. 
 
The second section will focus on the characteristics of the method as understood 
here. The method is constituted by a specific set of practices, which produce a 
specific set of consequences. An archaeology can be seen as a descriptive 
enterprise and, therefore, is not an attempt to trace a causal connection, or even 
progression, in the events and monuments described. Similarities and differences in 
the monuments may be highlighted by the archaeologist in order to account for 
changes in the discursive formation. Documents are taken to be monuments, or 
artefacts, worth examining in their own right. They are not treated as representative 
of an unwritten Truth. Further, an archaeologist does not look behind the  
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documents to intuit the truths that past authors are seeking to express or 
communicate. From this perspective, an archaeology provides an annotated 
description of past documents.  
 
The final section of this chapter begins with the application of the method, as 
described in the previous two sections, to a history of the law. In particular, the 
section will include an explanation of the choice of classifications to be used in the 
last three chapters of the thesis. In order to do this, this section will return to the 
concept of the common law as a written discourse and the legal profession as a 
discursive formation largely constructed through a set of discursive practices 
associated with the production of written texts.  
 
From a discursive perspective, the repetition of past legal statements in judgments 
and legal arguments is one of the fundamental practices of the legal profession. An 
application of a legal archaeology may, then, use decisions of courts of review as 
its raw materials. Specific judgments, if such an approach is adopted, can be 
excavated and used as the monuments upon which a project is focused. In addition, 
the words of the counsel who presented arguments to the court can be included in 
the excavation of judgments, as it is these members of the profession who offer 
particular legal statements to the judges who may choose to repeat them in 
delivering their decisions. 
 
This chapter supplies the description of the method that will be applied in the 
balance of this thesis. The choices I have made with respect to the judgments 
selected are also explained. As the legal field covered in this project is wide, from 
the historical writs of actions on the case and trespass to the more contemporary  
 
152
 
area of negligence, a selection process was necessary to determine which 
monuments were to be covered in this archaeology. The choice of cases to be 
examined was a reflection of the understanding of the relationships between the 
law, the members of the legal profession and their writings that are central to this 
thesis. This chapter is an attempt to explore this understanding and how it is 
reflected in the archaeologies generated in the chapters that follow. 
 
THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL METHOD 
 
The purpose of this section is to describe, at a theoretical level, the basic functions 
and techniques of Foucault’s archaeological method as I understand it. Initially, the 
broad relationship between the nature of the archaeological method and discourses 
in general will be examined. Then the relationship between the discursive 
formation and monuments outside that particular formation will be considered, 
situating the method in the wider world. In the third sub-section, I will examine the 
nature of the raw materials of the excavation. In the final sub-section, I will 
introduce the role of the archaeologists themselves and their participation in the 
process of writing “history”. In short, the method, as understood here, requires that 
each writer has to self-consciously, and explicitly, engage with an archive of 
monuments in order to produce a narrative. 
 
There are two preliminary points that can be made before any discussion of the 
archaeological method begins. First, it should be noted that Foucault utilised two 
different, yet connected, forms of historical exploration. Foucault considered both 
the archaeological and the genealogical techniques to be forms of ‘effective  
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history’,
5 with similar practices associated with both methods. It may be noted, 
therefore, that much of the literature on Foucaultian historical analysis is applicable 
to both archaeology and genealogy.  
 
Either method can be termed “effective” or “general” history.
6 The latter term was 
the one used by Dean in his summation of the difference between Foucault’s 
methods and traditional, or “total”, histories: 
 
A total history seeks a governing principle of a civilisation, epoch or 
society, which accounts for its coherence; it seeks to establish an 
homogenous network of relations and causality… and it is able to 
divide history into definite, cohesive, periods and stages… A 
general history… seeks series, divisions, differences of temporality 
and level, forms of continuity and mutation… [and] opens up an 
attention to detail… which is indispensable if [we are] to move 
beyond caricatures of historical periodisation passing for a science 
of social development.
7 
 
For the purposes of understanding Foucault’s methods, the distinction between 
genealogy and archaeology is less important than a recognition of the aims of both 
as compared to the aims of traditional histories. 
 
The second preliminary point concerns the status of the method itself. It has been 
argued that the archaeological method is ‘less a discipline than a domain of 
research’.
8 Further, Shumway has suggested that Foucault was only concerned with 
‘strategies or things like them: techniques, technologies, etc’.
9 Such understandings 
may indicate that there can be no certainty as to the exact nature of the 
                                                 
5 ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ in Rabinow, Foucault Reader at 87  
6 Foucault used the term “general history” in The Archaeology of Knowledge at 9 
7 Dean, Critical and Effective Histories at 93-4. This passage was brought to my attention by 
Kendall & Wickham, Using Foucault’s Methods at 24 
8 Deacon, R., ‘Theory as practice: Foucault’s Concept of Problematisation’ (2000) 118 Telos 127 at 
128 
9 Shumway, Michel Foucault at 14  
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archaeological method. Indeed, Shumway inferred from Foucault’s concern with 
strategy that Foucault was ‘not saying that historians should always do x, or that 
discourse is always like y. Rather, the strategies are employed because they are 
useful for Foucault’s ends’.
10 The archaeological method, then, can be seen as a 
range of strategies and practices that may be utilised by an archaeologist to 
highlight the discourse and discursive practices that are of interest to that 
archaeologist.
11 This chapter, therefore, focuses, not on a definitive understanding 
of the method, but on those strategies suggested by Foucault that I feel are 
appropriate for an examination of “the law” and of decisions of English courts of 
review. 
 
According to Foucault, an archaeology is ‘the appropriate methodology [for the] 
analysis of local discursivities, and “genealogy” would be the tactics whereby, on 
the basis of the descriptions of these local discursivities, the subjected knowledges 
which were thus released would be brought into play’.
12 Courts of law produce 
objects such as judgments and orders. In this case, “the law” can be seen as a local, 
internally cohesive, discursivity. If the object of examination in this thesis was a 
history of individual rights within English society, however, then genealogy may be 
a more appropriate method. A genealogical analysis may be appropriate as it may 
                                                 
10 Id 
11 Another commentator has argued that Foucault’s historical methods do not stand distinct from 
other historical techniques, rather that ‘archaeology is a useful supplement and, in some cases, a 
necessary corrective to standard approaches to intellectual history [as] it can hardly stand as a 
substitute for such work’: Gutting, G., ‘Introduction’ in Gutting, G. (ed), The Cambridge 
Companion to Foucault, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994 at 14 
12 Two Lectures’ at 85  
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allow an examination of statute law, common law, political practices and the 
constitution of political subjects.
13 
 
An archaeology can be seen to focus on the importance of discourses and 
discursive formations, being ‘the systematic and analytical description of particular 
discourses’,
14 or ‘discursive formations’.
15 Discursive formations, as was suggested 
in the previous chapter, are subject to certain controls over their self-definition and 
self-perpetuation. For Foucault, an ‘archaeological critique analyses the discursive 
limits of the truth axis’
16 of any discursive function. Therefore, an archaeology may 
examine the changes in the construction of the truth of a discursive formation, 
through an examination of the products of that formation.  
 
The “will to truth”, the discursive creation of “the truth”, is one of the methods of 
control that function within a given discursive formation. The aim of the 
archaeological method is to describe such ‘rules of formation’
17 of a discursive 
formation. This aim is accomplished through the examination of an “archive” of a 
discursive formation, with the archive being the set of statements ‘actually 
pronounced’.
18 Thus, an archaeology will examine and describe the practices of a 
particular formation at a given time in order ‘to isolate the level of discursive 
practices and formulate the rules of production and transformation for these 
                                                 
13 As I highlighted above, I recognise that a thorough description of the shift from an understanding 
of the feudal subject to an understanding of the modern subject would also need a genealogical 
analysis. That is why the change from “feudal” to “modern” is not central to this project.  
14 Dean, Critical and Effective Histories at 34 
15 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge at 157 
16 Simons, J., Foucault & the Political, Routledge, London, 1995 at 30 
17 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge at 167 
18 Foucault cited in Flynn, T., ‘Foucault’s mapping of history’ in Gutting, Cambridge Companion to 
Foucault at 29  
 
156
 
practices’.
19 These practices can be taken to construct both the formation and the 
subjects of that formation. An archaeology will examine the knowledge of a 
discursive formation, as that knowledge is the practices of the formation.
20 This 
knowledge can be understood to be perpetuated and reproduced by subjects who, 
themselves, are constituted by the discursive practices. 
 
If discursive practices create a discourse and the documents produced by the 
subjects of the discourse then an archaeology involves an examination of the 
practices of a discourse through an examination of its documents. The method 
looks at the ‘rules for the repeatability of statements’,
21 that is, the method looks at 
the practices that dictate the availability of statements for repetition. Further, the 
method ‘describes… statements covering the sayable and the visible’.
22  
 
The archaeological method can be seen as an attempt to answer the question: ‘how 
is it that one particular statement appeared rather than another?’
23 From this 
perspective, the method can be seen as a “problem-based inquiry”.
24 According to 
Kendall and Wickham, ‘Foucault’s approach to history is to select a problem rather 
than an historical period for investigation’.
25 That is, the focus of an archaeology of 
law can be “how did a particular judgment come to be constituted by a specific set 
                                                 
19 Davidson, A., ‘Archaeology, Genealogy, Ethics’ in Hoy (ed), Foucault – A Critical Reader, Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1986 at 227 
20 ‘Archaeological research examines not the meaning or truth, but the positivity of discourses’, 
Deacon, ‘Theory as Practice’ at 128 
21 Kendal & Wickham, Using Foucault’s Methods at 33 
22 Id 
23 Foucault quoted in Longo, B., ‘An Approach for Applying Cultural Study Theory to Technical 
Writing Research’ (1998) 7 Technical Writing Quarterly 53 at 62 
24 It has been suggested that ‘Foucault’s histories typically begin from his perception that something 
is terribly wrong in the present’: Gutting, ‘Introduction’ at 10. In other words, the method acts as 
‘social critique as well’, ibid at 32 
25 Using Foucault’s Methods at 22, italics in original.  
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of legal statements?” rather than a more traditional history of law that may examine 
a particular period of the law. This approach to the archaeological method means 
that the focus of the method is the monuments of the discourse. In examining the 
monuments, however, the practices of the discourse are also visible. 
 
Discourses and discursive formations have primacy in the understanding of society 
that is central to this thesis. Those who adopt the archaeological method, therefore, 
can be understood to reject the notion of a “sovereign” subject ‘anterior to 
discourse. It can be considered that it is not the individual who imparts meaning to 
discourse, rather it is the discursive formation that provides an array of “subject 
positions” which individuals may occupy’.
26 Subjects are not considered to exist 
prior to their constitution within a discursive formation. Their actions as members 
of the formation can be understood to be constituted solely by the discursive 
practices that function within the discursive formation to which they belong. An 
examination of the individuals as individuals acting within a discursive formation 
will not provide a complete picture, however, of the power relationships operating 
within the formation at the time. These relationships are to be found in the 
statements themselves, and in particular, in the patterns of dispersion of these 
statements - “the rules of formation” of the discourse. 
 
That is not to say that a discourse or discursive formation can be considered in 
vacuo. Foucault specifically linked his archaeological analysis with ‘non-discursive 
domains (institutions, political events, economic practices and processes)’.
27 The 
                                                 
26 McNay, L., Foucault - A Critical Introduction, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1994 at 68 
27  The Archaeology of Knowledge at 162. Some writers have interpreted this as linking 
archaeologies with non-discursive practices (for example Sheridan, A., Michel Foucault – The Will 
to Truth, Routledge, London, 1980 at 106), this, particularly in the context of the specific 
relationship between discourses and practices used in this thesis, may be misleading. For no  
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archaeological method encounters those events from outside the examined 
discourse in order to ‘show how the autonomy of discourse and its specificity 
nevertheless do not give it the status of pure ideality and total historical 
independence.’
28 Archaeology is not a practice in which a discursive formation of 
the past is isolated in order to produce an idealised, complete specimen for 
contemporary study; it is an attempt to re-describe the discourses and discursive 
formations of life as they existed for the constructed subjects of the past. Therefore, 
the method must reflect the engagement by members of the formation with 
“outside” events.  
 
These external events can be taken to include actions or statements from anyone 
who has not been constructed within the discursive formation under consideration. 
In a discursive understanding of society, however, these outside occurrences cannot 
be considered external to the discursive practices of the discursive formation. If 
these events are to form part of the “truth” of the formation they must be 
considered in terms of the discursive formation itself. From the perspective adopted 
in this thesis, if an event is to be incorporated into the discursive formation it must 
fit the criteria that allow events to be integrated into the formation. These criteria 
can be understood to form part of the set of discursive practices of the formation. 
These criteria allow the internalisation of the external event by the members of the 
discursive formation. This internalisation can be seen as an interpretation of the 
outside event according to the discursive rules of the formation. It is only these 
                                                                                                                                        
practice, in the understanding developed in this project, is non-discursive. A practice may be 
constructed by a different discourse than a discourse that is being examined, but it is not “outside” 
the discursive. 
28 The Archaeology of Knowledge at 164-165  
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interpretations that can be examined in an archaeology, as it is understood in this 
thesis. 
 
Interpretation may be seen as the means by which non-discursive events are 
integrated into a discursive formation. This interpretation can result in discursive 
rupture or discontinuity, when the discursive practices of a formation allow for 
such a discontinuity to be recognised. If the events that fit the criteria for discursive 
change occur then the members of a discursive formation will integrate this change 
into the discursive practices and discursive formation. If such an event or change 
occurs and the formation is constituted through a set of writing practices, then the 
event or change may be evident in the written texts of that discursive formation. It 
is these recordings that may become the focus of an archaeology. 
 
These recordings, statements, or texts play an integral role in the archaeological 
method. For the predominant technique is ‘the questioning of the document’.
29 
Foucault saw this as representing a shift from the standard practices of historians. 
Traditionally, historians ‘have asked not only what these documents meant, but also 
whether they were telling the truth, and by what right they could claim to be doing 
so’.
30 That is, historians questioned the integrity of texts as a reflection of the past. 
An archaeological treatment of texts ‘transforms documents into monuments... the 
condition of archaeology [is] the intrinsic description of the monument’.
31  
 
These monuments can be understood to be excavated and examined for what they 
themselves are, these documents cannot be treated as if they refer to the Truth. 
                                                 
29 Ibid at 6 
30 Id 
31 Ibid at 7  
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Indeed, the documents are examined for what they reveal about the knowledges, the 
discursive practices, that constructed the discursive formation within which they 
were generated. The ‘dictum’ of the archaeological method is that ‘we should try to 
make intelligible discourses by means of their own terms’.
32 The archaeologist does 
not read a document to ascertain any Truth that lies behind the text, but as part of 
an attempt to explore a formation as it is constituted through its statements. 
 
An archaeology is ‘gray, meticulous and patiently documentary’.
33 The method is 
only concerned with the collation
34 and description of the documents, the 
monuments, of the discursive formation. The intention is to ‘take statements as 
objects of study in their own right, making no effort to use them as means to revive 
the thoughts of the dead’.
35 Not only is there a refusal to look to the mental 
processes of the subjects who made the statements under consideration, those who 
adopt the method also refuse ‘to treat discourses as the sign of something else, be it 
unconscious wishes or the development of capitalism’.
36 Each document is taken as 
an artefact in its own right. It is examined for what it says in itself, rather than as a 
sign of, or symbol for, some deeper truth.  
 
If a document is not read as referring to something behind it, ‘eschewing any quest 
to go “beyond”… to find deeper meaning’,
37 then there is less of a need to read 
                                                 
32 Dean, M., ‘Questions of Method’ in Velody, I. and Williams, R., The Politics of Constructionism, 
Sage, London, 1998 at 189 
33 Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ at 76 
34 ‘For Foucault, the archaeologist is engaged in collating statements on a particular subject’ 
(Giulianotti, ‘Drugs and the media in the era of postmodernity’ at 416). 
35 Gutting, G., Michel Foucault’s Archaeology of Scientific Reason, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1989 at 231 
36 Brown, B. & Cousins, M., ‘The linguistic fault: the case of Foucault’s archaeology’ (1980) 9 
Economy and Society 251 at 253 
37 Kendall & Wickham, Using Foucault’s Methods at 33  
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continuities into a series of documents. Documents produced in a single discursive 
formation will reflect both its practices of continuity and discontinuity. That is, 
viewing documents in terms of continuity and discontinuity reflects a conception of 
a history which is as much discontinuous as continuous.  
 
It can be argued that one of the purposes of the archaeological method is to 
highlight both the constant and inconstant nature of “the past”. Foucault, for 
example, described his own project as ‘restoring to our silent and apparently 
immobile soil its rifts, its instability, its flaws’.
38 Foucault’s methods were 
concerned with ‘changes… [but] these changes may occur against a background of 
significant continuities’.
39 The archaeological method, then, ‘takes as its model 
neither a purely logical schema of simultaneities; nor a linear succession of events; 
but it tries to show the intersection between necessarily successive relations and 
others that are not so’.
40 The past, to an archaeologist, is a set of events, some of 
which reflect discursive continuities and some of which reflect discursive ruptures. 
 
The method treats each period as “the present” for the authors of the time. The 
archaeologist sees each period as “a present” in a series of “presents”. But the shift 
from one present to another is not “progress”, a “development” or an “evolution”. 
One of the key characteristics of the archaeological method is an emphasis on the 
non-teleological aspects of historical narratives. The legal discursive formation, 
then, cannot be understood in terms of a necessary connection between one point of 
legal history and another or a logical progression from one point to another. Indeed 
the core proposition of this thesis (that the construction of legal subjects in England 
                                                 
38 Order of Things at xxiv 
39 Gutting, Michel Foucault’s Archaeology of Scientific Reason at 247 
40 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge at 168-9  
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since 1750 has not been constant) combined with the denial of the possibility of a 
guiding “invisible hand”, make an archaeology the most fruitful method for 
examining the history of English forms of governance. This is because an 
‘archaeology is much more willing than the history of ideas to speak of 
discontinuities, ruptures, gaps, entirely new forms of positivity, and of sudden 
redistributions’.
41  
 
It can be argued that Foucaultian archaeologists recognise that there have been 
changes in the way that people interact. They do not attempt to “smooth down” 
these eruptive events in order to write a seamless story. For the archaeologist, the 
past can be seen as a series of moments, a series of “present days”, which can be 
separated into periods for the purposes of analysis. It is available to an 
archaeologist to accept, therefore, the present as it is, and to accept the past, as 
evidenced in the remaining monuments, as it was. From this perspective, an 
archaeologist must develop these separations with the knowledge that such 
categories reflect the intervention of the archaeologist, and not the truth of past 
times.  
 
Archaeologists may seek to render this reconstituted past unfamiliar to their 
audiences. Once the ‘internal rationality of a particular set of discourses and 
practices’ has been established, the archaeologist ‘has the option of making them 
seem more or less familiar’.
42 Rendering the past unfamiliar is a technique for 
rupturing a reader’s sense of continuity. This unfamiliarity may undermine a 
                                                 
41 Ibid at 169 
42 Dreyfus H., & Rabinow, P., Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics at 256  
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reader’s preconceived views about the events of the past and their relationship to 
the present.  
 
Archaeologists can be understood to recognise the constructed nature of the world. 
They also can be considered to recognise that the world was not always constructed 
as it is now. Discourses and discursive formations have changed and for the 
subjects constituted through them, the world itself is different. An archaeologist’s 
task, therefore, may be to do her or his best to ensure that no assumption of 
teleological progress is implied in an archaeological analysis, and no projection 
occurs back into the past which normalise it in relation to the future. 
 
The interpretation of an event in the past would be different for a past discursive 
subject from its interpretation for a modern discursive subject. These interpretations 
are important to archaeologists. Archaeology, as effective history, can be seen as 
focussing on the “event”, which can be the ‘usurpation of power, the appropriation 
of a vocabulary turned against those who had once used it... the entry of a masked 
“other”’.
43 These are the events around which discursive formations can be 
understood to change. The processes around which one vocabulary comes to 
displace another is sometimes bloody and sometimes painless. The ‘idea of a single 
break suddenly, at a given moment, dividing all discursive formations... cannot be 
sustained’.
44 In an archaeology there is no grand narrative to account for history, 
there are only separate histories for each discourse or discursive formation, as the 
subjects of each discursive function can be understood to engage with the world 
and the events of the world according to their internalised discursive practices. 
                                                 
43 Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ at 88 
44 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge at 175  
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Every monument, from the perspective adopted in this thesis, can be seen to reflect 
continuity and discontinuity within a discursive formation. Every new recording 
can be considered to produce a new account of an outside event with which the 
subjects of the discursive formation engage. As each and every monument 
contributes to the perpetuation of a discourse or discursive formation all can be 
studied in an archaeology. Constraints such as time and space, however, mean that 
archaeologists must engage in a process of selection. Even within the limited record 
of history as contained in a single discipline there are hundreds, thousands or tens 
of thousands of documents that could merit excavation. Archaeologists must be 
understood to play an active role in an archaeology, and archaeologists know that 
they have an active role in their archaeologies.  
 
The appropriate relationship between the archaeologist and the discourse chosen to 
be examined is not clear. For Dreyfus and Rabinow, unless the archaeologist 
‘understands the issues that concerns the thinkers he [sic] studies, he will be unable 
to distinguish when two different utterances are the same serious speech act and 
when two identical utterances are different speech acts’.
45 This may be taken to 
imply that the archaeologist, from this perspective, needs to be at least partially 
trained in the discursive practices of the discourse to be excavated. An alternative 
consideration could be that an archaeologist needs a degree of separation from the 
discourse in order to recognise the role of the discursive practices in the 
manufacture of the “Truth” of the discourse.
46 
                                                 
45 Dreyfus & Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics at 88 
46 It has been suggested that an archaeologist should remain an ‘outsider who must bracket the self-
understanding of discourse participants’ (Fleming, M., ‘Working in the Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity: Habermas, Foucault and Derrida’ (1996) 40 Philosophy Today 169 at 171). In terms of 
Foucault’s own archaeologies, his Madness and Civilisation may have been informed by his training 
in psychology, however, his Birth of the Clinic does not appear to be linked to any medical training 
on his part.  
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Irrespective of the relationship between the discourse and the archaeologist, an 
archaeology is “much more willing than the history of ideas to speak of 
discontinuities, ruptures, gaps, entirely new forms of positivity, and of sudden 
redistributions”. It is important to recognise that just because the archaeological 
method allows for the “restoration of rifts and instability” it does not mean that 
discontinuities are the sole focus of an archaeologist.
47 Foucault said of himself that 
‘no one is more of a continuist than I am’;
48 while his stories of the prison and the 
medical profession reflect continuities as well as discontinuities.
49 The 
archaeological method is only a method. It can be understood to be the role of the 
archaeologist to highlight either the ruptures or the seamlessness of a particular 
discourse.  
 
As the past is understood to be both continuous and discontinuous, an archaeologist 
can choose either as the focus of her or his project. ‘In the face of… assumptions of 
continuity, Foucault asks not that we assume precisely the opposite – that there is 
no continuity in history – but rather that we treat any assumed continuity with 
suspicion’.
50 The choices made by an archaeologist will provide the outline for the 
narrative of an archaeology, potentially consisting of discrete time periods which 
have been selected to provide some form of comparison or to provide a point of 
conflict. These periods can extend over a few years or over many centuries, 
                                                 
47 It has been suggested that to ‘found a theory of history on discontinuity would be to think in terms 
of a foundation, a continuity’: Shumway, Michel Foucault at 19 
48 ‘Questions of Method’ in Burchell, et al, The Foucault Effect at 76  
49 Archaeology ‘foregrounds discontinuities, gaps, ruptures and the new forms of positivity… [y]et 
it does not neglect repetitive and uninterrupted forms for they too, like the multiplicity of 
differences which arise with transformations, are subject to the rules of formation of positivities’, 
Smart, B., Michel Foucault, Routledge, London, 1985 at 50 
50 Shumway, Michel Foucault at 20  
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depending on the discursive formation involved and the choices made by the 
archaeologist.  
 
The choices of an archaeologist with respect to the narrative of a particular project 
may reflect a degree of genealogical intuition. An archaeologist’s understanding of 
a particular problem may not be limited to one “local discursivity”. It is likely that 
the archaeologist’s understanding will be informed by a number of discourses, that 
is, by the “tactics whereby, on the basis of the descriptions of these local 
discursivities, the subjected knowledges which were thus released would be 
brought into play”. However, an archaeologist may choose to examine the role of 
one discursivity in order to construct a narrative that may inform a more general 
examination of the broader tactics of subjectification through the operation of 
knowledges. 
 
The view that archaeologists make choices may be taken to suggest that they have a 
degree of personal autonomy. This is not intended. An archaeologist can be seen to 
be as constructed as the subjects about which they write. This understanding builds 
on the perspective that for ‘Foucault, there is no privileged standpoint of 
objectivity; he must begin as a situated subject writing from a perspective that he 
can problematise from within, but not leave’.
51  
 
Archaeologists, and the narratives they produce, can be understood to operate 
within similar discursive constraints to those within which the subjects of the 
discursive formation that is the focus of an archaeology operate. As the method 
                                                 
51 Simpson, J., ‘Archaeology and politicism: Foucault’s epistemic anarchism’ (1994) 27 Man and 
World 23 at 24  
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does not involve looking “behind” the monuments, the process may be more 
transparent than in traditional histories. The effects of the discourse that constructs 
an archaeologist will be evident, and may be engaged with, in the choices made by 
that archaeologist in the limits of her or his archaeological excavation. An 
archaeologist and the archaeological method are necessarily discursively 
constructed, but this constitution may be acknowledged in the process of explaining 
a project. 
 
Archaeology can be seen to derive from the recognition of the discursive nature of 
society, and the role that discursive practices, in particular writing practices, play in 
the perpetuation of social institutions. The active involvement of an archaeologist 
must be recognised, as the method does not provide limits for analysis. An 
archaeologist looks at monuments as artefacts in themselves, it is the archaeologist 
who constructs the narrative around the documents.  
 
For Kendall and Wickham this narrative could be, amongst other possibilities, an 
analysis of the ‘positions which are established between subjects in regard to 
statements’
52 or it could be a description of the ‘institutions which acquire authority 
and provide limits within which discursive objects may act or exist’.
53 For this 
thesis, the outcome of the application, the narrative, is of lesser importance than the 
application itself.  
 
This section has described the method in abstract terms. The techniques to be used 
in the legal archaeology that makes up the bulk of this thesis will be explored in the 
                                                 
52 Using Foucault’s Methods at 33 
53 Ibid at 26  
 
168
 
final section of the chapter. The next section emphasises some of the specifics of 
the application of the method, in order to describe what can be included within an 
archaeological narrative. 
 
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL METHOD 
 
This section highlights three traits of the archaeological method, as understood 
here, that shape the conclusions which may be drawn from archaeological research. 
The traits reflect the view that an archaeology can be seen as a ‘purely descriptive 
enterprise’
54 and Foucault’s view that effective history did ‘not resemble the 
evolution of a species and does not map the destiny of a people’.
55 These two 
statements indicate the central features of the archaeological method that will be 
addressed in this section. First, the method can be understood to only generate a 
description, or redescription of “events”. Second, an archaeology must involve an 
attempt to avoid any implication of progress and must seek simply to document 
change.
56 And finally, archaeologists only “deal” with the discourses and discursive 
formations that construct subjects, and not with people, either individuals (as 
individuals) or a geographically constituted group. These three aspects of the 
method will be discussed in turn in this section. 
 
That the method can be seen as “purely descriptive” limits the sorts of inferences 
that are to be drawn from the material with which an archaeologist deals. That is, as 
highlighted in the Introduction to this project, an archaeologist must attempt to 
                                                 
54 Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics at 56 
55 Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ at 81 
56 This is not easy as every archaeologist is “situated” and looks “backward”.   
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limit the use of “second order” judgments.
57 Certainly, an archaeologist must avoid 
giving the impression that she or he is looking behind the “surface” of the 
monuments to ascertain the thoughts or motivations of the authors who produced 
them. Such thoughts and motivations are not important in the formation and 
perpetuation of discursive formations. The method requires the attempt to present 
of documents as they were,
58 without any reference to their authors as individuals. 
The method ‘describes statements in a non-anthropological manner, as a means of 
avoiding the search for authors’.
59 It is a technique that reflects an attempt to 
present the archive of a past discursive formation. This “presentation” is not 
intended as an “uncovering” of any Truth. Any revealing that appears to be 
produced by the method is an unintended consequence of the presentation of the 
documents in an account of the discursive formation.  
 
That the method is predominantly descriptive may give rise to possible accusations 
of “superficiality”. The aim of the method can be understood to involve the 
presentation of the documents as they were written, it is ‘content to remain at the 
level of appearances’,
60 as the manner of their writing is the product of the 
discursive practices of the time. The method is to be “gray, meticulous and 
patiently documentary”, the focus is to be on the words as they were written. Each 
word is as important as any other. A consequence of this may be that many more 
words have to be highlighted and described than will be dealt with in a standard 
history. The discourses of the past can only be described in as effective a manner as 
possible if the practices of the time are sought to be observed minutely. 
                                                 
57 Once again, this is hard to do. 
58 This can be an attempt only, the presentation of documents as they were cannot really be done, in 
part because some documents are highlighted as worthy of discussion. 
59 Kendall & Wickham, Using Foucault’s Methods at 33 
60 Id  
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The understanding of archaeology as description, however, leaves open 
possibilities for the identification of trends and patterns over a period of time. 
Patterns may be evident in an archive, however, it must be recognised that it is the 
reading of the archive (either by the archaeologist or the reader of the 
archaeological narrative) that is generating these classifications.
61 The purposes of 
archaeologists will guide their decisions as to which categories they employ and 
which monuments they examine. The authors of the original documents have no 
“say” in these decisions. If any narrative is to be produced, the monuments are 
described by the archaeologists and then allocated a position in their archaeological 
narrative.  
 
Each monument can be taken as a statement from the discursive position of its 
author. Each monument may be understood as the recording of knowledge, the 
record of another interpretation of the events seen, experienced or described by that 
person. ‘Effective history is [an] affirmation of knowledge as perspective’.
62 An 
archaeologist must attempt to see each of the past monuments as reflecting a 
different perspective, and try to avoid the temptation to fit them into pre-conceived 
notions of a better account of the past.
63 The archaeologist must seek to present an 
account of the archive, a record of the perceptions and the constructions of the 
writers of the past. The method requires that an archaeologist does not seek to 
                                                 
61 It has been recognised that an archaeology of ‘mute statements’ and an emphasis on ‘pure 
description’ must still be based on a degree of interpretation with respect to the ‘choice of 
descriptive categories’ (Dreyfus & Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics at 85).  
62 Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ at 90 
63 The training of an archaeologist in any discipline will make this attempt very difficult to achieve. 
That is, training is built up on the privileging of some past experiences and perspectives. Further, the 
interest in the “historical dimension” of a discipline (as archaeologists are likely to have, otherwise, 
why would they seek to undertake an archaeology?) may affect the chance of success of the 
avoidance of pre-conceived notions of the past.  
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judge these perspectives.
64 These perspectives may be collated for descriptive 
purposes, but such a collation should try to avoid overwhelming the acceptance of 
the documents as perspectives. 
 
This attempt to take the words of the past as they are written can be understood as 
an effort to minimise the complexities of analytical historical research. The removal 
of as many layers of inference as possible in historical analyses results in a reading 
of the past that may be less susceptible to accusations of prejudice based on the 
pursuit of teleology or progress.
65 Part of the discipline of the archaeological 
method is the attempt by the archaeologist to avoid the view that the selection of 
documents is based on any free will on her or his part. That is, the choices made by 
the archaeologist are to be understood to be dictated by the discursive constitution 
of the archaeologists. This does not mean that the archaeologist does not have to 
account for her or himself. In the presentation by the archaeologist, however, there 
should be an explanation of the choices she or he has made in developing her or his 
archaeology. This is an attempt to reflect the effective historian’s role as a describer 
of the past and not an interpreter of the past.
66 
 
That archaeologists use their own categories in their accounts means that there 
ought not be the implication of causal relations between the events of the past and 
the present. The archaeological method is explicitly ‘not intended to uncover great 
                                                 
64 But few people can really avoid judgments when reading a document or perceiving the world. 
65 But nobody can quiet achieve it. To borrow Barthes’ metaphor, the reading of a history can be 
seen as slow progress through the many layers of onion skin, each layer representing another 
inference, interpretation or pre-conception that is a product of the reader, rather than being evident 
in the texts. (Barthes used this metaphor specifically in relation to texts, however, Deacon suggested 
that Barthes ‘could as well have been writing about history’, ‘Theory as Practice’ at 129).  
66 The potential for success in such a description is not known, however.  
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cultural continuities, nor to isolate mechanisms of causality’.
67 The past, from this 
perspective, is to be described and redescribed. An archaeologist is to seek to avoid 
the implication of “mechanisms of causality” that might otherwise be created by 
writers, and readers, of the present. If there is no assumption of continuity behind 
the grand “chain” of events that are taken to constitute history, then there is no need 
to create a chain of causation to bind the disparate happenings.
68 
 
The desire to avoid ascribing causality is, in part, based on a desire for a less 
layered reading of documents of the past. The imposition of a mechanism of 
causality upon the documents of the past adds yet another layer to a reading. To 
construct the past as a cause of the present reduces the number of interpretations of 
monuments that can be developed by other readers. The goal of an archaeologist is 
the presentation of monuments of the past. An archaeology, from this perspective, 
is an attempt to provide a description of the past as free as possible from its relation 
to the present. It is certainly an attempt to avoid a description of the past in any 
form of necessary relation with the present of the archaeologist. 
 
The relations between monuments in an archaeology may be suggested in terms of 
the words used, the forms of expression found in, and the content of, the 
monuments, in other words, in the ‘ordering of statements’.
69 It is the writing 
practices and the products of the writing practices that are of interest to 
archaeologists and not the author of the document. As the archaeological method 
                                                 
67 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge at 162 
68 Foucault in his archaeologies ‘is not denying change, but, rather, is denying the standard 
interpretation of change as necessarily having a cause’: Simpson, ‘Archaeology and politicism’ at 
28. The training of the archaeologist, and the reader, may make this rejection of the necessity of a 
causal connection very difficult. 
69 Kendall & Wickham, Using Foucault’s Methods at 27  
 
173
 
rests on the acceptance of a discursive interpretation of society, the method is 
limited with respect to what can be said about individual action. The discursive 
framework does not allow for the presentation of individuals who have autonomy 
with respect to their writing practices.  
 
This lack of autonomy, however, is not necessarily a complete lack of choice, from 
this perspective. For example, within the medical discursive formation a doctor 
presented with a particular set of symptoms may have the “choice” to administer 
drugs, recommend counselling or do nothing. The outcome of a doctor’s decision-
making process will be delimited by her or his training and her or his experiences 
as a doctor. In other words, her or his actions are understood to be constructed by 
the discursive formation. Subjects can choose from amongst a set of possible 
actions, from this perspective, but these options are those made available within a 
discursive formation.
70 More importantly, the discursive practices may tend to 
favour certain choices over others, therefore, any “choice” made by a subject is 
likely to be favoured by processes internal to the discursive formation. 
 
For these reasons, an archaeology may be understood to be an examination of the 
end product of choices made by subjects of a discursive formation. These 
monuments reflect discursive practices and, therefore, reflect a discursive 
formation. Authors are not treated as individuals with a free will but as subjects 
who write what is to be expected of someone of their position within the discursive 
formation. Understanding the relationship between the discursive formation and the 
                                                 
70 It can be considered that there are always a number of discursive practices available to a subject 
of a discourse, in the same manner that there are a number of “strategies and tactics” that constitute 
the form of governance that Foucault referred to as “governmentality”. In addition, one of the 
discursive practices that can be considered to construct the subject can be seen to hierarchise the 
available practices to “direct” the subject to exercise the most appropriate practice.  
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subject, according to Foucault, ‘is a matter of depriving the subject (or its 
substitute) of its role as originator, and of analysing the subject as a variable and 
complex function of discourse’.
71 From this perspective, subjects are to be 
constructed as within discursive formations; with the thoughts and actions of 
subjects taken as constructed by practices that operate within the discursive 
formation. Documents, in this understanding, are products of the multiplicity of 
discursive practices that constitute both the subject and the discursive formation in 
which subjects find themselves.  
 
The document can be understood as a reflection of the discursive practices that 
construct the subject. That is not to say that an archaeologist can fully describe 
subjects from their records (partly, because some discursive practices are not in 
written form) but that, within a given discursive formation, the document, as 
discursive practice, can be understood to constitute the author who, in turn, 
produces the document. Authors, from this perspective, do not have complete 
freedom as to the content or style of what they write, as least what they write as 
members of the discursive formation. The author, from the perspective adopted in 
this project, is limited by the practices of the discursive formation in which she or 
he participates. 
 
The importance of this lack of authorial autonomy for the archaeological method is 
that the excavated monuments can be understood to represent the subjects and the 
discursive formation as they were. The writers are taken to be products of 
discursive practices and these documents reflect the discursive practices that result 
in the production of texts. The purpose of an archaeology is an attempt to show the 
                                                 
71 Foucault, ‘What is an Author?’ at 118  
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past as close to how it existed in the past as possible. It is an attempt to treat the 
moment of the writing of these historical documents as the present time of the 
authors.
72 For the purposes of the archaeology, authors do not exist outside the 
documents they produce and, consequently, archaeologists seek to reduce the 
number of prejudices that “colour” their reading of monuments. 
 
As will be seen in the next section, the application of the archaeological method, as 
I understand it, to the history of the English common law provides a description of 
the monuments of the past. Certain similarities and differences may be highlighted 
by the archaeologist, but they are similarities and differences that are supposed to 
emerge from the documents themselves (rather than from my prejudices). Each 
monument can be understood as a discursive event which can be classified in one 
manner or another, depending on the project of the archaeologist. There must also 
be an attempt to avoid the attribution of a teleological, or causal, connection 
between the documents, as each and every monument is understood to reflect 
continuity and discontinuity. From this perspective, each monument is important in 
itself. Indeed, each document could be treated as a separable artefact of the 
discursive formation, as it is understood to be a product of that formation and only 
a product of that formation. 
 
THE APPLICATION OF THE METHOD TO “THE LAW” 
 
In the final section of this chapter I will discuss specific aspects of my application 
of the archaeological method to “the law”. I will seek to lay out the framework, and 
                                                 
72 The attempt can never be wholly successful as no writing, from this perspective, even by a self-
reflexive archaeologist is outside a discursive formation.  
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(at least, to the extent that I can) the reasoning behind the framework, for the three 
chapters that are to follow. This thesis is an attempt at an archaeology of a number 
of decisions from the English common law. These decisions contain differing 
statements concerning liability that suggest changes in the law and in the 
construction of the subjects of the legal discursive formation. This archaeology is 
an attempt to provide a history of how the members of the legal discursive 
formation “saw” legal subjects and relationships of liability within their 
community. This project can not include all cases that included statements which 
related to legal recognition of inter-personal relationships, however, so some 
explanation is required as to how the cases to be examined were selected.  
 
This project is an application of the method to “the law”, or, more precisely, it can 
be seen as an attempt at an application.
73 That means that it is not intended to 
constitute a definitive application. It is not definitive in at least three ways. First, it 
reflects my understanding of Foucault’s archaeological method. Second, the 
Foucaultian techniques used in the application are being “tried out” on the English 
legal monuments discussed; future applications may reject or refine the techniques 
used here. The third manner in which this application is not a definitive application 
is that the choice of monuments excavated in this thesis is not the only choice that 
was available. The commentators who have considered the archaeological method 
have not discussed in detail the creation of an “archive” of a discourse. The choice 
of monuments examined here, therefore, reflects my understanding of “the law” 
and the archaeological method.  
 
                                                 
73 Indeed, given the difficulty associated with being an archaeologist presenting an archaeology, 
discussed previously, it may well be understood to be doomed to failure.  
 
177
 
This archaeology examines a number of written decisions from the courts of review 
in England over a period of 220 years.
74 It would be just as appropriate, in terms of 
the method, to examine all the written documents produced in a single case, starting 
from the originating statements of claim (or writs, notices or applications) through 
to the final judgments of the last site of appeal in that case. Either set of monuments 
(and any other set of legal documents) may be appropriate for an application of the 
archaeological method, as either set is constructed through the practices of a 
specific discursive, the English legal profession. Almost any set of “court” 
documents can be seen to present a focus on an ‘historical slice (however extended 
that slice might be)’
75 rather than an “historical process”.
76 I have chosen to 
examine a number of decisions over an extended period of time, however; in part, 
in order to reflect upon the legal practice of repeating statements and in order to 
discuss what appears to be changes in the manner in which defendants were “seen” 
over the period covered by this thesis.
77 
 
The discussion of this application of the archaeological method to the history of 
“the law” will begin by re-visiting the written nature of “the law”. The law can be 
understood to be administered by the legal profession, the discursive formation, 
which is controlled through specific discursive practices. The most significant sets 
of practices that construct the legal profession relate to the writing of judgments 
                                                 
74 The choice of examining a number of monuments over an extended period of time can be seen to 
follow Foucault’s own analysis in The Order of Things where he examines the ‘intellectual 
conditions of possibility during the Renaissance, the classical age and the modern era’ (Shumway, 
Michel Foucault at 20). 
75 Kendall & Wickham, Using Foucault’s Methods at 31 
76 According to Kendall & Wickham, an emphasis on an historical process would be more indicative 
of a genealogical, rather than an archaeological, analysis. 
77 My interest in showing the apparent changes in how defendants were “seen” can be understood as 
an intrusion of my “genealogical” intuition. Such intuitions may, however, be a necessary part of 
any archaeology.  
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and the privileging and repetition of statements from past judgments in the 
articulation of the law. 
 
To briefly recap the conclusions of the first Part, English society can be understood 
as a collection of legal subjects, that is, people constructed within the discourses of 
governance. A sub-group of these citizens undertake specialised training in the 
administration of the English law. This sub-group is the English legal profession. 
Their training can be understood to predispose them to accept legal discursive 
practices as appropriate forms of professional behaviour. Both the law and the legal 
discursive formation can be seen to exist as predominantly written modes of 
governance. The principal legal discursive practices of the discursive formation 
operate through, and are directed to the production of, the written text.  
 
As was discussed in the section on the repetition of legal statements in Chapter 
Two, the discursive practices of privileging past judgments can be understood to be 
one of the techniques of discursive control that operate within the English legal 
discursive formation. The precise practices that surround the use of previous 
decisions have changed over the centuries. Since the times of the writ system, 
statements in preceding judgments have been considered relevant to the case in 
hand. In addition, the citing of “principles” from previous decisions has been a 
technique of legal argument since the eighteenth century. Thus, when examining a 
history of a certain class of cases, such as in tort, contract or trusts, it is important 
to be aware of previous decisions within that area. These past cases can be 
understood to be the law as it was to the judges of the time, these judgments can be 
taken as the law in documentary form. 
  
 
179
 
At its simplest, the English common law can be seen as changing through the 
processes that surround the repetition of legal statements. Those who constitute a 
court of review must refer to past cases in making their judgments. These past cases 
are put to them by counsel appearing before them to present legal argument. Any 
account of a particular area of legal discourse, therefore, may benefit from attention 
being paid to past statements, the treatment of past statements and the role of 
counsel in putting forward the statements. Archaeologists may, and judges do, see 
themselves as following a “chain” of past judgments. This “chain” can often extend 
back several centuries, as every judgment refers back to previous judgments in 
which reference will be made to even earlier judgments.
78 In this context, this 
process can be continued until judgments based purely on the writ system are 
encountered. Such a “chain” of judgments has formed the basis of my legal 
archaeology. 
 
Each judgment can be seen as a monument of the legal discursive formation. Each 
can be understood to have been written by a member of the legal discursive 
formation with the knowledge that it may be repeated in future judgments.
79 Each 
can be taken to have been written according to the discursive practices of the 
formation. The purpose of this archaeology is to provide an ‘intrinsic description of 
the document itself which results in the establishing of unities, sets, series, series of 
series and relations’.
80 As a means to achieve this, this archaeology of the legal 
discursive formation will involve providing an intrinsic description of the cases 
                                                 
78 It is likely, however, that an archaeologist would follow the “chain” further back than a judge 
would, as the judge is interested in the law as it is for the particular case she or he is overseeing, 
while the archaeologist may be interested in the “chain” in terms of how the law was for the judges 
who wrote the judgments in the “chain”. 
79 That is, if the judgment is being written in a court of record. 
80 McDonell, D., ‘On Foucault’s Philosophical Method’ (1977) 7 Canadian Journal of Philosophy 
537 at 543  
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themselves. This description will include the facts that gave rise to the original suits 
and the legal statements that justify the decision made by the judge. From this 
description commonalities in the facts and the legal statements will be highlighted 
in an attempt to identify at least some of the “unities, sets and series” of negligence 
law. 
 
The previous section highlighted the characteristic of the method that suggests a 
“superficiality” of description. This is true of the method, as it is understood here, 
when it is applied to legal judgments. The cases that are examined in detail in this 
thesis are looked at in great detail, but I have tried to ensure that this is always “at 
the level of appearances”. From my perspective, the point of the method is not to 
attempt to guess at the essence, or the ratio, of a judgment, nor is it to attempt to 
guess at the “true” meaning of the words of the judges. The aim of the method, as I 
understand it,  is to try to describe, in detail, the monuments of the law.  
 
The “superficiality” of description may appear to some readers to be similar to that 
of an overly long case-note. The difference is that a case-note can be understood to 
be an interpretation of the case that is part of a process for establishing the use of a 
particular decision for future legal work, or more particularly, for establishing the 
state of the law as it is now. The purpose of an archaeology, as understood in this 
thesis, is different. The words are taken at face value, at a non-interpretive level. 
This reflects the fact that one of the aims of an archaeological analysis is, as far as 
possible, to limit the use of “second order judgments”. It is from a quantity of these 
descriptions that an archaeological narrative can be told.  
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In this thesis, an archaeological narrative can be seen as either an analysis of the 
‘positions which are established between subjects in regard to statements’
81 or a 
description of the ‘institutions which acquire authority and provide limits within 
which discursive objects may act or exist’.
82 In other words, from the detailed 
descriptions that are presented in the following chapters a narrative will emerge that 
can be seen as an analysis of the relationship between the judges and their 
judgments or as a description of the institution that provides limits for the actions 
of the judges and defendants. Either narrative relies on taking the judgments at face 
value, rather than interpreting the decisions for future legal application as seems 
usual in a case-note. 
 
The legal practices that construct judges in their writings also construct them in 
their interpretation of the facts and the legal subjects who come before them.
83 
Judges can be understood to have been trained to respond to facts and legal 
statements in particular ways. It is unlikely, to choose an extreme example, that an 
employer who shoots an employee will be subjected to a hearing under the rubric 
of unfair dismissal, despite the fact it is through what may be seen as the 
inappropriate actions of the employer that the employee is no longer working. If 
legal counsel disagree with a court’s characterisation of legal statements as they 
relate to a case in which they are involved they may appeal to a more senior court 
to re-assess the decision. The hierarchical relationships of the common law courts, 
and the possible benefits of seeking leave to appeal, can be understood to reflect an 
                                                 
81 Kendall & Wickham, Using Foucault’s Methods at 33 
82 Ibid at 26 
83 It is arguable that it is standard legal practice to not consider judges to be “authors” of judgments. 
That is, lawyers, when dealing with past decisions, do not concern themselves with who wrote the 
judgment (with the possible exception of “maverick” judges). Irrespective of “standard legal 
practice”, it is important to stress the manner in which the archaeological method suggests that 
members of a discourse are to be considered in an application of the method.   
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acceptance on the part of members of the profession that all courts do not decide 
cases in the same manner.  
 
Despite what can be considered to be similar educational backgrounds, judges are 
not identical. Processes of subjectification within the legal profession and 
elsewhere do not produce intellectual clones. Each law student has a particular 
history before entering into the specialised training of the legal profession. No legal 
subject was a tabula rasa prior to their complicity in the perpetuation of the legal 
discursive practices.  
 
Legal training compounds these differences by encouraging students to construct 
different legal arguments to argue a case in moots or in examinations. Law 
students, who can create multiple legal arguments for a single set of facts, become 
lawyers and judges who can repeat legal statements in order to achieve a variety of 
effects. This variety in the judicial “perspective” is reflected in the discursive 
practice of majority decisions. The differences in the constitution of the members 
of the legal profession can be understood to contribute to the production of the non-
unanimous decisions handed down in courts of review. If all judges and lawyers 
were constituted identically, there would be many fewer disagreements when it 
came to the adjudication of a particular case. Despite the lack of clarity that results 
from these split decisions, all judgments can be still considered to contain 
statements of the law that are available for repetition by later judges.  
 
Importantly, in this context, it is through these differences in statements of law in 
the judgments that change may be produced. The varying interpretations of cases 
referred to by counsel can contribute to the production of different decisions  
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handed down by judges involved in the same case. Each of these individual 
judgments contains statements of the law for the use of future lawyers and judges. 
The continued use of dissenting judgments, and of words that are described as 
obiter dicta within single judgments, provides a mechanism through which the 
legal discursive formation can change. A dissenting judgment ‘sometimes plants a 
seed which later comes to fruit in a reversal of judicial authority’.
84 For example, 
the need for a shift towards a greater freedom in terms of political expression may 
be discussed by a number of judges in what is otherwise taken to their obiter, 
before a court of review decides that such an increase is appropriate as a matter of 
“public policy”. 
 
That is not to say that dissenting judgments always become the basis for a new 
dominant statement of law in that area. Some statements will be made in only one 
decision and never repeated. Others will be considered for re-statement and may be 
explicitly incorporated in legislation or removed from legal consideration by 
statute. However, it is the recording of these different statements that allows 
judgments to functions as monuments in a history of the English legal discursive 
formation. The excavation of past dissenting judgments and obiter can be 
understood to be a means for tracing the continuities and discontinuities within a 
particular area of the English legal discursive formation.  
 
Statutes and judgments from different jurisdictions may also be adduced during 
counsels’ arguments. These “outside” documents may be used in statements by the 
bench. This thesis is an archaeology of a part of the English common law, therefore 
                                                 
84 Kirby, M., ‘In Praise of Common Law Renewal’ (1992) 15 University of New South Wales Law 
Journal 462 at 470  
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the cases to be excavated are English cases. However, English case law does not sit 
in isolation from the law in rest of the United Kingdom and related international 
jurisdictions.  
 
What is important, in terms of the articulation of the law within the English legal 
discursive formation, is how and when the cases from other jurisdictions are 
included into the English common law. Such “foreign” judgments can be treated as 
belonging to non-discursive domains. Non-discursive domains can be understood 
to include monuments that are not produced by the practices of the discourse in 
question. Decisions from other jurisdictions will be written according to the legal 
discursive practices of the professions of those other jurisdictions. A judgment 
written, for example, by a member of the U.S. Supreme Court is written according 
to the discursive practices of the U.S. legal profession. These external judgments 
are legal statements in the other jurisdictions but they cannot become part of the 
English common law until they are repeated as legal statements by members of the 
English legal discursive formation.
85 For this reason, “outside” cases will be 
discussed only to the extent to which they are repeated as legal statements by the 
English judges in their decisions.
86  
 
                                                 
85 The closer the practices of the other jurisdiction are to English legal discursive practices, the more 
likely it will be that the statements from the other jurisdiction will be repeated into English law. 
86 Another example of an “outside” legal discourse that has relevance to some of the decisions 
examined in this thesis is the Scottish legal discourse. Cases that appear before the House of Lords 
sitting in their Scottish jurisdiction are decided according to Scots law. The legal statements that are 
repeated in argument are more likely to be from other Scottish cases and the lawyers that appear for 
either party are trained in Scots law. The procedures that had to be followed before the case was 
heard by the House of Lords are different for the Scots and English jurisdictions. (Many of the 
practices are, however, the same, otherwise the Law Lords could not hear the case.) Therefore, 
judgments that are written for Scottish cases can be understood to be based on different practices 
from judgments written in English cases.  
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The first of the cases to be discussed in this thesis was decided in 1750 and the last 
in 1972. The decisions have been divided into those handed down in the three 
centuries covered by this thesis. Thus, Chapter Four contains cases decided in the 
eighteenth century, Chapter Five the nineteenth and Chapter Six cases decided in 
the twentieth century. This presentation was chosen, in part, as a result of my 
understanding of Foucault’s methods. For, as Dillon has suggested, ‘Foucault’s 
Archaeology of Knowledge so thoroughly obliterates our notions of where 
historical unities like “periods” begin and end that it does seem that we specialise, 
teach and write in periods mainly for professional convenience’.
87 Therefore, the 
classification of cases into centuries is an attempt to avoid any reference to pre-
conceived “unities”. 
 
The choice of this method of presentation is also an attempt to remove any 
emphasis on any particular decision. That is, to present this archaeology in terms of 
“periods” or “unities” would require these periods to begin, or end, with particular 
cases. However, a presentation based on “marker cases” may, to legally trained 
eyes, promote other pre-conceptions, given the focus on “marker cases” that seems 
entrenched in normal legal training.
88 In an attempt to avoid unnecessary layering, 
the decisions excavated in this archaeology are organised in terms of centuries. 
 
Some of the changes evident in the statements of law over the period include the 
introduction of the word “duty” and the later introduction and persistent repetition 
of the phrase “duty of care”. Other differences that emerge from this description 
                                                 
87 ‘The Archaeology of Victorian Literature’ at 237 
88 Kendall & Wickham refer to the recourse to ‘powerful figures’ in historical analysis as possibly 
inappropriate use of Foucaultian techniques (Using Foucault’s Methods at 119). Therefore, to link a 
Foucaultian understanding of the law to “powerful” or “marker” cases may be a similarly 
inappropriate use of Foucaultian techniques.  
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include changes in statements associated with the scope of legal liability. In short, 
during the eighteenth century, legally recognised relationships of responsibility can 
be understood to have been limited to prescribed and delimited relationships. In 
other words, during this time, only particular classes of defendants were “seen” by 
the judges as capable of being held liable. Whereas in cases decided in the 
twentieth century the category of defendants who could be considered to be liable 
appears to have been much wider. 
 
The process of the selection of the decisions excavated in this thesis was mentioned 
in the Introduction to this project, however, more detail is necessary to make sense 
of this archaeology. A sequence of cases was chosen, rather than included through 
a process of random selection, to foreground the discursive practices associated 
with the repetition of legal statements. A single case was chosen as a starting point 
for this archaeology. A “web of decisions” to which this case was connected was 
then examined. That is, the judgments that were cited in the judgments in that 
decision were identified. The cases that were cited in these judgments were then 
identified. This process was repeated until a “web of decisions” that extended back 
beyond 1750, the other limit for this thesis, could be created. Again, it needs to be 
stressed that the “web” includes all cases cited in the judgments, that is, both 
decisions that the judges followed and those that they either mentioned or 
distinguished were included in the list of cases available for archaeological 
discussion. Further, the “web” that was constructed included all judgments in a 
decision, whether the judgments were part of the majority of the court or whether 
the judgment was in dissent. 
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A sequence of cases was chosen to demonstrate the practice of repetition. Any case 
that could have been chosen, particularly if it was decided in a court of review, 
would have a substantial “web” of cases that constituted some of the conditions of 
possibility for to that decision. The existence of such a “web of decisions”, or a 
sequence of cases is not intended to imply an evolution in the law, or that the final 
decision was a teleological outcome of a process of legal change. The existence of 
a “web of decisions” only demonstrates that the English common law operates 
through, and changes with, the use of past legal statements. 
 
Indeed, it is also hoped that an analysis of a “web of decisions” will highlight the 
non-linear nature of the law.
89 That is, my intention is to show that the legal 
statements in Herrington are not caused by the preceding judgments, more that the 
preceding judgments constituted conditions of possibility for the later decision. In 
addition, the use of the “web” will hopefully demonstrate that the changes in the 
law in the period covered in this project were not a reflection of a smooth transition 
from one form of liability to another. Some judgments are accepted and others are 
rejected. Some articulations of liability are repeated and some are not. The decision 
to focus on a “web of decisions” was intended to highlight how discontinuous the 
statements of law can be, within a particular web of decisions. 
 
The use of the word “web” is also intended to suggest a perspective on the nature 
of the use of “precedent” in the law. That is, legal statements can be understood to 
be taken from earlier cases, without a full understanding of the circumstances of the 
                                                 
89 An associated point is that it could be very difficult to present an archaeology of legal judgments 
that did not have a degree of linearity. That is, if there were to be a number of different judgments 
examined, they would necessarily be over a particular period of time. If the analysis of these 
judgments were to be presented in a manner that was not chronological, it would require a different 
form of second order judgment to create this different form of presentation.   
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decision in which the statements occurred. In some cases, a legal statement is not 
repeated with approval in a particular judgment because the facts of the earlier case 
are too dissimilar, however, in many cases, a legal statement is repeated without a 
discussion of its historical context. That is, “precedents” are taken to be 
“ahistorical”. In other words, precedents are used in order to attempt to indicate 
how the “law” is at the time of the repetition of the statement, not to explain how 
the law was at the time of the making of the statement. 
 
Once a final decision was selected and the “web of decision” of that decision 
established, the other 18 cases to be excavated had to be chosen. The first case 
examined, Dale v Hall
90 was decided in 1750, which was a time that the English 
legal discursive formation can be understood to have been established. The other 
cases that were selected for discussion were chosen on the basis of two main 
criteria. The first was that the words of the judges had to be clearly distinguishable 
from the words of the reporters and counsel.
91 The second criterion was that the 
judgments were to be spread fairly evenly across the period examined. This was 
done in order to avoid any suggestion that the account provided here involved an 
attempt to deliberately avoid cases decided during a particular period.  
 
                                                 
90 (1750) 1 Wils KB 281 
91 Of course, this criteria was more relevant for the 18
th century judgments.  
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The cases chosen were selected with two ends in mind.
92 First, to allow for an 
application of the method as I understand it itself. A simple category of monuments 
(negligence decisions over a particular period written by a discrete and relatively 
easily describable discursive formation, the English legal profession) made this 
attempt at the application of the method less complex than it might have been.
93 
The second reason for selection reflected my preconceptions concerning the 
narrative that I thought I could produce.
94 That narrative can be seen either as an 
account of a shift in the way that judges “saw” the defendants that came before 
them, or an examination of one of the conditions of possibility for the twentieth 
century “duty of care”, through a discussion of the practices associated with the 
repetition of statements of law. 
 
The introduction of the word “duty” can be seen to mark the beginning of a shift in 
the way in which judges “saw” the defendants who came before them.
95 The 
capacity of judges to “see” legal subjects as rational individuals, who could be 
judged according to universal internalised norms, is contingent on judges 
                                                 
92 In choosing cases I encountered a real tension with respect to the “notoriety” of some of the 
decisions. The repetition of statements from some of the decisions has made them “notorious”. The 
danger I felt was that I would reproduce “marker cases” ideas, but I could see no way to avoid this. 
Some of the cases examined in this project are relatively well-known and some are not. Scott v 
Shepherd (1773) 3 Wils KB 403 and Vaughan v Menlove (1837) 3 Bing (NC) 468 were chosen 
because the legal statements contained in the judgments have been repeated often. Other decisions 
in the third period, such as Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850 are recognisable both for the level of 
repetition of the statements and for their relative “youth”. Other cases, such as Ogle v Barnes (1799) 
8 TR 188 have virtually disappeared from current understandings of the law. 
93 I recognise that choosing decisions from the area of “negligence law” can be seen to be including 
the use of a “second order judgment” in the application of the archaeological method. However, any 
problems associated with the use of the judgment were felt to be outweighed by the benefits that 
may be achieved through the use of a class of decisions in terms of the construction of a narrative 
around changes to the articulation of liability in the law. 
94 At this point, genealogical intuitions may be understood to have “coloured” this project. 
95 For the purposes of this application of the archaeological method, legal statements including the 
word “duty” can be “marker statements”, however, the judgments in which the statements are 
included do not have to be considered to be “marker cases”. For the statements, rather than the 
cases, are intended to be the focus of this project.  
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recognising attributes and norms that were separable from those that could be 
understood to have been a function of the station in life of the defendant.
96 A 
“duty” can be taken to be an obligation expressed as a norm. That is, a “duty” may 
be understood as an obligation that can be expressed separately from the 
obligations that might be imposed as a result of the station in life of the defendant. 
 
The narrative produced by the application of the method as understood in this thesis 
emphasises the contingent nature of legal change. I do not mean to imply some 
form of legal evolution in this story. The introduction of the word “duty” can be 
seen as a condition of possibility, rather than a cause, of the “duty of care”. The fact 
that the “duty of care” became part of English law years after the use of the word 
“duty” does not mean that such an outcome was inevitable. I do not mean to 
suggest that contemporary negligence law “evolved” from eighteenth century 
descriptions of liability. The eighteenth century judges can be understood to have 
described liability in the terms that they were trained to describe liability. Just as 
twentieth century judges can be taken to have described liability in the terms of the 
discursive practices in which they were trained. 
 
This application of the archaeological method, as it is understood here, produces 
narratives that allow for the articulation of the separable positivities within the 
‘continuity’
97 of English law. My attempt to practise ‘utter unconcern for the staple 
                                                 
96 This shift in the way that judges “saw” the defendants that came before, and in particular, the 
judges’ interest in the “mentality”, the inner life of the defendants, was also discussed by Foucault 
in ‘The Dangerous Individual’, an interview in Kritzman, L. (ed), Michel Foucault – Politics, 
Philosophy, Culture, Routledge, New York, 1988, 125 
97 Caenegem, R. C. van, An Historical Introduction to Private Law, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1992 at 3  
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of conventional history’,
98 is intended to provide some scope for an appreciation of 
the changing interactions between legal institutions and individual subjects. These 
changing interactions and articulations can be characterised through the use of 
discourse theory and the idea that all subjects are constituted by the discursive 
practices in which they have been trained. 
 
The view that judges and counsel are legal subjects who have undergone 
specialised training and who utilise sanctioned legal discursive practices to 
perpetuate both the law and the legal discursive formation is at the heart of this 
legal archaeology. As the judiciary produce the judgments that can be seen as the 
monuments of the discursive formation, they can be understood to reproduce the 
discursive practices of the legal discursive formation. The lawyers who appear 
before judges, also legal subjects with specialised training, participate in the 
discursive practices associated with the repetition of legal statements by seeking 
out and repeating “precedents” in their arguments before the bench. In this way, 
these statements of law are available for repetition by the judges when writing their 
judgments.
99 These judgments may then become the artefacts that may be 
excavated by a legal archaeologist, some of which will be excavated in the 
remainder of this thesis. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
An archaeology, as understood in this project, is an excavation of the monuments 
generated within a discourse or discursive formation. This method can be 
                                                 
98 White, H., Tropics of Discourse - Essays in Cultural Criticism, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore, 1978 at 234 
99 In addition, judges themselves may seek out their statements for repetition in their judgments.  
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understood to be based upon a discursive understanding of society and the legal 
profession. This chapter, which was based on the discursive understanding put 
forward in Part One, presented a method for historical analysis of documents 
produced by members of the English legal discursive formation that incorporates 
such an understanding. 
 
The archaeological method can be understood to involve the reading of the 
documents produced within a discursive formation as monuments which reflect the 
discursive practices of the formation. The method may take these documents, 
therefore, as artefacts in themselves. From a discursive perspective, the document 
and the author of the document can be seen as products of discursive practices. 
Such an acceptance of the documents as artefacts in themselves may enable a 
deeper acknowledgment of a history that comprises both continuities and 
discontinuities than is enabled by other, more traditional, approaches to the writing 
of the history of law. From the perspective adopted in this thesis, every document 
has the potential to be part of the processes of change in the discursive formation 
and, therefore, every document produced by a subject of a discursive formation 
may be of value to an archaeologist. 
 
The role of an archaeologist is not intended to be presented as that of some 
impartial observer, as archaeologists themselves can be seen to be products of the 
discursive practices that construct them. As the past of a discursive formation is a 
multitude of documents, the categorisation of these into periods of change or 
constancy can be understood to be an act of the archaeologist. It is an imposition of 
categories onto the documents of the past. Such classifications may be suggested by  
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the words in the documents and may be inferred from the monuments, but these 
categories are explicitly generated by the archaeologist. 
 
As an archaeologist is not to “look behind” the documents, she or he is not 
authorised to assume or imply a chain of causation that runs through the “history” 
presented in an archaeology. There may be a connection between the monuments, 
but there can be no argument that one event “caused” another. As an archaeology, 
from the perspective adopted in this thesis, is to be a purely descriptive exercise, it 
disallows conjecture with respect to the motivations, or states of mind, of 
“authors”.
100 All that can be known, according to this view of archaeology, is what 
has been recorded. These records are to form the subject matter for an archaeology. 
 
The remainder of this thesis is an attempt to support the view that recorded legal 
judgments can constitute the subject matter for a legal archaeology. These 
judgments can be seen, if the archaeology avoids complete failure, as reflecting the 
state of the legal discursive formation at the time of their recording. Judges, and 
therefore their judgments, are to be taken as a product of the discursive practices 
that constitute the legal discursive formation. The legal practice of judges using 
previous judgments in making their decisions is to affirm the importance of 
records. The practice of majority judgments, and, by implication, minority, 
dissenting judgments, can be understood to be one of the sites of continuity and 
discontinuity within the legal discursive formation. Those who dissent are also 
                                                 
100 As has been suggested throughout this chapter, the goal of a “purely descriptive exercise” is one 
that may be impossible to achieve. The simple fact that an archaeologist wishes to construct an 
archaeological narrative of a particular set of discursive practices in itself adds a “layer” of 
interpretation to the archaeology.   
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important because it is in the words of the dissenting judges that there is some 
“room” for a discussion in which possible changes in the law may become possible.  
 
The archaeological excavations that follow in the next three chapters are an attempt 
to show the relationship between the law and the legal discursive formation. The 
excavations are also intended to suggest that changes have emerged in the 
articulation of liability and that there has been a shift in the construction of the legal 
subjects. These excavations are based on a discursive understanding of society. 
This discursive understanding allows for the possibility that the law and the legal 
discursive formation change whilst maintaining their integrity. As it is presented in 
this thesis, the archaeological method can be understood as an effective form of 
historical description that can help illustrate the continuous and discontinuous 
nature of the law. The balance of this thesis is an attempt at the application of this 
method. 
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CHAPTER FOUR – THE ARCHAEOLOGY: 1750 - 1800 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter is an attempt at an archaeological excavation of the period 1750 to 
1802. It is a close examination of five decisions of the English courts in which 
statements about relationships of liability were made. Before starting the 
excavation, I have developed some explanatory notes to provide a background to 
the cases. First, I offer a fuller discussion of the process involved in the specific 
selection of the cases excavated in this chapter. Second, I provide a brief 
description of the writ system of law and the use of previous decisions that were 
practised at the time. Third, I discuss the practices of case reporting in the period 
covered by this chapter. These sections are included to provide some background to 
the practices of law of the eighteenth century. The specifics of judicial procedures 
have changed in the past 200 years, so these brief descriptions are intended to assist 
in an understanding of the judgments that are excavated in this chapter. A 
description of how the cases will be discussed in this archaeology will complete 
this introductory section. 
 
The technique used for selecting the cases to be used in this legal archaeology was 
to examine cases that were cited in a recent decision. The decision in British 
Railways Board v Herrington was the case used for this process. The decisions to 
be examined in all three periods were chosen from the web of decisions associated 
with British Railways Board v Herrington. Five decisions are to be examined in 
this chapter; an analysis of these cases indicates a significant level of consistency in 
the legal statements articulating liability. 
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Most of the cases written in the period covered by this chapter were not suited to an 
archaeological examination. The reports of these cases were either too brief to 
allow for discussion of the law as presented by the courts in those cases, or the 
decisions were reported in such a way that it was difficult for me to differentiate 
between the words of the bench and the comments of the reporter. For a legal 
archaeology, as understood in this project, it is important to know the speaker of 
the particular words contained in a judgment. That is, it is important to know 
whether particular statements are statements offered to the court by counsel, are 
statements by judges contained in their judgments, or are “impressions” of the 
judgment written by the reporters. The words of each of these categories may have 
importance to a legal archaeology (however, it is only the words of counsel and 
judges that are the focus of this particular archaeology) but it can be considered to 
be important to be able to differentiate between the “speakers” of words. Therefore, 
for the purposes of this archaeology, cases where the statements were not 
differentiable were excluded.
1  
 
The decisions most suited to the project were those where the court was asked to 
rule on a question of law. That is, the most useful cases, in terms of the method 
used in this thesis, were decisions of courts acting as courts of review. As was 
mentioned before, there was not a separate category of negligence decisions in 
English law in the eighteenth century. In order to examine cases that were similar 
                                                 
1 Given the predominant aspect of the practice of repetition of past statements of law can be 
understood to be the repetition of statements made by judges, it is more important to be able to 
differentiate the words of judges from those of counsel or reporters. As a result of the reporting 
practices of the eighteenth century, however, many of the reports of the time did not clearly 
distinguish the words of counsel from those of reporters. If I was to only examine cases in which the 
words of the reporters, counsel and judges were clearly distinguished there would be very few cases 
available for excavation. Therefore, I felt it was more important to be able to focus on the words of 
judges (thus enabling the examination of decisions over a greater period of time) than only to 
excavate reports in which the words of counsel were clearly distinguishable from those of reporters.  
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in content to those in the later chapters, the decisions that I deemed most 
appropriate were those in which the central question related to the question of a 
relationship of liability between plaintiff and defendant. From the cases that fitted 
the above criteria those that used the clearest language in their description of the 
relationship were chosen for examination.
2 The final criterion that I used was that 
the decisions were spread fairly evenly through the period.
3 
 
One of the characteristics of eighteenth century law was the use of writs in the 
court procedures available to those who sought redress for damage done to their 
person or property. “The law”, in this understanding, only allowed a limited 
number of actions to be brought and each of these actions was to be specific in its 
application. That is, a plaintiff had to bring their grievance to the attention of the 
court with the appropriate writ. The plaintiff would be non-suited if their counsel 
brought the wrong action and the case thrown out of court. This was so even if facts 
were introduced that would have proven the defendant liable under another writ. 
Much of the legal argument of the time appears to have involved a debate about the 
appropriateness of the plaintiff’s writ.
4 
 
                                                 
2 Other cases that did fit the criteria but that were not examined in this thesis included Beckwith v 
Shordike (1767) 4 Burr 2092, Day v Edwards (1794) 5 TR 648, Merryweather v Nixon (1799) 8 TR 
186, Pasley v Freeman (1789) 3 TR 51, Payne v Rogers (1794) 2 H Bl 350, Wilkinson v Coverdale 
(1793) 1 Esp 75 
3 This was as part of an attempt to cover the period as well as possible within the constraints of a 
project of this size. 
4 In terms of the writs, two types are important for this chapter. These are “trespass” and “action on 
the case”. The former ‘was the remedy for injuries accompanied by immediate violence, whether 
to… property or to the person’ (Halsbury’s Laws of England, vol. 1, Butterworths, London, 1907 at 
43-44). Actions on the case were either ‘actions in respect of wrongs similar to those the subject of 
trespass, but unaccompanied by immediate violence; or general actions on the case, which provided 
a remedy for all wrongs which would otherwise have been remediless’ (ibid at 40).  
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Some of the argument around the use of writs included reference to how each writ 
had been used in previous cases. The use of previous legal statements was already 
established as an important discursive practice by this time.
5 If counsel for either 
the defendant or the plaintiff argued that a previous court had allowed a certain 
application of a writ, then the present judges would consider that past decision in 
their own judgments. Past statements of law functioned as part of legal argument. 
As the judges spoke for the law, if the counsel reminded them of previous legal 
statements, then the judges were compelled to at least consider those statements. As 
these statements were only used as evidence in argument, they were not considered 
binding. Judgments included references to precedents but judges were not 
constrained by them.  
 
Another important factor in the practice of repetition was that there was no rigid 
court hierarchy. That courts were not organised into a rigidly defined hierarchy of 
courts meant that there was no single “higher” court that functioned as the final 
arbiter of matters legal. That did not mean there was no appeal process, however. 
The Court of the King’s Bench, for example, did hear proceedings in error from 
lower courts. Also, many situations allowed judgments to be delayed until a point 
of law had been clarified by a full court.
6 
 
One of the matters that needed consideration in the use of previous statements was 
the reputation of the reports cited. There were no official reports in the eighteenth 
                                                 
5 The use of past decisions in the judgments examined in this chapter demonstrate the practice. In 
addition, Baker has noted that by 1600, even a majority opinion would have the ‘effect of settling 
the law’ with respect to a particular issue: An Introduction to English Legal History at 227 
6 Ibid at 155-161  
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century and a number of reporters provided the service.
7 Certain of these reporters 
acquired a better reputation than others. This was not necessarily a reflection of the 
greater accuracy of their reports and can be understood to indicate that the legal 
discursive practices of the time included those that meant that statements contained 
in certain sets of reports were more likely to be repeated than those contained in 
other sets of reports.
8 The words of the judges, as recorded in any of these reports, 
could have been taken to be statements of the law, notwithstanding the reputation 
of the reporter. The judges of the time can be considered to have been constituted 
through a multiplicity of different discursive practices. One set of these were the 
practices relating to the reception of precedents into legal argument. Legal practices 
were such that a particular set of reports could be given precedence over others. 
Any and all reports were available for use in legal argument, including different 
reports of the same judgment as each provided a statement of “the law”. 
 
The decisions explored in this chapter are Dale v Hall, Slater v Baker
9, Scott v 
Shepherd
10, Forward v Pittard
11 and Ogle v Barnes
12. The cases are dealt with in 
chronological order.
13 Each discussion has been broken down into two sections. 
The first covers the background of the decision, including the facts as presented to 
court, which gave rise to the original action. This section also includes a discussion 
of the legal question or questions as presented to the court. As each of these 
                                                 
7 For a greater discussion about the role of reporters and the practices of reporting judgments, see 
section 3 of Chapter 2, above. 
8 In the earlier part of the eighteenth century, some reports were ‘so bad that judges forbade their 
citation’: Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History at 210 
9 (1767) 2 Wils KB 359 
10 (1773) 3 Wils KB 403, 2 Bl W 892 
11 (1785) 1 TR 27 
12 (1799) 8 TR 188 
13 The use of a chronological order is not intended to imply anything. To re-order the cases would 
make little difference, in terms of the characterisation of dominant statements of the law, except that 
later cases cite earlier cases, therefore, a chronological order was chosen.   
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decisions are either appeals, or points of law that were seen to be in need of 
clarification prior to judgment in the court of first instance, all the cases turn on a 
question of law and not fact. Despite the centrality of the legal points, the facts are 
useful for presenting the relationships of liability as described by the judges. 
Importantly, the first section will also include the statements of law presented to the 
court by counsel, as it is often these statements that judges will use in their 
judgments. The second section of each discussion will focus on the judgments 
themselves. Each judgment will be examined statement by statement. This is 
intended to assist in a presentation of the judgment in terms of each of the 
statements of law it can be understood to have contained.
14  
 
The final section of the chapter will draw together the statements of law made by 
the judges in their decisions. Two features will be highlighted. First, the use of 
previous legal statements in the judgments will be discussed. This practice of 
repetition can be understood to ensure the perpetuation of the law and also allows 
the law to change, although there seems to be little evidence of change in the 
judgments examined in this chapter. Second, the manner in which the defendants 
are “seen” by the judges will be considered. The use of language by the judges in 
their characterisation of the defendants and their liabilities illustrates the 
relationship between the law and the profession, that is, the construction of the 
judges through the processes of subjectification. The way judges “see” the 
defendants may also suggest, over the length of the thesis, a shift from a form of 
                                                 
14 In the discussion of the judgments, there is little reference to the names of the judges who wrote 
them. This is done in order to highlight the refusal of “authorship” in Foucault’s work.  
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governance that, from a genealogical perspective,
15 can be seen as “feudal” to a 
form that can be seen as “modern”.
16   
                                                 
15 This genealogical perspective is not essential to this thesis and may be considered contentious. 
Some readers may prefer to refuse categories of “feudal” and “modern” as descriptions of the 
different visibilities present in some of the decisions examined in this project. 
16 For purposes of reducing confusion in this and subsequent chapters, a standardising practice will 
be followed when referring to the litigants. In all cases, the parties will be referred to as either the 
plaintiff or the defendant. In some of the examined cases, the different judgments use either 
appellant/respondent or plaintiff/defendant. To avoid confusion, only the latter categories will be 
used.  
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Dale v Hall
17 
STATEMENTS PRESENTED TO THE COURT 
 
This case was argued before the Court of King’s Bench. The plaintiff sought a 
ruling that the court of first instance was wrong in law on the question of the 
admissibility of certain evidence. The plaintiff requested a new trial. The original 
trial was between the defendant, a shipmaster, and the plaintiff, who provided 
consideration to the defendant in exchange for the defendant carrying a shipment of 
hardware from one port to another. The action was the result of the goods being 
damaged by water that came in through a hole made by rats in the keel of the ship. 
Payment of 24l. was sought as compensation.  
 
At the trial, the plaintiff did not declare that the defendant was a common carrier, 
but argued that there was a separate agreement between the two parties for the 
transport of the goods in return for consideration. The issue before the court was 
one of non assumpsit, a categorising of the rights and obligations owed to each of 
the parties. Evidence was presented at the trial, but not all the evidence was 
considered relevant. This contention was at the heart of the plaintiff’s request for a 
new trial. The evidence in question was introduced by the defendant to establish 
that he had taken all possible care with the goods. The plaintiff’s evidence dealt 
only with the condition of the cargo when delivered to the ship and the nature and 
extent of the damage suffered. All the evidence was put to the jury, which found for 
the defendant. 
 
                                                 
17 (1750) 1 Wils KB 281  
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At the later hearing, counsel for the plaintiff argued that the evidence submitted by 
the defendant at the first trial was inadmissible.
18 Counsel for the defendant 
countered that it was admissible because the plaintiff did not declare against their 
client as a common carrier, but sued on the basis of a single contract. This meant 
that the alleged breach of the contract was a failure to take sufficient care of the 
goods. This choice of action by the plaintiff’s counsel meant that negligence was at 
the heart of the issue and, therefore, that the defendant’s evidence was relevant and 
admissible. Further, counsel for the defendant claimed that the plaintiff failed to 
prove negligence and that the disputed evidence showed that there was no 
negligence on the defendant’s part.
19 
 
THE DECISION 
 
The judgments were unanimously for the plaintiff and a new trial was granted. The 
first judge stated that the evidence of the defendant was inadmissible. He ruled that 
the law holds that all who undertake to transport goods safely, in return for 
consideration, are liable for any damage that is sustained during the transportation. 
‘This is no more than the law says; everything is a negligence in a carrier or 
hoyman that the law does not excuse, and he is answerable for goods the instant he 
receives them into his custody’. This liability extends from the time that carriers 
take goods into their custody. The only exceptions to this is where the damage is 
sustained through an ‘Act of God, or the king’s enemies’.
20 
                                                 
18 Counsel were named as Mr Clayton and Mr Ford. No specific legal statements were attributed to 
counsel for the plaintiffs in the body of the report. There was, however, a reference in a footnote to a 
case, Goff v Clinkard (no citation was given) cited by counsel. 
19 1 Wils KB 281, 282. Counsel for the defendant were Sir Thomas Bootle and Serjeant Bootle. 
20 Id, per Lee, C.J., with whom Wright J. concurred. Emphasis in the original. No specific judgments 
were referred to in the statements of the judges.  
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The second written judgment did not discuss the issue of the admissibility of 
evidence. The decision was based on the law protecting the property of the hirer of 
the carrier. The judge ruled that though the plaintiff had not declared against the 
defendant as a “common carrier”, his claim was ‘the same in effect’. The protection 
of goods arises out of contract, and the ‘promise to carry safely need not be proved; 
[as] the law raises it’. The contract was breached, as the goods were ‘so negligently 
kept… that they were spoiled’.
21  
                                                 
21 Id, per Dennison J., with whom Foster J. concurred.  
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Slater v Baker and Stapleton
22 
STATEMENTS PRESENTED TO THE COURT 
 
This case was argued before the Court of Common Bench. The defendants sought a 
judgment from the court to set aside the jury’s verdict in the court of first instance. 
This appeal was based on two grounds. The first was a matter of the joinder of 
action between the two defendants. The second was based on the contention that 
the case should have been brought under the writ of trespass vi et armis and not 
under contract. 
 
The action was started after the plaintiff had suffered a broken leg and the 
defendants, one a surgeon and the other an apothecary, had been employed by the 
plaintiff to heal him. The plaintiff’s condition worsened after their treatment. At the 
original trial, evidence was introduced for the plaintiff to the effect that both of the 
bones in his leg were broken. For the first nine weeks, the plaintiff was under the 
care of another apothecary, John Latham. After that time, there was evidence that 
the leg was healing and that a callous had formed as part of that process and the 
plaintiff was allowed home. The evidence of another witness was that, at that stage, 
the plaintiff could walk with the aid of crutches. Another witness also said that the 
plaintiff was capable of bearing his weight on the leg at that time. 
 
Mr Latham gave testimony based on his visits to the plaintiff after the plaintiff had 
gone home. It was at this time that the defendants started their treatment of the 
plaintiff. The evidence placed before the court, undisputed by the defendants, was 
that the defendants broke the callous on the leg and fixed ‘an heavy steel thing that 
                                                 
22 (1767) 2 Wils KB 359  
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had teeth’ to the plaintiff’s leg. This instrument was designed to ‘stretch or 
lengthen the leg’. After the attachment of this device, the plaintiff was for three or 
four months afterward ‘still very ill and bad of it’. The plaintiff sued the 
defendants, alleging that they ‘not regarding their promise and undertaking, and the 
duty of their business and employment, so ignorantly and unskilfully broke and 
disunited the callous of the plaintiff’s leg after it was set, and the callous formed, 
whereby he is damaged’.
23 
 
The defendants were joined in the action, despite the fact they were in different 
professions. Evidence adduced at the original trial was to the effect that one of the 
defendants, when offered payment after one of his visits, had said that they should 
be paid together when their business was done. Also, there was evidence that they 
had worked together on the plaintiff.  
 
One of the issues that was repeatedly referred to at the original trial related to the 
reputation, and by logical extension the level of knowledge and expertise, of the 
defendants. One defendant had been the first surgeon of St Bartholomew’s Hospital 
for 20 years. Two other surgeons called as witnesses spoke of his good character, 
with one stating that the defendant was ‘eminent in his profession’.
24 There was no 
record of evidence as to the reputation of the apothecary. 
 
Evidence was also brought before the court as to the common practice in the 
treatment of broken legs. One witness gave the opinion that if the patient could bear 
his weight on a leg that was in the process of healing, there would be no need to 
                                                 
23 Id 
24 Id  
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break the callous. Another surgeon swore that in the event of a leg that is not 
healing straight, the appropriate remedy is the compression, rather than the 
extension, of the limb. A third surgeon repeated that the extension of the leg would 
constitute bad treatment.  
 
At the original trial, counsel for the defendants tried to contest the joining of the 
parties. They argued that the claim seemed to be against the surgeon, with little 
evidence as to the liability of the apothecary. The court dismissed this argument, 
leaving the matter to the jury to decide, with the observation that it was the 
apothecary who sent for the surgeon. The apothecary had only been summoned to 
remove the bandage and at that stage the plaintiff was not in any pain. The jury 
found for the plaintiff and awarded 500l. against the defendants jointly.  
 
The defendants appealed on the issue of the joinder of the defendants and on the 
choice of writ. On the first ground of appeal, counsel for the defendants argued that 
there was no evidence against the apothecary, save for his calling for the surgeon. 
As the apothecary never professed ‘any skill about the leg’, they argued, the jury 
must have found him guilty without any evidence. They also argued that the 
judgment against the surgeon must be unsound, as all the witnesses before the court 
at the trial agreed that the surgeon did not want for knowledge and ‘is celebrated 
for his knowledge in his profession as well as his humanity’.
25 
 
The second ground of appeal was based on counsel’s claim that the evidence 
brought before the court did not apply to this action upon a joint contract. Counsel 
for the defendants admitted that the evidence showed that the callous was broken 
                                                 
25 Id. Counsel were not named in this report of the decision.  
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without the patient’s consent and not that there was a lack of skill on the part of the 
defendants. As the action should have been based on the question of consent, the 
appropriate suit would have been trespass vi et armis. Counsel asked the question 
‘if the plaintiff should not be content with the present damages, but bring another 
action of trespass vi et armis, could this verdict be pleaded in bar?’
26 The court did 
not hear from the plaintiff’s counsel. 
 
THE DECISION 
 
The Court of the Common Bench brought down a unanimous decision for the 
plaintiff. The single judgment addressed the two grounds of appeal separately. On 
the issue of the joining of the defendants in the action, the court held that, as they 
acted jointly, they were jointly liable. Whenever anything was done for the 
plaintiff, the apothecary assisted the surgeon. The members of the court placed 
particular emphasis on their joint effort in breaking the callous. The request to be 
paid jointly at the end of the treatment also suggested a joint exercise.  
 
As to the surgeon defendant’s abilities, the court considered him to be of good 
character, but ‘cannot well conceive why he acted in the manner he did; but many 
men very skilful in their profession have frequently acted out of the common way 
for the sake of trying experiments’. The court restated the evidence that prior to the 
intervention of the two defendants the plaintiff was at home, free from pain and 
able to walk with crutches. The court questioned the surgeon’s application of the 
                                                 
26 Id  
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instrument, when the plaintiff had only sent for him to remove the bandage, and 
repeated the suggestion that it was for experimental purposes.
27 
 
As to the second ground of appeal, the question as to whether the issue could be 
pleaded in bar to an action of trespass vi et armis, the court held that it may be 
pleaded in bar. As their discussion on this point, the court held that it was 
reasonable for a patient to be told ‘what is about to be done to him’. The failure of 
the two defendants to obtain consent, which is ‘the usage and law of the surgeons’, 
showed ‘ignorance and unskilfulness… what no surgeon ought to have done’. The 
judgment stated that it ‘seems to be admitted’ by the defendants that the plaintiff 
‘ought to receive satisfaction for the injury’, but that the defendants claimed they 
should have been sued as trespassers vi et armis. The court held that it is not 
necessary for the bench to ‘look with eagle’s eyes to see whether the evidence 
applies exactly or not to the case, when they can see the plaintiff has obtained a 
verdict for such damages as he deserves’. In this case, it appeared to the court that 
this was the defendants’ attempt at experimenting with a new instrument. If this 
was true, then it was a ‘rash action, and he who acts rashly acts ignorantly’. Despite 
the fact that these two defendants may be as skilful as any in their profession in 
England, in this ‘particular case they have acted ignorantly and unskilfully, 
contrary to the known rule and usage of surgeons’.
28 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 Ibid at 362. No judges were named in the report and no references to precedents were included. 
28 Id  
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Scott v Shepherd
29 
STATEMENTS PRESENTED TO THE COURT 
 
This case was argued before the Court of Common Bench. The decision is the 
opinion of the court on a question of law that was raised in a jury trial. At that trial 
the jury found for the plaintiff and awarded damages. That verdict was not 
absolute, however, as judgment could not be executed until the question of law was 
considered by the present court. 
 
At the trial the plaintiff brought an action for trespass and assault declaring that the 
defendant assaulted him ‘with sticks, staves, clubs and fists and then and there 
threw… a lighted squib, consisting of gunpowder and other combustible materials, 
[which] struck [him] on the face therewith, and so greatly burnt one of [his] eyes 
that … [he] afterwards wholly lost his said eye’.
30 The incident happened in a 
‘market-house, which is a covered building, supported by arches, and enclosed at 
one end, but open at the other and both the sides, where a large concourse of people 
were assembled’.
31  
 
The evidence brought before the court indicated that the defendant did not throw 
the squib directly at the plaintiff. The defendant threw the squib within the market-
house. The device landed on the stall of a William Yates, where a ‘James Willis 
                                                 
29 (1773) 3 Wils KB 403, 2 Bl W 892. This case is the only case addressed in this Chapter that was 
recorded by two different reporters. Both records will be referred to in this section. The decisions in 
the web of decisions that centred on British Railways Board v Herrington cite both reports. That is, 
both versions are considered worthy of citation by members of the legal discursive formation. For 
this archaeological excavation, then, both reports are monuments worthy of examination. Any 
differences between the two records will be indicated where appropriate. 
30 3 Wils KB 403 at 403 
31 2 Bl W 892 at 893  
 
211
 
instantly, and to prevent injury to himself and to the said wares… took the said 
lighted serpent or squib from off the said standing, and then threw it across the said 
market-house’.
32 The squib then landed on the stall of James Ryall, who in turn, 
picked up and threw it to another part of the market-house. It was the result of Mr 
Ryall’s throw that the plaintiff was hit in the face by the squib. On this evidence, 
the jury found for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the Court of the Common 
Bench as to whether this action was legally maintainable against the defendant. 
 
At the original trial, counsel for the defendant had argued that bringing the action 
under trespass vi et armis was wrong in law. This argument was continued before 
the present court. Counsel’s argument was that the damage to the plaintiff was not 
‘done immediately by the defendant, but was consequential, and probably might 
not have happened to the plaintiff, if the squib had not been secondly thrown by 
Willis, and afterwards by Ryall’.
33 As the damage was consequential, rather than 
immediate, counsel for the defendant argued that the appropriate action was 
trespass upon the case. Counsel for the plaintiff responded with the claim that a 
person who commits a tortious act is answerable in trespass vi et armis for all the 
consequences of their act. Counsel highlighted one previous decision, Underwood v 
Hewson,
34 as evidence for this statement of law. This was the point on which the 
court was asked to rule. That is, they had to determine whether the defendant was 
answerable under an action for trespass vi et armis for all damage caused by his 
actions, or only that damage which was done as an immediate result of his action.
35 
 
                                                 
32 3 Wils KB 403 at 404-5 
33 3 Wils KB 403 at 406. Counsel for the defendant was Serjeant Burland. 
34 1 Str 596. 
35 3 Wils KB 403 at 405. Counsel for the plaintiff was Serjeant Glynn.  
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THE DECISION 
 
The Court found for the plaintiff. However, the judgment was not unanimous. The 
four judgments delivered in this case will be addressed in turn. 
 
The first judge to be reported found for the plaintiff. The question before the court 
was repeated as  
 
whether, upon the facts proved at the trial, which have been reported, 
and before stated, this action of trespass of assault and battery vi et 
armis doth not well lie against the defendant? Or whether it should not 
have been an action upon the case against him, upon a supposal that the 
injury done to the plaintiff was consequential and not immediate?
36 
 
The judge found that action of trespass vi et armis did lie against the defendant. 
According to the judge, the ‘nature of the act, the time and place when and where it 
was done, make it highly probable that some personal damage would immediately 
happen thereby to somebody’. Therefore, despite the fact that there were actions of 
others between the act of the defendant and the damage to the plaintiff, the 
defendant’s throw was ‘of a mischievous nature’ and he is ‘answerable in this 
action’. Further, ‘as the injury done was not inevitable, this action lies well against 
him’. The judge cited precedents to support that point and stated the law to be ‘if 
the act in the first instance be unlawful, trespass will lie; but if the act is prima facie 
lawful, and the prejudice to another is not immediate, but consequential, it must be 
an action upon the case’.
37 This distinction the judge attributed to the Lord Chief 
Justice Raymond in Reynolds v Clarke.
38 
                                                 
36 Ibid at 407, per Nares J. 
37 Ibid at 407-8 
38 (1724) 1 Str 634. The judge in the present case also referred to, with approval, the decision cited 
by counsel for the plaintiff, Underwood v Hewson.  
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That is, the judge held that trespass would lie if the initial act was unlawful. In 
terms of the writ that was pleaded, the judge did ‘not think it necessary, to maintain 
trespass, that the defendant should personally touch the plaintiff; if he does it by a 
mean it is sufficient’. The defendant ‘gave the mischievous faculty to the squib. 
That mischievous faculty remained in it till the explosion. No new power of 
mischief was communicated to it by Willis and Ryall’.
39 ‘If a man doth an unlawful 
act, he shall be answerable for the consequences of it’. The judgment finished with 
reference to the words of the decision in Slater v Baker:  
 
“we will not look with eagle’s eyes to see whether the evidence 
applies exactly or not to the case, when they can see the plaintiff has 
obtained a verdict for such damages as he deserves” so I am of the 
opinion the plaintiff ought to have judgment.
40 
 
The second judge reported found for the defendant. He stated that ‘if the injury 
received from the act of the defendant was not immediate, but a consequence, 
trespass vi et armis will not lie, but must be an action on the case’. This statement 
of the law was also attributed to the Lord Chief Justice Raymond in Reynolds v 
Clarke. In that case the law was characterised by the use of the example of a log 
and a highway.
41 If ‘I throw a log of timber into the highway, and another man 
tumbles over it, and is hurt, an action on the case only lies, it being a consequential 
damage; but if in throwing it I hit another man, he may bring trespass, because it is 
an immediate wrong’.
42 
 
For the judge reported second, the difference in his use of Reynolds v Clarke from 
that of the judge first reported was that for the judge reported second ‘the 
                                                 
39 2 Bl W 892 at 894 
40 3 Wils KB 403 at 409 
41 Anecdotally, this example is still repeated by torts law lecturers today. 
42 2 Bl W 892 at 894-5, per Blackstone J.  
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lawfulness or unlawfulness of an act is not the criterion between the two actions, 
for a man may become an immediate trespasser vi et armis by doing a lawful act’. 
This understanding was supported, in part, by reference to Underwood v Hewson, 
the judgment cited by counsel for the plaintiff in argument. The issue of the 
intervening actors prevented the defendant from being held liable, as the action was 
not immediate. ‘The first act in the present case was unlawful; but the squib by the 
first act did not strike the plaintiff, the first act was compleat when it lay on Yates’ 
stall’, and as both Willis and Ryall were ‘free agents’, the injury ‘was the 
consequence of, and not done immediately by the first act of the defendant’.
43  
 
In the eyes of the second judge reported, both Ryall and Willis had ‘exceeded the 
bounds of self-defence, and not used sufficient circumspection in removing the 
danger from themselves… not even menaces from others are sufficient to justify a 
trespass against a third person; much less a fear of danger to either his goods or his 
person; - nothing but inevitable necessity’. Various cases were then cited to support 
this view. The judge continued, the ‘defendant is answerable in trespass for all the 
direct and inevitable effects caused by his own immediate act’. His own immediate 
act was the ‘throwing [of] the squib to Yates’s stall. Had Yates’s goods been burnt, 
or his person injured, Shepherd must have been responsible in trespass. But he is 
not responsible for the actions of other men’.
44 
 
The statements of law from Slater v Baker were then discussed, but the decision in 
that case was distinguished. It was held that the court in Slater v Baker, when citing 
the lack of necessity to look through “eagle’s eyes”, was saying that it did not have 
                                                 
43 3 Wils KB 403 at 409-410  
44 2 Bl W 892 at 896-7  
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to do so because the plaintiff had already been awarded damages. Although the jury 
had awarded damages to the plaintiff in the present case, the award was subject to 
the current decision, ‘there being no compleat verdict in the present case, the court 
will not, like another sort of birds [sic], shut their eyes against the light’.
45 After an 
“eagle-eye” consideration of the choice of writ pleaded in this case, the second 
judge decided for the defendant. 
 
The third judge reported found for the plaintiff. He agreed with the first judge 
reported in that ‘wherever a man does an unlawful act, he is answerable for all the 
consequences; and trespass will lie against him, if the consequence be in the nature 
of trespass’.
46 The judge argued that neither of the intervening actors could be held 
liable as they had acted in ‘defence of themselves and their goods, being in a state 
of fear, without power of recollection’. Given that this was the case, then if the 
action did not lie against the defendant, then the ‘plaintiff who has been greatly 
injured will be without remedy’. Therefore, as the ‘defendant is the only 
wrongdoer… judgment must be for the plaintiff’.
47 
 
The last judge reported also found for the plaintiff. Again the focus of the judgment 
was on the appropriate forms of action. He stated that the ‘distinction between 
actions of trespass on the case, and trespass vi et armis should be most carefully 
and precisely observed, otherwise we shall introduce much confusion and 
uncertainty’.
48 The judge considered the law to be that trespass vi at armis lies if a 
                                                 
45 3 Wils KB 403 at 410 
46 2 Bl W 892 at 898, per Gould J. 
47 3 Wils KB 403 at 411. 
48 Id, per De Grey CJ.  
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person is injured through the use of force.
49 In the present case, therefore, the 
question concerns whether the plaintiff was injured ‘by force from the defendant? 
Or whether the injury was received from, or resulting from a new force of 
another?’
50 
 
The judge held that the throwing of the squib by the defendant was unlawful at 
common law, that the squib had a ‘natural power and tendency to do mischief 
indiscriminately; but what mischief, or where it would fall, none could know’. As 
the two other people included in the chain of action ‘did not act with, or in 
combination with the defendant… [and] for fear of danger to themselves’, their 
actions were merely a ‘continuation of the first act of the defendant’. As ‘no man 
contracts guilt in defending himself’, Willis and Ryall were not guilty of any 
trespass. Therefore ‘all the injury was done by the first act of the defendant’.
51 The 
judge held the defendant was liable for the injury suffered by the plaintiff. 
                                                 
49 The judge later repeated the qualification that ‘if the injury be immediate and direct, it is trespass 
vi et armis, if consequential, it will be trespass on the case’ 3 Wils KB 403 at 412, 2 Bl W 892 at 
899. 
50 3 Wils KB 403 at 411. 
51 Ibid at 412-413  
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Forward v Pittard
52 
STATEMENTS PRESENTED TO THE COURT 
 
This case was argued before the Court of King’s Bench. The judgment was on a 
question of law that was raised in a jury trial. The jury found for the plaintiff, 
subject to this opinion. The question concerned ‘an action on the case against the 
defendant as a common carrier, for not safely carrying and delivering the plaintiff’s 
goods’. The facts as presented were that the plaintiff delivered 12 pockets of hops 
to the defendant to be carried by the defendant’s road wagon. Prior to the goods 
being transported, a fire broke out 100 yards from where the hops were stored. The 
fire burnt with ‘inextinguishable violence’, spread and destroyed the plaintiff’s 
hops. The plaintiff did not allege any negligence on the defendant’s part, but that 
the fire ‘was not occasioned by lightning’.
53 
 
Counsel for the plaintiff argued that a carrier is liable for damage to goods they 
carry in all cases, save for acts of God or of the King’s enemies, as, they claimed, 
was decided in Dale v Hall. The only doubt about this rule coming from the 
construction of the words “act of God”. Counsel suggested that, with a reference to 
Amies v Stephens,
54 the phrase meant ‘an effect immediately produced without the 
interposition of any human cause… [or] a natural, not merely an inevitable 
accident’.
55 
 
                                                 
52 (1785) 1 TR 27 
53 Ibid at 27 
54 1 Str 128 
55 1 TR 27 at 28. Counsel for the plaintiff was named as N. Bond.   
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Counsel for the defendants disagreed with the statement of law presented by the 
plaintiff’s counsel. The view put forward was that a carrier is only liable ‘for 
damage and loss occasioned by the acts or negligence of himself and servants, that 
is, for such damage and loss only as human care or foresight could prevent’. As the 
question of negligence in this case was ‘expressly negatived’, counsel argued, the 
defendant should not be held liable. Past cases were cited and counsel stated that 
there was no precedent ‘which says that a carrier is responsible for mere accidents. 
He only engages against substraction, spoil, and loss, occasioned by the neglect of 
himself or his servants’.
56 
 
Counsel for the defendants added that if the court should be of the opinion that the 
carrier is answerable for all loss except damage occasioned by an act of God, then 
the fire in this case would be an ‘accident not within the words, [but] within the 
reason of that ground’. Events such as lightning and tempest are not the ‘immediate 
acts of the Almighty: they are permitted but not directed by him’. These 
occurrences are ‘not held to charge a carrier… [as] they are not under the control of 
the contracting party’. Therefore, if lightning and tempest are included in the 
exception to the liability of carriers, then a fire, such as the one in this case, should 
also exempt the carrier from liability for the damage suffered by the plaintiff.
57 
 
Counsel for the plaintiff, in reply, cited a number of previous decisions to counter 
the arguments of counsel for the defendants. Counsel for the plaintiff included a 
                                                 
56 Ibid at 28-30. Counsel for the defendant was named as Borough. Two of the past cases cited were 
Rich v Kneeland (Hob 17) and Coggs v Bernard (2 Ld Raym 909). 
57 1 TR 27 at 31-32. Counsel also used statements from Dale v Hall as evidence of his 
understanding of the law, on the basis that in that case there were ‘clear facts of negligence’.  
 
219
 
statement from Dale v Hall and referred to, among others, Goff v Clinkard to argue 
that defendant was liable for the loss suffered by the plaintiff.
58 
 
THE DECISION 
 
The decision of the Court was unanimously for the plaintiff and was delivered in a 
single judgment. The law was stated as being that there are ‘events for which the 
carrier is liable independent of his contract’. Also, arising from the contract the 
carrier is ‘liable for all due care and diligence; and for any negligence he is suable 
on his contract’. The law also attributes a ‘further degree of responsibility by the 
custom of the realm… a carrier is in the nature of an insurer’. A carrier is liable for 
all loss or damage, ‘for every accident, except by the act of God, or the King’s 
enemies’.
59 
 
The judgment then addressed the interpretation of an “act of God”. The judges 
considered such a thing to be ‘something in opposition to the act of man’. 
However, in order to limit litigation ‘going into circumstances impossible to be 
unravelled’, a carrier is considered to be liable for all loss except where it is shown 
to have been caused by the King’s enemies or ‘by such act as could not happen by 
the intervention of man, as storms, lightning, and tempests’. The court found that, 
in this case, the fire ‘certainly did arise from some act of man; for it is expressly 
stated not to have happened by lightning. The carrier therefore in this case is liable, 
inasmuch as he is liable for inevitable accident’.
60 
                                                 
58 Ibid at 32-33. Goff v Clinkard was a decision referred to in argument by counsel for the plaintiff 
in Dale v Hall. 
59 Ibid at 33, per Lord Mansfield. The judgment did not include specific reference to any previous 
judgment, despite the number of judgments referred to by counsel in argument. 
60 Ibid at 33-34  
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Ogle v Barnes
61 
STATEMENTS PRESENTED TO THE COURT 
 
This case was argued before the Court of King’s Bench. The case was an appeal for 
a rule in arrest of judgment. The plaintiffs had obtained a verdict in the original 
trial. The defendants then sought an arrest on the ground that the action was 
misconceived and should have been brought as trespass, rather than as an action on 
the case. 
 
The original declaration stated that the plaintiffs possessed a ship and were on a 
voyage. The declaration also stated that the defendants possessed a ship, and ‘that 
they so… negligently, and inexpertly managed, steered and directed their ship, and 
took such bad care of the management, steering and direction thereof’ that the 
defendant’s ship ‘through the mere default, and by reason of the negligence… and 
unskilfulness of the defendants, with great violence and force, sailed against and 
ran foul of, and came upon and against the ship of the plaintiffs with great force, so 
that the plaintiff’s ship was greatly damaged’.
62 The plaintiffs obtained the verdict 
on the basis of this declaration. 
 
At the hearing for the arrest of judgment, counsel for the plaintiffs argued that ‘if 
the injury be occasioned by the immediate act complained of, an action of trespass 
must be brought; but if the injury be merely consequential upon that act, an action 
upon the case is the proper remedy’. According to counsel, a qualification that 
‘there must be some act done by the defendant’ must be added for an action of 
                                                 
61 (1799) 8 TR 188 
62 Ibid at 188  
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trespass to succeed. They argued that ‘it does not appear that any act whatever was 
done by the defendants… it appears… that the injury complained of was 
occasioned by their negligence’.
63 
 
Counsel for the defendants, in reply, stated that as ‘the injury done was occasioned 
by the immediate act of the defendants, the plaintiffs should have brought an action 
of trespass’. They also argued that ‘to constitute trespass, it is not necessary that the 
will of the defendant should concur’. The distinction between wilful and negligent 
acts, therefore, is not applicable in a case such as this. The case of Scott v Shepherd 
was raised to support this claim. According to counsel, the defendant in Scott v 
Shepherd was held liable in an action for trespass, despite the fact that the injury to 
the plaintiff was not the result of a wilful act of the defendant, who ‘did not intend 
to do the mischief that ensued’.
64 
 
THE DECISION 
 
The decision of the court was unanimous in favour of the plaintiff. However, the 
judges gave different reasons for reaching this conclusion. The first judge reported 
began by noting that ‘it is clear that the mind need not concur in the act that 
occasions an injury to another’. He then cited Reynolds v Clarke and Scott v 
Shepherd where, for him, the legal distinction was clear. ‘[I]f the act occasion an 
immediate injury to another, trespass is the proper remedy; but if the injury be not 
immediate but only consequential upon the act done, there the party injured must 
                                                 
63 Ibid at 189. Counsel for the plaintiffs were Erskine, Gibbs and Alderson. A number of judgments 
were referred to, by name only, including Reynolds v Clarke (1 Str 634), Savignac v Roome (6 TR 
125) and Tripe v Potter (unreported, cited in Savignac v Roome). 
64 8 TR 188 at 190. Counsel for the defendants were Law and Bayley. Counsel also referred to 
Weaver v Ward (Hob 134).  
 
222
 
bring an action on the case’. However, ‘it cannot be said, that in this case the 
defendants vi et armis did an injury to the plaintiffs, when it appears that they did 
not do any act at all’. The declaration stated that the defendants carelessly and 
negligently steered their vessel and, ‘by reason of such negligence, their vessel 
sailed against and ran foul of the plaintiff’s; and for that negligence they are liable 
in an action upon the case’.
65 
 
The second judge reported started with the observation that, as the court was being 
asked for an arrest of judgment, ‘every presumption is to be made in favour of the 
verdict; at least nothing is to be presumed against it’. Here, the original verdict was 
based on an allegation of negligence and not of wilfulness. In the judge’s opinion, 
if the damage in the present case had been the result of a wilful act, then ‘this case 
must have been governed by that of Tripe v Potter’ and trespass would have been 
the appropriate form of action. The decision in Morley v Gaisford was highlighted 
as further evidence of this statement. If, during the trial in the present case, the 
damage was proved to have been the result of such a wilful act, then the plaintiffs 
would have been non-suited. The record states that the injury ‘was occasioned by 
the negligence of the defendants’. As the jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs, the 
complaint set forth in the declaration must have been proved, ‘and for such an 
injury an action upon the case is the proper remedy’.
66 
 
The third judge reported repeated the distinction that wilful actions required a suit 
in trespass, while negligent actions required a suit of action on the case. The 
                                                 
65 Ibid at 190-191, per Lord Kenyon, C.J. 
66 Ibid at 191, per Grose J.    
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decision in Haward v Banks
67 was referred to with approval in this context. The 
judge stressed the importance of evidence in ascertaining the proper remedy. In this 
case, the ‘negligent and improvident management of the defendants’ ship does not 
imply that any act was done by them’. After the initial negligence, ‘they may have 
done every thing in their power to avoid the mischief, and then the running against 
the plaintiffs’ vessel may have been owing to the wind and tide’. There was no 
evidence of wilfulness on the part of the defendants. If the facts had indicated 
wilfulness, the plaintiffs could have been nonsuited and the defendants ‘should 
have taken this objection at the trial; but after verdict, we must understand that that 
was not the fact’. The judge ruled in favour of the plaintiff.
68 
                                                 
67 2 Burr 1113. This cases was another of the decisions cited by counsel for the plaintiffs in 
argument. 
68 8 TR 188 at 192, per Lawrence J.  
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ANALYSIS 
 
During the eighteenth century, judges can be understood to have considered three 
questions when deciding whether the defendant had to compensate the plaintiff. 
The first was “was there any damage suffered by the plaintiff”. Second, “was the 
defendant in a category of people that could be liable to pay compensation?”, that 
is, was the defendant “visible” to the court, and last, “was the right writ pleaded by 
the plaintiff?”. In certain situations, the last two questions were conflated, however, 
in all cases, all the questions had to be answered in the affirmative for 
compensation to be payable. 
 
This analysis will look at the two features of the law that are of interest to this 
application of an archaeological method. First, the practice of repetition of past 
legal statements will be highlighted. Key phrases will be indicated and their 
progress through the decisions will be noted. As the period covered in this chapter 
is one of relative continuity in terms of the articulation of liability there will be 
little evidence of particular legal statements either “dropping out” of, or coming 
into regular use by the judges. The second feature of the law that will be examined 
is the manner in which the defendants are “seen” by the judges. That is, the manner 
in which the members of the legal profession describe and categorise the 
defendants will be looked at more closely.
69 
 
The outcomes of the cases discussed in this chapter are of little interest to this 
archaeology. It does not matter whether or not the defendant was found liable, it 
                                                 
69 This notion of discourse delimiting that which is “visible” to the members of the discourse is, as 
mentioned above, highlighted in Kendall & Wickham, Using Foucault’s Methods at 33.  
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does not matter who the defendants or plaintiffs are as individuals. In particular, it 
does not matter whether or not there was a just outcome for the parties. These 
issues are more the province of a traditional history of law, or at least of an 
archaeology with a difference focus from this one. What is of interest to this project 
is the language that is used by the judges. Specifically, the statements that the 
judges use and re-use are the focus of this analysis. 
 
THE PRACTICE OF REPETITION 
 
There are two types of repetition that are evident in the decisions covered in this 
chapter. The first type of repetition discussed here is the repetition of previous legal 
statements that are not connected to specific judgments of past judges. The second 
is the much-recognised use of precedents. The use of such precedents itself falls 
into two types. The first is the quotation of specific phrases from the earlier 
decision and the second is the reference, by name only, to the previous judgment. 
In this discussion I am predominantly interested in the repetition of statements of 
law (whether linked to specific cases or not); however, all forms references to 
previous judgments and statements from previous judgments can be understood to 
function in accordance with the legal discursive practice of repetition. 
 
Within even this small selection of cases there are references to other decisions 
examined in this chapter. In Scott v Shepherd two of the judges refer to the 
judgment in Slater v Baker. In particular, the judges in the later case refer to the use 
of “eagle’s eyes” by the court in the process of judgment. Further, in Ogle v 
Barnes, reference is made to the decision in Scott v Shepherd. And, although not  
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part of the judges’ decision, counsel for the plaintiff in Forward v Pittard cited 
Dale v Hall. 
 
In Dale v Hall, the first judge reported wrote: ‘this is no more than the law says; 
everything is a negligence in a carrier or hoyman that the law does not excuse, and 
he is answerable for goods the instant he receives them into his custody’.
70 This is a 
repeated statement of what the law is. This is the law that the judge considered was 
binding in this case and therefore he repeated it in creating his decision.  
 
The statement in Dale v Hall was qualified by the exceptions relating to the “Acts 
of God, or the King’s enemies”. It was this qualification that was important to the 
judges in Forward v Pittard. Therefore, the judges in that case repeated the 
statement as being foundational for their judgment. Other statements were repeated 
describing the obligations of the common carrier. The judgment included the 
statement that it ‘appears from all the cases for 100 years back, that there are events 
for which the carrier is liable independent of his contract... It is laid down that he is 
liable for every accident, except by the Act of God, or the King’s enemies’.
71 The 
judges added statements that discussed the common carrier being an “insurer” and 
describing the characteristics of “Acts of God”, however, their decision was built 
upon the repeated statements of law discussing the obligations of common carriers. 
 
In Slater v Baker, the practices of repetition were used in ascertaining whether the 
defendants had acted appropriately. The judges held that ‘it was improper to 
disunite the callous without consent; this is the usage and law of surgeons… and 
                                                 
70 1 Wils KB 281 at 282 
71 1 TR 27 at 33  
 
227
 
indeed it is reasonable that a patient should be told what is about to be done to 
him’. The judges repeated the finding of the court of first instance and held that 
they did not have to ‘look with eagle’s eyes to see whether the evidence applies 
exactly’ to the writ pleaded.
72  
 
This phrase was repeated by two of the judges in Scott v Shepherd in relation to 
issue of whether the right writ was pleaded. It did not matter that the reference to 
“eagle’s eyes” was not the ratio of the earlier case, it was important that past judges 
had written the phrase, therefore, the judges in Scott v Shepherd could use it in 
writing their judgments. The first judge used the phrase after repeating other 
statements that related to the “unlawfulness” and the writ of trespass vi et armis. 
The second judge used the phrase “eagle’s eyes” to find that the writ of trespass 
was not appropriate in this case. 
 
These two judges also disagreed on the repetition of statements from the Lord 
Chief Justice in Reynolds v Clarke. The first judge attributed the requirement of 
“unlawfulness” to him. This attribution allowed the judge to decide that the writ 
pleaded was the appropriate one. The second judge in Scott v Shepherd, however, 
used statements from the Chief Justice in Reynolds v Clarke to establish the 
difference between action on the case and trespass. The distinction found by the 
second judge allowed him to find that the wrong writ was pleaded. The other 
judges in Scott v Shepherd repeated statements about the use of writs without 
specifically repeating statements from Reynolds v Clarke. 
 
                                                 
72 2 Wils KB 359 at 361  
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Similar statements regarding the applicability of particular writs were repeated by 
the judges in Ogle v Barnes. These statements were attributed to specific 
precedents, with, for example, one of the judges referring to both Reynolds and 
Clarke and Scott v Shepherd. Other cases were referred to, and on the basis of these 
references and the statements of law connected to them, the judges wrote their 
judgements.  
 
Another practice that can be seen as similar to the practice of repetition is evident 
in the judgment in Ogle v Barnes. In that decision one of the judges stated that 
‘every presumption is to be made in favour of the verdict’.
73 In other words, the 
lower court had made a legal statement to the effect that the defendant was liable 
and, more particularly, that the writ pleaded in the court of first instance was the 
appropriate writ. The judge in the court of review felt guided by the practice that, as 
the liability of the defendants had already been ascertained, it was incumbent upon 
the court of review to be very cautious about setting aside such a verdict. 
 
What can also be seen from the decisions examined in this chapter is the role of 
counsel in process of the production of judgments. In some of the cases, Ogle v 
Barnes and Scott v Shepherd, a number of the judges made specific reference to 
judgments included in the argument of counsel. None of the judges in any of the 
cases examined in this chapter seemed to be limited to statements presented to them 
by counsel. In those judgments where specific reference was made to past cases, 
the judges engaged with the statements of law from judgments put forward by 
counsel. 
 
                                                 
73 8 TR 188 at 191  
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This engagement by judges with the legal statements put forward by counsel 
indicates the important role that counsel play in the law. The law can be understood 
to change through the repetition of statements. The manner in which the law can be 
understood to change is through the contra-positioning of the statements put 
forward by counsel. Counsel for one party can be seen as putting forward 
statements that represent continuity in the law while counsel for the other party can 
be seen as putting forward statements to change the law. In other words, the role of 
counsel can be seen as either working for change or “resisting” change. However, 
both counsel are acting according to the discursive practices in which they have 
been trained.
74 The contra-positioning of these practices can, then, be seen to be 
necessary for the continuity of law.  
 
 All the decisions examined in this chapter, then, relied on the repetition of past 
legal statements as the basis of the judges’ reasoning. The repetition did not dictate 
the verdicts, as the use of Reynolds v Clarke demonstrated. However, judgments 
were only possible if previous legal statements were repeated. Some of these 
statements related to the appropriateness of particular writs, while others related to 
the obligations of particular defendants. It is these obligations that will be examined 
more closely in the next section. 
 
THE ‘VISIBILITY’ OF DEFENDANTS 
 
Given the practices of the eighteenth century legal profession only certain 
categories of defendants would be “seen” by the judges as capable of being held 
                                                 
74 This can be seen in Forward v Pittard where both counsel use statements from Dale v Hall. That 
is, counsel used this decision, irrespective of whether the statements were to be used as evidence for 
either change or resistance in the continuity of the law.  
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liable for what might be seen today as negligent actions. The writ system meant 
that only particular groups of legal subjects would be compelled to compensate the 
plaintiff for the damage they suffered. For example, in Dale v Hall, the judges held 
that a carrier is ‘answerable for goods the instant he receives them into his custody, 
and in all events…’.
75 In this case, the court saw the defendant as being in the class 
of common carriers despite the fact that this was not pleaded.  
 
Once a legal subject was legally perceived by a court as a member of such a 
category, a set of obligations and responsibilities were owed by that person in 
particular circumstances. That is, the defendant was endowed with all the 
responsibilities that came with that category. The defendant was not a person who 
acted as a common carrier. He was not “seen” as a free-thinking, free-willed 
individual. The law constructed its subjects as belonging to a set of categories. The 
law constructed the population in what might be understood as a pre-modern, 
feudal style.
76 This was the way in which the eighteenth century legal discursive 
formation perceived and constituted English legal subjects. 
 
This link to the notion of feudalism is not meant to suggest an argument that 
England in the late eighteenth century could still be categorised as a feudal society. 
As was discussed in Chapter One, the statements of the judges in these decisions 
                                                 
75 1 Wils KB 281 at 282 
76 It has been suggested that in the Middle Ages, a time before the period covered in this project, but 
that can be considered to be “feudal”, ‘both sides of human consciousness – that which was turned 
within and that which was turned without – lay dreaming or half awake beneath a common veil. The 
veil was woven of faith, illusion, and childish prepossession, through which the world and history 
were seen clad in strange hues. Man [sic] was conscious of himself only as a member of a race, 
people, party, family, or corporation – only through some general category’ (Jacob Burckhardt, 
quoted in Fromm, E., The Fear of Freedom, Routledge, London, 1995 at 36). Again, this 
understanding does not show that feudal forms persisted in England until the nineteenth century, but 
that the articulations of the judges of the time bears some similarity to feudal understandings of 
society.  
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indicate that the defendants were still seen to owe a particular set of obligations that 
were dependent on their particular vocation, or station in life. They were not 
individuals who happened to be employed as common carriers. They were common 
carriers and only common carriers. In terms of the overall governance in England, 
this feudal remnant can be understood to suggest the extremely slow pace at which 
discursive change can occur. 
 
As soon as a defendant was considered to be a member of the category of common 
carriers, it did not matter what his intentions or actions were. This was made 
explicit in Ogle v Barnes where one of the judges held that ‘it is clear that the mind 
need not concur in the act that occasions an injury to another’.
77 In Dale v Hall the 
court was unconcerned as to whether the defendant did all that he could to protect 
the plaintiff’s goods. It was sufficient that there was damage suffered, the defendant 
was a common carrier, a class considered to be legally liable for damage suffered, 
and an appropriate writ was pleaded. 
 
This lack of mentality extend in Scott v Shepherd to the two intervening actors 
between the plaintiff and the defendant, Willis and Ryall. They might as well have 
been considered to be mindless automatons, as they were seen to have even been 
‘without the power of recollection’.
78 They acted to protect their goods. There was 
no consideration as to whether their actions were reasonable. There was no 
assessment of their states of mind. All three were considered to have simply acted. 
It was only their physical effect in the world that was of interest to the court. In all 
                                                 
77 8 TR 188 at 190 
78 3 Wils KB 403 at 411  
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the assessments of the obligations of the defendants, their mental state was not an 
issue. 
 
Even in Slater v Baker, where the judges were interested in the character and 
abilities of the defendants, their mental state was not relevant. In that case, the 
judges did not question whether or not they acted reasonably. The defendants were 
considered to have acted ‘contrary to the known rule and usage of surgeons’.
79 The 
reputations of the defendants were not an issue. It did not matter that they may have 
been the best in the land. They acted as surgeons (with the apothecary acting as an 
assistant) and damage was suffered by the plaintiff. This was sufficient for the 
payment of compensation, as long as the issue of the writs was appropriately 
satisfied. 
 
In  Forward v Pittard the defendant was considered to be a common carrier, 
therefore, a set of responsibilities and obligations were placed upon him, regardless 
of his intentions or actions. That is, the defendant was absolutely liable for any loss 
or damage suffered with respect to the goods that the defendant carried as soon as 
he accepted the task of carrying the goods. This is the case for all damage, save for 
damage which was caused by actions of the King’s enemies or by acts of God. In 
other words, the relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff was 
constructed by the “custom of the realm”. This construction included a 
characterisation of the role of the carrier as one of an “insurer”. This custom 
operated irrespective of the actual contract, whether written or oral. The law that 
considered the carrier had to cover the contracting party for all loss, except for 
those that resulted from acts of God or the King’s enemies. In this case, the plaintiff 
                                                 
79 2 Wils KB 359 at 362  
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suffered loss, therefore the defendant was liable and had to compensate the 
plaintiff, despite the fact that the defendant had taken the utmost care with the 
goods.  
 
The category of defendants that could be “seen” by the bench was not just limited 
to the “professional” categories such as common carrier or surgeon. Two decisions 
examined in chapter did not relate to such vocational relationships. Those cases 
were Scott v Shepherd and Ogle v Barnes. In these cases, the issue of whether or 
not the defendant was “seen” by the judges relied on the writ pleaded by the 
plaintiffs’ counsel. If the right writ was pleaded then the defendants could be 
“seen” by the court as being potentially liable for the damage suffered by the 
plaintiffs.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Members of the eighteenth century legal profession can be understood, from the 
perspective adopted here, to be constructed to see the law of liability in terms of 
specific obligations that bound particular categories of legal subjects. That is, only 
certain types of defendants were “seen” by the judges. These defendants were held 
to be liable, in part, due to their imputed position in society. A surgeon was 
constructed with a particular set of abilities and responsibilities, as was a common 
carrier. The liabilities these categories of people accrued were not applied to those 
outside such categories. 
 
In all the cases, whether they concerned “professional” or voluntary relationships, 
the mental state of the defendants did not play a part in findings of liability. The 
defendants’ intentions and actions only affected the writ pleaded. It did not matter 
what the defendants meant to do, or how they perceived the plaintiffs. The 
defendants were not considered to have any “personality” outside their station in 
life or beyond the minimal character requirements of the writ in question. They 
were surgeons or common carriers, they were not people who were employed as 
surgeons or common carriers. 
 
The members of the legal profession of the eighteenth century did not have another 
way to articulate liability for damages. The use of previous legal statements in legal 
argument demonstrates that the processes through which subjects of the legal 
discursive formation can be seen to be constructed were the same then as they were 
in the twentieth century. Counsel tried to get the courts to re-state the law in a way 
that would benefit their case. The law was articulated on a case by case basis. This  
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might have allowed for change, but, in the cases examined, the courts did not 
reconstitute the statements through which they constructed legal liability. Instead, 
the courts repeated the dominant legal statements. The courts were not even willing 
to extend “Acts of God” to include an out of control fire which did not appear to 
have been deliberately lit. 
 
It can be seen, however, that even in the repetition of statements examined in this 
chapter there was a possibility for legal change. For example, another aspect of 
Slater v Baker of interest to this project is the use of the phrase “eagle’s eyes”. Not 
only is it important that the phrase itself was repeated, but the effect of the 
statement is also worth noting. The court in this decision was not as interested in 
the specifics of the requirements of the writ under which the defendants were sued. 
In Dale v Hall, liability was only recognised if the defendant was a member of the 
appropriate category and if the appropriate writ was pleaded. In the present 
decision, then, it seems unusual that the court was not going to use “eagle’s eyes”. 
The distinction here is that this was the court sitting as a court of review. In the 
previous court, the legal discursive formation had already recognised the legal 
liability, the “plaintiff [had] obtained a verdict”, therefore the court of review did 
not need to be tied to the specifics of the writs to “see” the relationship. 
 
The use of the phrase “eagle’s eyes” can be seen as adding flexibility to the 
repetition of past legal statements as they relate to the use of writs. This potential 
for flexibility around the use of writs can be seen, but only in genealogical 
hindsight, as a condition of possibility for the later shifts to a wider “duty” ascribed 
to legal subjects. The decision in Slater v Baker still followed the feudal norms of 
categorising the defendants and bringing down the decision on the basis of that  
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categorisation. However, the inclusion of statements about the lack of a need for 
“eagle’s eyes” meant that these statements could be repeated later. It is the 
repetition of such statements that can, but does not necessarily, bring about change 
in the law. It may have been the repetition of that particular statement that 
contributed to the conditions of possibility for the shift to the more modern 
categorisations of liability that are evident, and discussed, in the later chapters of 
this thesis.
80 
 
                                                 
80 Again, it is necessary to highlight that the shifts from “feudal” to “modern” constructions of legal 
subjects are necessarily genealogical and therefore outside the strict bounds of an archaeological 
excavation. These observations are only included here for interest and a demonstration of part of my 
motivation for commencing this project.  
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CHAPTER FIVE – THE ARCHAEOLOGY: 1801-1900 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This Chapter includes the excavation of a number of decisions from the nineteenth 
century. Once again, the archaeology is presented as a close examination of a 
number of decisions of English courts. This period represents a time during which 
the construction of liability can be understood to have been in a state of flux. As in 
Chapter Four, the cases were selected from the web of decisions of which British 
Railways Board v Herrington is part. One of the cases is Govett v Radnidge, which 
is one of the first in the web decided in the nineteenth century and the first to 
involve a discussion of legal relationships of liability in terms of a duty.
1 The other 
cases were chosen in order for there to be an even spread across the century. These 
cases will be described and analysed in the same manner as the cases were 
discussed in the Chapter Four.
2  
 
The nineteenth century was a period of institutional reform within the English legal 
discursive formation. Heaven v Pender, for example, is the first case in this project 
that is a product of an appeal system that is substantially similar to that in place 
today. Changes were introduced with respect to the hierarchy of courts, the training 
of legal personnel, court procedures (for example, the shift from the use of 
declarations to statements of claim
3) and the practices involved in the reporting of 
                                                 
1 This case as was highlighted as a point of inflection, albeit for another description of the changes 
in negligence law, in Fifoot, C. H. S., History and Sources of the Common Law: Tort and Contract, 
Stevens & Sons Ltd, London, 1949 at 165 
2 Other cases that did fit the criteria but that were not examined in this thesis included Indermaur v 
Dames (1868) LR 1 CP 274, (1867) 2 CP 311; Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330; Smith v 
London Docks (1868) LR 3 CP 326; Winterbottom v Wright (1842) 10 M & W 109 
3 This involved the abolition of most of the different forms of action, commonly referred to as the 
writ system (Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History at 80).  
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judgments. In spite of these reforms, the important point, at least for this project, is 
that the central discursive practices remained substantially unchanged. These 
changes did not affect the relationship between the law and the legal profession, 
which remained largely the same. Past statements of law were consistently used to 
argue cases and written decisions stated “the law” as it applied to the given 
circumstances.  
 
Changes to the system of reporting judgments introduced in the nineteenth century 
are of particular importance for this thesis. The cases included in the last chapter, 
and the first three in this chapter, were reported in nominate reports. Those volumes 
of decisions were transcribed and published by individual reporters. This practice 
of recording changed in 1865 with the establishment of the Council of Law 
Reporting. This body was charged with the production of the Law Reports.
4 After 
1865, there were both official and unofficial reports. The official reports were 
privileged within the discursive formation, but that did not preclude the unofficial 
reports from being used as evidence of statements of law. In this chapter, in cases 
where there was an official report, discussion will focus on this report (with any 
variations evident in the other reports highlighted). For those decisions handed 
down before 1865, only the versions of the judgments included in the reports 
referred to in other decisions in the web of decisions associated with British 
Railways Board v Herrington will be examined. 
 
This chapter covers, what can be understood only in retrospect as, a “moment” of 
change in the law for the purposes of this project. That is, from a genealogical 
perspective, the eighteenth century can be seen as highlighting “feudal” 
                                                 
4 Ibid at 211  
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conceptions of liability and the twentieth century includes “modern” conceptions of 
liability. However, any period can be seen as such a “moment” of change. This 
change demonstrates the processes of change that were discussed earlier in this 
thesis. The law changes through members of the legal discursive formation 
repeating, and privileging, particular legal statements. Some legal statements are 
repeated from a particular case, some legal statements are ignored and other legal 
statements are distinguished on any of a number of grounds. It is the manner in 
which the thread of repetition of particular statements are either “picked up” or 
“dropped” that is of particular importance for this chapter. It is the changes in the 
threads of repetition that can be understood to indicate change in the law. 
 
This process of change in liability is evident in the treatment within the discursive 
formation of the case that does not seem to reflect the dominant ideas of the law. 
George v Skivington stands out, as it does not appear to be consistent with the other 
decisions of the time. This can be seen in its treatment in later cases. Some of the 
decisions discount it by distinguishing the facts of the case and others used stronger 
language to reject legal statements found in the decision. It is the discussion by 
various judges of varied treatments of legal statements that enables the members of 
the discursive formation to debate the effect of changes in the law. It is the varied 
treatment of previous legal statements that can be understood as an indicator of 
change in the law.  
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Govett v Radnidge, Pulman & Gimblett
5 
STATEMENTS PRESENTED TO THE COURT 
 
The case was argued before the Court of King’s Bench. The defendants sought a 
motion in arrest of judgment against the jury’s verdict in the original trial. The 
defendants argued that, as the original action was based on a joint contract, all 
parties to the contract should be jointly liable and, therefore, the jury decision, 
which acquitted two of the three defendants, could not be maintained. 
 
The declaration placed before the court at the start of the action stated that the 
plaintiff had possession of a hogshead of treacle. The defendants agreed to load this 
cask onto a cart in return for a reward. There was an agreement to pay two of the 
defendants a ‘certain reasonable reward’ and the third defendant, a ‘certain other 
reasonable reward’. The declaration claimed that the defendants ‘so carelessly, 
negligently… conducted themselves in the loading of the said hogshead’ that the 
cask fell and broke and the treacle was lost. The jury found for the plaintiff against 
only one of the three defendants.
6  
 
Counsel for the plaintiff argued that the defendants’ objection to the original 
verdict was based on the assumption that the original declaration was laid in 
assumpsit. If this was the case, then the contract was at the heart of the action. If 
that contract was a joint contract, then recovery would be against the defendants 
jointly, rather than severally. However, the action brought by the plaintiff was laid 
in tort, with the gist of it being ‘misfeazance [sic], which in its nature is several… 
                                                 
5 (1802) 3 East 62 
6 3 East 62 at 62-63. There was no discussion in the report as to why only one of the defendants was 
found liable in the original court, beyond the minimal distinction in the rewards paid.  
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and therefore there is no repugnancy in the finding one guilty, and acquitting the 
others’. Counsel argued that the circumstances of the defendants’ possession of the 
treacle were immaterial. It was ‘sufficient if so much be proved as will sustain the 
action, and all that was necessary here to prove was, that the defendants were in 
possession of the plaintiff’s hogshead, and that the injury was done’.
7  
 
Counsel for the plaintiff then demonstrated the appropriateness of bringing the 
action in tort by referring to past judgments. Previous courts had decided, in similar 
circumstances, that action should be ex delicto not ex contractu, even though it 
arose out of a contract. Previous courts had also held that an action against a 
negligent carrier could be brought in either contract or tort. Decisions cited 
included Dickon v Clifton
8 and Coggs v Bernard.
9 Counsel, however, admitted that 
another decision, Buddle v Wilson,
10 seemed to point in the opposite direction but 
argued that those discussions in which it was suggested that an action for joint 
liability was appropriate were obiter, as the plea by the defendant was too late.
11 
 
Counsel for the defendants argued that the present action arose in both contract and 
tort. It was not disputed by the plaintiff that the contract was a joint one and, as two 
of the defendants had been acquitted, ‘there can be no judgment on the verdict 
against the third’. Counsel reasoned that if the ‘contract were joint the negligence 
of one was the negligence of all; and therefore the only ground of the acquittal of 
the two must have been the negativing the joint contract’. Boson v Sandford
12 was 
                                                 
7 Ibid at 63-64. Counsel for the plaintiff were Serjeant Lens and Burrough. 
8 2 Wils KB 319 
9 2 Ld Raym 909 
10 (1795) 6 TR 369 
11 3 East 62 at 64-65 
12 Salk 440  
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cited in support of this claim. Counsel then cited a previous decision, Buddle v 
Wilson, in which, in an ex delicto action, judgment was found for the defendants on 
the grounds that the defendants should have been sued jointly, quasi ex contractu, 
rather than severally.
13 
 
THE DECISION 
 
The judgment of the court was contained in a single opinion in which the 
defendants’ application for a rule for an arrest of judgment was rejected. Given that 
the question before the court was one of legal practices, the bulk of the judgment 
dealt with the various forms of action available in this situation. The judges 
considered that the defendants’ argument that the action should be one of contract 
was based on a particular precedent, Boson v Sandford.
14 Based on the judgment 
from that case the statement was made that the defendants ‘against whom it was 
charged that they, disregarding their duty, and fraudulently intending to injure the 
plaintiff, so negligently placed, carried, and kept the goods in the ship, that the 
goods were damnified by sea water’.
15 
 
The issue in the present case was repeated as being framed as an ‘alleged neglect of 
duty’. A further case was cited, specifically relating to the choice of action with 
respect to a claim against a common carrier. The earlier case, Dickon v Clifton,
16 
included the statement, made by the then Chief Justice, that previously it had been 
                                                 
13 3 East 62 at 66-67. Counsel for the defendants were Dallas and Dampier. Counsel also referred to 
Dickon v Clifton, but only to the extent of stating that it was not relevant because there was ‘no joint 
contract laid as the foundation of the duty’: id. 
14 Salk 440 
15 3 East 62 at 68, per Lord Ellenborough CJ. 
16 2 Wils 319. The judgment in the present case noted specifically that Dickon v Clifton was ‘not 
directly contradicted by the judgment in Buddle v Wilson’ 3 East 62 at 71  
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held that ‘trover and a count against a common carrier cannot be joined, but 
common experience and practice is now to the contrary’.
17 This statement of the 
law was then applied to the current case, ‘if the count against the common carrier is 
laid as this is, not in terms of contract, but upon the breach of duty, it is now the 
daily, and… the convenient and well warranted practice to join them’.
18  
 
The judgment then included the suggestion that considering the action to be either a 
‘breach of duty as tortious negligence’ or a ‘breach of promise implied from the 
same consideration of hire… [avoids] a multiplicity of actions’. The judgment in 
the court of first instance was affirmed as the practice within the legal discursive 
formation; that is, to bring an ex delicto action in circumstances such as these was 
stated to be ‘established and recognised’. The court of review was of the opinion 
that the ‘acquittal of one defendant, in an action founded as this is on the neglect of 
duty, and not upon breach of promise, does not affect the right of the plaintiff to 
have his judgment as against the defendant, against whom the verdict has been 
obtained’.
19 
 
                                                 
17 Quoted on 3 East 62 at 70 
18 Ibid  
19 Ibid at 70-1  
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Garnett v Willan
20 
STATEMENTS PRESENTED TO THE COURT 
 
The defendant in this case, argued in King’s Bench, was a common carrier who had 
accepted a parcel from the plaintiff to be delivered to Worcester. The jury in the 
court of first instance had found for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of this 
Court. In the facts presented to the court of first instance, the defendants did not use 
their own carriages to transport the goods but used a ‘heavy coach’ owned by 
another party. The plaintiff’s parcel was ‘afterwards lost out of the heavy coach, 
but it did not appear by what means’. Also of importance to this case was a public 
notice, of which the plaintiff was aware, that read: 
 
Take notice, that the proprietors of the public carriages, who transact 
their business at this office, will not be answerable for any package 
containing cash, bank notes, bills, jewels, plate, watches, lace, silks, 
or muslins, however small the value, nor for any other package 
which, with its contents, shall exceed 5l. in value, if lost or 
damaged, unless the value be specified, and an insurance paid over 
and above the common carriage, when delivered here, or to any of 
their offices or agents in the different parts of the kingdom.
21 
 
Counsel for the plaintiff was not called to argue their case.
22 Counsel for the 
defendant argued that the defendant could not be liable for the loss, given the 
‘express terms of his notice’. Further, counsel argued that it was ‘not unreasonable, 
that, with respect to parcels of value, carriers should require an additional 
compensation in proportion to the risk they run’. Counsel cited an earlier case, 
Nicholson v Willan,
23 in which it was held that a parcel was a “lost or damaged” 
                                                 
20 (1821) 5 B & Ald 53 
21 Ibid at 53-5 
22 Counsel for the plaintiff was Chitty. 
23 5 East 507  
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parcel within the meaning of the notice after it had become lost. Some of the 
evidence in that case indicated that it was not known whether the parcel was lost in 
the ‘course of conveyance by the coach, or out of the warehouse’.
24 
 
THE DECISION 
 
The court found unanimously for the plaintiff. The three judges each provided their 
own judgments. The first judge reported began by discussing the meaning of the 
waiver notice. In particular, the issue was the meaning of the words “lost and 
damaged”. The ‘true construction’ for this judge was that ‘the carrier is not to be 
protected… if he divests himself wilfully of the charge of the parcel entrusted to his 
care’. Therefore, the words “lost and damaged” should be qualified with the words 
‘the carrier himself doing nothing by his own voluntary act, or the acts of his 
servants, to divest himself of the charge of carrying the goods to the ultimate place 
of destination’.
25 
 
The judge repeated the “principle” that ‘a carrier is responsible for the want of care 
and diligence of his servants’. His Honour then discussed the relevance of the 
notice, in the context of this statement of “vicarious liability”. A previous case, 
Smith v Horne,
26 was mentioned in which, despite having a notice similar to that of 
the defendants in the present case, the carrier was held liable when the goods were 
stolen while the servant was away from the carriage. Other cases, including 
Bodenham v Bennett
27 and Birkett v Willan
28 were repeated to indicate the nature of 
                                                 
24 (1821) 5 B & Ald 53 at 55-6. Counsel for the defendant as F. Pollock. 
25 Ibid at 56-7 per Bayley, J. 
26 (1818) 2 B Moore 18 
27 (1817) 4 Price 51 
28 (1819) 2 B & Ald 356  
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a carrier’s liability with respect to the actions of servants. Statements such as ‘the 
carrier was not protected by the notice, upon the principle, that, at the time the loss 
accrued, the carrier… by a wrongful act of his own, had divested himself of the 
charge of it’ formed part of the judge’s discussion of the previous legal 
statements.
29  
 
His Honour noted that the court had been ‘strongly pressed in argument by the case 
of Nicholson v Willan’. The judge stated that the case is ‘plainly distinguishable 
from the present’ on the basis of a difference of fact.
30 Therefore, that case ‘cannot 
govern the decision of the present’.
31  
 
A further legal statement was that in instances of ‘gross negligence’ any loss is ‘not 
protected by the terms “lost or damaged” in such a notice’. The judge argued that 
‘the courts have put a sound construction upon those words lost or damaged, by 
which the carrier will receive all the protection which he ought to receive… but not 
from the consequences of his own misfeasance’. The judge then applied these legal 
statements to the case before him and held that ‘upon principle as well as 
authority… the plaintiffs are entitled to… judgment’.
32 
 
The second judge reported repeated the legal ‘principle… that a carrier, 
notwithstanding his notice, is responsible for any loss or damage arising in the 
course of the trust reposed in him, either from his own personal misconduct or that 
of his servants’. The legal importance of the notice was the first issue discussed. 
                                                 
29 (1821) 5 B & Ald 53 at 57-58 
30 In Nicholson v Willan a parcel was lost in transit. However, unlike the present case, the carrier 
owned all the coaches involved in the transportation. 
31 (1821) 5 B & Ald 53 at 59-60 
32 Id   
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This judge held that the ‘words “if lost or damaged”… appl[ied] only to a loss or 
damage arising from any negligence or misconduct in the carriage of the goods’. 
That is, the notice would not offer protection for any ‘wrongful act of the 
defendants’. Acts that would be ‘wholly inconsistent with the contract they had 
entered into to carry the parcel’. In the opinion of this judge, the ‘delivery of [the 
parcel] over to another coach, when they had undertaken to carry it by their own 
coach, was a wrongful act’.
33 
 
Earlier cases were then cited, including Beck v Evans
34 and Ellis v Turner,
35 that 
affirmed the “principle” that ‘a carrier, notwithstanding these notices, is responsible 
for the negligence of his servant’. One of the quoted decisions, Nicholson v Willan, 
included a test based on the ‘renunciation’ of the character of the defendants as 
common carriers. The judge in the present case held that ‘there was a wrongful 
renunciation’ of the defendant’s character as a common carrier because of the use 
of another company’s carriage. This renunciation meant that they are responsible 
‘for all the consequences’.
36  
 
The words of another case relating to the use of notices, Bodenham v Bennett, were 
repeated as ‘these special conditions were introduced for the purpose of protecting 
carriers from extraordinary events; but they were not meant to protect them from 
due and ordinary care’. This statement was applied and it was held that ‘in this case 
the loss arose both from the want of due and ordinary care, and from doing an act 
in contravention of their duty and undertaking… upon these grounds… the 
                                                 
33 Ibid at 60-1 per Holroyd J. 
34 16 East 247 
35 8 TR 531 
36 (1821) 5 B & Ald 53 at 61-2  
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defendants are responsible for the value of the property lost in consequence of the 
wrongful act of their servants’.
37 
 
The third judge reported based his judgment on the distinction between ‘negligence 
and misfeasance… because it appears… that this is a case of misfeasance’. Without 
recourse to a specific precedent, it was stated that ‘by common law a carrier is 
answerable for the negligence, as well as the misfeasance of his servants’. His 
Honour briefly engaged with the decision in Nicholson v Willan, however, only to 
the extent of stating that the ‘authority of the case is considerably shaken by the 
case of Birkett v Willan, where the decision of the court proceeded expressly on the 
ground that the carrier was liable for gross negligence’. The judgment was 
completed with the statement that by their ‘notices the carrier is only protected 
from that responsibility which belongs to him as insurer; that is a principle that all 
mankind can understand’. The judgment, therefore, was for the plaintiff.
38 
                                                 
37 Ibid at 62-3 
38 Ibid at 63-4, per Best J.  
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Vaughan v Menlove
39 
STATEMENTS PRESENTED TO THE COURT 
 
The case was argued before the Court of Common Pleas. The defendant was 
arguing for a new trial, after a jury had brought down a verdict for the plaintiff on 
the grounds that the original jury had been misdirected. The facts contained in the 
declaration were that the defendant was a farmer who maintained a rick of hay. 
This stack was situated close to the cottages and other wooden buildings of two of 
the plaintiff’s tenants. The defendant was alleged to have ‘wrongfully negligently, 
and improperly, kept and continued the said rick or stack of hay, so likely and 
liable to ignite and take fire, and in a state and condition dangerous to the said 
cottages’. The declaration further stated that, due to its improper maintenance, the 
rick did ‘break out into flame, and by fire and flame thence issuing and arising, the 
said buildings of the defendant… were set on fire… [and] were consumed, 
damaged, and wholly destroyed’.
40 The value of the buildings was claimed to be 
500l.. 
 
In the court of first instance, evidence had been adduced that the rick was built near 
the defendant’s own boundary and in such a manner ‘as to give rise to discussions 
on the probability of fire’. The defendant was warned of the potential danger of the 
hay on a number of occasions. On one occasion, in response to such a warning, the 
defendant said “he would chance it”. The rick did burst into flames, the fire then 
                                                 
39 (1837) 3 Bing (NC) 468, 3 Hodges 51, 4 Scott 244, 1 Jur 215, 6 LJCP 92. The reports that were 
cited in the web of decisions that centred on British Railways Board v Herrington were those of 
Bing and Scott. These two reports will be the focus of this excavation. These two reports are also 
the reports privileged by their inclusion in current tort law textbooks eg. Salmond, J. W. Sir, 
Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts, 21
st edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1996 
40 4 Scott 244 at 245-246, 3 Bing (NC) 468 at 469-470. The defendant’s occupation was only 
mentioned at 6 LJCP 92 at 92  
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jumped to the defendant’s barn and stables and, from there, to the plaintiff’s 
cottages. The question put to the jury was whether the ‘fire had been occasioned by 
gross negligence on the part of the defendant; adding that he was bound to proceed 
with such reasonable caution as a prudent man would have exercised under such 
circumstances’.
41  
 
The jury gave a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant obtained a rule nisi.
42 This 
was granted on the ground that the jury should have been directed to ‘consider, not, 
whether the defendant had been guilty of gross negligence with reference to the 
standard of ordinary prudence, a standard too uncertain to afford any criterion; but 
whether he had acted bona fide to the best of his judgment’.
43 ‘[T]his was not like 
the case of negligently keeping a fire’,
44 for the defendant did not cause the fire and 
he ‘ought not to be responsible for the misfortune of not possessing the highest 
order of intelligence’.
45 
 
Counsel for the plaintiff, in showing cause, said the judge’s summing up was 
‘perfectly correct’.
46 The issue of scienter was also raised, in that defendants have 
been held liable for the knowledge that they had of the likelihood of damage being 
done. The case of Thomas v Morgan
47 was cited. The facts of that case were that a 
                                                 
41 3 Bing (NC) 468 at 470-471 
42 This meant that the plaintiff had to show sufficient cause for the rule to be discharged. If the 
plaintiff showed sufficient cause, the verdict stood. If the plaintiff failed to show sufficient cause, 
then the rule nisi became absolute and the case would have gone back to trial.  
43 1 Jur 215 at 216 
44 4 Scott 244 at 248 
45 3 Bing (NC) 468 at 471 
46 3 Hodges 51 at 53. Counsel for the plaintiff were Serjeant Talfourd and Whately. 
47 2 C M & R 496  
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defendant was liable for dog attacks, not only because his ‘dogs were of a savage 
disposition, but also that the defendant knew them to be so’.
48 
 
Counsel argued that the action, ‘though new in specie, is founded on a principle 
fully established, that a man must so use his own property as not to injure that of 
others’. It was noted that the defendant had previously been sued ‘for burning 
weeds so near the extremity of his own land as to set fire to and destroy his 
neighbours’ wood’. At that time, the defendant did not seek to set aside the verdict 
gained by the plaintiff and, in that instance, there were ‘no means of estimating the 
defendant’s negligence, except by taking as a standard, the conduct of a man of 
ordinary prudence’. Cases were cited, Gill v Cubitt
49 and Crook v Jadis,
50 to 
support the claim that in ‘taking bills of exchange… degrees of caution and 
prudence [are] necessary’. In the opinion of the plaintiff’s counsel, the standard of 
ordinary prudence ‘has been the rule always laid down, and there is no other that 
would not be open to much greater uncertainties’.
51 
 
Counsel for the defendant, in support of the rule, argued that the previous action 
against the defendant was not relevant for the present case, as the earlier action was 
‘clearly a case of negligence, and has no analogy to the present’. Addressing the 
current action, counsel stated that ‘[w]hat is or is not gross negligence, can only be 
properly estimated by reference to the individual skill and judgment of the party. 
The degrees of prudence are as various as are men’s tempers and dispositions’.
52  
 
                                                 
48 4 Scott 244 at 249 
49 3 Barn & Cress 466 
50 5 Barn & Adol 509. These two cases were only referred to in the report of Hodges. 
51 3 Bing (NC) 468 at 472 
52 4 Scott 244 at 249. Counsel for the defendant was R V Richards.  
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A precedent, Wyatt v Harrison,
53 was cited in defence of the claim that the 
‘defendant had a right to place his stack as near to the extremity of his own land as 
he pleased… under that right, and subject to no contract, he can only be called on 
to act bona fide to the best of his judgment’. Further precedents, including Crook v 
Jadis,  Foster v Pearson
54 and Gill v Cubitt were adduced that compared the 
standard of prudence argued for in this case to previous cases involving negotiable 
instruments. Counsel argued that in these cases it was considered that bona fide 
action was an appropriate standard, rather than that of a prudent person.
55 
 
Counsel for the defendant claimed that the address to the jury by the judge of first 
instance was ‘clearly erroneous’
56 and that ‘the distinction between the degrees of 
negligence was not put to the jury with sufficient accuracy’.
57 The judge’s 
direction, including the use of the phrase “gross negligence” and ‘associated with 
his observations respecting the degree of prudence to be exercised by the 
defendant, had misled the jury, and had infused into their minds the belief that the 
defendant had been guilty of the gross negligence’.
58 According to the defendant’s 
counsel, this flawed summing up created a false impression which resulted in the 
jury finding for the plaintiff. 
 
 
 
                                                 
53 3 Barn & Adol 871 
54 1 C M & R 855 
55 3 Bing (NC) 468 at 472-473 
56 4 Scott 244 at 249 
57 3 Hodges 51 at 54, this claim was not present in the other reports. 
58 6 LJCP 92 at 93, this specific claim as to the judge misleading the jury was unique to this report.  
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THE DECISION 
 
The court decided unanimously for the plaintiff, but the judges delivered their 
opinions separately. The first judge reported began with an acknowledgment that 
the case was one of primae impressionis, but argued that there was ‘no difficulty in 
applying to it the principles of law laid down in other cases of a similar kind’. The 
judge recognised that the circumstances did not fall into the category of contract or 
bailment, but repeated the legal statement that there was a ‘rule of law which says 
you must so enjoy your own property as not to injure that of another; and according 
to that rule the defendant is liable for the consequence of his own neglect’. Despite 
the fact that the defendant did not start the fire, he was liable for the damage 
caused, as ‘it is well known that hay will ferment and take fire if it be not carefully 
stacked’. This statement was supported by reference to an earlier decision, 
Tubervill v Stamp,
59 which involved the burning of weeds near the boundary of the 
defendant’s land.
60 
 
The judge then responded to the claim that the jury had been misdirected, due to 
the trial judge’s linking of the question of negligence with the standard of the 
prudent man, rather than posing the question as to whether the defendant had acted 
bona fide and to the best of his judgment. This was rejected outright with the 
statement that the ‘care taken by the prudent man has always been the rule laid 
down’
61 in the case of bailment and contract. This “rule” was supported by 
reference to Coggs v Bernard.
62 That is, the first judge stated that ‘to hold the 
                                                 
59 (1697) 1 Salk 13 
60 3 Bing (NC) 468 at 474, per Tindal C.J. 
61 Ibid at 474-475 
62 (1703) 2 Ld Raym 909  
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degree of care to be sufficient if co-extensive with the judgment of the individual 
would introduce a rule as uncertain as it is possible to conceive’.
63  
 
The judge then repeated a modified statement more often used in the context of 
judgments in the courts of Equity. The judge held that instead of liability for 
negligence being ‘co-extensive with the judgment of each individual, which would 
be as variable as the length of the foot of each individual, we ought to adhere to the 
rule which requires in all cases a regard to caution such as a man of ordinary 
prudence would observe’. The opinion ended with a final assessment of the 
negligence of the defendant and the judge discharged the rule.
64 
 
The second judge reported agreed with the first. He accepted that the case, whilst 
one of first impression, still fell ‘within a principle long established, that a man 
must so use his own property as not to injure that of others’. This was repeated as 
‘every man must use his own so as not to hurt another’. This judge also referred to 
the decision of Tubervill v Stamp. In his opinion, the trial judge’s direction was 
‘perfectly correct’. The judge added a qualification to the jury’s finding to the 
effect that ‘[a]fter he [the defendant] had been warned repeatedly during five weeks 
as to the consequences likely to happen, there is no colour for altering the verdict, 
unless it were to increase the damages’.
65  
 
                                                 
63 4 Scott 244 at 253 
64 3 Bing (NC) 468 at 475-6 
65 Ibid at 476-477, per Park J.. The latter qualification was also included in the Law Journal report (6 
LJCP 92 at 95), while the other three reports only agreed with the verdict of the jury (4 Scott 244 at 
253, Jur 215 at 216, 3 Hodges 51 at 55).  
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The third judge reported agreed with the first two.
66 The fourth, and last, judge 
reported acknowledged that the ‘principle upon which we hold this action to be 
maintainable is by no means new. It is at least as old as Tubervill v Stamp’.
67 That 
“principle” was ‘every one takes upon himself the duty of so dealing with his own 
property as not to injure the property of others’. As for the standard of conduct 
against which the defendant’s actions should be measured, the judge raised the 
example of insurance cases. In such cases ‘the question has always been, whether 
[the defendant] has pursued the course which a prudent man would have pursued 
under the same circumstances’. Given this assessment of the law, and the fact that 
‘there was not a single witness whose testimony did not go to establish gross 
negligence in the defendant’,
68 the judge discharged the rule. 
                                                 
66 4 Scott 244 at 254, per Gaselee, J. 
67 4 Scott 244 at 254, per Vaughan J. 
68 3 Bing (NC) 468 at 477   
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Longmeid v Holliday
69 
STATEMENTS PRESENTED TO THE COURT 
 
The case was argued before the Court of Exchequer. The declaration stated that the 
defendant manufactured and sold a certain type of lamp called “The Holliday 
Lamp”. The first plaintiff bought such a lamp from the defendant for his own use. 
Included in the declaration was the allegation that the defendant ‘deceitfully 
warranted to the plaintiff… that the lamp then was reasonably fit and proper to be 
used’. It was also alleged that the lamp, was not, either at the time of sale, or 
afterwards, ‘reasonably fit and proper to be used… but was then made of weak and 
insufficient materials, and then was cracked and leaky, dangerous, unsafe, and 
wholly unfit and improper for use by the plaintiffs’. The second plaintiff, the first 
plaintiff’s wife, tried to use the lamp in their shop. While she was holding the lamp 
it ‘burst, exploded and flew to pieces; and the spirit and naphtha then contained 
therein… ignited and ran upon and over [her and she] was greatly burned scorched 
and wounded’.
70  
 
At the trial, the ‘jury found all the facts for the plaintiffs, except the allegation of 
fraud, they being not satisfied that the defendant knew of the defects’. Counsel for 
the defendants obtained a rule nisi on the grounds that if the fraud was not proved 
then the action would not lie. That is, if there was no fraud then the plaintiffs could 
not recover as there was no contract between the defendant and the person who 
suffered the injury.
71 
                                                 
69 (1851) 6 Exch 761, 20 LJ Ex 430, 17 LTOS 243. The reports cited by the later cases were the Law 
Journal and the Exchequer reports. These, therefore, will provide the material for the excavation. 
70 6 Exch 761 at 761-2 
71 Ibid at 763  
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Counsel for the plaintiffs, before the court of review, argued that the action was not 
‘for a breach of duty arising solely from contract, but for an injury resulting from 
conduct amounting to fraud’.
72 It was argued that the ‘lamp was purchased 
expressly to be used in the plaintiff’s shop; and there was, therefore, an implied 
warranty by the defendant’. The decisions in Jones v Bright
73 and Morley v 
Attenborough,
74 among others,  were cited in defence of the statement. Counsel 
further asserted that if a ‘person sells an article for a specific purpose, he 
undertakes that it is adapted for the purpose for which it is designed’.
75 Other cases 
referred to in argument were Langridge v Levy,
76 Pippin v Shepherd
77 and Gladwell 
v Steggall.
78 
 
Counsel for the defendants ‘conceded, on the authority of Langridge v Levy, that 
where a person knowingly sells to another a dangerous article under a false 
representation of its safety, being well aware that the article is to be used by a third 
person, the latter may maintain an action for the injury sustained by him in 
consequence of its defective construction’. They argued that this was not the 
situation in this case. The jury ‘negatived fraud, so that the action is not founded on 
a breach of duty, but depends simply on contract; and the contract was with the 
husband alone’.
79 Other cases cited by counsel included Winterbottom v Wright,
80 
Ormerod v Ruth
81 and Chanter v Hopkins.
82 
                                                 
72 Ibid at 765. Counsel for the plaintiffs were Serjeant Miller and R. B. Miller. 
73 5 Bing 533 
74 3 Exch 500 
75 20 LJ Ex 430 at 431 
76 2 M & W 519 
77 11 Price 400 
78 5 Bing NC 733 
79 6 Exch 761 at 765. Counsel for the defendants were Watson and Webster. 
80 10 M & W 109 
81 14 M & W 651 
82 4 M & W 399  
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THE DECISION 
 
The court, in a unanimous decision, found for the defendant. The judges started by 
repeating the “principle”, repeated from the decision in Langridge v Levy, that ‘if 
any one knowingly tells a falsehood, with intent to induce another to do an act 
which results in his loss, he is liable to that person in an action for deceit’. 
However, fraud was ‘negatived’ in this case, so the ‘action cannot be maintained’.
83 
 
The judges recognised that there were cases, ‘besides those of fraud’, where a ‘third 
person, though not a party to the contract, may sue for the damage sustained, if it be 
broken. These cases occur where there has been a wrong done to that person, for 
which he would have had a right of action, though no such contract had been 
made’. Examples were given from decisions including Pippin v Shepherd and 
Gladwell v Steggall. These included situations involving apothecaries and surgeons 
where a patient suffered harm due to treatment but where someone else paid for the 
treatment. Other examples included that of a mason and a stage-coach proprietor. 
The final example was put in the following terms: ‘it may be the same when any 
one delivers to another without notice an instrument in its nature dangerous, or… a 
loaded gun… and that other person to whom it is delivered is injured thereby, or if 
he places it in a situation easily accessible to a third person’ who is then injured. 
Dixon v Bell
84 was cited as a ‘very strong case to that effect’. 
85 
 
The extremes of the position in law was stated as  
 
                                                 
83 6 Exch 761 at 766. The records of the judgment in the two Reports are virtually identical. The 
only differences being in punctuation. 
84 5 M & Selw 198 
85 6 Exch 761 at 766-8  
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it would be going much too far to say, that so much care is required 
in the ordinary intercourse of life between one individual and 
another, that, if a machine not in its nature dangerous, but which 
might become so by a latent defect entirely unknown, although 
discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care, should be lent or 
given by one person, even by the person who manufactured it, to 
another, the former should be answerable to the latter for a 
subsequent damage accruing by the use of it. 
This “principle” was applied to the facts in the case. If the lamp had been lent or 
given to the plaintiff’s wife there would have been no action maintainable against 
the defendant. Had it been a case of a ‘breach of contract with the plaintiffs, the 
husband might have sued for it; but there being no misfeasance towards the wife 
independently of the contract, she cannot sue and join herself with her husband. 
Therefore a nonsuit must be entered’.
86 
                                                 
86 Ibid at 768  
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George and Wife v Skivington
87 
STATEMENTS PRESENTED TO THE COURT 
 
The case was argued before the Court of Exchequer. The argument centred on a 
demurrer plea brought by the defendant. That is, the court was asked to decide 
whether there was legal sufficiency in the declaration. In such a pleading the court 
assumes that the facts contained in the declaration are true and must decide whether 
these facts require a defendant to respond to a plaintiff’s claim.  
 
The declaration stated that the defendant carried on the ‘business of a chemist, and 
in the course of such business professed to sell a chemical compound made of 
ingredients known only to the defendant’. The defendant ‘represented and 
professed’ that the product was ‘fit and proper to be used for washing the hair, 
which could and might be so used without personal injury’ and had ‘been carefully 
and skilfully and properly compounded by him’. The first named plaintiff 
purchased a bottle of this compound for his wife. Of this, the plaintiffs would 
argue, the defendant was aware.
 The declaration alleged that the defendant had ‘so 
unskilfully, negligently and improperly conducted himself in and about making and 
selling’ the compound that is was not ‘fit or proper to be used for washing the hair, 
nor could it be used without personal injury to the person using the same’. The 
second named plaintiff had ‘used the compound for washing her hair, pursuant to 
the terms upon which the same was sold by the defendant, [and] was by using the 
same injured in health’.
 88 
                                                 
87 (1869) LR 5 Ex 1, 39 LJ Ex 8, 21 LT Rep 495, 18 WR 118. The reports cited by later cases were 
those in the Law Journal and the Exchequer Law Reports, therefore, these will be the focus of this 
excavation. 
88 Law Rep 5 Ex 1 at 1-2  
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Counsel for the defendant claimed that the declaration ‘discloses no facts on which 
a legal duty on the defendant’s part towards her can be raised’. Counsel argued that 
the plaintiffs were not claiming that the defendant ‘knew the compound he 
manufactured and sold was unsuitable for the purpose it was bought for’.
89 
Therefore, this case is distinguished from Langridge v Levy and the defendant 
‘cannot be held responsible for injuries sustained by a third person with who he has 
no contract’.
90 Further, there was ‘no implied warranty that an article sold by a 
tradesman to a customer shall be for the purpose for which it is sold’.
91  
 
Counsel argued further that, even if there was an implied warranty, there was ‘no 
duty cast upon the tradesman towards a stranger to the contract of sale, and he 
cannot be made liable at the suit of a stranger who has been injured by using the 
article sold, unless he knew that the article was deleterious’.
92 Unless fraud was 
alleged, counsel argued, there was no legal practice in which a person who was not 
party to the original contract of sale was allowed to bring an action against the 
manufacturer. ‘Negligence, in these cases, must be either with regard to contract or 
with regard to public duty’.
93 The decisions in Longmeid v Holliday and McFarlane 
v Taylor
94 were cited as providing statements that supported these claims. Counsel 
also contended that the plaintiff who suffered the injury did not fit into either of 
these categories and, therefore, could not claim for the damage she suffered as a 
result of her using the product. 
 
                                                 
89 Law Rep 5 Ex 1 at 2. Counsel for the defendant was Lord. Counsel for the plaintiffs, Ingham, was 
not called upon. 
90 18 WR 118 at 118 
91 Law Rep 5 Ex 1 at 2 
92 Ibid at 2-3 
93 21 LT Rep 495 at 496 
94 Law Rep 1 HL, Sc 245  
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THE DECISION 
 
The court decided unanimously for the plaintiffs. The decision was delivered in 
separate judgments which will be examined in turn. The first judge reported, after 
repeating the facts of the declaration, stated that the question before the court was 
‘whether an action at the suit of the plaintiff, Emma George, her husband being 
joined for conformity, will lie’.
95 The first issue he addressed concerned the 
rejection of any express or implied warranty. The judge said it was ‘not necessary 
to enter into that question, because the contract of sale is only alleged by way of 
inducement’.
96 The ‘charge is that the defendant so negligently and unskilfully 
compounded the article, that… the article turned out unfit for the purpose, and 
effected a personal injury to the female plaintiff’.
97 
 
As he considered it unnecessary to enter into the question of warranties, this judge 
stated that ‘there was a duty on the defendant, the vendor, to use ordinary care in 
compounding this wash for the hair’. The judge held there existed ‘such a duty 
towards the purchaser, and it extends… to the person for whose use the vendor 
knew the compound was purchased’. This position was justified by reference to a 
previous decision, Langridge v Levy, in which it was held that, while there was no 
contract between the plaintiff and the vendor of the gun, ‘a duty arose towards the 
plaintiff that the gun should be safe’. The first opinion in the present case ended 
with the statement that ‘[u]nder these circumstances, there being in the declaration 
a direct allegation of negligence and unskilfulness, our judgment ought to be for the 
plaintiffs’. The decision in Longmeid v Holliday was explicitly distinguished on the 
                                                 
95 Law Rep 5 Ex 1 at 3, per Kelly, C.B. 
96 Id 
97 39 LJ Ex 8 at 9  
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grounds that the jury in the earlier case ‘found bona fides and no negligence on the 
part of the vendor’.
98 
 
The second judge agreed with the first.
99 The third judge argued from the position 
that the ‘action is, in effect, against a tradesman for negligence and unskilfulness in 
his business’
100 and that if ‘the article been bought by the husband for his own use, 
and the action been brought by him alone, it cannot be doubted that it would have 
been maintainable’.
101 The judge stated that there was ‘no reason’ why the 
‘defendant’s duty’ should not extend to the plaintiff’s wife. However, he continued, 
there was no doubt the case would ‘have been very different if the declaration had 
not alleged that the defendant knew for whom the compound was intended’. The 
opinion distinguished this set of circumstances from a situation where a chemist 
sold a compound that is suitable for a grown-up man to a customer who then gives 
it to a young child, who suffers injury from using it. In such a case ‘it could not be 
contended that the chemist was liable’.
102 However, ‘it is only reasonable common 
sense that a duty should extend to a case like the present, and that the wife should 
be allowed to recover for the injury she has sustained’.
103 
 
The fourth, and last, judge agreed that the ‘declaration shews a good cause of action 
in the female plaintiff’. The judge stated that, while ‘[n]o person can sue on a 
contract but the person with whom the contract is made’, in a previous case, 
Langridge v Levy, the legal “principle” was held to be that a ‘vendor who has been 
                                                 
98 Law Rep 5 Ex 1 at 3-4 
99 39 LJ Ex 8 at 10, per Channell, B. 
100 Law Rep 5 Ex 1 at 4, per Pigott, B. 
101 21 LT Rep 495 at 497 
102 Law Rep 5 Ex 1 at 4 
103 39 LJ Ex 8 at 10-11. The third judge made no reference to specific decisions.  
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guilty of fraud or deceit is liable to whomsoever has been injured by that fraud, 
although not one of the parties to the original contract, provided at least that his use 
of the article was contemplated by the vendor’. For the present case, if the ‘word 
“negligence”’ was substituted ‘for “fraud”’, then ‘the analogy’ between the two 
cases ‘is complete’.
104 
 
According to this judge, the ‘real question is whether the allegations in the 
declaration are sufficient to raise a duty towards the female plaintiff’. Given that 
the declaration stated that ‘the defendant himself manufactured this wash of 
ingredients known only to him, and that he held it out and professed it to be of a 
certain quality, and it was not of that quality’, and given that ‘he knew it was 
purchased for the purpose of being used by the female plaintiff’, then ‘there was a 
duty imposed upon him to use due and ordinary care’.
105 The defendant’s 
knowledge that the compound was for the use of the female plaintiff, and not the 
purchaser, meant that there was no issue of remoteness of damage to be considered. 
In summation, ‘two things concur here; negligence and injury flowing therefrom. 
There was, therefore, a good cause of action in the person injured’.
106 
                                                 
104 Law Rep 5 Ex 1 at 4-5, per Cleasby, B  
105 Id 
106 Law Rep 5 Ex 1 at 5  
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Heaven v Pender
107 
STATEMENTS PRESENTED TO THE COURT 
 
This case was argued in the Court of Appeal of the Queen’s Bench Division. This 
was an appeal of a decision of the Queen’s Bench Division
108 in which the court 
had held that the plaintiff could not maintain an action against the defendant. The 
plaintiff had been given judgment at the original trial and had been awarded 
damages of 20l..  
 
The defendant was the owner of a dry dock where vessels were painted and 
repaired. The plaintiff was a ship painter who had been contracted to paint a vessel 
in the defendant’s dry dock. The defendant had supplied and set up the scaffolding 
and staging necessary for the job. The owner of the vessel had hired a master 
painter, William Gray, to do the job. Mr Gray had subsequently employed the 
plaintiff. The scaffolding and staging no longer remained in the control of the 
defendant after it had been handed over to the ship owner. On the day the defendant 
had erected the scaffolding and staging, the plaintiff commenced work using the 
staging. While they were in the process of painting, one of the ropes gave way. The 
plaintiff fell to the dock and was badly injured. The ropes had been supplied by the 
defendant as ‘part of the machinery of the staging, and there was evidence that they 
had been scorched and were unfit for use with safety’ and that ‘reasonable care had 
not been taken by the defendant as to their state and condition’.
109 
 
                                                 
107 (1883) 11 QBD 503, 49 LT 357, 52 LJQB 702, 47 JP 709, 27 Sol Jo 667. The Queen’s Bench 
Division report is the official report and therefore that is the version that will form the basis of this 
excavation. 
108 (1882) 9 QBD 302 
109 11 QBD 503 at 504  
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Counsel for the plaintiff stated that, as the plaintiff was on the dock on the ship 
owner’s business and as the defendant had supplied and erected the staging for that 
purpose, then the defendant owed a duty towards the plaintiff that ‘the staging 
should be in a state of reasonable safety and fitness for the work’. Counsel argued 
that, as the plaintiff had been invited onto the defendant’s property and as the 
staging was dangerous, the defendant was liable for the injury suffered by the 
plaintiff.
110 Counsel stated that the cases of Indermaur v Dames and Smith v 
London and St. Katherine Docks were similar. 
 
The defendant, counsel argued, must have realised the importance of the staging in 
the nature of the work requested by the ship’s owner. Counsel for the plaintiff 
argued further that George v Skivington was applicable, as the defendant in this 
case knew of the nature of the work and the need for good staging in that work. If 
George v Skivington (a decision that according to counsel was an ‘extension of 
Langridge v Levy), applied counsel argued, then the defendant was liable for any 
damage suffered from the use of the staging.
111  
 
According to counsel for the plaintiff, both Winterbottom v Wright and Longmeid v 
Holliday are distinguishable from the present case. The former is distinguishable 
because the duty in that case arose from contract and there is no contract binding 
the parties in the present case. Further, Longmeid v Holliday is ‘also 
distinguishable, as there was no negligence’.
112 
 
                                                 
110 Ibid at 504. Counsel for the plaintiff were A. Charles QC and C. C. Scott. 
111 11 QBD 503 at 505 
112 Id. Counsel also referred to Collis v Selden (Law Rep 3 CP 495), Corby v Hill (4 C. B. NS 556), 
Blackmore v Bristol & Exeter Rwy Co (8 E & B 1035) and Francis v Cockrell (Law Rep 5 QB 184) 
among others.  
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Counsel for the defendant argued that as ‘soon as the staging had been put up 
against the sides of the vessel it became… part of the vessel, and the defendant’s 
liability… ceased, for he had no longer any control over it’. Any liability that might 
arise could only come out of the contract under which he supplied the staging, 
counsel argued, and no-one who was not a party to that contract could sue the 
defendant. In a review of past cases, counsel argued that unless the defendant was 
aware of the ‘dangerous condition of the staging there was no duty he owed the 
plaintiff’.
113 Counsel argued that Winterbottom v Wright ‘governs the present case’ 
and that Langridge v Levy was distinguishable because it was ‘decided entirely on 
the ground that there was fraud’. Counsel also distinguished George v Skivington 
from the current case on the grounds that it ‘stands alone, and is not to be 
reconciled with a long series of cases, all of which tell in favour of the 
defendant’.
114 
 
THE DECISION 
 
The court found for the plaintiff. This judgment was delivered in two opinions. In 
the first, the issue was framed as ‘in form and substance an action for negligence’. 
The defendant did not deny that the staging was ‘supplied in a state unsafe for use’. 
However, the judge added, a mere ‘want of ordinary care is not a good cause of 
action’, even if injury arises from such a want. ‘Actionable negligence consists in 
the neglect of the use of ordinary care or skill towards a person to whom the 
                                                 
113 11 QBD 503 at 505-6. Counsel for the defendants were Bompas QC and H. Dickens. The 
reviewed cases included Alton v Midland Rwy Co (19 C. B. (NS) 213 and Dickson v Reuter’s 
Telegraph Co (2 C. P. D. 62). 
114 52 LJQB 702 at 703  
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defendant owes the duty of observing ordinary care and skill’. The focus in this 
case was ‘whether the defendant owed such a duty to the plaintiff’.
 115 
 
The judge considered the notion of “duty” in abstract terms. First, in a contractual 
situation where a person agrees to use ordinary care as part of the contract; in this 
case, that care is an obligation of a contract and not to be seen in terms of a duty. 
However, for this judge, there are situations where there is no contract, such as two 
drivers sharing the same road, in which one person may owe a duty to another. A 
railway company which has contracted with one person to carry another person also 
owes a duty to the passenger. An owner or occupier of a building, who allows 
others to come onto the land, also owes a duty, despite the lack of contract. Further, 
the ‘existence of a contract between two persons does not prevent the existence of 
the suggested duty between them also raised by law independently of the 
contract’.
116 
 
The judge then moved to justify a duty which accrues independent of 
circumstances of contract or fraud. In the circumstances of the drivers, when they 
are ‘approaching each other, such a relation arises between them… that, unless they 
use ordinary care and skill to avoid it, there will be danger of an injurious collision 
between them’. In the case of the railway company, even if there is not a contract 
between the company and the passenger, ‘the law implies the duty, because it must 
be obvious that unless ordinary care and skill be used the personal safety of the 
passenger must be endangered’. For the property owner or occupier, ‘if you permit 
                                                 
115 11 QBD 503 at 506-7, per Brett, M.R. 
116 Ibid at 507  
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a person to enter [the premises] you impose on yourself a duty not to lay a trap for 
him’.
117  
 
Underlying these duties is the claim that ‘every one ought by the universally 
recognised rules of right and wrong, to think so much with regard to the safety of 
others who may be jeopardised by his conduct’. If a person ‘does not think… or if 
he neglects to use ordinary care or skill, and injury ensue, the law, which takes 
cognisance of and enforces the rules of right and wrong, will force him to give an 
indemnity for the injury’.
118 In a summation of the circumstances where the 
members of the legal discursive formation did recognise a duty between two 
people, the judge provided a general statement: 
Whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position 
with regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who did 
think would at once recognise that if he did not use ordinary care 
and skill in his own conduct with regard to those circumstances he 
would cause danger of injury to the person or property of the other, 
a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger.
119 
 
The judge then tested the proposition in hypothetical circumstances involving 
suppliers of goods or machinery. In such a case, where a supplier, ‘if he thought’, 
would ‘recognise at once that unless he use ordinary care and skill with regard to 
the condition of the thing supplied… there will be a danger of injury to the person’ 
who is to use the goods, then ‘a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill as to the 
condition or manner of supplying such thing’. The proposition was then applied to 
past judgments, including George v Skivington, where the judge considered that 
‘the proposition laid down in this judgment is clearly adopted’.
120 The judge 
                                                 
117 Ibid at 508-509 
118 Ibid at 508 
119 Ibid at 509 
120 The other decisions that were addressed included Langridge v Levy, Corby v Hill, Winterbottom 
v Wright, Smith v London & St. Katherine Docks and Collis v Selden.  
 
270
 
considered that there was no circumstances where, if the facts were proved to fit the 
proposition, the law would not find liability. As the present case fits the 
proposition, then the ‘appeal must… be allowed, and judgment entered for the 
plaintiff’.
121 
 
In the second opinion the judges also repeated the relevant facts of the case. They 
concluded that all who came to the ships for ‘the purpose of painting and otherwise 
repairing them were there for business in which the dock owner was interested, 
and… must be considered as invited by the dock owner to use the dock and all 
appliances provided’ that are necessary to carry out the painting and repairs. Given 
this invitation, ‘the dock owner was under an obligation to take reasonable care that 
at the time the appliances provided for immediate use in the dock were provided by 
him they were in a fit state to be used’. Past decisions had held this to be the case 
where the appliances provided remained under the control of the dock owner, the 
judges considered that the ‘same duty must exist as to things supplied by the dock 
owner for immediate use in the dock, of which the control is not retained by the 
dock owner’.
122 
 
This consideration of the ‘reasonable care’ owed by the dock owner to those invited 
on to the dock to conduct work in which the dock owner had an interest was 
sufficient to decide this appeal in favour of the plaintiff. This second opinion 
specifically expressed an unwillingness to ‘concur’ with the first opinion in the 
‘laying down unnecessarily’ of the ‘larger principle’. This position was based on 
                                                 
121 11 QBD 503 at 510-514 
122 Ibid at 514-515 per Cotton, L.J. with whom Bowen L.J. agreed.  
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different interpretations of the past decisions.
123 For example, the decisions of 
George v Skivington and Longmeid v Holliday were considered not to have 
‘support[ed] the existence of a general principle’ of liability.
124 The judges posited 
another “principle”, however, that  
 
anyone who leaves a dangerous instrument, as a gun, in such a way 
as to cause danger, or who without due warning supplies to others 
for use an instrument or thing which to his knowledge, from its 
construction or otherwise, is in such a condition as to cause danger, 
not necessarily incident to the use of such an instrument or thing, is 
liable for injury caused to others by reason of his negligent act.
125 
This “principle” was not given any further discussion as to its effect, its connection 
with past decisions or in terms of any hypothetical situations in which it might 
apply. 
 
                                                 
123 The decisions considered included Langridge v Levy, Indermaur v Dames, Smith v London & St. 
Katherine Docks and Blackmore v Bristol & Exeter Rwy Co. 
124 11 QBD 503 at 515-517 
125 Ibid at 517  
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Le Lievre and Dennes v Gould
126 
STATEMENTS PRESENTED TO THE COURT 
 
This decision was by the Court of Appeal in Queen’s Bench after an appeal by the 
plaintiffs against the refusal of a lower court to set aside a judgment for the 
defendants. The plaintiffs had interests in mortgages over a piece of land and the 
defendant was an architect and surveyor. The plaintiffs had alleged that the 
defendant had issued some certificates which ‘were in fact untrue’ and as a result of 
these certificates they had suffered loss. In their declaration the plaintiffs alleged 
that the ‘certificates when given were untrue in fact to the knowledge of Gould, and 
that, even if there were no fraud on his part, the defendant did not use due care, 
skill, and diligence to ascertain whether the facts to which he certified were true’. It 
was further alleged that the defendant ‘acted with gross negligence, and in breach 
of the duty which he owed to the plaintiffs’. The official referee in the lower court 
held that there was no contract between the plaintiff and the defendant, that there 
had been no fraud on the part of the defendant and that the defendant did not owe 
the plaintiffs a duty. Judgment, therefore, was for the defendant.
127 
 
Before the Court of Appeal, counsel for the plaintiffs argued that ‘independently of 
contract, the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiffs to exercise due care in giving 
his certificates. He knew, or ought to have known, that the certificates would or 
might be acted upon for the purpose of obtaining’ money, therefore he ‘was grossly 
negligent… and he is liable to the plaintiffs for his breach of duty’. Heaven v 
                                                 
126 [1893] 1 QB 491; 62 LJQB 353; 68 LT 626; 57 JP 484; 41 WR 468; 37 Sol Jo 267; 4 R 274; 9 
TLR 243 (sub nom Dennes v Gould) 
127 [1893] 1 QB 491 at 491-5  
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Pender and Cann v Willson
128 was referred to in support. Counsel commented that 
the decision of the official referee in the lower court only meant that the defendant 
‘had no corrupt motive’. However, the evidence shows that ‘he recklessly made a 
representation which was untrue in fact, not caring whether it was true or false, and 
taking no trouble to ascertain the facts’.
129 Counsel for the defendants was not 
‘heard’.
130 
 
THE DECISION 
 
The Court found unanimously for the defendant. Three judgments were brought 
down separately and will be examined in turn. The first judge reported started by 
suggesting that if there was indeed a contract between the plaintiff and the 
defendant then there was no doubt that ‘one of the implied terms of that contract 
[would be] that the defendant in giving the certificates should use reasonable care 
to ascertain the truth of the facts to which he certified’. However, there was no such 
contract.
131 
 
The judge then discussed the proposition that the defendant, despite the lack of 
contract, ‘owed a duty to the plaintiffs to exercise care in giving the certificates, 
because he knew that the plaintiffs would or might act upon them’. The judge 
accepted that the ‘defendant did give untrue certificates; it was negligent on his part 
to do so, and it may even be called gross negligence’. The law was stated, however, 
as the ‘question of liability for negligence cannot arise at all until it is established 
                                                 
128 Ch D 39 
129 Ibid at 495-6. Other decisions referred to included Derry v Peek (14 App Cas 337) and Scholes v 
Brook (63 LT 837). Counsel for the plaintiffs were Jelf QC and Montague Lush.  
130 Counsel for the defendant was Upjohn. 
131 Ibid at 496, per Lord Esher, M.R.  
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that the man who has been negligent owed some duty to the person who seeks to 
make him liable for his negligence’.
132 
 
Another legal statement was repeated: ‘A man is entitled to be as negligent as he 
pleases towards the whole world if he owes no duty to them’. The decision in 
Heaven v Pender was distinguished, without reason beyond the claims that the 
decision ‘has no bearing upon the present question’ and ‘it has no application to the 
present case’. The ‘effect’ of the decision of Heaven v Pender was discussed in 
detail nonetheless. The judge considered that the decision ‘established that, under 
certain circumstances, one man may owe a duty to another, even though there is no 
contract between them’. And, further, that ‘if one man is near to another, or is near 
to the property of another, a duty lies upon him not to do that which may cause a 
personal injury to that other, or may injure his property’. The example of a motorist 
was used. ‘If a man is driving on Salisbury Plain, and no other person is near him, 
he is at liberty to drive as fast and as recklessly as he pleases’. However, as soon as 
‘he sees another carriage coming near to him, immediately a duty arises not to drive 
in such a way as is likely to cause an injury to that other carriage’.
133 
 
The judge discussed four other decisions, Scholes v Brook, Cann v Willson, Derry v 
Peek and Peek v Derry.
134 The judge considered that the decision in Derry v Peek 
‘restated the old law that, in the absence of contract, an action for negligence 
cannot be maintained when there is no fraud’. In order to establish fraud, it must be 
shown that the defendant ‘had a wicked mind’. A person who ‘tells a wilful 
falsehood, with the intention that it shall be acted upon by the person to whom he 
                                                 
132 Ibid at 496-7 
133 Ibid at 497 
134 (1887) 37 Ch D 541  
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tells it’ has a “wicked mind”. As does a person who ‘recklessly makes a statement 
intending it to be acted upon, and not caring whether it be true or false’. However, 
negligence, no matter how ‘great, does not of itself constitute fraud’. On the facts 
as they were present to the official referee in this case, any ‘negligence, in the 
absence of contract with the plaintiffs, can give no right of action at law or in 
equity… the appeal must be dismissed’.
135 
 
The second judge reported agreed with the first. The judge stated that there ‘was no 
contractual relation between the plaintiffs and the defendant, and upon that point, 
therefore, we must decide against the plaintiffs’. He went, however, to discuss the 
issue of fraud. The official referee ‘found that the there was no fraud, that is, that 
there was no fraud in the sense that the law understands it… the conduct of the 
defendant was not dishonest’. Based on that finding, ‘it is impossible… [to] allow 
the case to be tried again on the question of fraud’.
136 
 
The judge considered the question whether the defendant owed the plaintiffs a duty 
outside of contract. Reference was made to the decisions in Cann v Willson and 
Derry v Peek. The former as a support for the claim of a duty outside contract and 
the latter, a later decision, was held to over-rule the former. Derry v Peek ‘decided 
two things. It decided, first, that a plaintiff cannot succeed in an action of deceit or 
fraud without proving that the defendant was fraudulent’. The judge went on to 
consider the history of the courts of Equity in order to determine whether such a 
proposition could be doubted. This history tied together decisions based on gross 
negligence and fraud to the extent that ‘at last a notion came to be entertained that it 
                                                 
135 [1893] 1 QB 491 at 498 
136 Ibid at 499, per Bowen, LJ  
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was sufficient to prove gross negligence in order to establish fraud’. For this judge, 
this was an error and was recognised to be so in Derry v Peek, which he 
represented as holding that ‘an action of deceit must be based upon fraud, and that 
negligence is not of itself fraud, although negligence in some cases may be of such 
a kind as to make it highly probable that there has been fraud’.
137 
 
The second legal statement that this judge repeated as coming from Derry v Peek 
was that ‘there is no duty enforceable in law to be careful. Negligent 
misrepresentation does not amount to deceit, and negligent misrepresentation can 
give rise to a cause of action only if a duty lies upon the defendant not to be 
negligent’. The judge then considered whether there was such a duty in the present 
situation. Heaven v Pender was cited as suggesting that the defendant did have a 
duty. That case, for this judge, meant that where an owner of a chattel, such as a 
gun, which is ‘of such a character that, if it be used carelessly, it may injure some 
third person who is near it; then it is as plain as daylight that the owner of that 
chattel, who is responsible for its management, is bound to be careful how he uses 
it’. Applying this reading of Heaven v Pender to the present case, the second judge 
reported held that the ‘law of England… does not consider that what a man writes 
on paper is like a gun… and, unless he intends to deceive, the law does not, in the 
absence of contract, hold him responsible for drawing his certificate carelessly’.
138 
 
Further case law was highlighted which held that there were two situations where a 
duty existed outside of contract. One is where ‘one person invites another to come 
upon his premises, in which case the person giving the invitation must use 
                                                 
137 Ibid at 499-501 
138 Ibid at 501-2  
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reasonable care to ensure that the condition of the premises does not subject the 
person invited to danger’. The other situation is where a ‘person becomes liable for 
using or leaving about in such a way as to cause danger, an instrument which is 
dangerous in itself’. According to this judge, this case does not fit either of these 
situations, therefore, as there was no contract established, the action must fail.
139 
 
The third judge reported stated that the ‘defendant was right in saying… that he 
owed no duty to the plaintiffs, unless they could shew, which they cannot, that he 
entered into a contract with them to give the certificates’. The judge also raised the 
case of Heaven v Pender. That decision, the judge stated, ‘was founded upon the 
principle, that a duty to take due care did arise when the person or property of one 
was in such proximity to the person or property of another that, if due care was not 
taken, damage might be done’. However, ‘that case is a totally different one from 
the present, and its principle cannot be applied to it’.
140 
 
The law, as it applied to the present case, was stated as being that there was ‘no 
duty… arising from the defendant to the plaintiffs, unless by contract, and no 
contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant has been proved, and, 
consequently, no breach of duty on the part of the defendant has been established’. 
The judge also raised the decisions in Cann v Willson, Peek v Derry and Derry v 
Peek. The latter case was the governing House of Lords precedent for the judge in 
the present case, therefore, the decision of the official referee was upheld.
141 
                                                 
139 Ibid at 502-3 
140 Ibid at 504, per A. L. Smith, LJ 
141 Id  
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ANALYSIS 
 
One of the first changes that can be noticed from the cases discussed in this chapter 
is that the legal discussion undertaken by the judges became longer as the period 
progressed. The practices of the judges, however, remained the same. They 
discussed the facts as they were presented in the court of first instance in terms of 
repeated statements of law. That is, the judges in these cases were being asked to 
rule on points of law and on the application of “the law” to the particular fact 
situations in each case. 
 
The outcome of the applications of the past statements of law to the facts was that 
the notion of liability was undergoing change. The significance of the first case, 
Govett v Radnidge, was the use, by the court, of the term “duty”. The introduction 
of this term was a condition of possibility for the wider form of liability evident in 
the twentieth century. However, the extent of liability did not seem to change to 
any great extent during this period.  
 
The shift in liability that was evident in the nineteenth century was not a complete 
shift. The change involved a discussion of liability that used a different repeated 
statement. This form of liability was that related to the vendor or owner of a “thing 
dangerous in itself”. The repetition of this phrase was based on the liability that was 
owed by a contracting party to another contracting party. This phrase was applied 
in circumstances involving other potential plaintiffs if, and only if, the contract 
between the parties involved an article “dangerous in itself”. 
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The way in which defendants were “seen” by the judges was also undergoing 
change. By the end of the nineteenth century, the judges no longer “talked of” some 
of the defendants in terms of them belonging to discrete categories. These 
defendants were no longer held to be liable according to their station in life. That is, 
some defendants began to be judged against “standards of behaviour” rather than 
being merely categorised by the legal profession as belonging to particular 
vocations.  
 
THE PRACTICE OF REPETITION 
 
As was the case with the decisions in Chapter Four, there are two types of 
repetition evident in these judgments. The first is the repetition of past cases and 
the “law” for which they were taken to stand. The second type of repetition is the 
repeating of a statement of law as “law”, often described as a “legal principle”, in 
itself. The statements in this second category are repeated without the need for 
them to be justified by recourse to a particular precedent. That is, for the judges 
who repeat them these statements are self-evident, they did not need to be sourced 
to a specific case or justified. 
 
The specific use of repetition that is of interest to this project as a whole is the 
introduction and later use of the term “duty”. This word was first used in Govett v 
Radnidge and repeated in all bar one of the other cases in this chapter (Longmeid v 
Holliday) and it will also be found in all of the cases in Chapter Six. The repetition 
of this word by the nineteenth century judges will be discussed separately below.  
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The other repeated statements of law in Govett v Radnidge were very similar to the 
repeated statements of law that were evident in the previous chapter. That is, there 
were statements relating to the liability of “common carriers” and there were 
statements relating to the ways in which the courts deal with particular types of 
actions. The same type of statements were also repeated in Garnett v Willan as the 
defendant in that case was also a common carrier.  
 
Another type of statement repeated in Garnett v Willan, relating to the profession 
of the defendant, discussed the meaning of “lost and damaged” in the context of 
goods for which a common carrier had assumed responsibility. Statements were 
taken from earlier cases and applied to the facts in the present case. A “principle”, a 
repeated legal statement unattached to a specific decision, was also used to support 
the claim that carriers are only protected by disclaimers from “responsibility which 
belongs to them as insurer”. 
 
The decision in Vaughan v Menlove is interesting because, despite the fact it was 
described as a “case of first impression”, the judges could still repeat earlier 
statements of law to arrive at a conclusion. The issue before the court was whether 
the defendant should have done something that he had not done. To do this, the 
judges had to assess the standard of behaviour of the defendant. This was done by 
“importing” statements from other areas of law. These statements were that the 
“care taken by the prudent man has always been the rule laid down”. This 
“principle” did not need explanation or justification, it was just a repeated 
“statement of law”.
142 After Vaughan v Menlove, the courts could, and did, look at 
                                                 
142 Another “principle” that was “imported” in this decision was the reference, as an aside, to one of 
the statements that used to refer, pejoratively, to the Courts in Equity. This “principle” related to the 
“practice” of basing statements of justice on flexible standards. In this case liability could not be  
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the care taken by a defendant and took into account the specifics of the 
circumstances of the event that caused the damage. In Vaughan v Menlove, as the 
defendant failed this standard, the defendant was legally liable for the damage. 
 
The court in Vaughan v Menlove also applied a legal statement that usually formed 
part of the discursive practices relating to bailment or contract, that is that “you 
must so enjoy your own property as not to injure that of another”. The result of the 
repetition of this statement was that the defendant could be held liable for the 
damage suffered by the plaintiff. The introduction of this statement into a case of 
personal liability law mean that it was open to later judges in the same area of law 
to repeat the same statement. In other words, it could be said that the law of 
liability in negligence was changed as a result of the repetition of these single legal 
statements from other areas of law.  
 
In Longmeid v Holliday, the judges repeated three categories of statements from 
previous decisions. These categories related to the “law” of deceit, the “law” that 
related to liability being found for damage sustained by a plaintiff that was not a 
party to a contract binding the defendant and the “law” that limited liability for 
injuries suffered from “instruments dangerous in themselves”. Interestingly, the 
judges in this decision referred to the previous decision of Langridge v Levy, a case 
involving a gun, as an example of things dangerous in themselves. This example 
and decision was repeated again in George v Skivington and Heaven v Pender. 
 
                                                                                                                                        
seen as “co-extensive with the judgment of each individual, which would be as variable as the 
length of the foot of each individual”.  
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The different judges in George v Skivington repeated different types of legal 
statements in establishing their decisions. The first judge reported, with whom the 
second agreed, stated, as legal “principle”, that the there was a “duty on the 
defendant to use ordinary care” in the manufacture of the product. This position 
was reinforced with reference to previous legal statements relating to things 
dangerous in themselves. This judge also distinguished the decision in Longmeid v 
Holliday, as the jury in that case found no negligence on the part of the defendant.  
 
The third judge reported based his decision on repeated generalities. The judge 
repeated the law as being that if the purchaser has suffered from the use of the 
product then the defendant would have been liable. The judge further argued that if 
the defendant did not know the end user then there would be no reason to extend 
the law to make the defendant liable for any damage suffered. However, in this 
case, it is “only reasonable common sense that a duty should extend” to cover the 
wife of the purchaser. 
 
The fourth judge reported argued that statements relating to the law of fraud were 
appropriate in these circumstances. The statements of “law” in that area were taken 
to mean that if a third party suffers damage due to the fraud of one of the 
contracting parties then the defendant would be liable if the defendant had that 
third party in mind. The fourth judge considered that it was appropriate to repeat 
this “principle” in the area of negligence law and therefore found the vendor of the 
hair wash liable. 
 
The judgments in Heaven v Pender also repeated certain legal statements to explain 
their reasons. The minority judge began by repeating the “principles” that a mere  
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“want of ordinary care is not a good cause of action” and “actionable negligence 
consists in the neglect of the use of ordinary care or skill towards a person to whom 
the defendant owes the duty of observing ordinary care and skill”. These 
“principles” were not supported by the use of precedent. It was in the context of the 
judge’s discussion of “duty” that earlier decisions were discussed. 
 
The “use” of the term “duty” 
 
One of the more common legal concepts, in terms of this project, that is introduced 
in the cases covered in this chapter is “duty”. This word was not used in the cases 
that were described in Chapter Four. The word was first used, in this area of “the 
law” (as far as I have been able to establish), in the decision of Govett v Radnidge. 
The judges in that case cited a previous decision, Boson v Sandford, and they 
repeated a statement of law that Boson  v Sandford was said to “mean”. This 
statement included the word “duty”. The use of the word “duty” was by the 
nineteenth, rather than seventeenth, century judge.
143  
 
The term “duty” was repeated without qualification. There did not appear to be a 
need on the part of the judge to explain how this term related to other statements of 
“the law” in this area, despite the fact that it had not been applied in the past. There 
was no discussion of the extent of such a duty and there was no discussion of how a 
liability based on a failure of a “duty” differed from other forms of liability. As far 
                                                 
143 There are two problems that arise in assessing whether the judges in Boson v Sandford used the 
word duty. The first is that the reports tended to only include the reporters analysis of the decisions 
(Baker considers that the ‘reports of the period 1650-1750 were mostly of an inferior nature, An 
Introduction to English Legal History at 210), and secondly, as was discussed in Chapter Two, after 
the end of the Commonwealth, the language of the court returned to be Latin and Law French, 
therefore, issues exist with respect to the translation of the original judgment into English.   
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as the legal discursive practices existed at the time, there was nothing 
“revolutionary” about the use of the word. It did not affect other statements with 
respect to the liability of the defendant, or the compensation owed to the plaintiff.  
 
The word “duty” was then used in all the other cases in this chapter, with the 
exception of Longmeid v Holliday.  None of these later cases cited Govett v 
Radnidge, or any other case, as the basis for the introduction of the term “duty” into 
the law of personal liability. It just seemed to be accepted that this word was to be 
used in discussions of liability, despite the fact that the word had not been used in 
this manner before. “Liability” in Longmeid v Holliday was used in a way more 
like the way that it was used in discussions of liability in the eighteenth century. 
That is, the defendant “should be answerable to the [plaintiff] for subsequent 
damage” if the facts fitted the legal requirements. 
 
An important aspect of the decision in Vaughan v Menlove was the fact that one of 
the judges, the minority, “spoke” of the liability in terms of a general duty imposed 
on the defendant. This fourth judge reported averred that “every one takes upon 
himself the duty of so dealing with his own property as not to injure the property of 
others” (emphasis added), or in the words of one of the other reports, “it clearly 
was the defendant’s duty, whilst enjoying his own premises, to take care that his 
neighbour was not injured by any act or neglect of his”. 
 
This judge was not speaking of a strict set of responsibilities that arose from a 
defendant’s station in life. The judge’s statements seem open to use in statements 
that established a general duty, that is, in statements to the effect that all legal 
subjects, regardless of their occupation, could potentially be liable in certain  
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circumstances. As these were only the words of a minority judgment, discursive 
practices of the law meant that it carried less weight than if it was from the 
majority. The fact that it was recorded, however, meant that it was open to 
repetition by other members of the legal discursive formation according to the 
discursive practices associated with the repetition of statements. 
 
Earlier statements associated with the projection of a “duty” seem to have been 
supplemented in George v Skivington. The word “duty” was repeated without 
question in the three written judgments. One of the judges repeated “duty” in terms 
of fraud, another in terms of “things dangerous in themselves” and in the other 
written judgment it was stated to be a “principle” that a manufacturer “owes a duty” 
when they manufacture their goods. All four judges agreed that the duty present 
was not to be limited by the contract of sale between the vendor and the purchaser. 
All four judges made statements in which a wider duty was central to their finding 
of liability. 
 
The minority judgment in Heaven v Pender repeated statements about the notion in 
terms of parties to a contract, in terms of fraud and in circumstances where there 
was no contract or fraud. The example the judge gave involved two drivers 
approaching each other, with their physical closeness giving rise to a relationship in 
which they owe each other a duty. These descriptions of duties were not taken from 
specific, named, decisions but are from previous categories of cases where liability 
for an injury had been found. These earlier classes of liability, in particular the 
cases involving two “strangers”, had not always been discussed in terms of a 
“duty” owed by the parties involved. The judge’s discussion of duty was then 
reinforced with reference to George v Skivington. The “principle” in that case  
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accorded with the judge’s conception of a generalised duty, therefore the judge 
found for the plaintiff.  
 
The reasoning of the majority in Heaven v Pender, despite also finding for the 
plaintiff, was inconsistent with that of the minority judge. Their disagreement, 
however, seems only a matter of degree. The majority judges repeated statements in 
which it was suggested that a dock owner was under an obligation, a “duty”, to take 
care with respect to appliances that were under their control and which were to be 
used by others.  
 
The repetition, by the majority, of the “principle” from George v Skivington was 
however, different from that of the minority judge. The majority judges were 
unwilling to “concur” with the statement that George v Skivington had laid down 
the wide “principle” that the minority judge suggested that it did. The majority 
repeated the “principle” from George v Skivington as turning on the more widely 
repeated legal statements relating to “things dangerous in themselves”. The 
majority did not state that those people with control of a dangerous item had a 
“duty” to ensure that others were not harmed, rather the majority stated the law as 
being that anyone who leaves a dangerous item “in such a way as to cause 
danger… is liable for injury caused to others by reason of his negligent act”. 
 
In Le Lievre v Gould the judges were all of the opinion that the defendant did not 
owe the plaintiff a duty. The two relevant “principles” were repeated by the first 
judge as being “liability for negligence can not arise at all until it is established that 
the man who has been negligent owed some duty to the person who seeks to make  
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him liable for his negligence” and “a man is entitled to be as negligent as he pleases 
towards the whole world if he owes no duty to them”. 
 
The decision in Heaven v Pender was discussed, by the judges separately, but it 
was distinguished as having “no bearing” on the case. The “meaning” of that 
decision, in relation to a duty owed to a person not party to a contract, was still 
discussed. The first reported judge repeated one of the fact situations used in the 
minority judgment of Heaven v Pender. According to the judge in Le Lievre v 
Gould motorists can drive as they like when there is no one else around, but as soon 
as there is another carriage near them, then the drivers owe each other a duty “not 
to drive in such a way as is likely to cause an injury” to the other driver. 
 
The judge reported second repeated the relevant statement from Heaven v Pender 
in terms of it applying in relation to “things dangerous in themselves”. But as what 
a person writes on paper is not like a gun, that “principle”, in the eyes of the second 
judge, was not applicable here. The third judge reported considered statements 
from Heaven v Pender in terms of the decision providing a “principle” that a “duty 
to take care arises when the person or property of one is in such proximity to the 
person or property of another that, if due care was not taken, damage might be 
done”. As, however, “that case is totally different from the present its principle 
cannot be applied to it”. 
 
The other source of legal statements that were repeated in Le Lievre v Gould related 
to cases concerning fraud. A precedent was cited as “restating the old law that, in 
the absence of contract, an action for negligence cannot be maintained when there 
is no fraud”. A further “principle” was repeated that indicated that “negligence, no  
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matter how great, does not of itself constitute fraud”. One earlier case, Cann v 
Wilson, was highlighted by the second judge reported who restated the case to 
suggest that gross negligence could be sufficient to establish fraud. However, a 
more recent decision was cited that repeated the “principle” that “an action of 
deceit must be based upon fraud, and that negligence is not of itself fraud, although 
negligence in some cases may be of such kind as to make it highly probable that 
there has been fraud”. 
 
These precedents, and others, produced the statements of law that were evident in 
the judgments in this chapter. Many of these precedents are also used as the basis 
of the judgments in the next chapter. The law both changes and maintains its 
authority through this, almost contradictory, use of past legal statements. The value 
of the archaeological method, as it is understood in this thesis, is that it helps to 
show the manner in which the legal practices “produce” the law and the manner in 
which statements are repeated by the judges in such a way as to allow for both 
continuity and discontinuity in the law. However, before the method is applied to 
the cases decided in the twentieth century, it appears useful to engage in a 
discussion of the way in which the nineteenth century judges “saw” the defendants 
who came before them. This is because statements of the law can be understood to 
be part of the processes trough which defendants become visible to the court. 
 
THE ‘VISIBILITY’ OF DEFENDANTS 
 
One of the changes evident in the cases discussed in this project is in the way in 
which the judges in the different times “saw” defendants. The eighteenth century 
judges did not “see” the defendants as “rational” “individuals” who happened to  
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occupy certain positions. These judges simply “saw” people as, for example, 
common carriers. When the judges “saw” a common carrier, they knew that 
common carriers had certain legal obligations because they were common carriers. 
In the nineteenth century, the way in which judges “saw” defendants began to 
change. This section will describe how the judges can be understood to have “seen” 
the defendants in the cases discussed in this chapter. 
 
In Govett v Radnidge the defendant was seen in much the same way in which 
common carriers were seen by the courts in the eighteenth century. On the facts as 
they were presented, the defendant was a common carrier who had taken 
responsibility for goods and these goods were damaged. That is, there was damage 
sustained, the defendant was in a category that could be seen as liable, and the 
appropriate writ was pleaded. The defendant was liable because he was a common 
carrier. This was also the outcome in Garnett v Willan. In that case the defendant 
was also a common carrier. Here again, the court considered the defendant liable 
because he was a common carrier. Liability was contingent on the “station in life” 
of the defendant. 
 
The “visibility” of the defendant began to change, in terms of the cases described in 
this thesis in the next case. In Vaughan v Menlove, the judges were not simply 
interested in seeing the defendant as a member of a particular class of legal 
subjects. The judges were interested in measuring the standard of behaviour of the 
defendant. One of the issues before the court related to whether the defendant 
should be measured against the standard of the “prudent man”. The judges accepted 
this as the appropriate standard and held that the defendant was liable because of 
his failure to meet this standard.  
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In finding for the plaintiff the court in Vaughan v Menlove was introducing the 
concept of individuality on the part of the defendant into the area of negligence 
law. As can be seen in the cases up to this point, the defendants were considered to 
be part of a particular category, and it was the membership of the category that was 
important in an assessment of liability. The introduction of a separable standard 
against which the behaviour of defendants could be judged meant that the 
defendants were no longer held liable just because they belonged to a specific class 
of subjects. They could be held liable if they did not live up to a required standard 
of behaviour. 
 
The four judges in Vaughan v Menlove can be considered to have formed a 
majority/ minority split on one particular point. The majority, that is three of the 
judges, considered the liability in terms of the absolute obligation to “enjoy your 
own property as not to injure that of another”. The fourth judge described liability 
in terms of the general duty that was highlighted above. The choice of one of the 
judges to describe and use statements of obligations of defendants in terms of a 
general duty is important in this archaeology of statements of legal liability. 
Statements concerning defendants were no longer with respect to their “station in 
life”. The statements of this one judge can be understood to have allowed the 
possibility for statements in which a specific standard of behaviour was applied in 
specific circumstances and those in which a general standard could be applied to all 
subjects in any situation.  
 
The decision in Longmeid v Holliday “saw” the defendant as a contracting party. A 
contracting party was not just seen as being responsible for damage suffered by 
other parties to the contract (this responsibility was not described in terms of a  
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“duty”). Contracting parties were “seen” to be responsible for other injured people 
outside the contract in certain circumstances (for example, in cases concerning 
fraud). In the eyes of the court, the facts in Longmeid v Holliday did not fit any of 
those circumstances, so the defendant was not found to be liable. 
 
In George v Skivington the defendant was “seen” as a manufacturer. Manufacturers 
were seen as people who owed a duty to the end-user of their products only where 
they knew who the end-user of their products was to be. In other words, the 
defendant was “seen” as someone who was liable only when he had specific 
knowledge and was supposed to act bearing that knowledge in mind. The court 
held that legal liability rested on the defendant’s knowledge that the end-user was 
to be the purchaser’s wife. The defendant had the consumer in mind and, therefore, 
should have considered her at the time of sale. The judges were not constituting a 
manufacturer as a just a manufacturer. This manufacturer was held to possess 
certain traits and owed responsibilities that arose from his specific knowledge. For 
all the legal statements and argument that are evident in this case, the dominant 
discursive practices of the nineteenth century discursive formation were such that 
statements from George v Skivington were not repeated in a majority judgment 
with approval. 
 
In Heaven v Pender the minority judge and majority judges “saw” the defendant 
differently. The minority judge saw him in terms of the statement that “everyone 
ought by the universally recognised rules of right and wrong, to think so much with 
regard to the safety of others who may be jeopardised by his conduct”. This judge 
characterised the defendant as a person who should take others into account when  
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he acted. This “ought” was not limited to the defendant’s life as a member of his 
profession, this was a general duty to take care which “everyone” should exhibit. 
 
In other words, the minority judge saw the defendant as a legal subject who was 
capable of foresight and who was obliged to act according to that foresight. The 
law was stated, in this opinion, to suggest the possibility of statements in which 
liability in negligence was no longer limited to specific categories of legal subjects. 
Each and every legal subject was to be measured against the norm of a person who 
uses ordinary care and skill in her or his conduct. 
 
The difference between the two judgements can be understood to lie in, what may 
be called, the mental element of the duty. In the minority opinion, normal human 
beings were seen to think in general terms about their actions. Thus a person could 
be seen as liable “whenever [that] person is by circumstances placed in such a 
position with regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who did think 
would at once recognise that if he did not use ordinary care… he would cause 
danger of injury…”. Here the mental element was constructed in terms of an 
abstract person who could “think” and could “recognise” the consequences of her 
or his actions.  
 
In the majority opinion, the “principle” was confined to the defendant and “an 
instrument or thing which to his knowledge” was “is in such a condition as to cause 
danger”. That is, the mental element was limited to the actual knowledge of the 
defendant. The defendant was constructed by the judges to be closer in kind to the 
earlier categories of defendants who could be liable to pay compensation. The 
defendant was liable because he was the defendant in the position of, and with the  
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knowledge of, the defendant. There were statements in which the defendant’s 
behaviour was understood in terms of a general norm of behaviour and there was 
no wider consideration of potential defendants. There was no consideration of what 
another person, including an ordinary person, may do in the same circumstances.  
 
The majority used the words of “duty” and “obligation to take reasonable care” to 
characterise the manner in which dock owners were expected to control their docks 
and the appliances used in relation to their docks. Statements in which these duties 
and obligations were made, however, were specific to dock owners. The majority 
could not be understood to have been suggesting that there was a general duty of 
care that all legal subjects should observe, the majority considered that dock 
owners were limited by obligations specific to dock owners. In the same manner 
that eighteenth century common carriers had obligations specific to common 
carriers, late nineteenth century dock owners had duties that were specific to dock 
owners. The difference between these two conceptions of obligation was that the 
common carrier was liable for all injury, save for acts of God, while dock owners 
only had to take reasonable care. This can be understood to be an important 
difference, as it introduces statements as to “reasonable care” that could be severed 
from specific applications. 
 
In Le Lievre v Gould the defendant was not held to owe a duty to the plaintiff. The 
law was stated by the second judge as “there is no duty enforceable in law to be 
careful”. It did not matter to the court whether or not the defendant knew of the 
plaintiff or knew that the information the defendant was supplying was to be relied 
upon by a third party. That is, the judges did not “see” the defendant as a person 
who should have exhibited that level of foresight. The defendant was “seen” as a  
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contracting party and, therefore, governed by statements that created obligations to 
other parties to the contract. The judges considered that the defendant might have 
been seen to have a “wicked mind”. If seen in this way, the defendant would have 
been understood in terms of statements associated with fraud and the defendant 
would have been liable to third parties who had suffered injury due to the fraud 
(according to statements that formed part of contracts law). This is not to say the 
judges would “see” a fraudulent party as owing a duty to third parties, only that the 
defendant would have been liable if there had been fraud. 
 
There seem to have been a couple of different ways in which judges “saw” 
defendants in the nineteenth century. There is no evidence that there was an 
“evolutionary” shift involved in the different manners of “seeing” defendants. 
Within individual cases there can be seen to be different ways of “seeing” the 
defendant. However, as will be evident in the next chapter, there appears to have 
been greater consistency in the “visibility” of defendants in the twentieth century.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The dual “nature” of law is perhaps more obvious in this chapter than in the other 
two periods considered in this thesis. When a number of cases are examined in 
detail, the importance of the repetition of statements in the writing of judgments 
emerges more clearly. When a series of judgments dealing with a particular area of 
law are examined, it is easier to see how the law can change without losing its 
legitimacy. 
 
The nineteenth century can be understood to reflect a moment of change in the 
articulation of liability. Prior to the decision in Govett v Radnidge, there were no 
legal statements that delimited relationships of liability outside those that existed 
within certain specific relationships. That is, the repeatable legal statements 
constructed particular relationships between plaintiffs and defendants that depended 
on the circumstances of the action and the writs pleaded. There was no general duty 
that governed an understanding of all legal subjects. From the cases discussed in 
this chapter, it can be seen that there was much judicial discussion as to the 
possible extent of general duties of liability.  
 
Previous statements of liability were not explicitly discarded. However, within the 
discursive formation much broader statements of liability began to be articulated.
144 
It is this change in the law, in particular in the language of the law, that is important 
in this chapter. That is, the processes of legal change and the mechanisms for the 
continued legitimacy of the law were intended to be made evident in the cases 
                                                 
144 As was stated above, it is possible to see this change in terms of judges repeating earlier 
statements without including the references to the specific relationships.  
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examined. The statements changed, in particular, from being about specific 
applications of writs, to being about a consideration of generalised normative 
claims, where claims with respect to proper conduct were made. This category of 
“others” toward whom one owed a “duty” widened over the course of this moment 
of change. These others were no longer limited to those with whom one formed 
specific relationships, such as that owed to a patient by a surgeon.  
 
The changes in the nineteenth century can be understood to have been brought 
about through the repetition of particular statements reported in judicial decisions. 
Govett v Radnidge was the first, from the web of decisions associated with British 
Railways Board v Herrington, in which the word “duty” was used in the context of 
a discussion of liability. This word was taken up in the judgments handed down by 
later courts. Another discursive practice evident here is that legal terms and 
statements from one area of law could be supplemented with legal statements from 
other areas of law. For example, Vaughan v Menlove, a case of first impression, 
repeated a “principle” from another area of law (bailment) and brought it into 
negligence law. George v Skivington repeated precedents and, in the process, 
produced a statement of a duty which was almost as broad as that in Donoghue v 
Stevenson, a significant decision in negligence law decided in 1932.
145 The judges 
of the nineteenth century were still constrained to repeat only a limited number of 
legal statements, however. Their training still required them to repeat the dominant 
legal statements in any particular area of law and few of those whose decisions 
came after it could repeat statements from George v Skivington with approval. 
 
                                                 
145 One of the majority judgments in Donoghue v Stevenson interpreted George v Skivington as 
being ‘based on an ordinary duty to take care’ [1932] AC 562 at 584 per Lord Atkin  
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For the purposes of the application of the archaeological method as understood in 
this thesis, and only in retrospect, the use of the word “duty” in Govett v Radnidge 
represents an important discursive event. Prior to this point, a common carrier had 
to act as a common carrier, because that was what they were. The introduction of 
the notion of “duty” can be understood to have contributed to an opening up of the 
discursive possibility of a separation between the subject and the profession. In 
1802, there was no way of knowing what would become of the word “duty” as a 
statement of law. However, viewed from the present day, the use of the word 
contributed to the possibility of the legal changes that were to follow. 
 
George v Skivington was problematic for the courts, as it contained statements that 
implied a recognition of a much wider scope of liability than was implied in 
previous statements. Even within a single decision, such as Heaven v Pender, there 
were two separate interpretations of George v Skivington. Both readings of the 
“problem” decision were still valid statements within the legal discursive 
formation. The members of the formation recognised the statements in George v 
Skivington as legal statements and such statements had to be spoken of, but, in the 
nineteenth century, they were difficult to repeat with approval. This point was 
emphasised by one of the dissenting judges in Donoghue v Stevenson, who, when 
referring to George v Skivington, stated that ‘few cases can have lived so 
dangerously and lived so long’.
146 
 
                                                 
146 [1932] AC 562 at 570 per Lord Buckmaster. His lordship went further and stated that ‘[s]o far… 
as the case of George v Skivington and the dicta in Heaven v Pender are concerned, it is in my 
opinion better that they should be buried so securely that their perturbed spirits shall no longer vex 
the law’, at 576  
 
298
 
The changes associated with statements of liability can be understood to reflect a 
shift in the way the courts “saw” defendants. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, the judges “saw” those who came before them as members of their 
profession. They did not have any other characteristics that were relevant to any 
finding of liability. However, during the nineteenth century, statements began to 
emerge with respect to the tests to be applied in viewing the standard of care and 
the knowledge required of those who caused injury. That is, over this time, the 
courts began to “see” the defendants as having other characteristics beyond their 
job description. 
 
These other characteristics gained in importance as the members of the legal 
discursive formation began to repeat statements that refected a generalised norm of 
conduct, such as the standard of “ordinary prudence”, as the basis of the legal 
recognition of relationships of liability. In the eighteenth century, a surgeon was 
assumed to have a pre-determined standard of appropriate behaviour as a surgeon, 
rather than as a person who happened to work as a surgeon. It may be considered 
that statements with respect to the required standard became more general as they 
came closer to being universally applicable. Alternatively, it may be considered 
that only specific aspects of particular statements were replaced. That is, statements 
reflecting the requirement that a surgeon use due care began to be repeated as 
statements requiring a person use due care. The law, and the legal profession, 
changed and legal practices began to include the production of statements as to a 
possible general duty of care. In other words, the judges and lawyers could be 
understood to have “seen” defendants as having characteristics that could be 
measured against a normalised standard of behaviour.  
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All the judgments discussed in this chapter can be understood as having contributed 
to the conditions of possibility for the legal statements produced in the twentieth 
century. It is arguable that the term “duty” itself is an important condition for the 
broader obligation known in the twentieth century as the “duty of care”. Without a 
word that can be used more generally, away from the specifics of the 
surgeon/patient or the common carrier/customer relationships, the introduction of 
new statements into the law of liability may have not occurred in the same way, or 
at the same time. This is not to say that the introduction of the word “duty” into the 
legal vocabulary “caused” the changes, merely that without the term, statements 
with respect to any general obligation toward liability of care would be different. 
 
As will be seen in the next chapter, in the twentieth century, statements like those 
in George v Skivington were much more widely repeated within the legal discursive 
formation. This chapter can be understood as having covered a period of change in 
the legal articulation of liability. The decisions excavated in the next chapter will 
also be presented in terms of processes of change. However, the cases examined in 
both this chapter and the next can also be understood to illustrate the manner in 
which “the law” stays the same. The demonstration of this dual nature of the law is 
one of the more important effects of the application of the archaeological method, 
as understood in this project, to the law.  
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CHAPTER SIX – THE ARCHAEOLOGY: 1901-1972 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter covers the third, and final period, of the archaeological excavation 
developed in this thesis. The period covered in this chapter ends with the nominal 
inclusion of the English legal system under the jurisdiction of the European Court 
of Justice.
1 The legislation enacted in 1972 did not represent an immediate and 
drastic shift in the practices of the English legal discursive formation, but it did 
displace the House of Lords as the highest appellate court in England. This has 
sufficiently opened the legal discursive formation of the English common law to 
new discursive practices to provide a limit point for this thesis. 
 
The selection, and discussion, of cases in this chapter was governed by similar 
principles to those used in the previous chapters. The main difference was that the 
final case was instrumental in the choice of the eighteen other excavated cases. 
Given that the period covered by this archaeology ended in 1972, the most recent 
decision to be selected was to be one reported in 1972. British Railways Board v 
Herrington was chosen,
2 and the web of decisions of which that decision is part 
was used to select the other cases dealt with in this thesis.  
 
The decisions discussed in this chapter are McDowall v Great Western Railways,
3 
Blacker v Lake & Elliott,
4 Hodge v Anglo-American Oil Company,
5 Farr v Butters 
                                                 
1 European Communities Act (1972) s. 3 (1) 
2 Two decisions that could have taken the place of British Railways Board v Herrington are Dutton 
v Bognor Regis Urban District Council [1972] 1 QB 373 and Home Office v Dorset Yacht [1970] 
AC 1004 
3 [1903] 2 KB 331 
4 (1912) 106 LT 533 
5 (1922) 12 LlL Rep 183  
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Brothers,
6 Bolton v Stone
7 and Videan v British Transport Commission.
8 Many 
other cases could have been included in this chapter.
9 Those included in this 
chapter were chosen, in part, to be relatively evenly spread across the period, in the 
same manner as was done in Chapters Four and Five. 
 
The discursive formation, as examined in this chapter, is likely to be much more 
familiar to the modern reader than the profession as examined in Chapters Four and 
Five. However, the similarities in discursive practices suggest that it is still the 
same legal discourse as governed the judges who decided Dale v Hall in 1750. 
There are, nonetheless, sufficient differences in the articulations of liability 
contained in the judgments to suggest that twentieth century judges “saw” the 
defendants that came before them differently from the manner in which eighteenth 
century judges “saw” the defendants that came before them. That is, dominant 
members of the twentieth century legal discursive formation constructed and “saw” 
legal subjects as self-reflexive members of the community who were reasonable 
and who were aware of, and took into account, those other members of the 
community who may be affected by their actions or omissions. 
 
                                                 
6 [1932] 2 KB 606 
7 [1951] AC 850 
8 [1963] 2 QB 650 
9 Other cases that would have been eminently suitable for an archaeological excavation in this 
period were Earl v Lubbock [1905] 1 KB 253; Latham v Johnson [1913] 1 KB 413; Adams v Naylor 
[1944] KB 750 and Hedley Byrne v Heller [1964] AC 465  
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McDowall v Great Western Railway Company
10 
STATEMENTS PRESENTED TO THE COURT 
 
This decision was an appeal in the Court of King’s Bench. The defendants were a 
railway company, the servants of which left some rail trucks coupled to a brake van 
on an inclined siding. The servants left the trucks below a catch point in the tracks 
designed to prevent trucks rolling down the incline onto a highway. The servants 
left the trucks in a safe condition with their brakes screwed down. Trespassers then 
came onto the siding and caused the trucks to roll down the incline and to strike the 
plaintiff, who was lawfully passing along the highway. Judgment was given for the 
plaintiff in the court of first instance.
11 
 
In the court of appeal, counsel for the defendant argued that the judge in the court 
below used the wrong precedent.
12 The precedent that the judge was considered to 
have relied on, Clark v Chambers,
13 and all the cases relied on in that judgment, 
according to counsel in the present case, involved ‘some wrongful, negligent, or 
careless act on the part of the defendant’. Counsel stated that there is ‘no case in 
which a man using his own land in the way he has a right to do is liable for an 
accident arising from such lawful use’.
14  
 
In this case, the defendants left the ‘train standing on their own land, as they had a 
perfect right to do, and they had no reason to anticipate that this would result in 
doing an injury to anybody’. The jury had found that the van was left in a ‘safe 
                                                 
10 [1903] 2 KB 331; 72 LJKB 652; 88 LT 825; 19 TLR 552; 47 Sol Jo 603 
11 [1903] 2 KB 331 at 331 
12 Counsel for the defendants were Francis Williams KC and Denman Benson. 
13 (1878) 3 QBD 327 
14 [1903] 2 KB 331 at 332  
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position, and that it only became dangerous upon the intervention of the 
trespassers’. Various precedents were discussed, including Vaughan v Menlove, 
Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks,
15 Lynch v Nurdin
16 and Engelhart v Farrant,
17 
and the law was argued to be that, on a ‘question of alleged negligence as being the 
cause of an accident on a man’s own land, the rule is that it must appear whether all 
care was taken by him as should be taken by a prudent man’. Counsel asserted that 
the defendants lived up to that standard in the present case. It was acknowledged 
that the trucks and van were not left on the safe side of the catch point, however ‘it 
is settled that you are not under any obligation to use a particular contrivance or 
thing merely because it happens to be on your property’.
18 
 
Counsel for the plaintiff suggested that the issue was whether there was any ‘initial 
negligence on the part of the defendants’.
19 It was argued that the defendants left 
the trucks and the van in an unsafe place and that they ‘had had actual knowledge 
for years of the mischievous acts committed by boys on this part of their line, and 
therefore should have taken precautions’. Precedents were raised, including Dixon v 
Bell
20 and Lynch v Nurdin and the law stated as being that ‘if this was an accident 
which, in the circumstances, the defendants might have foreseen’ then the plaintiff 
was entitled to relief.
21 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 (1856) 11 Ex 781 
16 (1841) 1 QB 29 
17 [1897] 1 QB 240 
18 [1903] 2 KB 331 at 332-3 
19 Counsel for the plaintiff were Arthur Lewis and E. M. Samson. 
20 5 M & Selw 198 
21 [1903] 2 KB 331 at 333-4  
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THE DECISION 
 
The court allowed the appeal and found for the defendant. The decision was given 
in three judgments, which will be examined in turn. The first judge reported 
suggested that ‘at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case there was really no case to 
go to the jury at all – no evidence of the neglect on the part of the defendant railway 
company of any duty the neglect of which would have led to this accident’. The 
judge, however, still examined the case on the basis of the findings of the jury. For 
him, the central issue is whether ‘there really [was] any reasonable evidence to go 
to the jury, in respect of those findings of the jury, so far as they are findings, 
which are against the defendants’.
22 
 
The answers to the first three questions put to the jury were that the van was left in 
a safe position with regard to persons using the highway; that the accident would 
not have happened if the van had not been interfered with; and that it was the 
negligent act of the trespassers that had caused the van to roll down the incline. 
That means that, with respect to the first three questions, there ‘is nothing to shew 
any negligence whatsoever by the railway company’. The judge argued that not 
only was the van placed in a safe position, ‘but also that it was placed there under 
conditions to make it safe. It was locked up, it was braked, and it was coupled by a 
screw coupling to the train. Under those circumstances, for this interference… 
these boys… had to go through a very considerable operation’. That “operation” 
meant that the boys first had to break ‘into the van, or get into it with keys, which it 
                                                 
22 Ibid at 334-5, per Vaughan Williams LJ  
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is suggested they did; and when they got there they had a great deal to do before 
this van could be loosed and allowed to run down the incline’.
23 
 
The fourth question to go to the jury concerned whether ‘the danger of such 
interference causing injury to persons using the highway [was] known to the 
defendants at the time when the van was left… and might it have been sufficiently 
guarded against by the exercise of reasonable care and skill on the part of the 
defendants?’ The jury answered yes. The first judge reported considered the 
question in two parts. The first part concerned whether ‘the danger of such 
interference causing injury to persons using the highway [was] known to the 
defendants at the time when the van was left?’ As a response to this, the judge 
noted that there was a history of boys breaking into the vans or trucks but there was 
‘no evidence that they ever loosed a van or vehicle before during all that time’, 
therefore, ‘there is nothing… to lead one to anticipate that they would go and 
uncouple a vehicle and let it down the incline’.
24 
 
The judge considered this to mean that there was ‘no evidence to go to the jury 
upon which they could properly find that the danger of such interference causing 
injury to persons using the highway was known to the defendants… and might have 
been sufficiently guarded against by the exercise of reasonable care on the part of 
the defendants’. The argument of counsel for the plaintiff was that the van and 
trucks could have been left the other side of the catch point, however, ‘it is not true 
to say absolutely that if the defendants had done so it could not have gone down the 
incline, and it is not true to say that upon the other side of the catch point it would 
                                                 
23 Ibid at 335 
24 Ibid at 335-6  
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have been safe’. That is, ‘all these boys would have had to do was to open or close, 
as the case may be, this catch point and let the van go by… a very much simpler 
operation than that they went through when they got into the van, of uncoupling 
and unbraking the van’.
25 
 
The final question put to the jury concerned whether ‘the occurrence of injury to 
the plaintiff [was] materially and effectively caused by want of reasonable care and 
skill on the part of the defendant’s servants?’ The jury responded that the ‘company 
was negligent in not placing the van to the east of the catch point’. The judge 
repeated his conclusion that ‘there is nothing to justify the finding that the not 
placing the van to the east of the catch point was an effective cause of the 
accident’.
26 
 
After these conclusions as to the facts, the judge turned to the applicable law. That 
law was stated as being that ‘in those cases in which part of the cause of the 
accident was the interference of a stranger or third person, the defendants are not 
held responsible unless it is found that that which they do or omit to do… is itself 
the effective cause of the accident’. This was qualified by the addition that where 
the ‘circumstances are such that anyone of common sense having the custody or 
control over a particular thing would recognise the danger of that happening which 
would be likely to injure others, it is the duty of the person having such custody or 
control to take reasonable care to avoid such injury’.
27 
 
                                                 
25 Ibid at 336-7 
26 Ibid at 337 
27 Id  
 
307
 
The judge continued that if this was the law then ‘there was nothing in the 
circumstances of this case which would induce an ordinary person of common 
sense and care to do anything more than the railway company did in respect of this 
van’. He then considered a hypothetical situation where ‘there was evidence to go 
to the jury of neglect by the defendants of that care which a reasonable man would 
have taken to avoid… “obvious dangers”.’ The law that applied in such a situation 
was repeated as ‘if a stranger interferes it does not follow that the defendant is 
liable, but equally it does not follow that because a stranger interferes the defendant 
is not liable if the negligence of a servant of his is the effective cause of the 
accident’. This statement of law was a direct quotation from a judgment in 
Engelhart v Farrant, one of the cases cited by counsel for the defendants in 
argument. The judge in the present case then considered that even if the defendant 
had been negligent, ‘such neglect was not the effective cause of this accident, 
and… if it was not, that means that the defendants are not liable’.
28 
 
The second judge reported agreed with the first. The fact that the jury found that the 
train was left in a ‘perfectly safe’ condition was noted. The judge argued that as the 
trucks were ‘not left in any condition in which it could be said that there was any 
negligence on the part of the railway company… unless it is plain that the evidence 
relating to the mischievous boys turned the that act which was otherwise a proper 
act… into a negligent one’. In this judge’s view, the jury could not reasonably have 
found that the defendant ‘ought under the circumstances in which they left this 
train, reasonably to have anticipated that the boys would do or might have done 
what they in fact did’. Further the jury could not reasonably have found that there 
was ‘at the time, known to the company, any such risk of the particular acts of the 
                                                 
28 Ibid at 337-8  
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boys which caused the accident as called upon the railway company to take further 
precautions against those particular acts’. Given these facts, ‘the findings upon 
which the learned judge below acted cannot be relied upon on behalf of the 
plaintiff, and… the appeal ought to succeed’.
29 
 
The third judge reported was ‘of the same opinion’. For this judge the question 
became, after the findings of the jury, ‘was there any evidence to shew that the 
company ought reasonably to anticipated’ the interference by the trespassers?’ The 
judge in the court below had stated that ‘for years the defendants had been troubled 
by boys trespassing on this part of the line and playing in and about the vehicles 
standing upon it, and… to the knowledge of the defendants, used to get into the 
trucks and vans and unlock the doors of the vans’. As this had been going on for 
years ‘and no accident of any kind had occurred’, the contention that ‘the company 
ought to have reasonably anticipated any such act as was actually done by the 
boys… or the result which came from it’ does not ‘seem… fair’. On that basis, the 
judge allowed the appeal.
30 
                                                 
29 Ibid at 338-9, per Romer LJ. The judge made no specific reference to previous decisions. 
30 Ibid at 339, per Stirling LJ. The judge made no specific reference to previous decisions.  
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Blacker v Lake and Elliott Ltd
31 
THE DECISION
32 
 
The first judge reported started by repeating the facts of the case. The plaintiff 
sustained ‘severe injuries’ as a result of using a brazing lamp in the course of his 
employment as a bicycle maker and repairer. In the ‘ordinary course of user [sic] it 
burst at a joint in the top of the container which forms one part of the instrument’. 
The paraffin oil that fuels the lamp was ‘driven forcibly out in the direction of 
another part of the instrument called the vaporiser, became ignited and fell upon the 
plaintiff’. He had bought the lamp ‘from a firm who sells various articles required 
in the bicycle-making trade’. This firm had bought the lamp from the 
manufacturers, the defendants. The judge described the brazing lamp in detail and 
considered that a ‘person who bought such an instrument for use, and the person 
who made it to be used and sold it, must have realised that in the course of its use it 
might be a source of some danger’. In other words, ‘there was a capability of 
danger about this instrument, but the nature of that danger was one which might 
easily be apprehended without any explanation’.
33 
 
The judge then addressed the history of the legal proceedings in the case. The judge 
in the court of first instance had ‘ruled that there was a case to go to the jury upon 
the ground that the lamp was a thing dangerous in itself’. The lower court judge put 
the following questions to the jury: Was the lamp defective? Were the plaintiff’s 
                                                 
31 (1912) 106 LT 533 
32 There was no separate background, beyond the headnote, for the case provided in this report, only 
a report of the decision. Therefore, the discussion of this case will be presented differently. All the 
facts and the arguments of counsel are contained in the words of the judges. Therefore, only the 
judgments themselves will be examined. Counsel for the plaintiff was named as Mallinson and 
counsel for defendants was H. Jacobs. 
33 (1912) 106 LT 533 at 534 per Hamilton J, sitting in the court of King’s Bench.  
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injuries by any defect in the lamp? Was the lamp when made, and for the purposes 
for which it was intended by the defendants to be used, a dangerous thing? If the 
lamp was dangerous, did the defendants know that it was so? The judge in the court 
of review suggested that the result of the lower court judge’s address and of the 
questions put to the jury was that the jury were told that the plaintiff could be 
successful ‘if the defendants have put upon the market a lamp really not fit for use 
in the sense that, although worked with reasonable care and not damaged in any 
way, the person working it still incurred a risk which a properly constructed lamp 
would not impose upon him’. The jury were also considered to have been told that 
‘they might find that the plaintiff had a cause of action if the impropriety consisted 
in defects in design, workmanship or material’. After the judge’s address and 
questions, the jury ‘found that the plaintiff had a cause of action’ and that the lamp 
was ‘improperly designed, although the materials and workmanship were not 
defective, and that the lamp was a dangerous thing for the purpose it was intended 
to be used’. The jury also found that ‘although the defendants were not aware that 
the lamp was dangerous… as reasonable men they ought to have known about it’.
34 
 
The judge held that the ‘direction of the learned judge was incorrect’. The judge 
repeated several examples where a plaintiff could recover in tort for an injury 
suffered and held that it is a ‘question of law and not fact whether a given case 
comes within one category or another, and whether one rule of law is to be applied 
or another’. In terms of the facts of this case, the judge held that it was ‘for the 
learned judge to decide whether this lamp was a thing dangerous in itself as that 
                                                 
34 Ibid at 534-5  
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term has been used in decided cases’. The trial judge, however, left this decision to 
the jury.
35 
 
The facts, according to the judge, were that the ‘lamp was an instrument of a 
common kind and was not sold by the plaintiff to the defendant. It was absolutely 
innocuous until used with paraffin, and when it had been charged with paraffin it 
worked with perfect safety and without defect whatever’ for almost a year. In the 
opinion of the witnesses ‘more care in its manufacture might have produced a more 
durable article’. Therefore, according to the judge, the lamp was not ‘brought 
within the category, so far as it has been defined, of a dangerous object, the dealing 
with which per se imposes any special liability’. The judge recognised that it may 
have been made more durable, but, there is ‘authority for the proposition that a man 
is entitled to let a tumbledown house, and I think there is no law which says that a 
man may not sell a cheap lamp’. Therefore, in the opinion of the judge, the judge at 
the trial ‘ought to have said that this was not a dangerous instrument in itself, and 
that it was not dangerous in the way it was constructed so as to bring it within the 
category of chattels which a person incurs a special risk in dealing in’.
36 
 
The judge then turned to the ‘authorities’ that provided the law in this case.
37 The 
area of law into which this case fell was that of ‘chattels bought and sold, where 
there is no privity of contract between the parties to the action… [where] the 
plaintiff and his injuries are not too remote… because he was within the class of 
persons into whose hands the thing sold might from the first be contemplated as 
                                                 
35 Ibid at 535 
36 Id 
37 These authorities included Winterbottom v Wright (10 M & W 109), Earl v Lubbock ([1905] 1 KB 
253) and Cavalier v Pope ([1906] AC 429).  
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likely to come’. This characterisation meant that a number of precedents were not 
relevant. Further, this was not a case ‘of the sale of any commodity which is… 
dangerous per se’.
38 
 
Three specific precedents, Collis v Selden,
39  Parry v Smith
40 and Dominion v 
Natural Gas Company,
41 were cited that gave rise to the law being that the ‘breach 
of the defendant’s contract with A to use care and skill in and about the 
manufacture or repair of an article does not of itself give any cause of action to B 
when he is injured, by reason of the article proving to be defective in breach of that 
contract’. The judge was ‘unable to see how a person could be under a greater 
obligation when he makes a thing without having personally having contracted to 
do so than when he makes it under a contract’.
42  
 
The judge re-phrased the statements of law presented by the plaintiff’s counsel as: 
‘when a person deals with a dangerous thing, whether he is ignorant of its danger or 
not, he is bound at his peril, with regard to anyone into whose hands it may come in 
ordinary course, to see that it shall be safe so far as the then existing knowledge’ of 
humanity can make it. The judge offered another statement of the law: ‘if the article 
is a dangerous thing, either by reason of its general character or by reason of the 
specific condition in which it is sent out, then the maker owes a duty of care and 
skill’. This “duty of care and skill” is owed ‘to the same class of persons which 
extends not only to the employment of skill in the manufacture and the avoidance 
                                                 
38 (1912) 106 LT 533 at 535-6 
39 (1868) Law Rep 3 CP 495 
40 (1879) 4 CP Div 325 
41 [1909] AC 640 
42 (1912) 106 LT 533 at 536  
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of a possible case of misfeasance, but even to an obligation upon the manufacturers 
to provide themselves with the best knowledge in existence at the time’.
43 
 
The judge ‘put aside’ three cases as being irrelevant to this case. These decisions 
dealt with “things dangerous in themselves”. The judge considered the plaintiff’s 
case to rest on the decision of Langridge v Levy.
44 The judge repeated the following 
statement of a judge in Langridge v Levy: 
 
We should pause before we made a precedent by our decision which 
would be an authority for an action against the vendors, even of such 
instruments and articles as are dangerous in themselves, at the suit 
of any person whomsoever into whose hands they might happen to 
pass, and who should be injured thereby. We do not feel it necessary 
to go to that length, and our judgment proceeds upon another 
ground. 
The judge then raised the case of Longmeid v Holliday in which the ‘cause of 
action, which was in respect of the explosion of a lamp, failed because there was no 
misfeasance by the defendant independently of the contract to which the plaintiff 
was not a party’.
45 
 
Other cases
46 relating to the ‘question of dealing with dangerous articles’ were 
raised and the conclusion was that the ‘point is that a knowledge of the danger is 
the foundation of the obligation to warn’. An extensive quotation from Longmeid v 
Holliday was repeated which stated that ‘it would be going much too far to say… 
that if a machine not in its nature dangerous but one which might become so by a 
latent defect discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care… [the manufacture] 
                                                 
43 Id  
44 (1837) 2 M & W 519 
45 (1912) 106 LT 533 at 536-7 
46 Including Brass v Maitland (6 E & B 471), Farrant v Barnes (11 CB (NS) 553) and Acatos v 
Burns (3 Ex Div 282).  
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should be answerable… for a subsequent damage accruing by the use of it’. The 
judge in the present case considered that ‘all that can be said is that the defendants 
did not know that their lamp was not perfectly safe and had no reason to believe it 
was not so’.
47 
 
George v Skivington was the next precedent discussed. The judge stated that he had 
examined all reports of that case to see ‘whether the difficulty which the case 
presents can be explained by any discrepancy in the reports’. The judge then 
provided a detailed discussion of the arguments of the judges in George v 
Skivington and used extensive quotations from the various reports. The judge then 
dealt with how later courts had received the decision. It was suggested that the 
‘case has not been expressly affirmed, but I do find that it has been expressly 
doubted’. Several decisions were referred to which discussed, but did not follow, 
George v Skivington.  Heaven v Pender was one of these cases. The judge 
considered that he ‘was unable to see in these judgments any dissent from the 
discredit cast on the decision in George v Skivington by the Divisional Court in 
Heaven v Pender’. Further cases, including Le Lievre v Gould and Cavalier v Pope 
(a decision from which an extensive quotation was repeated) were then raised to 
counter the statement of law contained in George v Skivington.
48 
 
The judge concluded with the ‘consideration’ that ‘without presuming to say that 
the decision in George v Skivington was wrong, it is not a case which I can follow 
here’. Therefore, Skivington is ‘no authority in the present case’. According to this 
judge, as the trial judge had misdirected the jury because he had led the jury ‘to 
                                                 
47 (1912) 106 LT 533 at 537 
48 Ibid at 537-9  
 
315
 
suppose that if this lamp was… likely to do harm or expose the user to risk when a 
properly made lamp would not do so, they were entitled to say that it was a 
dangerous instrument’ and therefore entitled to ‘justify a judgment against the 
defendants’. It was up to the judge ‘to decide whether it was a dangerous 
instrument with a view to seeing a whether any special rule of law was applicable 
to it’. The verdict of the jury was based on the ‘evidence of [a] want of care against 
the makers [which] amounted to no more than that they had omitted to inform their 
minds as to the best method of constructing such an instrument’. As such, the first 
judge reported was ‘of the opinion that there was no evidence upon which the 
defendants could be held liable… the appeal must be allowed and judgment entered 
for the defendants with costs’.
49 
 
The second judge reported agreed that the judge in the court of first instance had 
misdirected the jury. He stated that ‘there was no evidence which warranted them 
in coming to the conclusion of fact at which they arrived’. The judge considered 
that that was sufficient to allow the appeal but decided to discuss the law as ‘so 
many questions of great importance have been raised in the course of the 
arguments’.
50 
 
The judge began by discussing the law from the hypothetical position that the 
‘brazier was a thing which falls within the class of chattels which are dangerous in 
themselves… and that there was some want of care in the manufacture of the article 
by the defendants’. The issue then became whether liability would arise in this 
hypothetical situation. Before there could be liability there had to be a duty. As 
                                                 
49 Ibid at 539-40 
50 Ibid at 540, per Lush J  
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there was no contract of sale between the defendant and the plaintiff, there could be 
no implied or express term in contract for liability, which meant that the plaintiff 
had to show a duty outside of contract. That ‘duty must be one created or brought 
about by the relation subsisting between the defendant and himself, a duty created 
by the supply of the chattel and not by the contract under which it is supplied’. A 
‘long line of authorities’ shows that ‘whatever may be the want of care’ in the 
making or repairing of a chattel, that ‘want of care can be taken advantage of only 
by the person towards whom the care should have been exercised’.
51 
 
The judge then dealt with some of the same precedents as the first judge reported. 
The cases established the ‘proposition that dealing with a chattel of an ordinary 
kind, not a chattel which comes within the special class of articles in themselves 
dangerous, if there is any negligence in the manufacture of… the chattel, that 
negligence cannot be made the foundation of an action’ if there is no contract. 
George v Skivington was expressly highlighted. The judge acknowledged that it 
‘has never been in terms overruled, but it is inconsistent’ with other authorities and 
therefore is would be ‘quite impossible to follow the decision… and it cannot be… 
regarded as good law’.
52 
 
The judge considered that ‘in order that a stranger to a contract may maintain an 
action in regard to a defective chattel by which he has been injured, he must… 
bring his case within one of the following three classes of cases’. The first class 
was where ‘the vendor knows that the particular person is going to use the article… 
and if he allows the chattel to be so used, fraudulently representing that it is safe, he 
                                                 
51 Ibid. The “long line of authorities” included  Earl v Lubbock, Cavalier v Pope and Malone v 
Laskey ([1907] 2 KB 141). 
52 Id  
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will be liable’. The second class includes those cases where the article was a 
‘thing… noxious or dangerous’ in itself. In such an instance, if the ‘vendor sells the 
chattel to one person contemplating or knowing that it will be used by another, he 
is under a duty towards the person who he knows will use it not to misrepresent its 
real nature’. The third class is that ‘class of cases in which the thing supplied is in 
itself a public nuisance. In such a case the person who is responsible for the 
nuisance is liable to any person who is specially damaged’.
53 
 
A fourth class of cases that related to defective chattels was suggested by counsel 
for the plaintiff. This class was founded on a previous decision, Elliott v Hall,
54 
which if ‘merely glance[d]’ suggests that ‘a person who supplies a defective 
waggon [sic] to another knowing that a third person will use it is liable to that third 
person if he is injured’. The judge in the present case, however, considered that if 
‘the case is more closely looked at… it belongs to that totally different class of 
cases where the control of premises or the management of a dangerous thing 
creates a duty’. In other words, a ‘person who is in control of a thing, such as a 
waggon, to which he knows other people will resort, owes a duty to those persons 
to take reasonable care that it shall be safe’. This duty ‘arises, not from contract, but 
from the fact that the person has dominion or control over the… waggon’. Another 
case, Mulholland v Caledonian Railway,
55 counters Elliott v Hall and is a ‘direct 
authority for saying that the supply of a defective waggon gives no cause of action 
to a person who, to the knowledge of him who supplied the waggon, was going to 
use it and who was injured in the course of using it’.
56 
                                                 
53 Ibid at 540-1 
54 (1885) 15 QBD 315 
55 [1898] AC 216 
56 (1912) 106 LT 533 at 541  
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In terms of the ‘vendor of a chattel which does belong to the “dangerous” class’ as 
soon as ‘he discloses the nature of the chattel he has done all that the law requires 
him to do’. In circumstances where a chattel that is ‘obviously dangerous, or is 
known to be dangerous, occasions injuries to a third person, because of its 
imperfect manufacture, the manufacturer is under no more obligation towards the 
person injured than the manufacturer of a cart with a defective wheel’ where the 
wheel comes off the cart causing injury to a third person. The law was stated as 
being that there is a duty ‘to warn, and, if that duty has been discharged, no duty to 
take care in the manufacture of the article is owing except to the person with whom 
the manufacturer contracts’. In other words, the ‘manufacturer is no more bound, as 
between himself and a stranger, to take reasonable care in the manufacture of the 
article than if the chattel were not dangerous, because the only duty… when a 
chattel belongs to the dangerous class is to disclose its true character’.
57 
 
Central to this judge’s review of precedents was a discussion of the relevance of 
George v Skivington. ‘If the decision in George v Skivington had proceeded on 
[these] grounds… it would not have been in conflict with any of the [other] 
authorities’. However, George v Skivington, ‘upon which the plaintiff principally 
relies in the present case, is not an authority which we can follow… and for the 
reasons that I have give, I think the judgment entered in favour of the plaintiff must 
be set aside and judgment entered for the defendants’.
58 
                                                 
57 Id 
58 Ibid at 541-2  
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Hodge & Sons v Anglo-American Oil Company and D. T. Miller & Co
59 
THE DECISION
60 
 
The court found for the defendants in both cases, unanimously in Hodge & Sons v 
Anglo-American Oil Company, but by a majority of 2 to 1 in Willmott & Others v 
Anglo-American Oil Company. The opinions of the court were given separately.  
 
The opinion of the first judge reported began with a recitation of the circumstances 
of the two actions. Both arose from the explosion of an oil tank barge that was 
moored at the wharf of Hodge and Sons. The judge held that such a barge, whether 
laden, empty or after being efficiently cleaned, ‘is a dangerous thing’. Due to the 
dangers associated with the transportation and storage of petrol, specific practices 
for the cleaning of barges were in place at the time of the explosion. These included 
the extraction ‘as far as possible’ of the remaining petrol, the mopping out of the 
tank by hand, and the use of ‘steam at high pressure’ to vaporise any petrol left and 
to vent the vapour through apertures in the tank designed for that purpose.
61 
 
                                                 
59 (1922) 12 LlL Rep 183 
60 There was no separate background, beyond the headnote, for the case provided in this report, only 
a report of the decision. As with the previous decision, the discussion of this case will only include 
an examination of the judgments. By way of background, however, this decision of the Court of 
Appeal was from an appeal brought by the plaintiffs. This case was heard simultaneously with that 
of Willmott & Others v Anglo-American Oil Company and D. T. Miller & Co. Both actions were a 
result of an explosion on the defendant company’s oil tank barge, the Warwick, in which several 
lives were lost. Hodge & Sons, the named plaintiff, were ship-repairers and wharf owners who 
suffered damage from the explosion. The case brought by Willmott was a test action on behalf of 
workers who were injured by the blast. The other salient facts of the case were included in the 
judgment of the court and will be addressed in the following section. Counsel for Hodge were R. A. 
Wright KC and J. Dickinson, counsel for Willmott were Harold Morris KC and Tristram Beresford, 
counsel for Anglo-American were Patrick Hastings KC and H. Claughton Scott and counsel for 
Miller were A. Neilson KC and W. A. Jowitt KC.  
61 12 LlL Rep 183 at 183-184 per Bankes L.J.  
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The defendant owned several barges and employed D. T. Miller & Co to do the 
repair work on them. Mr Miller gave evidence at the trials of first instance that he 
used his own sense of smell in order to ascertain whether it was safe for workers to 
commence repairs on the tanks. If he smelt petrol vapour, no work commenced 
until the smell disappeared. Over a period of years this method appeared to work, 
as there had been no accident at Mr Miller’s premises. However, these premises did 
not have the facilities to lift the storage tanks out of the barges. This, when the 
defendant asked Miller to modify the interior of the Warwick’s tank, Miller 
arranged for Hodge to carry out the work, as the latter company had the facilities to 
carry out the repair. All communications between Hodge and Miller ‘appear to 
have been verbal’, but Miller had sent barges for repair to Hodge twice before 
without incident. Within half an hour of the Warwick arriving at wharf of Hodge 
and Sons, however, the explosion occurred.
62  
 
As to the question of liability, the first judge held that the defendant, the oil 
company, was under a ‘double duty, (a) the duty of using reasonable means for 
securing the efficient cleaning out of the tank, and (b) the duty of giving any 
necessary warning of the dangerous character of the tank even after a proper and 
sufficient cleaning’. The former was owed to all those ‘who necessarily came into 
contact with the tank in the course of carrying out the repairs’. The plaintiff 
Willmott would be included in this category. The warning included in the second 
duty would not be required ‘where the person who would otherwise be entitled to 
warning was already aware of the danger, or who might reasonably be assumed to 
be aware of it’. The defendant Miller ‘obviously required no warning’.
63 
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The relationship between the plaintiff, Hodge and Sons, with the first defendant, 
Anglo-American, was different from the one between the plaintiff and second 
defendant, Miller. If the first defendant was aware that the barge was being sent to 
Hodge’s wharf, then Hodge ‘would be entitled to a warning’ unless, like Miller, it 
could be assumed that they were aware of the danger. Given ‘what must be the state 
of knowledge among ship and barge repairers on the Thames as to the danger of 
dealing with cleaned petrol tanks’, the judge considered that the defendants could 
assume that Hodge needed no warning. From the evidence, it ‘appeared’ that the 
manager of Hodge’s wharf was ‘sufficiently aware of the danger’, and ‘it would 
appear also that if a warning was needed it was sufficiently given by the notice 
painted on the barge itself’. The judge went further and held that neither defendant 
was under an obligation to warn all of Hodge’s employees individually. Therefore, 
the defendants were not ‘under any duty to give any warning to the plaintiff 
Willmott or to the other employees of Messrs. Hodges’.
64 
 
When the barge arrived at the wharf of Hodge and Sons, it was in the charge of a 
‘lighterman in the employ’ of the first defendant. ‘The covers on the openings to 
the tank were… closed, as they were bound to be, while the barge was being 
navigated on the Thames’. There was no evidence to suggest that the workers on 
the wharf made any attempt to ‘ascertain whether petrol vapour was present in the 
tank’ before they started ‘work on the tank with an oxy-acetylene burner, with the 
result that the disastrous explosion occurred’. Apart from the fact that the Hodges’ 
representatives should have realised that the barge had been carrying petrol, the 
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lighterman, when he saw the work commenced with the burner, told the ‘foreman 
that it was not right to use the burner until the barge was opened out’.
65 
 
The court of first instance held that the representatives of Hodges and Sons ‘were 
guilty of negligence in allowing the oxy-acetylene burner to be used in the tank in 
the way and at the time at which it was used; and that their negligence caused or 
contributed to the explosion’. This first judge ‘entirely’ concurred with those 
decisions. Therefore, Hodge and Sons ‘must fail in their action, and their appeal 
must be dismissed with costs’.
66 
 
With respect to Willmott’s action, the court of first instance had held that no 
negligence had been established, despite the fact that similar evidence had been 
presented to both lower courts. As to the finding in Wilmott’s action, the present 
judge held that it ‘is impossible to say that there is no evidence of negligence’. The 
defendants, however, were ‘entitled to the benefit of the rule accepted in this Court 
that the decision of a learned Judge upon a question of fact is not to be reversed 
unless the Court is satisfied that it is wrong’. As the court of first instance had the 
opportunity to assess the witnesses, ‘it would not be right for this Court to disturb 
the finding of the learned Judge upon this all-important issue in the action’. This 
‘conclusion disposes of the appeal’.
67 
 
On a more general point, it ‘was said that even if the [defendants] were guilty of 
negligence the immediate cause of the explosion was the negligence of Messrs 
Hodges’ foreman… rendering Messrs. Hodges, and Messrs Hodges alone, 
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responsible for the explosion’. The judge cited a precedent, Ruoff v Long,
68 in 
which Scott v Shepherd was cited, and considered that if the ‘test in reference to 
things dangerous in themselves is… that the person guilty of the original 
negligence is liable for the act of an intervener in all cases where the act of an 
intervener could reasonably have been foreseen’ then the defendant in the present 
case ‘are freed from liability’. Even ‘if they failed to cause the tank to be 
sufficiently cleaned… no one could possibly have anticipated the reckless act of a 
person employed to repair the tank of using a naked light… before it has been 
opened out and some means taken to ascertain the presence of petrol vapour’. 
Therefore, the appeal of Willmott ‘fails and must be dismissed with costs’.
69 
 
The second judge reported dealt with Willmott’s appeal first. ‘The first matter is to 
ascertain what is the legal liability of the owners towards workmen who may work 
on the tank, but with whom or their employers the owners have no contract’. It was 
suggested that ‘the state of the authorities in England is not very satisfactory’ in 
terms of providing the limits of liability of a person who negligently puts a 
dangerous item into ‘circulation’, particularly when there is no contract. A past 
decision of the House of Lords, Earl v Lubbock, suggested that ‘the repairer or 
constructor is under no liability to a person whom he might reasonably expect to 
use it, but with whom he has no contract’. Other cases, including Blacker v Lake, 
Cavalier v Pope, Winterbottom v Wright and Caledonian Railway Co v Mulholland 
were highlighted, featuring an extensive quotation from Longmeid v Holliday, 
limiting the liability of those dealing with dangerous items.
70 
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A line of cases was also adduced that suggested that a wider liability was 
recognised in English law, one of the decisions mentioned was the ‘much-doubted 
case of George v Skivington’. Other decisions included in the list were Langridge v 
Levy, Elliott v Hall and Parry v Smith. The judge in the present case considered 
himself bound by precedent ‘to hold [that] the defendant is not liable to persons 
with whom he has no contract for damage caused by the dangerous article’. This 
position was qualified by the proposition that it ‘may be otherwise where he 
himself invites the plaintiff and his class to use the article without examination, 
which is probably the explanation of the majority judgment in Heaven v Pender’.
71 
 
The judge then discussed the distinction between a ‘thing in its nature dangerous’
72 
and something that was dangerous due to negligent construction. The judge did ‘not 
understand the difference between a thing dangerous in itself, as poison, and a thing 
not dangerous as a class, but by negligent construction dangerous as a particular 
thing. The latter… seems the more dangerous… a wolf in sheep’s clothing instead 
of an obvious wolf’. In the former circumstances, the ‘duty is to warn of dangers 
not obvious to a reasonably careful person’. However, if the ‘damage was 
occasioned by the act of a third party in connection with the dangerous thing’, then 
the defendant is not ‘liable to third parties for action of the receiver [of the 
dangerous thing]’.
73 
 
Applying this understanding of the statements available in the law to the present 
case, the judge considered three legal statements that were applicable in this case. 
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The first was that, ‘if the barge which has carried petrol is an article dangerous in 
itself, it is the duty of the owners to take proper and reasonable precautions to 
prevent its doing damage to people likely to come into contact with it’. The second 
was that, if the same barge ‘is not dangerous in itself, but becomes dangerous 
because it has been insufficiently cleaned, and the owner is ignorant of the danger, 
the owner is not liable for damage caused by it to persons with whom he has no 
contract’. And, finally, that ‘where the danger is obvious or the owner has given 
proper warning to the person entrusted with it, not being his servant, the owner is 
not liable for negligence of such person causing injury to a third party’.
74 
 
In the present case, the judge posed the question: ‘was the barge which had carried 
petrol a thing dangerous in itself?’ The answer, in his opinion was “yes”, ‘in view 
of the extreme difficulty of freeing it from vapour’. Therefore, on this basis, ‘the 
owners came under a duty to persons likely to come into contact with it, to take 
reasonable precautions to prevent damage from it, which might be satisfied by 
adequate warning of its danger if not obvious’. In terms of the practices involved in 
the cleaning of oil tank barges, there ‘was no evidence of any explosion on a barge 
before this one; and according to the evidence the methods pursued in cleaning this 
barge were those ordinarily used with success on previous barges’. Although the 
‘presence of a considerable amount of vapour after cleaning may be some evidence 
of negligence’ and given the ‘view of the evidence of experts that no ordinary 
cleaning can be relied on to extract all petrol vapour’, this was not sufficient ‘to 
overweigh the actual evidence of the ordinary method followed’. Therefore, the 
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judge was ‘not be prepared to overrule the finding of the Judge below that there 
was no negligence in cleaning’.
75  
 
The judge considered that Miller, the Hodges and the Hodges’ foreman had ‘ample 
knowledge and warning that the barge was dangerous’. If the owners ‘hand a 
dangerous barge to competent people who had full knowledge of the probability of 
danger, even if they did not know the exact amount of it, [then, it] appears… to 
involve no further liability on the owners’. The actions of such competent people 
could amount to a ‘new intervening cause, which may impose liability on the 
interveners, but breaks the chain of liability on the owner’. On this ground, 
Willmott’s appeal ‘must be dismissed’.
76  
 
With respect to Hodge and Sons’ appeal, the second judge considered that there 
was no need to repeat the legal analysis from the decision on Willmott’s appeal, as 
it was considered sufficient. Given the facts, ‘it is not necessary in this case to 
express an opinion about the negligence of the oil company’. As to the foreman’s 
actions, it was held that ‘it was great negligence to set an oxy-acetylene flare to 
work on the hold, without any precautions either by smell or ventilation, to 
ascertain that the hold was safe or get it clear of petrol’. Due to this intervening 
cause, the appeal of Hodge and Sons also ‘must be dismissed’.
77  
 
The third judge reported looked at Hodge and Sons’ appeal first. He stated that he 
was ‘not prepared to reverse the Judge’s finding of contributory negligence’. It was 
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not ‘necessary’ to add to the reasons given in the other two opinions, therefore, the 
appeal ‘must be dismissed’.
78  
 
With regard to Willmott’s appeal, the third judge re-visited the findings of the court 
of first instance. There the court ‘negatived any negligence on the part of the 
defendants; [but] was not prepared to decide whether, if there was any negligence 
in the defendants, the negligence of the foreman was a novus actus interveniens 
forming the sole cause of the damage’. Given that ‘in respect of the same accident 
there have been two conflicting findings of fact on the issue of the defendants’ 
negligence’, this judge questioned whether, in the case of Willmott, the judge 
‘ought to have found negligence established’.
79  
 
This judge stated that  
 
if a person for his own purpose manufactures a dangerous article, or 
puts any chattel into a dangerous condition such that it is likely to 
cause injury to third persons who in the ordinary course of affairs 
come into its vicinity, it is his duty to such third persons before so 
disposing of it as that they may be affected by it, to take reasonable 
precautions to make it as little dangerous as possible. 
Applying this duty to the present case, ‘the defendants, having loaded the tank 
barge with petrol which when discharged left an explosive spirit in the tank, owed a 
duty to third persons whom the barge might affect to take reasonable precautions to 
see that the explosive vapour was removed’. After reviewing past cases, including 
the majority judgment from Heaven v Pender and the decisions of Dixon v Bell, 
Dominion v Natural Gas Company and Parry v Smith, in order to defend this 
statement of the law, the judge then considered whether there was a breach of this 
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duty. The ‘fact remains that the danger is from explosion, that the obligation to 
cleanse is to avoid that danger; that a very violent explosion took place some 15 
hours after the cleansing operation had ceased’. When details of the cleaning were 
considered, the steaming was for ‘one hour in the tank, and then only in two 
compartments, how the steaming of the outside was again only on one side, and 
above all how the all-important ventilation ceased at 9.30pm in order that the 
servants concerned might catch their trains’, the judge held that ‘there was 
negligence in cleansing’.
80  
 
This understanding of the situation removed the need for the judge to discuss the 
issue of whether the defendant was under a duty to warn third parties of the 
possible danger, as the duty is to take “reasonable precautions to make it as little 
dangerous as possible”. The judge did suggest, however, that if there was a ‘duty to 
warn, it appears… not to be sufficiently performed by a mere statement that the 
chattel may be in a dangerous condition that may follow careful cleansing, if… it is 
in the far more dangerous condition that follows careless cleansing’. The judge 
ruled that in the specific circumstances of this case the ‘appeal should be 
allowed’.
81 
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Farr v Butters Brothers and Company
82 
STATEMENTS PRESENTED TO THE COURT 
 
This case was heard in the Court of Appeal of the King’s Bench Division. At the 
hearing in the lower court it was held that, after the evidence had been presented for 
the plaintiff, there was no case to go to the jury. The original hearing was held prior 
to the handing down of the decision in Donoghue v Stevenson,
83 but this appeal was 
heard after the decision in that landmark case was brought down. 
 
The plaintiff was the widow of an ‘experienced crane erector’ who died when the 
jib of a crane fell on him. The deceased worked for builders who had purchased an 
unassembled crane from the defendants, who were manufacturers of cranes. During 
the construction of the crane the deceased had made chalk marks on those cog-
wheels that ‘worked with unusual stiffness’ and that ‘fitted inaccurately’. This was 
done with the intention of notifying his principals. The deceased, however, began 
‘working the crane before the defects had been remedied, and while it was working 
and he was standing under the jib it fell and killed him’.
84 
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In the statement of claim, the plaintiff alleged that the crane was new and that it 
was made and supplied by the defendants ‘who were responsible for its safe and 
efficient working’ and that the accident was ‘the result of the negligence of the 
defendants, their servants or agents’. The particulars alleged were, firstly, that the 
‘crane was defective in construction and assembled without proper care in that the 
gear wheels had not been trimmed to mesh properly’. This caused them to jam and 
break, causing the jib to fall. The second particular allegation was that the 
defendant failed to ‘test the crane before delivery and/or after erection’.
85 
 
The court of first instance considered that there was evidence that the crane was 
defective when it was delivered, but that ‘there was no evidence that the defendants 
knew that the crane was dangerous or defective, nor could it be said that there was 
any concealed defect in the crane’. If there was negligence on the part of the 
defendant in the assembly of the gear wheels, the judge held, then there must also 
have been ‘negligence on the part of the deceased man, who knew the exact state of 
affairs, who allowed the crane to be worked with that knowledge, and who was the 
first to be responsible for its use when the accident occurred’. On this basis, the 
judge held that the defendants had no case to answer and the jury was not asked to 
come to a decision on the evidence.
86 
 
In the appeal, counsel for the plaintiff stated that the ‘action, which is based on 
negligence apart from contract, is brought by its facts within the principle of the 
decision of the House of Lords’ in Donoghue v Stevenson. That is, a ‘duty was 
owed by the defendants to those in the purchaser’s employment who were to use 
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the crane’. Counsel noted that, in Donoghue v Stevenson, ‘emphasis was no doubt 
laid on the fact that the bottle was intended to reach the ultimate consumer… 
exactly in the state in which it was sent out by the manufacturers and with no 
possibility of intermediate examination’. Applying this “principle” to the present 
case, counsel argued that ‘the crane was sent out by the [defendants] as being in a 
fit state to be assembled out of the identical parts they supplied, and without the 
idea that any intermediate examination was necessary’. Counsel then cited cases, 
including George v Skivington, Dominion v Natural Gas Company and a decision 
from the United States, MacPherson v Buick Motor Company,
87 where it had been 
held that a manufacturer who supplied an object that featured some form of ‘latent 
danger’ was responsible for injuries suffered by consumers as a result of the use of 
that object.
88 
 
Counsel also responded to the lower court’s finding that, even if there was 
negligence on the part of the defendant, the deceased person was also negligent. 
Counsel argued that, although the ‘deceased man saw that the meshing of the cog-
wheels was irregular, there is strong evidence on the facts that he was unaware that 
such a defect would cause anything but a stiffness in working’. It was contended 
that the deceased man would not have ‘gone on working the crane if he knew that 
danger was involved in doing so. Stiffness in working is quite common in a new 
crane’. Counsel further argued that the decisions that were relied upon by the lower 
court, Earl v Lubbock and Winterbottom v Wright, were no longer ‘good law’ after 
the decision in Donoghue v Stevenson. Further, counsel asserted that even if there 
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was a ‘question of contributory negligence, that ought to have been left to the 
jury’.
89 
 
THE DECISION 
 
The court found unanimously for the defendants, with the decision being given in 
three separate judgments. The reasoning in the judgments will be examined in turn. 
The first judge reported started by noting that the present case was ‘of considerable 
interest’ because of the, then recent, decision in Donoghue v Stevenson. There was 
not going to be, however, a ‘complete judgment on the effect of that decision’. The 
Scots case is relevant but ‘the question is, is there any liability on the part of the 
manufacturers to the employee of the purchaser?’
90 
 
After a review of the evidence, the judge held that ‘after the manufacturers had 
supplied the parts of the crane to their purchasers there was an opportunity for 
examination in that the purchasers were going to assemble the parts’. And further, 
that the crane was assembled by the purchaser’s ‘skilled erector, who examined the 
wheels and found their condition and did not rectify it’. The courts ‘have repeatedly 
held that when a plaintiff gives evidence which is only consistent with the accident 
being caused by his own negligence the judge ought to withdraw the case from the 
jury’. As that was the action of the trial judge, this appeal judge endorsed that 
action.
91 
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The judge then considered the effect that the decision in Donoghue v Stevenson 
could have in this case. The “principle” extracted from the House of Lords case 
was that: 
 
You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you 
can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who 
then, in law, is my neighbour? The answer seems to be persons who are 
so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to 
have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing 
my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.
92 
Reference was also made to Le Lievre v Gould. The statement of law, by one of the 
judges in that case was repeated as ‘if one man is near to another, or is near to the 
property of another, a duty lies upon him not to do that which may cause a personal 
injury to that other, or may injure his property’. The judge in the present case, 
however, considered that statement of the law to be ‘inaccurate’.
93 
 
The judge returned to the quotation from Donoghue v Stevenson and stated that he 
considered that this ‘general proposition… is wider than is necessary’. He held that 
the House of Lords did not rule that the above proposition was part of the English 
law but only that ‘liability exists on the part of the manufacturer to a person who 
ultimately uses the goods which the manufacturer has sold’. That is, on the facts of 
Donoghue v Stevenson, ‘the consumer was in such a proximate relation to the 
manufacturer that legal relations resulted’. This proximity ‘rested on the fact that 
the manufacturer sent out his goods in such a container that no one could discover 
the defect until the consumer had begun to consume the ginger beer’. In other 
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words, liability existed because ‘[t]here was no opportunity of independent 
examination between the manufacturer and the consumer’.
94 
 
This analysis of Donoghue v Stevenson was reinforced by three lengthy quotations 
from that case. The second of the three is the most descriptive of the duty owed by 
manufacturers to the users of their products:
95 
 
It may be a good general rule to regard responsibility as ceasing when 
control ceases. So also where as between the manufacturer and the user 
there is interposed a party who has the means and opportunity of 
examining the manufacturer’s product before he reissues it to the actual 
user. But where, as in the present case, the article of consumption is so 
prepared as to be intended to reach the consumer in the condition in 
which it leaves the manufacturer and the manufacturer takes steps to 
ensure this by sealing or otherwise closing the container, so that the 
contents cannot be tampered with, I regard his control as remaining 
effective until the article reaches the consumer and the container is 
opened by him. The intervention of any exterior agency is intended to 
be excluded, and was in fact in the present case excluded.
96 
The statements of law from Donoghue v Stevenson were again summarised as 
being that ‘liability is rested upon no reasonable possibility of examination between 
the manufacturer and consumer’. Therefore, the first judge in the present case held 
that as ‘there was ample opportunity for intermediate examination before the 
deceased man met with his accident… the appeal must be dismissed in spite of the 
new view involved in the recent decision of the House of Lords’.
97 
 
The second judge reported agreed with the first. He distinguished the circumstances 
of the present case from those in Donoghue v Stevenson, holding that the 
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“principle” from the earlier case ‘was not intended to apply to a case like the 
present where the article (a crane) was supplied by the manufacturers in parts to be 
assembled by the purchasers before use’. The defect was ‘patent and discoverable, 
and was in fact discovered by the deceased’. The ‘fact that the cog-wheels did not 
fit must have brought home to the deceased… that there was something wrong with 
the crane, yet he took his chance of operating it without remedying the defect or 
testing the crane’. The judge agreed that this meant that the ‘appeal fails’.
98 
 
The third judge reported came ‘to the same conclusion’. He stated that the essence 
of the plaintiff’s claim was that ‘her husband had been killed by reason of a breach 
of duty by the defendants’. The judge accepted that the witnesses for the plaintiff 
‘gave evidence showing that the cog-wheels had not been trimmed to mesh 
properly, and that if the wheels had been trimmed to mesh properly when the crane 
was delivered to the purchasers this accident would not have happened’. The 
judgment then stated that the ‘question is whether that in law would justify a 
finding for the plaintiff’.
99 
 
The governing legal statement for this judge was that it is ‘common knowledge 
among lawyers that mere negligence in itself is not a cause of action. To give a 
cause there must be negligence which amounts to a breach of duty towards the 
person claiming’. The judge considered that the ‘decision of the majority of the 
House [in Donoghue v Stevenson] must be regarded as a reasonable interpretation 
of the law, but it was a very different case from that which we are concerned’. If 
the present case had involved a ‘machine defective in construction in a way that no 
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reasonable examination can be expected to discover’, then the judge conceded that 
Donoghue v Stevenson ‘may carry a decision in favour of a workman’. However, in 
the ‘present case the particular defect complained of was not only capable of 
discovery by reasonable inspection, but was in fact discovered at the hands of the 
unfortunate deceased man’. The judge repeated the following statement from 
Donoghue v Stevenson:
100  
 
[A] manufacturer of products which he sells in such a form as to 
show that he intends them to reach the ultimate consumer in the 
form in which he left him, with no reasonable possibility of 
intermediate examination, and with the knowledge that the absence 
of reasonable care in the preparation or putting up of the products is 
likely to result in injury to the consumer’s life or property, owes a 
duty to the consumer to take that reasonable care. 
This judge interpreted this to mean that ‘if the manufacturer had left a reasonable 
possibility of examination, either through an intermediate person or by its use, there 
would be no liability, because there would be no duty’. The judge saw as decisive 
the ‘point that there was no evidence that the accident was caused through any 
breach of duty towards the deceased by the manufacturers’.
101 
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Bolton and others v Stone
102 
STATEMENTS PRESENTED TO THE COURT 
 
This case was decided in the House of Lords after an appeal from the Court of 
Appeal in King’s Bench. The plaintiff was a pedestrian who was hit by a cricket 
ball when she was standing on a highway adjacent to a cricket ground. The ball was 
hit by a batsman during a match on the ground. The defendants were the committee 
and the members of the club. The club had existed since 1864, with the ground 
having been constructed in 1910. The pitch was not centrally located on the ground, 
with the boundary over which the shot in question was hit being ‘a few yards nearer 
the batsman’ than at the opposite end. At the point at which the ball left the field, 
the fence was ‘seven feet high but the upward slope of the ground was such that the 
top of the fence was some seventeen feet above the cricket pitch’. The fence was 
about seventy-eight yards from the striker and the spot where the plaintiff was hit 
was ‘just under 100 yards’ from the batsman.
103 
 
Evidence was given by a person living near the ground that ‘five or six times 
during the last few years he had known balls hit his house or come into the yard’. 
His evidence was considered ‘vague’, however. Club members ‘of twenty years 
standing or more agreed… that the hit was altogether exceptional in comparison 
with anything previously seen on that ground’. The trial court accepted their 
evidence that it was ‘only very rarely indeed that a ball was hit over the fence 
during a match’. One member could recall ‘no complaints of balls being hit into the 
road’ and another ‘estimated that balls had been hit into the road about six times in 
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twenty-eight years, but said that there had been no previous accident, so far as he 
knew’.
104 
 
The plaintiff ‘claimed damages in respect of injuries said to be caused by the 
defendants’ negligence’. This claim was founded on allegations that the defendants 
placed the cricket pitch too near to the road; failed to erect a fence of sufficient 
height and otherwise failed to ensure that cricket balls would not be hit onto the 
road. The trial court ‘acquitted the defendants of negligence’. On appeal, the Court 
of Appeal reversed the decision, holding ‘that the defendants were guilty of 
negligence and were liable in damages’.
105 
 
In the House of Lords appeal, counsel for the defendants argued that the issue was 
‘whether what the defendants should have foreseen and guarded against was not a 
bare possibility, but a reasonable probability’. They admitted that the ‘chance of a 
ball hitting a person on the highway was not a fantastically remote possibility but it 
was improbable’.
106 
 
Counsel for the defendants contended that the questions relating to the issue of 
negligence were ‘What standard of duty is owed by the occupiers of a ground on 
which a lawful game is played to persons using an adjacent highway? Were the 
defendants in breach of that duty? If so, was the injury caused by that breach?’ 
Counsel argued that, in terms of ‘the duty owed, the degree of care demanded 
varies with the risk involved’. The decision in Glasgow Corporation v Muir
107 was 
                                                 
104 Ibid at 852 
105 Id 
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put forward as evidence of this assertion. Counsel argued that in terms of risk, 
‘every person using the highway must, as a social animal, accept some risk from 
the lawful occupations of others’. Further, the ‘standard of care required in each 
case must be infinitely variable to meet all cases, and it should not be put too high’. 
In the circumstances of this case, counsel argued that it should be a ‘duty to guard 
against the ball being constantly hit out of the ground or against it being hit out of 
the ground by an ordinary stroke, but it is not necessary to provide against an 
extraordinary or exceptional stroke’.
108 This statement was put forward to 
distinguish another sporting ground case, Castle v St Augustine’s Links,
109 in which 
the plaintiff’s claim succeeded. 
 
Counsel for the plaintiff argued that when the ‘boundary was altered in 1910 it was 
the duty of the committee of the club to consider whether in all the circumstances 
their arrangements provided reasonable safety for persons on the highway’. In the 
game of cricket ‘[b]alls are not hit out of the ground accidentally. Players are 
encouraged to do so by being awarded six runs’. Counsel argued that the 
‘defendants were negligent in failing to take sufficient precautions to prevent the 
escape of cricket balls from the ground and the consequent injury of the plaintiff’. 
The few previous incidents involving balls being hit out of the ground, counsel 
contended, were sufficient to give the committee ‘warning that one might land in 
the road and that it was likely to cause injury to anyone standing there. Longer hits 
than the one in question have been known in cricket’.
110 
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Counsel also argued that the court of first instance ‘made no express finding that 
this was an exceptional hit. If even one ball went over there arose a duty of care to 
insure that no one was injured in the future’. It was admitted that the ‘cost of 
precautions is a relevant factor’ in considerations of safety, however, in this case, 
the ‘accident was very easy to avoid. If the wickets had been placed at the centre of 
the field… [t]he ball would not then have been hit onto the highway and the 
accident would not have occurred’.
111 
 
Counsel for the defendants were given the opportunity to reply to this assertion. 
They argued that it ‘was suggested that when one ball had crossed the fence there 
arose in the defendants a duty of care to insure. But one is in the realm of practical 
life and common sense’. The hit in question was said to be a ‘terrific’ one and the 
‘standard of care applicable is affected by the fact that it was wholly exceptional’. 
In terms of the game, counsel suggested, ‘the defendants were anxious to prevent 
the opposing team from hitting boundaries, and the hit was made by a visiting 
batsman’. The defendants ‘did not cause the ball to leave the ground’. As for the 
standard of care, the ‘matter is one of degree and fact and the standard must vary in 
relation to the place where the occurrence happened’.
112 
 
THE DECISION 
 
The House of Lords unanimously found for the defendants. The decision was 
delivered in five separate judgments. For the first judge reported, the central 
question was: ‘Is it enough to make an action negligent to say that its performance 
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may possibly cause injury, or must some greater probability exist of that result 
ensuing in order to make those responsible for its occurrence guilty of negligence?’ 
It was important to this judge that, in this case, the defendants did not carry out the 
act, but were ‘trustees of a field where cricket is played, are in control of it, and 
invite visiting teams to play there’. In this case, the question was: ‘What degree of 
care must they exercise to escape liability for anything which may occur as a result 
of this intended use of the field?’
113 
 
‘Undoubtedly’, according to the first judge, the defendants knew that a cricket ball 
being hit ‘out of the ground was an event which might occur and, therefore, that 
there was a conceivable possibility that someone would be hit by it. But so extreme 
an obligation of care cannot be imposed in all cases’. The judge then repeated 
statements concerning the legal conception of duty from preceding judgments. 
From the decision in Bourhill v Young,
114 the judge stated that  the ‘duty is to 
exercise “such reasonable care as will avoid the risk of injury to such persons as he 
can reasonably foresee might be injured by failure to exercise such reasonable 
care”.’ And he repeated the statement from Donoghue v Stevenson, that “you must 
take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee 
would be likely to injure your neighbour”. However, the judge qualified this duty 
with the statement that ‘it is not enough that the event should be such as can be 
reasonably foreseen; the further result that injury is likely to follow must also be 
such as a reasonable man would contemplate’. The ‘remote possibility of injury’ is 
not enough, ‘there must be sufficient probability to lead a reasonable man to 
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anticipate it. The existence of some risk is an ordinary incident of life, even when 
all due care has been, as it must be, taken’.
115 
 
The judge accepted the finding of the court of first instance ‘that a reasonable man 
would not anticipate that injury would be likely to result to any person as a result of 
cricket being played in the field in question’. In a finding of negligence the 
‘quantum of danger must always be a question of degree. It is not enough that there 
is a remote possibility that injury may occur: the question is, would a reasonable 
man anticipate it?’ As the ‘tribunal upon whom lies the duty of the finding of facts 
is the proper judge of whether he would or not’, the ‘appeal should be allowed’.
116 
 
The second judge reported stated that ‘it is not questioned that the occupier of the 
cricket ground owes a duty of care to persons on an adjacent highway or on 
neighbouring property… But it is necessary to consider the measure of the duty 
owed’. After discussing the finding of the lower courts, the judge stated that it ‘is 
not the law that precautions must be taken against every peril that can be foreseen 
by the timorous’. Past judgments, including Glasgow Corporation v Muir and 
Donoghue v Stevenson, were then discussed with the judge holding that it is ‘not 
enough… to say that the [defendants] could have foreseen the possibility that a ball 
might be hit out of the ground… [but] that they ought, as reasonable men, to have 
foreseen the probability of such an occurrence’.
117 
 
The judge then revisited, and accepted, the findings of fact of the court of first 
instance. He arrived at the conclusion that ‘the number of balls driven straight of 
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the ground… is so small as to be almost negligible, and the probability of a ball so 
struck hitting anyone in Beckenham Road is very slight’. The judge stated that the 
‘only practical way in which the possibility of danger could have been avoided 
would have been to stop playing cricket on this ground’ and held that the ‘appeal 
should be allowed’.
118 
 
The third judge reported agreed that the decision by the court of first instance 
should be restored. ‘The standard of care in the law of negligence is the standard of 
an ordinarily careful man, but… an ordinarily careful man does not take 
precautions against every foreseeable risk’. An ordinarily careful man,
119 in this 
judge’s view, can ‘foresee the possibility of many risks, but life would be almost 
impossible if he were to attempt to take precautions against every risk which he can 
foresee. He takes precautions against risks which are reasonably likely to happen’. 
Applying this to the present case, it was possible that ‘after this accident the 
ordinarily prudent committee man of a similar cricket ground would take some 
further precaution, but that is not to say that he would have taken a similar 
precaution before the accident’. After highlighting a case involving golf links, 
Castle v St Augustine’s Links, the judge held that the ‘owners and the committees’ 
of ‘cricket and golf courses and… the pedestrians who use the adjacent footpaths 
and highways’ treat the risks associated with balls driven out of such grounds as 
‘negligible’, therefore, ‘it is not… actionable negligence not to take precautions to 
avoid such risks’.
120  
                                                 
118 Ibid at 861-863 
119 The gendered nature of the articulation can also be seen as another manner in which the members 
of the legal profession, and in  particular the judges, “see” those who appear before them. As 
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120 [1951] AC 850 at 863 per Lord Oaksey  
 
344
 
The fourth judge reported stated that ‘it was readily foreseeable that an accident 
such as befell the [plaintiff] might possibly occur during one of the [defendants’] 
cricket matches’. In this situation, however, ‘the chance of a person ever being 
struck even in a long period of years was very small’. Therefore, he wrote, the 
question becomes ‘what is the duty and extent of the duty of a person who 
promotes on his land operations which may cause damage to persons on an 
adjoining highway’.
121 
 
The judge first repeated a statement from Blyth v Birmingham Water Works in 
which negligence was presented as ‘the omission to do something which a 
reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the 
conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and 
reasonable man would not do’.
122 The judge then repeated the statement of 
Donoghue v Stevenson “You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions 
which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour”.
123 
 
Statements from further judgments were quoted, including Bourhill v Young and 
Fardon v Harcourt-Rivington,
124 in part to show that the ‘law of Scotland does not 
differ in this matter from the law of England’. The statements repeated by this 
judge did not support the contention of the plaintiff that ‘as soon as one ball had 
been driven into the road in the ordinary course of a match, the [defendants] could 
and should have realised that that might happen again and that, if it did, someone 
might be injured’. Such a claim could only succeed if ‘the true test is foreseeability 
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alone’. As the ‘crowded conditions of modern life’ present many risks, the judge 
wrote, ‘the test to be applied here is whether the risk of damage to a person on the 
road was so small that a reasonable man in the position of the [defendants]… 
would have thought it right to refrain from taking steps to prevent the danger’.
125 
 
The judge stated that the court of first instance had decided that the ground ‘was 
large enough to be safe’. Based on this finding, which was a ‘question not of law 
but of fact and degree’, and after ‘much repeated and anxious consideration’, the 
judge found for the defendants, but added that ‘this case is not far from the 
borderline’. The decision would have gone the other way if the ‘risk here had been 
other than extremely small’. That the risk was extremely small meant that the 
‘appeal should be allowed’.
126 
 
The final judge reported agreed ‘with regret’ that the ‘appeal must be allowed’. He 
considered that it would not be ‘unfair’ for the defendants ‘to compensate the 
[plaintiff] for the serious injury that she has received as a result of the sport they 
have organised… But the law of negligence is concerned less with what is fair than 
with what is culpable’.
127 
 
If the duty owed by the defendants, the judge argued, was ‘to depend merely on the 
answer to the question whether this accident was a reasonably foreseeable risk… 
[then] there would have been a breach of duty’. But in this case, ‘there was only a 
remote… chance of the accident taking place at any particular time’. Given that 
fact, ‘a breach of duty has taken place if they show the [defendants] guilty of a 
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failure to take reasonable care to prevent the accident’. Reasonable care, according 
to this judge, means that ‘unless there has been something which a reasonable man 
would blame as falling beneath the standard of conduct that he would set for 
himself and require of his neighbour, there has been no breach of legal duty’. In the 
circumstances of this case, ‘a reasonable man, taking account of the chances against 
an accident happening, would not have felt himself called upon either to abandon 
the use of the ground for cricket or to increase the height of his surrounding 
fences’.
128 
                                                 
128 Ibid at 868-869  
 
347
 
Videan and Another v British Transport Commission
129 
STATEMENTS PRESENTED TO THE COURT 
 
This case was decided in the Court of Appeal of the Queen’s Bench Division. The 
appeal was based on the claim that the judge in the lower court ‘misdirected 
himself’
130 and misunderstood the duty owed to the plaintiffs by the defendants. 
 
There were two plaintiffs. The first was an infant who had been hit by a ‘power-
driven trolley’ that was passing through a train station. The second was his mother. 
She was acting as administratrix of the estate of her husband’s, the infant’s father, 
who had died trying to rescue his child. The plaintiffs were suing the British 
Transport Commission for negligence. The infant, then two, had ‘strayed from the 
station platform on to the track’. His father, the stationmaster at the station where 
the accident happened, was not on duty at the time of the accident. The defendants 
‘denied liability and claimed that, as the infant was a trespasser on the line, they 
owed him no duty of care’.
131 The driver, the defendant’s employee, was not joined 
as a party to the action.  
 
The court of first instance dismissed the claims of the plaintiffs. The judge found 
that if the driver had been ‘keeping a proper look-out he would have seen the boy 
before he saw the [stationmaster and porter]’. The regulation applicable to the 
conduct of the driver in the circumstances of the accident ‘provides that: “A power-
worked trolley… must not be allowed to exceed a speed of 30 miles per hour… 
Stations, signal-boxes and catch points must be approached with care…”’. The 
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judge found that, if the driver had been ‘driving at a reasonable speed’ for the 
conditions, he ‘would have slowed down quicker after seeing the men and perhaps 
would have been driving more slowly before seeing them’. And if the driver 
‘should have applied his brake hard before he did and so would probably have 
avoided running down the boy and his father’.
132 
 
The conclusion of the court of first instance was that the driver ‘failed to approach 
this station with the reasonable care that an experienced trolley-driver should have 
taken and that if he had taken reasonable care, the injury to the infant plaintiff and 
the death of his father would probably have been prevented’. The court, however, 
failed to find ‘any negligence on the part of any other servant of the defendants’, 
but did find that ‘the infant plaintiff was a trespasser upon the line when he was 
struck’. The ‘submission that carelessness of the… [driver] is a breach of duty to 
this trespasser’ was rejected, as was ‘the submission that the defendants and their 
servant owed the dead man a duty of reasonable care distinct from and more 
stringent than the duty they owed his son…’.
133 
 
Counsel for the plaintiffs in the Court of Appeal began by arguing against the 
assumption that the infant was a trespasser.
134 It was contended that ‘the duty owed 
to him by the [defendants] was that of occupiers of land on which current 
operations were being carried on, and that is the duty to take reasonable care not to 
injure their “neighbour”’. Counsel highlighted one of the judgments from 
Donoghue v Stevenson in this context. This is the same duty as is owed to a 
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‘licensee or invitee, though the facts which would amount to a breach of the duty 
might be different and a question of degree’.
135  
 
The judge in the court of first instance considered that ‘there must be some element 
of wilful or reckless disregard in order to constitute a breach of duty’. On appeal, 
counsel for the plaintiffs stated that this was a ‘statement’ relating to the duty of the 
occupier in relation to the static condition of the land’. Counsel argued that the 
defendants owed ‘the duty of a contractor, not being the occupier’. A previous 
decision, Excelsior Wire v Callan,
136 was argued to be one in which the ‘House of 
Lords held that there was a duty owed by contractors who carried on activities on 
the land to trespassing children whose presence ought to have been foreseen’.
137 
 
Counsel then argued that ‘whatever may be the duty of the commission as 
occupiers, the duty of the trolley-driver, in relation to people whom he might 
reasonably expect to be around the station, was to take reasonable care, having 
regard to all the circumstances’. Counsel acknowledged that the judge in the court 
of first instance had ‘found that the driver did not take reasonable care but that he 
was not liable because his carelessness fell short of wilful or reckless disregard of 
the possible presence of a trespasser’. If the driver had been sued alone, however, 
he could not have pleaded that the infant was a trespasser as the driver was not the 
occupier of the land. Counsel argued that the ‘driver was guilty of reckless 
disregard of the boy’s possible presence… he was therefore in breach of the duty 
owed to the trespasser, so that the commission are vicariously liable’.
138 
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Counsel then discussed the issue of whether the infant was a trespasser. The boy 
‘had not come from outside on to the commission’s land but started there lawfully 
and only strayed a very short distance beyond his licence’. The defendants had 
provided a house in the station precincts for the stationmaster and his family. ‘It 
would be going too far to say that a small child who had wandered only a few feet 
beyond the point to which he had a right to go would be converted automatically 
into a trespasser’.
139 
 
As to the ‘claim of the widow and the duty owed to the father’, the court 
‘misdirected’ itself, ‘for the defendants owed him a duty of reasonable care distinct 
from that owed to the child’. Referring to precedents, including Bourhill v Young, 
counsel argued that the ‘right of the rescuer is not dependent on a breach by the 
defendant of a legal duty to someone else’. Applying this to the present 
circumstances, ‘the trolley driver did not have to foresee the precise form which the 
emergency caused by his bad driving might take’.
140 
 
Counsel for the defendants argued that, despite the initial conduct of the driver, 
‘once he became aware of the child’s presence on the line, [he did] everything in 
his power to prevent the tragedy’.
141 Therefore, this ‘eliminates any question of 
reckless disregard of the presence of someone whom he knew or ought reasonably 
to have anticipated being there’. As the infant was a trespasser, counsel claimed, 
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with reference to Addie v Dumbreck,
142 that there ‘was no negligence of the quality 
required to constitute a breach of duty to this trespassing child’.
143 
 
Counsel for the defendants also rejected two submissions by the opposing counsel 
relating to the duty owed by the driver. Counsel for the defendants first addressed 
the issue of vicarious liability. The ‘driver was not in breach of any duty owed to 
the child whose presence could not have been foreseen’. That is, the child was not 
the “neighbour” of the driver and, therefore, the defendants are ‘not vicariously 
liable’. Counsel then discussed the driver’s relationship with the father. Counsel 
contended that, as the driver had no reason to foresee the presence of a trespasser, 
‘then a fortiori he had no reason to anticipate the presence of a rescuer, and the 
rescuer was therefore not his “neighbour” in the Donoghue v Stevenson sense’.
144 
 
THE DECISION 
 
The Court found for the defendants in respect of the appeal on behalf of the child, 
but found for the plaintiff in respect of the appeal on behalf of the father. The 
decision was given in three separate judgments. The first legal question addressed 
in the first judgment reported was as to whether the infant was a trespasser at the 
time of the accident, ‘as much of the law depends on it’. That is, if ‘he was lawfully 
present, the occupier owes him the common duty of care’. The argument that the 
child’s straying of a few yards was insufficient to render him a trespasser was 
                                                 
142 [1929] AC 358. This decision will be discussed more in the next case in this application of the 
archaeological method. 
143 [1963] 2 QB 650 at 657-658 
144 Ibid at 659  
 
352
 
rejected on the basis of a number of precedents. As ‘he went beyond the bounds of 
any licence that he had’, the judge held, he was a trespasser.
145 
 
The judge then addressed, as a matter of “settled” law, the duty of care owed to a 
trespasser by an occupier of land. ‘It has commonly been supposed that the 
occupier of land owes no duty towards a trespasser to care for his protection’. The 
judge repeated a statement from Addie v Dumbreck to justify this position. 
However, he continued, as many trespassers are ‘innocent of any wicked intent’, 
the courts ‘have time and again turned a trespasser into a licensee so as to give him 
a remedy for negligence when otherwise he would have none’. More recently, a 
‘new way has been found to mitigate the harshness of the old rule about 
trespassers’. It has been considered that the old rule ‘only applies when it is sought 
to make the occupier liable, as occupier, for the condition of his premises’. 
However, the occupier’s ‘duty towards his neighbour to conduct his activities with 
reasonable care’ remains ‘untouched’. Therefore, ‘he may be liable as neighbour 
for negligence when he would not be liable as occupier’.
146 
 
The judge then considered various precedents, including Donoghue v Stevenson, 
Bourhill v Young, Excelsior Wire v Callan, Addie v Dumbreck and Lynch v Nurdin, 
and stated that the ‘true principle’ that applies in this situation is that ‘the duty to 
use reasonable care extends to all persons lawfully on the land, but does not extend 
to trespassers, for the simple reason that he cannot ordinarily be expected to foresee 
the presence of a trespasser’. In certain situations, however, the occupier of the land 
‘ought to foresee even the presence of a trespasser… Once he foresees their 
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presence, he owes them the common duty of care, no more and no less’. There were 
several criteria, in this judge’s view, that have to be considered in the application of 
this ‘simple test’. These include ‘the gravity and likelihood of the probable injury… 
the character of the intrusion by the trespasser… the nature of the place where the 
trespass occurs… [and] the knowledge which the defendant has, or ought to have, 
of the likelihood of trespassers being present’. In addition, that judge stated that this 
test ‘applies only where an occupier or a contractor or anyone else conducts 
activities on land’.
147 
 
The judge then applied these legal statements to the present case. In terms of the 
actions of the defendants, ‘they were carrying on the simple operation of driving a 
trolley along a railway line. The railway line was not open to the public. It was 
prohibited to everyone except such person as a porter or platelayer on his lawful 
occasions’. On this basis, the judge held that it ‘could not reasonably be foreseen 
that a trespasser would be there. Not even a child trespasser could be foreseen, for 
there is no evidence that children were in the habit of trespassing there at all’. In 
particular, the driver ‘could not reasonably be expected to foresee that a child was 
there… therefore… the child’s claim fails’.
148 
 
The judge then turned ‘to the widow’s claim in respect of the death of her 
husband’. For it to succeed, she must demonstrate that the driver ‘owed a duty of 
care to the stationmaster, that he broke that duty, and that, in consequence of the 
breach, the stationmaster was killed’. After considering two cases that discussed 
liability toward rescuers, Haynes v Harwood
149 and Baker v Hopkins,
150 the judge 
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stated that the ‘right of the rescuer is an independent right and is not derived from 
that of the victim’. Foreseeability was still a ‘necessary’ factor, ‘but not [the] 
foreseeability of the particular emergency that arose’.
 151  
 
In this case, the driver ‘ought reasonably to foresee that, if he did not take care, 
some emergency or other might arise, and that someone or other might be impelled 
to expose himself to danger in order to effect a rescue’. This judge stated that ‘if a 
person by his fault creates a situation of peril, he must answer for it to any person 
who attempts to rescue the person who is in danger…’ That is, ‘so long as it is not 
wanton interference… the rescuer… can recover damages from the one whose fault 
has been the cause of it’. Therefore, the first judge ‘would allow the appeal of the 
widow and dismiss the claim of the child’.
152 
 
The second judge reported stated that ‘so far as the facts of this case are known, 
there does not seem… to be any relevant dispute about them’. Therefore, the ‘first 
question to be answered is whether the boy on the line was a trespasser’. In this 
judge’s view, ‘the boy undoubtedly was a trespasser… [as there is] no trace of any 
invitation or permission to him to cross the line’. After discussing precedents 
relating to the issue of children and licences, including Jenkins v Great Western 
Railway,
153 Cooke v Midland Great Western Railway
154 and Latham v Johnson, and 
repeating extensive statements of law from them, the judge held that the 
                                                                                                                                        
150 [1959] 1 WLR 966. These two cases were referred to in argument by counsel for the plaintiffs. 
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‘investigation, therefore, must start from the premise that the child was not lawfully 
upon the line, but a trespasser’.
155 
 
Precedents, ‘however, do show that there may be a duty even to trespassing 
children in some circumstances’. This is important as ‘negligence in law involves a 
duty’. Duties to trespassers have been found where the presence of a trespasser is 
known, or where their ‘presence… may be probable or suspected’. This statement 
was emphasised through the use of statements from earlier cases, including 
Excelsior Wire v Callan, Addie v Dumbreck and Bourhill v Young. Therefore, for 
this judge, this case ‘seems to turn on whether it was reasonably foreseeable by the 
driver that the child would be on the line’. On the facts of the case, the driver ‘had 
no reason to suppose the child would be there. If that be so, he owed the child no 
duty because his presence there was not reasonably foreseeable: if so, his 
carelessness does not amount to negligence in law’.
156 
 
The judge then considered the claim relating to the father’s death. The argument 
that the ‘father could not be in a better position than his son’ was not accepted. As 
power-driven trolleys did not run to a strict schedule, ‘with no stated times and no 
warning of their approach’, their drivers ‘must approach stations with care’. That is, 
‘they must take care that there are no persons on the line, more especially railway 
servants engaged in maintenance and like duties. One of these servants was the 
dead stationmaster’. A child on the line could have been that of a passenger and it 
‘would clearly be within the scope of the stationmaster’s employment to take all 
steps to rescue such a child’. In terms of foreseeability, it is ‘not necessary that the 
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exact event should be foreseeable. The presence of the stationmaster… on the track 
was within the sphere of contemplation’. As a result, ‘though the child’s action 
fails, the father’s succeeds, and the appeal should be allowed to that extent’.
157 
 
The third judge reported first laid out the findings of fact from the court of first 
instance that ‘were fully justified by the evidence and should be accepted’. These 
included the finding, that the trolley driver was ‘negligent in three respects… he 
was driving too fast… he was not keeping a sufficiently careful look-out… he did 
not respond sufficiently to the attempts of the stationmaster and the porter to 
communicate with him by hand signals’. The last fact that the third judge accepted 
was that neither the driver ‘nor anybody else acted in reckless disregard of the 
presence of the infant plaintiff’. Therefore, ‘prima facie on those facts the 
[defendants] had no liability to the infant plaintiff… did not owe him any ordinary 
duty of care, and… did not act with reckless disregard of his safety’. This statement 
was supported with reference to Addie v Dumbreck.
158 
 
The judge then engaged with the arguments of counsel and considered statements 
of the law as it related to the duty owed to trespassers, including those from 
Bourhill v Young. As the ‘presence and movements’ of trespassers are 
‘unpredictable’, they are ‘not within the zone of reasonable contemplation and he is 
not a “neighbour” to the occupier or to any other person working or present on the 
land, and no precautions can reasonably be required to be taken’ to protect the 
trespasser’s safety. The judge then repeated a statement from Bolton v Stone: ‘The 
quantum of danger must always be a question of degree. It is not enough that there 
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is a remote possibility that injury may occur: the question is, would a reasonable 
man anticipate it?’ Other precedents were cited to emphasise the ‘unforeseeability 
of trespassing’. There is also the possibility, according to this judge, that ‘the 
presence of the trespasser is known to, or reasonably to be anticipated by, the 
person concerned’. In that case, that person still owes some duty of care to the 
trespasser’, as the ‘trespasser is a neighbour, though an underprivileged neighbour’. 
Such a duty, however, ‘is radically different from the duty of care owing to a lawful 
visitor’.
159 
 
Therefore, there are ‘two principles governing liability to trespassers’. First, if ‘the 
person concerned does not know of or have good reason to anticipate the presence 
of the trespasser, that person owes him no duty of care’. Second, if ‘the person 
concerned knows of or has good reason to anticipate the presence of the trespasser, 
that person owes… a duty of care which is substantially less than the duty of care 
which is owing to the lawful visitor’. This lesser duty is ‘only a duty to treat him 
with common humanity and not a duty to make the land and operations thereon 
safe for the trespasser in his trespassing’. The judge held that as the infant was a 
trespasser, ‘it is quite clear that… up to a late stage of this tragic incident nobody 
knew or had reason to anticipate the presence of the infant plaintiff’. This assertion 
was supported by a statement repeated from Addie v Dumbreck. The judge also 
found that ‘there was not at any stage any reckless disregard of his presence, or any 
conduct showing lack of common humanity’. On these bases, the judge affirmed 
the decision of the court of first instance ‘in respect of the claim of the infant 
plaintiff’.
160 
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The judge then turned to the appeal of ‘the widow, who claims damages for the 
death of her husband’. The judge held that the driver ‘in his approach to the station 
was acting negligently in relation to anyone to whom he owed a duty of care’. The 
issue then, was whether the driver ‘owed any relevant duty of care to the deceased’. 
The court of first instance ‘evidently accepted… that the position of the rescuer 
could not be any better than the position of the person rescued’. However, in this 
judge’s view, ‘the deceased was the stationmaster, having a general responsibility 
for dealing with any emergency that might arise at the station’. Therefore, it ‘was 
foreseeable’ on the part of the driver ‘that if he drove his vehicle carelessly into the 
station he might imperil the stationmaster, as the stationmaster might well have 
some proper occasion for going on the track in the performance of his duties’. On 
this basis, the driver’s ‘careless approach to the station was a breach of a duty 
owing by him to the deceased as stationmaster, and it caused the accident, and 
consequently, [the defendants are] liable to the widow and her appeal should be 
allowed’.
161 
                                                 
161 Ibid at 682-683  
 
359
 
British Railways Board v Herrington
162 
STATEMENTS PRESENTED TO THE COURT 
 
This case was an appeal to the House of Lords from a decision of the Court of 
Appeal. Much of the discussion of the judges relates, in this construction, to the 
great reluctance of the Lords to refuse to repeat statements of a previous decision of 
the House of Lords.
163 
 
The defendants were ‘the owners of a single line electrified railway’ in Surrey. One 
segment of this line ran between two National Trust properties. These properties 
were open to the public and were fenced off from the railway. One section of the 
‘fencing had become detached from one of the concrete posts and had been pressed 
down so that its top curved down to within ten inches from the ground’. It was held 
by the court of first instance that the ‘fence at this point had been in that condition 
for at least several weeks and probably for months and that people were using the 
route as a short cut’.
164 
 
The plaintiff was a six year old boy who was playing with his two older brothers on 
one of the National Trust properties. He was ‘found to be missing… [and] was 
shortly afterwards discovered lying on the electrified rail opposite the point where 
the fence was broken down’. Further evidence indicated that the ‘mother did not 
                                                 
162 [1972] AC 877, [1972] 1 All ER 749, [1972] 2 WLR 537, 116 Sol Jo 178 
163 That decision was Robert Addie v Dumbreck [1929] AC 358, which was on appeal from the 
Scottish courts. In that case, a four year old boy was crushed by a wheel that was part of a haulage 
system at a colliery. The wheel was situated in a field that was protected by a hedge, but the field 
was still frequently used by children as a playground. The colliery staff were aware of this. When 
the accident occurred, however, none of the colliery employees had checked to ensure that there 
were no children in the vicinity when the wheel was set in motion. 
164 [1972] AC 877 at 881  
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know that her children were going’ to that property that day and ‘that she had 
warned all her children never to go on the railway line and that the two older 
brothers understood the warning’. There was also evidence from the ‘stationmaster 
at Mitcham Junction that… some seven weeks previous to the accident, children 
had been seen at some unspecified part of the line between Mitcham and Morden 
Road Halt’.
165 
 
Before the House of Lords, counsel for the defendants argued that there was ‘no 
question of “allurement” and no doubt that the [plaintiff] had no right to be on the 
land and [had] no implied licence’.
166 The child was a trespasser ‘for his own 
purposes and has been injured through something which was lawfully on the 
[defendant’s] land’. Precedents, including Addie v Dumbreck, Latham v Johnson, 
Cooke v Midland Great Western Railway and Excelsior Wire v Callan, were cited 
that showed that the ‘nature of the duty owed by an occupier of premises towards 
the trespassers, including infants, has been settled’. The court of first instance held 
that as ‘the stationmaster had been told that children had been seen on the line, that 
that should have alerted the [defendants] to the possible presence of child 
trespassers and that the failure to repair the fence was a breach of duty’. Such a 
“principle”, according to the defendants’ counsel, gives rise to the ‘startling 
proposition that if a landowner hears that children have trespassed on his land and 
there is anything on the land that might harm them, he must either keep them out or 
box in the dangerous thing’.
167 
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Counsel for the defendants argued that if ‘the law limits the landowner’s duty 
towards a trespasser, it would be strange if it imposed a more onerous duty on him 
to prevent a person from becoming a trespasser by keeping him out’. Precedents 
were cited, including Slater v Clay Cross,
168 in support of the claim that a 
‘trespasser has no cause of action for the negligent activities of the occupier’. It was 
suggested that Parliament had ‘declined to alter the law with regard to trespassers 
and had trespassers in mind at the time’. In terms of public policy, counsel argued 
that, if ‘the standard of care towards trespassers whom the landowner knew were 
likely to be on the premises was that of reasonable care based on reasonable 
foresight, then when the risk of injury was substantial, grave and expensive 
preventive steps might be required’. Such a new position, counsel contended, 
‘should not be imposed by a judicial body’.
169  
 
Counsel for the plaintiff argued that ‘this branch of law’ is in ‘an unsatisfactory 
state’.
170 Counsel offered four possible judicial solutions,
171 with the correct one, in 
their opinion, being the acceptance of the ‘formulation which commended itself to 
the Court of Appeal in the present case, holding that a duty arises if the occupier 
could reasonably have foreseen the trespassers presence’. Statements from Videan v 
British Transport Commission were used to support this statement of the law.
172 
 
Applying that formulation to the current circumstances, counsel argued ‘it was 
enough to establish that the open spaces lay on either side of the railway line, that, 
                                                 
168 [1956] 2 KB 264 
169 [1972] AC 877 at 883-885 
170 Counsel for the plaintiff were Hunter QC and Chambers. 
171 Counsel put forward a number of precedents as justifications for each of the four solutions. The 
decisions cited included Lynch v Nurdin,  Heaven v Pender,  Cooke v Great Western Railway, 
Excelsior Wire v Callan and Glasgow Corporation v Muir. 
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by reasonable inference, children would go there and, by actual knowledge, that 
some children at some time had come there’. The duty applicable ‘in such a case, is 
measured by the nature of the peril but it may be discharged either by a warning 
notice, by exclusion or by removal of the danger’. And further, the ‘duty must be 
proportionate to the danger and must correspond to the conduct of the reasonable 
man in all the circumstances. The duty is only to take reasonable steps’. In this 
case, a ‘notice would be a sufficient warning to an adult, but not to a child’. And as 
the ‘only possible inference from the facts proved was that for months the public 
had been crossing the railway. The court can infer complete indifference on the part 
of the [defendants]. Since nothing was done by them for months, the inference of 
gross negligence was very easy’.
173 
 
Counsel summarised their position with respect to the responsibilities of the 
defendants and argued that the standard ‘of the reasonable man would not pose an 
intolerable burden on landowners’. In general, counsel contended, the ‘concept of 
reasonable foreseeability rests on the creation of an acute danger on land in 
physical proximity to a place where people normally go, so that a duty of care 
arises’, as it does in this case.
174 
 
THE DECISION 
 
The House of Lords unanimously dismissed the appeal, with the decision being 
delivered in five separate judgments. Once again, these judgments will be 
examined in turn. The first judge reported briefly recounted the facts and then 
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stated that ‘if the [defendants] owed to potential child trespassers any duty of care 
to take steps for their safety, they were in breach of any such duty’. However, it 
was the defendants’ counsel’s ‘main contention… that [the defendants] owed no 
duty to this child’. This claim was based on the precedent, Addie v Dumbreck, in 
which occurred the statement that ‘no occupier is under any duty to potential 
trespassers, whether adults or children, to do anything to protect them from any 
danger on his land, however likely it may be that they will come and run into 
danger and however lethal the danger may be’.
175 
 
The judge considered various precedents, including Excelsior Wire v Callan, 
Mourton v Poulter
176 and Edwards v Railway Executive,
177 which either applied 
similar statements to those in Addie v Dumbreck, or distinguished that case. In one 
such precedent, close in its facts to the present one, it was held that ‘persistent 
trespassing by children imposed no duty on the railway to keep them out or protect 
them’. The judge also considered Videan v British Transport Commission, and he 
placed emphasis on the statement: 
 
the true principle is this: In the ordinary way the duty to use reasonable 
care extends to all persons lawfully on the land, but it does not extend 
to trespassers… But the circumstances may be such that he ought to 
foresee even the presence of a trespasser: and then the duty of care 
extends to the trespasser also. 
According to this judge, this test of foreseeability provided a ‘new view’ on the 
legal issue. It specifically went against Addie v Dumbreck where the House held 
that there was no duty even though ‘the presence of children was not only 
foreseeable, it was very probable’. This “new view” meant that ‘no satisfactory 
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solution can be found without a re-examination of the whole problem and a 
reconsideration by this House of its decision in Addie’s case’.
178 
 
This judge suggested that ‘child trespassers have for a very long time presented to 
the courts an almost insoluble problem’. Only two methods can ‘completely 
safeguard’ them, in his view. Parents ‘must be required always to control… their 
young children, or occupiers of premises where they are likely to trespass must be 
required to take effective steps to keep them out or else to make their premises safe 
for them’. These methods, he argued, are not ‘practicable’. In his view, ‘legal 
solutions cannot solve the problem. How far occupiers are to be required by law to 
take steps to safeguard such children must be a matter of public policy’. The 
decision in Addie v Dumbreck was arguably made as ‘good public policy’ then, but 
it would be ‘unarguable today’. The judge then expressed a ‘dislike’ for the 
possibility of usurping the functions of Parliament’ with such a foray into public 
policy.
179 
 
In terms of a legal solution, the ‘first matter to be determined is the nature of the 
duty owed by occupiers to trespassers’. Addie v Dumbreck contained the statement 
that there was a ‘duty not to act recklessly’, and that this duty was a ‘humanitarian’ 
one.  
If a person chooses to assume a relationship with members of the 
public… the law requires him to conduct himself as a reasonable man 
with adequate skill, knowledge and resources would do. He will not be 
heard to say that in fact he could not attain that standard. If he cannot 
attain that standard he ought not to assume the responsibility which that 
relationship involves. 
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However, ‘an occupier does not voluntarily assume a relationship with trespassers. 
By trespassing they force a “neighbour” relationship on him. When they do so, he 
must act in a humane manner’, there is no reason ‘why he should be required to do 
more’. Therefore, in this judge’s view, ‘an occupier’s duty to trespassers must vary 
according to his knowledge, ability and resources’. Trespassers, instead of taking 
‘the land as they find it’, should ‘take the occupier as they find him’.
180 
 
The judge then made the following statement intended to summarise the “principle” 
that applied here: 
 
So the question whether an occupier is liable in respect of an accident 
to a trespasser on his land would depend on whether a conscientious 
humane man with his knowledge, skill and resources could reasonably 
have been expected to have done or refrained from doing before the 
accident something which would have avoided it. If he knew before the 
accident that there was a substantial probability that trespassers would 
come… most people would regard as culpable failure to give any 
thought to their safety. He might often reasonably think, weighing the 
seriousness of the danger and the degree of likelihood of trespassers 
coming against the burden he would have to incur in preventing their 
entry or making his premises safe, or curtailing his own activities on his 
own land, that he could not fairly be expected to do anything. But if he 
could at small trouble and expense take some effective action… most 
people would think it inhumane and culpable not to do that. 
Applying this “test” to the present case, the judge considered the defendants ‘must 
be held responsible for this accident’. For the facts showed that the defendants 
‘brought onto their land… a lethal and to a young child a concealed danger. It 
would have been easy for them to have and enforce a reasonable system of 
inspection and repair of their boundary fence… Yet they did nothing’. Therefore, 
the defendants are ‘liable’ and the appeal should be dismissed.
181 
 
                                                 
180 Ibid at 898-899 
181 Ibid at 899-900  
 
366
 
The second judge reported suggested that if the facts of the case were ‘put to any 
well-disposed but fair-minded member of the public… [then] the response guided 
by the promptings of common sense would be that having regard to the dangerous 
nature of the live rail… the railways board were grievously at fault’. It was then a 
‘matter of regret and of concern if the answer of law does not accord with the 
answer that common sense would suggest’.
182 
 
The defendants claimed, according to the judge, that ‘the law must refuse the 
infant’s claim. In effect they say he was a legal outcast. In short he was a 
trespasser’. A statement from the decision in Addie v Dumbreck, adopted by 
counsel for the defendants, was repeated: ‘there must be some act done with the 
deliberate intention of doing harm to the trespasser, or at least some act done with 
reckless disregard of the presence of the trespasser’. This was repeated by the judge 
in the present case as a claim that ‘an occupier is only liable to a trespasser where 
the injury is due to some wilful act involving something more than the absence of 
reasonable care’. This judge presented counsel for the defendants as arguing that 
‘there was no wilful act done against the infant: the railways board did not know of 
his presence and did nothing in disregard of his presence’.
183 
 
The second judge stressed the differences in the facts of the present case and those 
in Addie v Dumbreck. This was accompanied by a warning that there ‘is always 
peril in treating the words of a… judgment as though they were words in a 
legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made 
in the setting of the facts of a particular case’. The question then became whether or 
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not the House ‘should depart… from what was laid down in Addie’s case or 
whether in the light of developments in the law since 1929 there are some 
modifications which permissibly can be accepted’.
184 
 
The judge considered the history of the relationship between occupiers of land and 
trespassers. It was noted that in the nineteenth century spring guns were used to 
protect property, however, it was also noted that ‘the duty to warn was recognised’ 
by the courts. One earlier judgment, Adams v Naylor,
185 was referred to in which 
the judge ‘saw no reason in principle why an occupier should not be called on to 
take all reasonable precautions to keep trespassing children out of a place where he 
knows they will be blown up’. In an 1820 judgment, Ilott v Wilkes,
186 it was also 
recognised that ‘there may be circumstances in which there is a duty to prevent 
injury to a trespasser… even inaction, when humanitarian impulses would prompt 
action, might amount to a breach of a duty owed to a trespasser’. The judge found 
similarities between the use of spring guns and the live rail in the current case, as 
both situations contained circumstances of ‘expected or foreseen’ trespassers and 
the possibility of injury to such people. ‘If humanity is to be a guide should it not 
operate to lessen the risk of foreseeable injury from a danger which has been 
created even though such injury is not intended?’
187 
 
This judge noted that it is ‘basic’ to current ‘legal thinking that every member of 
the community must have regard to the effect upon others of his actions or his 
inactions’. Based on ‘reasons of common sense and common humanity… a duty is 
                                                 
184 Ibid at 902-903 
185 [1944] KB 750 
186 (1820) 3 B & Ald 304 
187 [1972] AC 877 at 904-906  
 
368
 
owed by an occupier of land to potential trespassers as well as to actual trespassers 
of whom he is positively aware’. The decision in Videan v British Transport 
Commission was used as evidence on this point. On the facts of the current case, 
‘taking ordinary thought and exercising “common sense and ordinary intelligence” 
– even apart from the guidance of common humanity’, the judge considered that 
the defendants ‘would see’ that ‘there was a likelihood that some child might pass 
over the broken down fence and get on to the track with its live rail and be in peril 
of serious injury’.
188 
 
The following statement from Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks was repeated as the 
definition of negligence: ‘the omission to do something which a reasonable man, 
guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human 
affairs, would do, or do something which a prudent and reasonable man would not 
do’. The judge then suggested that ‘in a civilised community [the] need to take 
thought as to the result of acts or omissions has long been recognised’. He then 
repeated the following statement from Heaven v Pender: 
whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with 
regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who did think would 
at once recognise that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his 
own conduct with regard to those circumstances he would cause danger 
of injury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use 
ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger. 
The judge then referred to other cases, including Donoghue v Stevenson and Dorset 
Yacht v Home Office,
189 before going on to say that in the present case, ‘it is 
abundantly clear that the railways board, if they had taken thought, must have 
realised that if they allowed the fence to be broken down... there was a considerable 
risk that a small child would pass through it’. As the child was a trespasser, ‘it 
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cannot be said that the railways board owed a common duty of care to the young 
boy… they did owe to him at least the duty of acting with common humanity 
towards him’.
190 
 
Such a duty ‘was a limited one. There was no duty to ensure that no trespasser 
could enter upon the land. And certainly an occupier owes no duty to make his land 
fit for trespassers to trespass in’. The law, based in part on a reference to Videan v 
British Transport Commission and statements from Commissioner for Railways 
(NSW) v Cardy,
191 in this judge’s opinion, still considers that ‘one who trespasses 
does so at his peril’. Yet, here there ‘were a number of special circumstances’ and, 
because of those, there was a ‘duty which, while not amounting to the duty of care 
which an occupier owes to a visitor, would be a duty to take such steps as common 
sense or common humanity would dictate’. Such steps would be ‘to exclude or to 
warn or otherwise within reasonable and practicable limits to reduce or avert 
danger’. This judge found that ‘the plaintiff was entitled to recover… [and] would 
dismiss the appeal’.
192 
 
The third judge reported summed up the circumstances of the case as a ‘boy was 
trespassing on the railway… [and] was severely injured. There was no allurement 
onto the defendant’s land; there is no basis… by which the child can be treated as a 
licensee’. In terms of the actions of the defendants, ‘there was no wilful intention to 
injure’ the child ‘nor reckless disregard of his presence. At most there was a lack of 
care by the board as regards the maintenance of its fences’.
193 
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As there is in England no ‘general law as to public enterprise liability… if the 
plaintiff is to recover, he must rely on our outdated law of fault liability which 
involves the need to establish a duty of care towards him and breach of it’. For this 
judge, however, Addie v Dumbreck represented a ‘formidable’ obstacle. That case 
has to be ‘considered in a context, the context of previous and subsequent cases of 
common law, and the context of bordering but not identical typical situations’. The 
House is here presented with ‘a cry that this case as a statement of law must be 
overruled’.
194 
 
The rules in Addie v Dumbreck ‘were expressive of certain consequences as regards 
proximity and foreseeability which flow from the given relationship (occupier and 
invitee-licensee-trespasser)’. This meant ‘that the law can, particularly take into 
account other relevant factors, if they exist, which bear upon these matters of 
foresight and prudence’. The law already recognised modifications of the rules in 
Addie v Dumbreck, such as the doctrines of allurements, pitfalls and the positions 
of ‘contractors carrying out work on the land’. The judge then considered several 
Australian cases in depth for ‘valuable guidance in the search for a modern 
definition, or at least outline, of the duty of care which may be owed to trespassers 
in cases such as the present’.
195 
 
The judge held, again with reference to Videan v British Transport Commission, 
that in general, ‘an occupier of land owes no duty to trespassers, or intending 
trespassers: he is not obliged to make his land safe for their trespassing’. However, 
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if ‘he knows, or “as good as knows”, of the actual presence of a trespasser, he is 
under a duty – as defined in Addie’s case - not to act with the deliberate intention of 
doing harm to him or to act with reckless disregard of his presence’. But, the judge 
contended, there is ‘no reason to discard the alternative test of “extremely likely” in 
relation to the trespasser’s presence… it excludes necessarily any lower duty of 
foreseeability in the general case by an occupier of trespassers’ presence’.
196 
 
For this judge, ‘the question remains whether, in particular circumstances, a man 
may be under some duty of a particular kind, other than to abstain from wilful 
injury, or reckless disregard’. In general, an ‘occupier is not under any general duty 
to foresee the possibility or likelihood of trespass on his land, or to carry out 
inspection to see whether trespass is occurring or likely. To suppose otherwise 
would impose impossible burdens’. Further, an ‘occupier is under no general duty 
to fence his land against trespassers, or even child trespassers’. To these 
generalities there were exceptions, such as the doctrine of allurements, which could 
be seen as imposing a ‘duty to take reasonable steps not to place in the way of 
small children potentially hurtful and attractive objects’.
197 
 
‘In the particular case of railway companies’, the judge added, ‘there is no general 
duty to erect or maintain fences sufficient to exclude adults or children… the only 
duty is to mark off railway property’. However, the judge continued, the courts 
must ‘take account of the placing of electrical conductors above or on the ground 
all over our overcrowded island’. This may affect the requirements of ‘foresight 
and care’. Any variations in a duty ‘must stem from the inevitable proximity to 
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places of access… from the continuous nature of the danger, from the lethal danger 
of contact and from the fact that to children the danger may not be apparent’. There 
still can be ‘no duty to make the place safe, but a duty does arise because of the 
existence, near to the public, of a dangerous situation. The greater the proximity, 
the greater the risk, and correspondingly the need of foresight and a duty of care’. 
When considering such a duty, the judge stated, ‘it must be remembered that we are 
concerned with trespassers, and a compromise must be reached between the 
demands of humanity and the necessity to avoid placing undue burdens on 
occupiers’. The extent of the duty, in this judge’s view, would depend on the 
circumstances, on the ‘nature and degree of the danger’ and on ‘the difficulty and 
expense of guarding against it’.
198 
 
The judge then applied these statements of law to the present case. The facts 
showed that the ‘stationmaster at the nearest station… had been informed some six 
weeks earlier that on one occasion children had been seen somewhere on the line’. 
Despite the lack of evidence as to his precise knowledge of the maintenance and 
condition of the fences, ‘there remains the fact of this electrified line lying between 
two open spaces... and of the broken down chain link fence at a point near to where 
children might play’. The fence was ‘designed to be adequate, in view of the 
existing risk, and became inadequate through lack of maintenance’. Therefore, ‘in 
relation to the special duty of care incumbent on the board in the relevant place, 
there was a breach of that duty amounting to legal negligence’. The judge 
dismissed the appeal.
199 
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The fourth judge reported considered the ‘fundamental distinction’ between the 
duty owed to the lawful visitor and that owed to the trespasser. The distinction, 
according to this judge, was that the occupier ‘does not owe to the trespasser a duty 
to take such care as in all the circumstances of the case is reasonable to see that the 
trespasser will be reasonably safe in using the premises for the purposes for which 
he is trespassing’. That does not mean, in his view, that ‘the occupier never owes 
any duty to the trespasser’. As long as the ‘presence of the trespasser is known to or 
reasonably to be anticipated by the occupier’, then the occupier owes a ‘duty to 
treat the trespasser with ordinary humanity’, which is a ‘lower and less onerous 
duty than the one which the occupier owes to a lawful visitor’.
200 
 
Such a description of the duty was, according to this judge, a ‘vague phrase’. Addie 
v Dumbreck provided the ‘authoritative formulation’ but that is ‘severely restrictive 
and… now inadequate’. Previous statements of law, from cases including Ilott v 
Wilkes, Bird v Holbrook,
201 Cooke v Midland Great Western Railway and Excelsior 
Wire v Callan, suggested that ‘normally… the occupier is not at fault, he has done 
as much as is required of him, if he has taken reasonable steps to deter the 
trespasser from entering or remaining on the premises… in which he will encounter 
a dangerous situation’. If these deterrents are ignored by the trespasser, the 
trespasser ‘must take the condition of the land and the operations on the land as he 
finds them’. This formulation is subject to a ‘proviso: if the occupier knows or as 
good as knows that some emergency has arisen where the trespasser has been 
placed in a position of imminent peril, ordinary humanity requires further steps to 
be taken’.
202 
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The judge then considered the ‘reasons why an occupier should not have imposed 
upon him onerous obligations to a trespasser’. Four reasons were presented. These 
included the ‘unpredictability of the possible trespasser both as to whether he will 
come on the land at all and also as to where he will go and what he will do if he 
does come on the land’. A discussion of Videan v British Transport Commission 
was included to establish this point. The second reason was that, even if the 
trespasser’s ‘presence is known or reasonably to be anticipated, so that he becomes 
a neighbour, the trespasser is rightly to be regarded as an under-privileged 
neighbour’. The third reason why an occupier should not suffer onerous obligations 
with respect to trespassers was that it ‘would in many, if not most, cases be 
impracticable to take effective steps to prevent trespassers from going into or 
remaining in situations of danger’. The last reason is ‘moral’. ‘Apart from 
trespasses which are inadvertent or more or less excusable, trespassing is a form of 
misbehaviour, showing lack of consideration for the rights of others. It would be 
unfair if trespassers could by their misbehaviour impose onerous obligations on 
others’.
203 
 
The judge reiterated the statement that ‘the occupier does not owe to a trespasser 
the “common duty of care” [and] the occupier does not owe to the trespasser any 
general duty of care’. A large number of judgments were referred to, including 
Commissioner for Railways v Quinlan,  Addie v Dumbreck,  Latham v Johnson, 
Videan v British Transport Commission and Donoghue v Stevenson, with the judge 
concluding that past ‘exclusive and comprehensive formula[e] defining the duty of 
occupier to trespasser… [have] created difficulties and aroused criticisms’, or have 
                                                 
203 Ibid at 924-925. Extensive statements were repeated in this discussion from Hillen v ICI [1936] 
AC 65 and Munnings v Hydro-Electric Commission (1971) 45 ALJR 378  
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been ‘too narrow and inadequate’. The statements from Addie v Dumbreck are 
‘plainly inadequate for modern conditions, and [the decision’s] rigid and restrictive 
character has impeded the proper development of the common law in this field’.
204 
 
According to this judge, ‘the duty of the occupier should remain limited’. However, 
in his view, the ‘railway board in the circumstances had a duty to take reasonable 
steps to deter children from straying from the public space on to the electrified 
railway line… But the railway board failed to repair the broken down fence’. 
Therefore, he held there ‘was a clear breach of the duty’. The judge held the appeal 
should be dismissed.
205 
 
The fifth judge reported stated that ‘anyone endowed with common humanity 
would say that the common law ought to afford to the injured child a legal right to 
compensation against the railway authorities; and that if it did not there was 
something wrong with the common law’. In the court of first instance, the 
defendants, ‘elected to call no witnesses’, a ‘legitimate tactical move under our 
adversarial system of litigation’. A party who chooses that path, however, ‘cannot 
complain if the court draws from the facts which have been disclosed all reasonable 
inferences as to what are the facts which the defendant has chosen to withhold’. For 
example, a ‘court may take judicial notice that railway lines are regularly patrolled 
by linesmen and gangers. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is entitled to 
infer that one or more of them in the course of several weeks noticed what was 
plain for all to see’. Further, a ‘court is entitled to infer from the inaction of the 
                                                 
204 [1972] AC 877 at 926-930 
205 Ibid at 930  
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[defendants] that one or more of their employees decided to allow the risk to 
continue of some child crossing the boundary and being injured or killed’.
206 
 
The judge recognised the ‘obstacle’ of Addie v Dumbreck. He also stated that all 
the courts involved in the present case have been ‘convinced that the plaintiff’s 
claim ought to succeed; and… are determined that it shall’. He then gave a brief 
history of the duties owed by occupiers of land toward trespassers, including an 
overview of Addie v Dumbreck itself. This history included an examination of the 
use of the ‘fiction of a “licence” to persons who would otherwise be trespassers’.
207 
The judge then commented that such a fiction had served a purpose, but he thought 
that it was ‘ripe for discard’. The judge considered that it was ‘surely time now for 
this House… to discard the fiction of a “licence” to meritorious trespassers’.
208 
 
Donoghue v Stevenson was mentioned as being of importance for the ‘recognition 
that conduct likely to cause injury to another person could in itself create the legal 
relationship between the parties to which the duty attached’. In the case of 
trespassers, the judge stated, 
 
once the conduct of the occupier is recognised as being capable in itself 
of creating a legal relationship to another person which attracts duties 
owed to that person in respect of his safety, it is no longer necessary in 
cases where that conduct attracts a duty to take reasonable steps to deter 
another person from entering a dangerous part of the occupier’s land, to 
sub-divide his duties to that person into a duty to deter his entry, a 
breach of which gives rise to a subsequent duty to take reasonable steps 
to enable him to avoid the danger. To deter his entry is merely one way 
                                                 
206 Ibid at 930-931 per Lord Diplock 
207 This history included references to, and statements from, decisions such as Donoghue v 
Stevenson,  Commissioner for Railways v Quinlan,  Cooke v Midland Great Western Railway, 
Latham v Johnson, Edwards v Railway Executive and Lowery v Walker [1911] AC 10. 
208 [1972] AC 877 at 931-934  
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of enabling him to avoid the danger. The whole duty can be described 
as a duty to take reasonable steps to enable him to avoid danger. 
Such an ‘approach clearly runs counter to that of this House in Addie’s case’, the 
judge argued, but is ‘in harmony with the general development of legal concepts 
since 1929 as to the source of one man’s duty to take steps for the safety of 
another’.
209 
 
In terms of the relationship between two people, any ‘duty imposed by common 
law upon one person to take steps to avoid harming another arises out of some 
relationship recognised by the common law as subsisting between the two persons’. 
In cases like the present, there is a ‘relevant distinction between a person who is 
lawfully upon the occupier’s land with the occupier’s consent and a trespasser’. 
That distinction is that for a lawful visitor ‘the occupier has consented to the 
creation of the relationship from which the duty flows’; whereas for a ‘trespasser 
the relationship has been forced upon the occupier against his will and as a result of 
a legal wrong inflicted on him by the trespasser himself’.
210 
 
According to this judge, this distinction affected the content of the duty owed by an 
occupier. ‘It would be an unjustifiable burden for the law to impose upon an 
occupier for the benefit of wrongdoers, a duty to make inspections and inquiries in 
order to ascertain whether or not trespassers are likely to come onto his land’. The 
extent of the duty depended, in this judge’s view, on the facts of the situation. The 
 
test of whether an occupier is under any duty to a trespasser to do more 
than to keep the danger within the boundaries of his land is whether he 
is actually aware of facts which make it likely that some trespasser will 
come onto that part of his land where the danger is. 
                                                 
209 Ibid at 934-935 
210 Ibid at 936  
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That is, the test is ‘not what the occupier would have been aware of if he had 
exercised more diligence or foresight than he did’.
211 
 
The judge then addressed the content of the duty through a consideration of the 
history of the duty owed to licensees. After his review of the precedents, including 
Indermaur v Dames and Gautret v Egerton,
212 the judge stated that  
 
there is no duty owed by an occupier to any trespasser unless he 
actually knows of the physical facts in relation to the state of his land or 
some activity carried out upon it, which constitute a serious danger to 
persons on the land who are unaware of those facts. He is under no duty 
to any trespasser to make inspections or inquiries to ascertain whether 
there is any such danger. Where he does know of physical facts which a 
reasonable man would appreciate involved danger of serious injury to 
the trespasser his duty is to take reasonable steps to enable the 
trespasser to avoid the danger. 
The extent of such ‘reasonable steps will depend upon the kind of trespasser to 
whom the duty is owed’.
213 
 
The judge then turned to consider the ‘class of trespassers’ owed such a duty, and 
more particularly, ‘the degree of expectation on the part of the occupier that the 
trespassers will come on to his land which, in the absence of actual knowledge of 
his presence, is sufficient to give rise to the duty’.
214 The judge held that  
 
if the danger is created by an occasional or intermittent activity upon 
the land… the test of the creation of the occupier’s liability to the 
injured trespasser is his expectation of the trespasser’s presence at the 
point of danger at that moment of activity. Whereas if the danger lies in 
some permanent condition of the land… the test is his expectation of 
                                                 
211 Ibid at 937 
212 (1867) Law Rep 2 CP 371 
213 [1972] AC 877 at 937-940 
214 The judge considered the cases of Adams v Naylor and Commissioner for Railways v Quinlan in 
this context.  
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some trespasser’s presence at the point of danger at any time while that 
condition continues to exist… 
In terms of ‘an occupier’s expectation of a trespasser’s presence’, he contended, the 
law was that 
 
the test of appreciation of the likelihood of trespass is whether a 
reasonable man knowing only the physical facts which the occupier 
actually knew, would appreciate that a trespasser’s presence at the point 
and time of danger was so likely that in all the circumstances it would 
be inhumane not to give him effective warning of the danger or, in the 
case of a child too young to understand a warning, not to take steps to 
convey to his infant intelligence that he must keep away.
215 
 
The judge then considered ‘an occupier’s duty to trespassers on his land’ as having 
four characteristics. The first is that the ‘duty does not arise until the occupier has 
actual knowledge either of the presence of the trespasser upon his land or of facts 
which make it likely that the trespasser will come on to his land’. The second 
characteristic is that ‘once the occupier has actual knowledge of such facts, his own 
failure to appreciate the likelihood of the trespasser’s presence… does not absolve 
the occupier from his duty’. The third is that the ‘duty when it arises is limited to 
taking reasonable steps to enable the trespasser to avoid the danger’. The final 
characteristic is that the ‘relevant likelihood to be considered is of the trespasser’s 
presence at the actual time and place of danger to him’.
216 
 
In the present case, the judge argued, the defendants ‘did know the physical facts 
that made it likely that little children playing… would trespass on [the railway] line 
and, if they did so, would run a serious risk of grave if not mortal injury from the 
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electric rail’. Therefore, ‘[b]reach of the other characteristics of the duty which then 
arose is… established’. The judge held that the appeal should be dismissed.
217 
                                                 
217 Ibid at 942  
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ANALYSIS 
 
There was less variation in the articulations of liability in the cases examined in this 
Chapter when compared to the decisions in the period covered in Chapter Five. 
Despite this relative stability, the judgments of the period still showed the effects of 
the processes of legal change. The practice of repetition of past legal statements can 
be considered to have contributed to both the stability and the change evident in 
this period. 
 
In this section, the practice of repetition will be discussed, as will the “visibility” of 
the defendants on the part of the judges. I have also included a discussion of the 
way in which the courts “saw” the plaintiffs, as some of the judges in the earlier 
twentieth century decisions began to speak of the behaviours and characteristics of 
the plaintiffs during the assessment of the liability of defendants. This practice 
became more pronounced later in the century and was reflected in the way in which 
the “visibility” of the defendants was articulated. The practice, with respect to 
plaintiffs, developed in a manner similar to that with respect to defendants. The 
way in which judges “saw” both defendants and plaintiffs was developed through 
the repetition of past legal statements. It is this practice of repetition that will be 
discussed first. 
 
REPETITION OF LEGAL STATEMENTS 
 
One of the first things that emerged from my research on this period was that all the 
members of the legal profession, the judges and counsel, repeated an increasing 
number of statements from earlier cases as the century wore on. The judgments that  
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were referred to where also not as limited as was evident in my research for 
Chapters Four and Five. That is, the twentieth century judges repeated statements 
from a wider range of jurisdictions than earlier judges did. However, in another 
sense the judges were more limited. That is, twentieth century judges were more 
likely to restrict the statements they repeated to those put forward by counsel in 
argument. Whatever changes might have been adopted with respect to the source 
that previous legal statements were drawn from, the changes that are evident in the 
articulations of liability can be considered to be based on the repetition of legal 
statements. 
 
One example of the relative stability evident in this Chapter is that all of the cases 
excavated in this Chapter repeated statements with respect to the “duty” potentially 
owed by the defendants to the plaintiffs. The qualification of the “duty”, however, 
can be seen to be an example of the change evident in the Chapter. That is, the 
decisions from the early part of the twentieth century considered “duties” only 
arose with respect to “things dangerous in themselves”, whereas later twentieth 
century judges used the notion of “duty” without this restriction. 
 
For example, the judges in Blacker v Lake considered liability in terms of duties 
owed with respect to “things dangerous in themselves”.
218 The plaintiff in Blacker v 
Lake was injured as a result of a product which they did not buy directly from the 
manufacturer. One issue for the court was whether or not the trial judge’s direction 
to the jury, that they should decide whether the lamp was a thing dangerous in 
                                                 
218 Interestingly, Blacker v Lake is a case the facts of which are similar to those in George v 
Skivington  and yet the judges in George v Skivington did not repeat statements about “things 
dangerous in themselves”. George v Skivington, however, was described as “much doubted” by the 
first, reported judge in Blacker v Lake. The second said of George v Skivington that “it cannot be 
regarded as good law”.  
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itself, was correct. The first judge reported considered this in terms of the duty of 
manufacturer to the end-user of their product. Of particular importance was the 
characterisation of the product itself. If the product was categorised as a thing 
“dangerous in itself” then a “special liability” may be imposed. If it was not a 
“dangerous thing” then there was no additional duty on the part of its manufacturer.  
 
Where a product “is a dangerous thing then the maker owes a duty of care and 
skill”. This statement was supported through the use of precedents, and the direct 
quotation from two of them, even though they were considered irrelevant (as the 
judge in the present case did not consider the lamp to be a thing dangerous in 
itself). Where the product was not dangerous in itself the judge stated that there was 
“authority for the proposition that a man is entitled to let a tumbledown house, and 
I think there is no law which says that a man may not sell a cheap lamp”. This first 
judge reported only used the word “duty” in the context of statements concerning 
liability outside of contract, that is, where a manufacturer owed a duty with respect 
to things dangerous in themselves. When the judge discussed the liability of a 
manufacturer to a purchaser of a product then the judge said the manufacturer had a 
“contract to use care and skill”. 
 
The second judge in Blacker v Lake repeated the law as being that before there 
“could be liability there had to be a duty”. As the plaintiff in this case did not buy 
the lamp from the manufacturer “there could be no implied or express term in 
contract for liability which means that the plaintiff has to show a duty outside of 
contract”. The judge rephrased these sentiments in terms of there being a “long line 
of authorities that show that whatever may be the want of care that want of care can  
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be taken advantage of only by the person towards whom the care should have been 
exercised”.  
 
The “principles” that created liabilities on the part of manufacturers toward those 
not party to a contract with the manufacturer were highlighted in Blacker v Lake. 
The circumstances necessary for liability were repeated as being based on either 
fraud on the part of the manufacturer, where the product amounted to a public 
nuisance, or where the article was a thing dangerous in itself. A further category 
was added which related to people who were in “dominion or control” of dangerous 
things. Of these four sets of circumstances, it was only in terms of dangerous things 
that the judge applied the term “duty”. If a “vendor sells a dangerous chattel to one 
person contemplating or knowing that it will be used by another, he is under a duty 
towards the person who he knows will use it not to represent its real nature”. 
Whereas a “person who is in control of a dangerous thing, to which he knows other 
people will resort, owes a duty to those persons to take reasonable care that it shall 
be safe”. The judge concluded with the statement that a “manufacturer is no more 
bound, as between himself and a stranger, to take reasonable care in the 
manufacture of the article than if the chattel were not dangerous, because the only 
duty, when a chattel belongs to the dangerous class, is to disclose its true 
character”. 
 
The scope of the word “duty” in cases such as Bolton v Stone, Videan v British 
Transport Commission and British Railways Board v Herrington can be seen as 
different to its scope with respect to “things dangerous in themselves”. “Duty” was 
repeated as a “duty to exercise such reasonable care as will avoid the risk of injury 
to such persons as he can reasonably foresee might be injured by failure to exercise  
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such reasonable care”. The issue in Bolton v Stone was the foreseeability of a 
person on a road being hit by a cricket ball. The issue in the later two cases was 
whether or not particular people on railway tracks were foreseeable.  
 
These statements constructed liability in terms of the likelihood of the incident 
happening. This was characterised in Bolton v Stone as a question of fact and not 
law. As it was a question of fact, the judges could leave the determination of the 
likelihood of the event to the judge in the court of first instance. The appeal judges, 
therefore, repeated the statements of the findings of the court of first instance. In 
this case, the risk was too remote, despite the fact that it was foreseeable.  
 
Also of interest in Bolton v Stone was the repetition of statements from Blyth v 
Birmingham Waterworks. Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks was decided prior to 
George v Skivington. The characterisation of negligence in Blyth v Birmingham 
Waterworks is similar to the “duty” considered in the cases excavated in this 
project decided after 1950. Bolton v Stone is the first decision, however, of those 
discussed in this thesis to refer to Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks.
219 Also of note 
is the fact that in Bolton v Stone, Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks was repeated as 
part of a decision denying liability, but, in British Railways Board v Herrington, in 
which it was also referred to, statements from Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks 
were part of a discussion in which liability was found to exist. 
 
An examination of the decisions handed down in the period between Blacker v 
Lake and Bolton v Stone does not show a “reason” or “cause” for the shift in the 
understanding of “duty” that appears to have occurred. Such an examination only 
                                                 
219 It was, however, referred to by counsel in argument in McDowall v Great Western Railway.  
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demonstrates that judges repeat previous legal statements. There is no possibility of 
a “more complete” understanding of the change emerging, given the understanding 
of the archaeological method adopted here, though a wider, genealogical, 
perspective may allow it. 
 
In McDowall v Great Western Railway Company the bulk of the judgments turned 
on the limits to the thought processes in which a reasonable person engages. In the 
words of the first judge reported, “at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case there was 
really no case to go to the jury at all – no evidence of the neglect on the part of the 
defendant railway company of any duty the neglect of which would have led to this 
accident”. This understanding was supported by the legal statement that “in those 
cases in which part of the cause of the accident was the interference of a stranger or 
a third person, the defendants are not held responsible unless it is found that that 
which they do or omit to do… is itself the effective cause of the accident”.  
 
This statement of “the law” was qualified with the statement that where the 
“circumstances are such that anyone of common sense having the custody or 
control over a particular thing would recognise the danger of that happening which 
would be likely to injure others, it is the duty of the person having such custody or 
control to take reasonable care to avoid such injury”. Another statement of “the 
law” was repeated: “if a stranger interferes it does not follow that the defendant is 
liable if the negligence of a servant of his is the effective cause of the accident”. 
For the judges in this case these statements were “common sense”, they did not 
need to be supported by specific reference to specific precedents. However, their 
“common sense” can be understood to reflect the repetition of past legal statements.  
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These legal statements constituted the context for their decisions with respect to the 
appeal. 
 
In Hodge v Anglo-American, all three judges took the barge to be a dangerous thing 
(although there was some discussion of the difference between a “thing in its nature 
dangerous” and a “thing dangerous due to negligent construction”), and therefore, 
all discussions of a possible duty was limited to duties that arose in relation to 
articles that were dangerous in themselves. For the first judge, the defendant was 
taken to be under a double duty. They were under a duty to “use reasonable means 
for securing the efficient cleaning out of the tank” and a duty to “give any 
necessary warning of the dangerous character of the tank”. The former duty was 
owed to all “who necessarily came into contact with the tank in the course of 
carrying out the repairs” and the second duty was owed to those who were not 
“already aware of the danger or who might reasonably be assumed to be aware of 
it”. 
 
The second judge in this case suggested that the “state of authorities in England is 
not very satisfactory” in terms of the extent of liability of those who put dangerous 
items into circulation, particularly where there was no contract. The authorities that, 
nonetheless, were mentioned included Longmeid v Holliday and Blacker v Lake. A 
statement from Earl v Lubbock was highlighted in which the was said to be that a 
“repairer or constructor is under no liability to a person whom he might reasonably 
expect to use it, but with whom he has no contract”. George v Skivington was 
reduced to a “much-doubted” case and the law stated in Heaven v Pender was not 
repeated on the grounds that the defendant in that case had “invited the plaintiff and 
his class to use the article without examination”.  
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The judge highlighted a distinction between “things dangerous in themselves” and 
things that became dangerous as a result of some introduced fault or problem. For 
this judge, if the barge was a thing dangerous in itself, the defendant was under a 
duty “to take proper and reasonable precautions to prevent damage to people likely 
to come into contact with it”. However, if the barge was only dangerous because it 
had been insufficiently cleaned and the owner does not know of its dangerous 
character then the law for this judge was that the owner is not liable for any damage 
suffered by those with whom he has no contract. As the judge considered that the 
barge was a thing dangerous in itself, then the owners were under a “duty to take 
reasonable precautions to prevent damage which might be satisfied by adequate 
warning of its danger if not obvious”.  
 
The third judge reported stated that “if a person manufactures a dangerous article 
such that it is likely to cause injury to third persons who in the ordinary course of 
affairs come into its vicinity, it is his duty to such third persons to take reasonable 
precautions to make it as little dangerous as possible”. This meant that the 
defendants in this case “owed a duty to third persons whom the barge might affect 
to take reasonable precautions to see that the explosive vapour was removed”.  
 
The court in Farr v Butters Brothers treated the wider understanding of “duty” in 
Donoghue v Stevenson as  obiter dicta (in the same manner that the minority 
judgment in Heaven v Pender was considered obiter). That is, these statements of 
the law were treated as not requiring repetition or other explanation of a refusal to  
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repeat. Statements of the narrow understanding of duty, therefore, were treated as 
those that required repetition (unless the decision could be “distinguished”).
220  
 
The “narrower” statements from Donoghue v Stevenson were repeated in Farr v 
Butters Brothers. These statements related to the finding that the defendant in 
Donoghue v Stevenson was liable because of the opaque nature of the ginger beer 
bottle. That is, the manufacturer was liable for the damage suffered by the plaintiff 
because the consumer could not examine the contents. This proposition was applied 
to the crane manufacturer in this case. But, as the crane was inspected prior to use 
by someone deemed to “know” about such matters, the manufacturer was not held 
to be liable for the injury that resulted from the use of the defective crane. 
 
The third judge reported stated a further legal “principle”. That “principle” was that 
“mere negligence in itself is not a cause of action. To give a cause there must be 
negligence which amounts to a breach of duty towards the person claiming”. As the 
manufacturer has “left a reasonable possibility of examination”, there was no duty, 
and, therefore, no cause of action against the manufacturer. 
 
The practice of repeating past statements highlighted another legal issue in the last 
two decisions examined in this Chapter besides the repetition of statements 
associated with the defendant’s “duty” to the plaintiff. Both Videan v British 
Transport Commission and British Railways Board v Herrington related to injuries 
suffered by trespassers on railway tracks. In the earlier case, the court repeated 
statements from Addie v Dumbreck, amongst others, which limited the liability of a 
                                                 
220 The explaining of why the wider neighbour “principle” was repeated as law (as evidence in 
Bolton v Stone) rather than the narrower liability that had been around since the majority opinion of 
Heaven v Pender is beyond the scope of an archaeology.  
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railway company with respect to trespassers. In British Railways Board v 
Herrington the court also referred to Addie v Dumbreck but found that the railway 
company could be liable for the damage suffered by a trespasser. The question in 
the later case was whether or not the judges had to follow the statements in Addie v 
Dumbreck. 
 
The judges in British Railways Board v Herrington were bound by the practice of 
repeating past statements. The decision in Addie v Dumbreck, another Scottish 
case, had been as important in terms of the liability towards trespassers as 
Donoghue v Stevenson has been considered to be in terms of negligence law.
221 The 
judges in British Railways Board v Herrington also had to repeat statements which 
delimited findings of liability in terms of reasonable foreseeability, as discussed in 
Bolton v Stone. Their findings reflected an acceptance of established exceptions to 
Addie v Dumbreck and a reluctance to apply the statements in Addie v Dumbreck. 
 
The judges constructed their own statements in terms of “over-ruling” Addie v 
Dumbreck. This reflects the importance the Law Lords placed on the decision in 
Addie v Dumbreck. Prior to 1966, it was considered that the House of Lords was 
bound by previous decisions of the Law Lords. There was great reluctance on the 
part of the House in this case to over-rule Addie v Dumbreck, despite the admission 
that the law already recognised modifications to its statements. The judges referred 
to “fair-mindedness” and “developments in the law since 1929”, or claimed that the 
                                                 
221 It can be noted that, in terms of the discussion of liability in this thesis, Addie v Dumbreck is 
more important than Donoghue v Stevenson, despite the “notoriety” of the latter case. None of the 
last four cases excavated in this project “turned” on the decision in Donoghue v Stevenson, that is 
there was little discussion of the case after which the statements from it were accepted completely. 
However, statements from the decision in Addie v Dumbreck were central to both Videan v British 
Transport Commission and British Railways Board v Herrington.  
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earlier decision was “severely restrictive and… now inadequate”, in order to justify 
their departure from Addie v Dumbreck. None of these statements are “true” but 
each served to mask a refusal to repeat that is fundamentally at odds with the 
practice of stare decisis.
222 
 
It is arguable whether this departure constituted an “over-ruling” of Addie v 
Dumbreck. What is clear is that, through the repetition of these legal statements 
“justifying” the change, the House of Lords created legal statements about the duty 
owed to trespassers that did not agree with its statements in Addie v Dumbreck. In 
doing this, however, they followed statements from Videan v British Transport 
Commission, which, in turn, followed Addie v Dumbreck. These statements related 
to the potential of extending liability to include damage suffered by trespassers if 
the “circumstances were such that the defendant ought to foresee the presence of a 
trespasser”. The judges also contended that there were already “modifications” to 
the rule in Addie v Dumbreck, including the doctrines relating to allurement and 
pitfalls. Further, statements from the decision of Addie v Dumbreck itself were 
repeated that included the requirement that defendants act according to a 
“humanitarian duty not act recklessly”. From the perspective adopted in this thesis, 
the decision in British Railways Board v Herrington does not contradict the 
decision in Addie v Dumbreck, it merely demonstrates how the law can change over 
time through the repetition of previous legal statements. 
 
 
 
                                                 
222 Over-ruling may be seen to be “at odds” with stare decisis, however, it can be understood to be 
an allowed practice of the discursive practices of repetition, as long as the refusal to repeat a 
particular statement is because of the availability of other legal statements for repetition.  
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VISIBILITY OF DEFENDANTS 
 
The courts in this period “saw” the defendants in a relatively uniform manner. All 
judges recognised that any person may be owe a duty of care to another person. The 
judges also can be considered to have “seen” the defendants as individuals who had 
the capacity to be “reasonable” and to exercise foresight. It can be contended that 
the manner in which the judges in the twentieth century “saw” defendants was 
different to the manner in which earlier judges “saw” defendants. There are two 
main characteristics that the “modern” judges “saw” in “modern” defendants that 
were not evident, to the same degree, in earlier judgments. These two 
characteristics are “imputed knowledge” and “foresight”. These two characteristics 
will be discussed later in this section. 
 
As was discussed in Chapter Two, one of the discursive practices of the twentieth 
century included the practice of referring to the standard of the “reasonable 
man”.
223 This “reasonable man” was, and still is, considered to exhibit these 
attributes of “knowledge” and “foresight”. For the purposes of this project, 
however, it is more useful to consider the “reasonable man” in terms of the specific 
characteristics attributed to “him” rather than to focus on the construct “itself”.  
 
The defendants in the cases examined in this Chapter were not “personally” 
involved in the incidents that gave rise to the injuries.
224 The defendants were still 
                                                 
223 As was seen above, however, the reference to the “reasonable man” is not limited to the 
twentieth century. The judgment in Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks, cited in Bolton v Stone, also 
included a reference to the “reasonable man”. 
224 All the cases involved defendants who were not “natural” people, but rather companies. In Farr v 
Butters Brothers it was the company, rather than the workers, that defended the action. In Bolton v 
Stone it was the cricket club, not the batter who hit the ball, that was the defendant. And in the first 
and last two decisions in the Chapter the defendants were railway companies.  
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“seen”, however, to have particular characteristics that were relevant to the events 
that gave rise to the legal action. That is, the legal construction of the defendants 
included the projection of an “internalised” set of norms of behaviour against 
which actions and inactions could be judged. The characteristics associated with 
the “reasonable man” were not uniform through all the cases, but they were still 
governed by the repetition of past legal statements. 
 
In McDowall, the judges described the standard against which the behaviour of the 
defendants was assessed as that of “an ordinary person of common sense”. The 
legal question to be posed was, then, “did a want of reasonable care and skill on the 
part of the defendant’s servants materially and effectively cause the plaintiff’s 
injury?” In other words, the judges “saw” the defendants as being “ordinary 
people” who were supposed to exhibit “reasonable care and skill”. According to the 
judges, the servants of the defendants did everything necessary to live up to that 
standard. It was acknowledged that the servants could have done more but that 
were found to have done enough to fulfil their obligations to people using the 
highway below.  
 
The issue of the knowledge of the defendants was also raised in this case. No 
trespassers in the past had done as much as the ones who had caused the van to roll 
down the incline, so this knowledge of past trespassers did not amount to 
“knowledge” of the possibility that the trespassers would act as they did. The 
defendants were not to be considered liable just because they were in control of 
rolling stock that caused someone injury. They could only be considered liable if it 
could be shown that there were specific circumstances (knowledge) which meant 
that they should be judged differently from other people who controlled rolling  
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stock. The judges can be understood to be “seeing” the defendants as separable 
from their profession, separable on the basis of their knowledge concerning the 
behaviour of previous trespassers on their property. 
 
In Blacker v Lake a manufacturer was seen to be liable for breach of contract or, if 
they were dealing with dangerous articles, then they were seen to be under a certain 
duty to people with whom they did not have a contract. The manufacturer was seen 
as a person who is supposed to use care and skill in the manufacture or repair of an 
article. That is, the manufacturer would be liable if they had made a defective 
article and it had injured the purchaser of the item. There was no statement of the 
level of skill or care necessary. If the manufacturer had constructed a defective 
product then they would have been liable for the injuries suffered. 
 
If the manufacturer had produced a dangerous item, and they knew who the user 
was to be, then they would have been under a duty to ensure that the user (not the 
purchaser) of the product knew of the dangerous nature of the product. This “duty” 
did not extend to a higher standard of care necessary in the manufacture of the 
article. This duty only existed if there was knowledge of the user on the part of the 
manufacturer. It was not a general duty to all consumers to warn them of the 
dangerous nature of the manufacturer’s product. The manufacturer was seen as part 
of a class of defendants with particular responsibilities given particular 
circumstances. There was no discussion of an internalised standard, or norm, to 
which a reasonable manufacturer should conform. If the defendant was a 
manufacturer and the other circumstances of the case satisfied the legally 
established criteria, then the defendant would be liable. 
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In Hodge v Anglo-American, the statements introduced to describe the potential 
liability of the defendants required that their actions had to be seen to be 
“reasonable” in the circumstances. That is, the first judge considered the defendants 
to be under a duty to use “reasonable means to secure the cleaning of the tank” and 
the judge considered that defendants had to provide a warning unless it could be 
“reasonably assumed” that the warning was unnecessary. The second judge 
reported argued that if the barge was a “thing dangerous itself”, the owners were 
under a duty to “take proper and reasonable precautions to prevent its doing 
damage”. The third judge agreed with the statement that in situations involving 
dangerous articles, manufacturers, and others, are under a duty “to take reasonable 
precautions to make the article as little dangerous as possible”. The third judge also 
held that the defendants should not be liable, as the plaintiff “failed to exercise 
reasonable care; and… that such negligence contributed to the disaster”. The judges 
do not appear to have been seeing the defendants (or plaintiffs) as subject to 
liabilities based on their profession, the judges can be understood to have assessed 
the conduct of the defendants against a separate standard of “reasonableness”.  
 
Other terms that these three judges used in classifying and characterising the 
behaviour of the defendants included “foreseeability” and “knowledge”. With 
respect to the degree of foresight required on the part of the defendants, the first 
judge reported considered that “no one could possibly have anticipated the reckless 
act of a person employed to repair the tank using a naked light”. In terms of 
knowledge, the amount of knowledge that the defendant had with respect to the 
nature of the “thing” in question was important, particularly when liability was not 
controlled by a contract. Both knowledge as to the level of danger presented by an 
article and the dispersal of such knowledge in the form of a warning were  
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important to a finding of liability. The defendants were constructed as potentially 
being legal subjects who could be expected to know of any inherent dangers and 
who could be expected to warn others of any such dangers. The warning, according 
to the second judge, need only be “adequate” to satisfy the legal requirement. 
 
This “duty of care” meant, in Farr v Butters Brothers, that, if there had not been the 
opportunity for intermediate inspection by a person qualified to conduct the 
inspection, that the manufacturer had a duty to take reasonable care in the 
construction of the crane. The statements in that case, with respect to the duty owed 
by the manufacturer, are articulated in terms of a norm of conduct. The 
manufacturer should take extra care where they should know that the end-user will 
not have the opportunity to sufficiently check the safety of the product. In this case, 
the plaintiff’s own actions prevented the defendant from being held liable. This did 
not prevent the judges making statements about the nature of the liability of 
manufacturers in general. 
 
As mentioned above, the capacity for, and use of, foresight was important to the 
judges’ construction of the defendants who came before them. That is, the judges 
“saw” defendants as having a capacity for foresight and treated this capacity as part 
of the “norm” of conduct against which the behaviour of defendants was measured. 
This characteristic of foresight is particularly evident in the last three cases 
presented in the Chapter. In Bolton v Stone, the court stressed that the standard of 
care was determined by what a reasonable person would consider appropriate. “The 
standard of care in the law of negligence is the standard of an ordinarily careful 
man… an ordinarily careful man does not take precautions against every 
foreseeable risk”. Given the “crowded conditions of modern life”, the question was  
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whether a “reasonable man… would have thought it right to refrain from taking 
steps to prevent the danger”.
225 That is, the standard of care reflects a norm of 
behaviour. An ordinary, careful person should not take steps to prevent all possible 
harm that might befall others. An ordinary, careful person should only seek to 
guard against harm that was reasonably foreseeable. 
 
The actions of the defendants were compared with those to be expected of “the 
ordinary careful man”. The defendants had to live up to the standards of behaviour 
of that “ordinary careful man”. This standard required the defendants to consider 
potential risks to innocent third parties. This standard did not require the defendants 
to protect possible third parties from all risks, but only from reasonably foreseeable 
risks. 
 
Foreseeability was also central to the decision in Videan v British Transport 
Commission. That all three judges considered the infant plaintiff to be a trespasser 
did not automatically deny him the possibility of being owed a duty of care by the 
defendants. The statements with respect to liability and respect to trespassers that 
were repeated in the judgments suggested that the matter was one of the 
foreseeability of injury. If the driver should have reasonably foreseen that a 
trespasser would be on the tracks at that time, then the defendants might have been 
held liable. In this case, the court held, based on previous legal statements, that 
there was no relationship that could give rise to legal liability between the infant 
plaintiff and the defendants, as the presence of a trespasser, such as the child, could 
not be reasonably anticipated. 
                                                 
225 Perhaps it is also possible to argue that a “reasonable man” in this case could be seen as a person 
who wants cricket to be unencumbered. Such an argument is, however, beyond a strictly 
archaeological reading of the judgments.  
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The court was also unanimous with respect to the relationship between the 
stationmaster and the defendants. In this case, all three judges found that the driver, 
and therefore the defendants, owed a duty of care to the deceased. The driver 
should have foreseen that the stationmaster, or other railway workers, may be on 
the tracks near a station. That is, the driver was “seen” as having a capacity for 
foresight and as being required to use that foresight to avoid the accident. These 
people may have been on the tracks to carry out maintenance works or to effect a 
rescue. These railway workers were constructed as “neighbours” of people such as 
trolley drivers. Drivers, in this period, are seen to be people who are under a duty to 
act with reasonable care toward neighbours when approaching stations. This 
particular driver was taken to have breached that duty and so the defendants were 
liable. 
 
Tied to the question of foreseeability was the issue of the knowledge that the 
defendants, as ordinary reasonable people, can be assumed to have had. That is, 
judges considered that defendants should have particular knowledge and should be 
required to have acted on that knowledge. One of the judges in Videan v British 
Transport Commission stated that there was no evidence that the children were in 
the habit of trespassing on that stretch of track. The importance of any history of 
children trespassing on railway tracks was also discussed in McDowall v Great 
Western Railway. As there was no such knowledge, it was less foreseeable that a 
child would be on the track. However, with respect to the station-master, as the 
driver should have known that maintenance workers, or even the station-master 
himself, may have been on the line, the driver should have exercised more care. 
Foreseeability, and therefore liability, was based, in part, on the knowledge, either 
actual or imputed, of the defendant.  
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Statements concerning foreseeability in Videan v British Transport Commission, 
which were repeated in British Railways Board v Herrington, illustrated an aspect 
of the processes of legal change. The judge in one of the judgements in Videan v 
British Transport Commission recognised that the use of foreseeability as a test for 
liability to trespassers was a “new view”. Foreseeability, however, was only new in 
relation to trespassers. The introduction of this “view”, however, was instituted 
through the repetition of a single previous legal statement that highlighted the need 
for foreseeability on the part of defendants. This change did not take effect in 
Videan v British Transport Commission, where the “principle” was first stated, 
however was effective in British Railways Board v Herrington when the statement 
concerning foreseeability was repeated. These new statements then became 
available to be repeated by later courts when faced with questions of liability 
concerning injuries to trespassers. 
 
Foreseeability was not the only characteristic of the defendants that was discussed 
in British Railways Board v Herrington. Statements were repeated which held that  
if the defendants choose to assume a relationship with members of 
the public then the law requires the defendants to conduct 
themselves as a reasonable person with adequate skill, knowledge 
and resources would do. They will not be heard to say that in fact 
they could not attain that standard. If they cannot attain that standard 
they ought not to assume the responsibility which that relationship 
involves.  
In other words, the standard of care was used as the norm of behaviour. This was 
the standard of the humane person.  
 
The judges in British Railways Board v Herrington held that the standard of care 
that occupiers of the land owed to trespassers was that of the “humane person”. The 
standard of the humane person was a normative measure which was articulated in a  
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number of ways in the different judgments. It was evident in statements concerning 
a “humanitarian duty to take care” and the standard of a “humane man”. This 
statement of the law in terms of the “humane person” can be seen as a “new” 
statement of the law. The statement still, however, includes the repetition of 
previous statements of duties in negligence with “new” words the judges 
introduced into the statements.
226 
 
In terms of the facts of the case, the defendants were held to have failed to live up 
to that standard, to have failed to act “normally”. As people using “common sense” 
and “ordinary intelligence”, the defendants could easily have prevented the 
accident by instituting a system of inspections in order to ensure that access to the 
line from the recreational areas was prevented. As they failed to have prevented 
access onto their land, and as the plaintiff was severely injured, the defendants were 
considered to have not lived up to the norm. The defendants were considered liable, 
in part, because they could be taken to have known of the hole in the fence and, in 
part, because they should have known that there was a hole in the fence. That is, the 
judges “saw” them as having this knowledge (because a reasonable person would 
have know about it) and being liable because they failed to act appropriately on that 
knowledge. The defendants knew of the danger posed by their property. They were 
seen as having known about the uses of the land surrounding their property. They 
should have ensured, therefore, that there was no access to their property.  
 
The final characteristic of the defendant that was important to the judges was the 
knowledge they were taken to have. As the plaintiff was a trespasser, the 
                                                 
226 A search for the origin of the words “humane” and “humanitarian” is outside the scope of this 
thesis, in the same manner that a search for the origin of the word “duty” in the nineteenth century 
judgments is outside the scope of the project.  
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knowledge of the defendant was only considered in terms of what they did, in fact, 
know, rather than what they should have known (the standard that would have been 
applied if the plaintiff was a lawful visitor). In other words, the judges in this case 
“saw” the defendants as being reasonable people who owed a duty to act humanely 
based on specific knowledge on their part. The defendants had specific knowledge 
of the trespassers but failed to act on the knowledge. The defendants, therefore, 
failed in their duty and were liable for the damage suffered by the plaintiffs. 
 
VISIBILITY OF PLAINTIFFS 
 
Two of the cases discussed in this chapter included the judges’ assessment of the 
characteristics of people involved in the action who were not defendants. These 
assessments were articulated in the context of establishing the liability of the 
defendants. In these two cases, Hodge v Anglo-American and Blacker v Lake, the 
characteristics of the plaintiffs did not affect the liability of the defendants. 
Therefore, in a traditional reading of the cases, these articulations would be seen as 
obiter dicta. However, in this project, these articulations are important because they 
are repeatable legal statements.
227 
 
It was the knowledge of the other party that was important in both of the earlier 
cases. In Blacker v Lake, one of the judges said that the ‘person who bought such 
an instrument for use… must have realised that in the course of its use it might be a 
                                                 
227 Not all plaintiffs were considered in terms of the particular attributes they “should” or did 
possess. The judgments in Bolton v Stone and McDowall v Great Western Railway did not consider 
the characteristics of the plaintiff. It is possible to read a gender bias in this given that the plaintiff in 
the later case was a woman and the plaintiff in the earlier was not described in terms of her or his 
gender.  
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source of some danger’.
228 In Hodge v Anglo-American, it was held that if the 
owners ‘hand a dangerous barge to competent people who had full knowledge of 
the probability of danger, even if they did not know the exact amount of it, [then, it] 
appears… to involve no further liability on the owners’.
229 
 
The importance of the knowledge of parties other than the defendants was repeated 
in Farr v Butters Brothers. The defendants were held not to be liable in that case 
because of the knowledge of the plaintiff. The facts of the case resulted in findings 
that not only did the plaintiff have the opportunity to inspect the machinery, he was 
also a “skilled erector” of cranes. His knowledge was such that the judges 
considered him to be responsible for his actions. That is, the plaintiff was not seen 
as the sort of person to whom a duty was owed by the manufacturer. The actions 
and knowledge of the plaintiff meant that, within the legal discursive formation, the 
defendant could no longer be considered legally responsible for the incident.  
 
In  Videan v British Transport Commission, there were two plaintiffs. These 
plaintiffs, the infant and the station-master, were “seen” differently by the court. 
Two people suffered injuries, but the defendants were only liable for the damage 
suffered by one of them. In terms of the station-master, the behaviour of the trolley 
driver was measured against that of the reasonable man. That is, a reasonable man 
driving a trolley would have slowed down as he neared the station, just in case an 
employee or other authorised person was on the track. Therefore, the driver was 
responsible for the father’s injuries.  
 
                                                 
228 (1912) 106 LT 533 at 534 
229 12 LlL Rep 183 at 189  
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If the driver in this case had taken the precaution of slowing down he may not have 
hit the child, but he was not held liable for the boy’s injuries. This leads to an 
incongruous situation in which the driver was considered to have failed to have 
lived up to the required standard of the reasonable driver, but was only legally 
liable for one set of injuries. If he had acted according to the appropriate norm, 
neither plaintiff would have been injured.  
 
The defendants did not owe the infant a duty to take care because the child was a 
trespasser. As a trespasser, the child was not “seen” as being entitled to the full 
protection of the law. In a sense, the child was “seen” to be “outside” the law. 
Statements were repeated to the effect that trespassers were not totally without legal 
recourse if they were injured through a negligent act. However, they could only 
receive compensation if their presence was reasonably foreseeable and if the 
defendants in such circumstances had failed to live up to the lesser duty of treating 
the trespasser with “common humanity”.  
 
In  British Railways Board v Herrington, as in Videan v British Transport 
Commission, one of the key issues related to the legal construction of trespassers. 
The members of the legal discursive formation have long repeated statements to the 
effect that those legal subjects who have ventured onto another’s land without 
permission or lawful excuse cannot be treated in the same manner as other legal 
subjects on the land. In this case, the judges emphasised the point that a trespasser 
could not be placed in a better position than a lawful visitor on the land. The 
standard of the reasonable person could not be applied in the same way, therefore, 
as it would be if a lawful visitor had been injured by the railway line.  
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In  British Railways Board v Herrington, the plaintiff, as a trespasser, was 
characterised as a “legal outcast”. The plaintiff was also, however, an infant. That 
he was only a child meant that his knowledge was an important factor in this case. 
For the child, the electrified line was a “concealed danger”. This child, then, is 
likely to have been “seen” in a different way from that which older plaintiffs may 
have been “seen” if they had been injured in similar circumstances. A child the age 
of the plaintiff was not constructed to have the same level of awareness as other 
members of the community. 
 
This characterisation of the plaintiff was important in terms of the assessment of 
liability of the defendants in British Railways Board v Herrington. Given the age of 
potential trespassers, based on the knowledge of the defendants, a system of mere 
warning would have been insufficient to render the defendants free from liability. 
That is, normal legal subjects, such as the defendants, were constructed to know 
that a child would not understand the danger or any warning signs.  
 
As the defendants maintained a dangerous activity on the land, they were under an 
obligation to take certain steps to minimise the danger to others. In their judgments, 
the judges discussed people, and the defendants in particular, consciously forming 
relationships with other members of the public. Once such a relationship was 
formed, certain consequences followed. Even though trespassers “forced” such a 
relationship upon occupiers, this did not render the relationship devoid of 
obligations on the part of the occupier. No longer could trespassers in the position 
of the plaintiff be considered legal outcasts, as the occupiers were still under certain 
obligations to limit the potential for harm to such a trespasser.  
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The House acknowledged that no “wilful act” had been done against the infant 
plaintiff, however the relationship was established and the defendants were liable 
for the injury suffered. It was considered “basic” to current “legal thinking that 
every member of the community must have regard to the effect upon others of his 
actions or his inactions”, more specifically, “anyone endowed with common 
humanity would say that the common law ought to afford to the injured child a 
legal right to compensation… and if it did not there was something wrong with the 
common law”. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The twentieth century was a period of relative stability in the articulation of legal 
liability with respect to negligent actions causing harm to legal subjects. Over time, 
and as a function of the repetition of legal statements, a test was established as the 
dominant statement for the legal obligations that constructed all legal subjects with 
respect to their relationships with others. All legal subjects were to be held to a 
particular standard of care in terms of their awareness and treatment of other people 
who may be affected by their actions or inaction. The establishment of the test, and 
the changes in liability from those evident in the early to mid-nineteenth century, 
can be understood as a function of the processes of legal changes. 
 
The change that happened was neither necessary nor pre-ordained and it was not 
smooth. For example, the decision in Blacker v Lake seems to owe more to the 
“vocation as category” basis of liability than to the later discussions of “duty” as 
contained in decisions like Heaven v Pender. That is, in Blacker v Lake, the court 
assessed liability in terms of the responsibilities of a vendor qua vendor. There was 
no standard of “reasonableness”, there was no mention of the “ordinary vendor”. 
The defendant was a vendor and so the defendant owed particular obligations to 
those who contracted with him. This is not significantly different to statements 
concerning the liability of common carriers in Govett v Radnidge, Garnett v Willan 
and the eighteenth century judgments dealt with in this thesis. 
 
The decision in Farr v Butters Brothers also demonstrates a lack of total, instant 
change. The recourse in that case to statements associated with the construction of 
legal subjects evident prior to the decision in Donoghue v Stevenson is indicative of  
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the slow process of legal change. Although statements regarding a wider “duty” in 
Donoghue v Stevenson had been made by the time of the judgment in Farr  v 
Butters Brothers, it was distinguished by the judges. More specifically, one of the 
judges claimed that the “duty” “is wider than is necessary”. The judges in the Farr 
v Butters Brothers could repeat the statements made in Donoghue v Stevenson and 
could repeat them as statements of the English common law, but they did not repeat 
them in justifying their decision in this case. The characterisation of the defendants, 
and the articulation of the circumstances where they could be considered to be 
liable, therefore, were repeated from statements of the legal discursive formation 
that were made prior to the acceptance of statements from Donoghue v Stevenson. 
 
Bolton v Stone was the first decision in this archaeology to repeat the legal 
statement of the wider “duty” with approval. The statements as to a general duty 
from Donoghue v Stevenson were accepted as the supplying appropriate norm to be 
applied in this situation. The actions of the defendants were compared with the 
standards of the “reasonable man”. The Lords found that the defendants, acting as 
“reasonable men”, could overlook foreseeable risks if those risks were “too 
remote”. Therefore, the court in Bolton v Stone held that the men at the cricket club 
were not in the wrong for not taking any further precautions.  
 
In the final case examined, British Railways Board v Herrington, the judges 
considered a similar set of facts to Videan v British Transport Commission, but, 
unlike the earlier case, held that there was a relationship between the infant plaintiff 
and the defendants. There were four aspects of the decision in British Railways 
Board v Herrington that demonstrated something of the processes of legal change. 
The first was the re-statement of law in terms of children trespassing on railway  
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tracks. The second was the judicial debate on the possibility of over-ruling, or 
distinguishing, the decision of Addie v Dumbreck. The possibility of a shift from 
the position in Addie v Dumbreck, was brought about through the repetition of past 
legal statements. The third was the recognition by one of the judges of the 
introduction of statements that related to “foreseeability” into the law relating to 
liability toward trespassers. The final aspect of the decision that demonstrated the 
processes of legal change was the introduction of statements relating to the 
“conscientious humane man”. Each of these changes provide some support for the 
claim that the law changes discursively. The law changes incrementally, through 
the repetition of single legal statements, usually from the highest level of appellate 
courts. 
 
In general, the twentieth century saw the acceptance of statements that constructed 
legal subjects as potentially owing a “duty” to other legal subjects. In the later cases 
in this chapter, this “duty” was considered to be a general duty of care that 
connected these legal subjects as “neighbours”, the duty however, was still limited. 
These relationships were defined in terms of a general duty, that is, they pre-existed 
any damage or injury suffered. These relationships became part of the constitution 
of legal subjects. People were “seen” as being capable of considering others, and 
expected others to consider them and were held liable if they failed to be 
sufficiently considerate of others. In the courts, the actions or inaction of 
defendants were compared with legal statements as to the standards of behaviour 
expected of legal subjects as “reasonable men”. The defendants were held liable if 
the defendants did not live up to the required standard. 
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These general potential relationships of liability were not total. The norms of 
behaviour did not require the legal subjects to take every precaution, or to have the 
“prophetic vision of a clairvoyant”. The norms did include a set of duties, however. 
These included limitations, such as those with respect to what a “reasonable man” 
was expected to consider in terms of the “remoteness” of damage and of the 
“foreseeability” of injury. The articulations of the duties and of the limitations to 
these duties are always subject to change. The legal discursive formation is not a 
static discursive formation. Some of the duties and discursive practices changed in 
this period, but the legal discursive formation can be understood to have retained its 
legitimacy, its role in the governance of society, despite these changes. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this thesis was to undertake a tentative application of Foucault’s 
archaeological method to a “discourse in action”. The discourse chosen was “law”. 
This was, in part, a result of the fact that there has been some very important work 
done linking Foucault’s ideas with the manner in which law operates in our society. 
In addition to that work, there has also been a significant amount of work done in 
terms of expanding our understanding of Foucault’s historical methods. The work 
done has been more theoretical than applied and this project is, I feel, another small 
step in investigating this well-discussed, but relatively under-utilised, method. 
 
“Law” was chosen as the focus of this application for two reasons. First, because it 
appears to be one of the fundamental discourses in our society, and therefore, an 
examination of it with a different historical method presented the possibility of 
interesting results relevant to our community. Second, the manner in which “law” 
is written appeared to make judicial decisions ideal monuments for an 
archaeological examination, as the rules for their production depend so heavily 
upon the law and the judges’ legal training.  
 
The relationship between the monuments and the discourse is important for this 
application of the method. In the discursive understanding of the law discussed in 
this project, judges in the English common law are trained in specific ways to write 
their judgments in a specific way. That is, the legal discursive practices can be seen 
to construct judges to write their judgments in a particular manner, consequently 
legal judgments can be understood to reflect the legal discursive practices. The  
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focus of this thesis, then, was on the discursive practices as evidenced in the written 
judgments of courts of review in the English common law. 
 
This Conclusion will consist of two substantive sections. The first will recap the 
narrative produced by the application of the archaeological method as it was 
understood in this project. The second will include a discussion of the apparent 
effectiveness of this application of the method. This second section has been 
included because of an apparent expectation built up around Foucault’s methods 
that any narrative produced by an application of one of his methods will be 
radically different from a narrative produced in more traditional histories. This 
expectation, in the words of Kendall and Wickham, results in the view that ‘a 
Foucault that does not disturb the obviousness of something is no Foucault at all’.
1 
As this project has been a tentative application, there was no certainty, in my mind, 
that a disturbance of the obviousness of negligence law would be produced. It 
seems necessary, then, to consider the differences between the narrative produced 
here and more traditional legal histories and to assess why any differences detected 
between them may not have been as great as those who expect disturbance of the 
obviousness of negligence law might hope for. 
 
NARRATIVE PRODUCED IN THIS APPLICATION OF THE METHOD 
 
This use of an archaeological method was established with an examination of 220 
years of case law. This application of the method was intended to produce two 
basic outcomes. The first was a deeper understanding of the fundamental 
relationship between the law and the legal profession, as a Foucaultian might see it. 
                                                 
1 Kendall & Wickham, Using Foucault’s Methods at 119  
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This involved demonstrating how the practices that construct the law and the legal 
profession allow for, and produce, change in the law, whilst maintaining the 
integrity of the law as a system of governance. The second outcome, which was 
coupled with this description of legal discursive change, was a description of an 
apparent change in the construction of legal subjects in articulations of 
relationships of liability within the English common law.  
 
The perspective on the law and on legal change that was presented in this thesis 
was founded on discourse theory. That is, the law and the legal profession were 
understood as being constituted by a set of discursive practices. The profession, 
from this perspective, can be seen as a self-regulating, self-perpetuating discursive 
institution. This form of governance privileges the written word and perpetuates 
itself in terms of practices of reading and repeating of written statements. Some of 
these practices around reading and repetition can be considered to limit the 
production of written judgments. The sum of these judgments can be understood to 
be the common law. From this perspective, the  common law can be seen as a 
cohesive body of statements. And further, as the judges and lawyers, from the 
perspective adopted in this thesis, are a relatively cohesive body of subjects of the 
legal discursive formation, the legal profession can be seen to be governed by, and 
perpetuate, the discursive practices that constitute the legal discursive formation. 
These subjects, then, can be considered to be governed by, and perpetuate, the 
common law. 
 
The subjects of the discursive formation function within an hierarchical structure. 
Those members who are taken to display the skills in an exemplary fashion are 
authorised, via promotion within the formation, to make authoritative statements of  
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the law. In order to be appointed to the bench, those who become judges must be 
recognised as sufficiently skilled in the use of the set of governing practices 
associated with the production of the law (though this might not be the only 
criterion for promotion). The privileged form of communication within the law is 
that of the written judgment. Judges produce the law in the form of legal 
judgments. From this perspective, judges are authorised “speakers” for the law and 
they “speak” the law in their judgments.  
 
While judges can be understood to be “authors” of their judgments, some of the 
most important elements of judgments are the statements by previous judges that 
have been chosen for restatement. Judges, in the writing of their judgments, repeat 
statements of law that were written by previous judges. To understand the law, 
then, judgments and patterns of repetitions of statements must, from this 
perspective, be examined. The law, in this understanding, is that which is 
evidenced in the writings produced by judges in the carrying out of their 
professional duties. The law is that which is written by judges in accordance with 
their training. More specifically, the law can be understood as produced by the 
repetition of legal statements by judges in accordance with the practices of the legal 
discursive formation. 
 
It is the discursive practices, the legal training, of subjects of the discursive 
formation that can be seen as perpetuating the profession. It is these very practices 
of the discursive formation, however, that also can be understood to allow for 
change in the law. From the perspective adopted in this thesis, these practices, both 
those of continuity and discontinuity construct the members of the discursive 
formation, and the members of the discursive formation internalise these practices.  
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When these members of the legal profession act as lawyers and judges they repeat 
the discursive practices that they have internalised. Understood in this way, the law 
is that which lawyers and judges do. 
 
Legal discursive practices can also be understood to play a role in the construction 
of other subjects of the law. For these discursive practices determine the manner in 
which lawyers and judges constitute those legal subjects who come before them. 
The discursive practices of the legal discursive formation construct, though only in 
part, all legal subjects and the relationships that are found to exist between them. 
For the law can be considered to be, and to have been, one of the main discourses 
of governance in English society. The legal subjects of this society can be seen to 
learn, and internalise, their norms of behaviour from a variety of sources. The legal 
profession is one of these sources. As the statements of law change with regard to a 
particular area of behaviour, the standards of normal behaviour are affected and the 
internalised norms of legal subjects may be modified. 
 
From the perspective adopted in this project, discursive practices constitute the law 
and allow for change in the law. The most fundamental of these practices can be 
understood be the repetition of past legal statements. The use of previous 
statements, “precedents”, can be seen to organise and reproduce the hierarchy of 
the courts. “Precedents” can be taken to be those sections of legal judgments that 
are repeated by future lawyers and judges.  The practices associated with this 
practice order the law and the legal discursive formation providing for both 
stability and change. 
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On the surface, the practice of repetition operates through the privileging of past 
judgments. The practice limits and controls the use of these past judicial 
statements. The practice can also be understood to work at a deeper level, to limit 
and control the lawyers and judges with respect to the legal statements they can 
repeat in legal argument. The effect of this practice is that lawyers and judges are 
trained to repeat the law as single legal statements. These statements are usually 
written by members of the appellate courts. Judges, in particular, can be understood 
to be trained to choose from a myriad of available legal statements in order to write 
their judgments. These judgments, in turn, contain statements that may be used as 
precedents that both perpetuate and change the law. 
 
From the perspective adopted in this thesis, this process of repeating legal 
statements permits the law to be both continuous and discontinuous. The discursive 
practice that is the repetition of legal statements perpetuates the profession, whilst 
changes in the statements that are repeated introduce changes in the profession and 
the law. Statements from past cases in the same area of law can be repeated in any 
given judgment. Legal statements from other branches of the law can also be 
“imported” and repeated in any judgment. Even legal statements from other 
jurisdictions can be introduced into a judgment. This process of the repetition of 
legal statements is a mechanism through which any given area of law can “grow”. 
Such growth can be understood to enable the English common law to both 
perpetuate itself and undergo change.  
 
In other words, cases can be understood to be sites within which judges “choose” 
from a number of possible legal statements made by preceding judges. Their 
“choice” is, however, controlled through a variety of principles. The common law  
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can be seen, therefore, as a process in which statements by particular judges in 
specific cases are valorised, primarily through repetition, until alternative 
statements are largely, but never completely, excluded. From this perspective, it is 
these statements that largely exclude all others that come to be taken as the law. A 
decision, in which a previous statement is followed, is a moment in which a judge 
“chooses” to repeat a specific utterance by a preceding judge as “the law”. While 
the selection of a statement for repetition is affected by court hierarchies, a decision 
is as much a process of refusing other possible utterances than it is one identifying 
“the law”.  
 
The importance of the repetition of written legal statements in the production of 
law is reflected in the method used in this thesis. That is, written legal judgments 
are central to both the law and this application of the archaeological method. The 
method, as understood here, involves the examination of discursive monuments in 
order to demonstrate the discursive practices that produced them. The members of 
the legal discursive formation produce written judgments. The archaeological 
method, as understood in this project, takes these texts to be monuments of the 
discourse. The texts are privileged and not their authors. The latter can be 
understood to be little more than the sum of the practices through which they are 
constituted. That the discursive practices of the legal discursive formation also 
privilege texts means that the archaeological method is, for me, eminently suited to 
an examination of the law.  
 
This application of the method, as understood here, to the law can only provide a 
description of the decisions discussed. The archaeologist may, however, highlight 
similarities and differences in these descriptions. In this thesis, in-depth  
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descriptions of certain cases, with a chronological ordering, were used to highlight 
certain characteristics of those decisions. The area of law that the judgments were 
taken from was negligence law. The period covered was 1750 to 1972. This 
covered a time from after the point when the judges were independent of the 
English Crown to when the English common law came under the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Justice. 
 
The first period examined included some of the decisions from the eighteenth 
century that were part of the “web of decisions” associated with British Railways 
Board v Herrington, the last case that was discussed. Decisions in these cases were 
based on a variety of writs including action on the case and trespass. In order to 
establish liability in these cases, the courts had to be satisfied with respect to three 
criteria. First, that the plaintiff had suffered damage. Second, that the defendants 
were of a category of legal subjects who could be found liable. And third, that the 
plaintiff had sued under the appropriate writ. That is, legal liability was recognised 
after the court established that the circumstances of the case and the writs pleaded 
satisfied the legal requirements. There was no consideration of the state of mind, or 
intent, of the defendant.  
 
The courts of the time can be understood to have contributed to what can be seen as 
the perpetuation of the feudal form of governance through their categorisation of 
the defendants according to their station in life. A defendant could be an 
apothecary, which meant that they were imbued with certain characteristics 
essential to being an apothecary. They were not constituted as individuals who 
merely worked as apothecaries. The apothecary was their station in life. That was 
who they were. Their intentions in the carrying out of their jobs were not important  
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when it came to establishing their liability for harm suffered by a patient. If a 
patient in their care was harmed then they were responsible, irrespective of any 
question of negligence or evidence that they had done everything possible to look 
after the patient. If the court found that the plaintiff had suffered harm, that the 
right writ was pleaded, and that the defendant filled a category of legal subjects 
who would be found liable for the harm, then the court would find the defendant 
liable.  
 
The second group of cases examined in this project were from the nineteenth 
century. The decisions from the early part of the century can be understood to have 
continued to reflect the understandings of liability that were evident in the 
eighteenth century cases (at least as they were presented in the preceding chapter). 
Later decisions, however, can be taken to suggest that the articulations of liability 
were undergoing change. These changes in articulation were reflected in statements 
in the judgments of the time.  
 
An examination of these judgments suggested that at the beginning of this period 
the word “duty” began to be used in the context of ascertaining the liability of 
defendants. That is, the early decisions included the word “duty” while the judges 
continuing to decide liability in the same manner as in the eighteenth century 
decisions (as represented here). The word “duty” was then repeated as a delimiting 
factor in assessing liability in later judgments. In other words, the articulations of 
liability in the nineteenth century changed, but the use of the word “duty” remained 
throughout the century. Such a word can be seen as a condition of possibility for 
the introduction of a general notion of potential liability in the twentieth century.  
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The analysis of the decisions examined in Chapter Five suggested there were three 
significant articulations of liability evident in the nineteenth century. The first was 
the articulation that was associated with decisions in the eighteenth century. 
Another articulation was founded on the notion of duties based on “things 
dangerous in themselves”. The third articulation, not however repeated in a 
majority judgment in the cases examined, was one that suggested a generalised 
“duty of care”. 
 
Some decisions of the nineteenth century, therefore, were still based on the specific 
assessments of the circumstances, with particular emphasis on the vocation of the 
defendant; however, the language used to justify the finding of liability can be 
understood to have been shifting. The shift was not a deliberate or intended 
outcome consciously pursued by the members of the discursive formation. There 
was no evidence of an intention to change the articulations of liability in any 
particular direction. The shift that did occur, however, can be understood to have 
made possible the later construction of liability based on a general duty to take 
care. 
 
The courts of the nineteenth century still appeared to base their judgments on the 
earlier criteria for finding liability. The practices of constructing defendants in the 
same manner they were in the eighteenth century, however, were not continued. It 
was not sufficient for the liability of defendants to be considered simply in terms of 
their membership of a particular category of legal subjects. The members of the 
legal discursive formation can be understood, through the statements they used in 
their judgments, to have been beginning to consider the “mind” of the defendants 
when they assessed their liability. In particular, it may be considered that the judges  
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began to look at the intentions and the knowledge of the defendants before they 
came to a finding of liability. 
 
In terms of the understanding of the law adopted in this thesis, this can be 
understood to be a process in which judges in the nineteenth century had begun to 
include statements in their judgments that allowed for a shift away from what can 
be understood as “feudal” categorisations of the defendants specifically, and the 
other legal subjects more generally. This shift was apparent whether the judges 
articulated liability in terms of “things dangerous in themselves” or in terms of a 
more general duty. Statements were made in which legal subjects were constituted 
with attributes that did not derive merely from their station in life. The members of 
the legal profession, however, did not switch straight from, what might be called, a 
feudal characterisation of legal subjects to another, perhaps modern, 
characterisation. The nineteenth century was a period where multiple possibilities 
for the constitution of legal subjects existed.  
 
The decisions examined from the twentieth century also suggested that the 
articulations of liability was changing. The early cases continued the understanding 
of liability that was evident in the later part of the nineteenth century. The later 
decisions, however, considered liability in the context of statements associated with 
a more general “duty of care”. This general duty was owed by all legal subjects to 
other legal subjects who may be affected by their actions or omissions. Once that 
duty of care is held to exist in a particular case, then the judges must consider 
whether the defendant had lived up to the appropriate standard of care. 
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This duty and this standard are norms of behaviour that the courts use to assess 
whether the defendants should pay compensation for the damage suffered by the 
plaintiff. These norms have been internalised by legal subjects. They are not divine 
or monarchical edicts. The internalisation of these norms represents, in part, the 
modern form of governance. This modern form can be seen as constructing all legal 
subjects as self-regulating and self-reflexive subjects.  
 
The members of the legal profession, as they are part of one of the dominant 
institutions of governance in England, can also be understood to constitute the legal 
subjects who come before them as self-regulating and self-reflexive subjects. In 
doing so, judges consider the states of mind of the defendants, their level of 
knowledge and their training before they rule on the question of their liability. The 
profession of the defendant is no longer sufficient, in itself, to establish liability. 
The defendant’s profession is only relevant to the extent that it affects her/his 
knowledge and experience. 
 
These three periods provide some indications of the discursive legal change that is 
evident in articulations of liability. In the eighteenth century, the circumstances of 
the incident and the ensuing legal procedure had to fit the appropriate criteria for 
liability to be established. If the law did not recognise the relationship of liability 
through the appropriate use of the appropriate writ, then it did not matter that the 
plaintiff deserved compensation. The members of the profession in the eighteenth 
century were trained to recognise only this manner of liability. 
 
For much of the twentieth century members of the legal discursive formation were 
constituted to recognise a general duty to take care. The legal subjects of the time  
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were constructed to consider others, to be conscious of their neighbours and to 
foresee the likelihood of their neighbours being affected by their actions, or 
inactions. If these legal subjects did not live up to the legally accepted standard of 
behaviour, members of the legal discursive formation, in particular the judges, 
would consider them liable for any damage that resulted, and require them to 
compensate the injured party. This assumed relationship could be negatived, 
however, if the circumstances of the case meant that the damage was too remote, or 
was not reasonably foreseeable. 
 
The judgments examined in Chapters Five and Six demonstrate the processes of 
legal change particularly well.
2 Legal statements were selected by the judges and 
repeated in their judgments. Some of them were repeated with approval, some were 
distinguished and some were imported from other areas of the law. These legal 
statements were brought before the court in the form of “precedents”. The use of 
previous legal statements allows for and produces legal change.
3 It was through the 
application of the archaeological method that this narrative was produced in this 
project; for the practices of repetition are that which constitute an inextricable link 
between the law and the legal profession. In this application of the archaeological 
method, “the law” can be seen as the sum of the practices of the profession and 
their writings.  
 
                                                 
2 This, however, may simply be an unintended effect of my method of case selection. 
3 It is also arguable that, though it is not something that can be resolved here, legal change can be 
seen as a function of a decrease in the level of specificity of statements. For example, the obligation 
owed by an inn-keeper “became” a duty owed by the average person, or a duty with respect to 
“things dangerous in themselves” “became” a duty with respect to all things in the care of the 
average person.  
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EFFECTIVENESS OF THE APPLICATION OF THE METHOD IN THIS 
PROJECT 
 
My application of the archaeological method had one explicit and one implicit 
purpose. The explicit purpose was to attempt an application of the method. This 
involved two steps. The first was the development of the method and the second 
was the use of the method as I understood it. The implicit purpose was to see if the 
application of the method, as I understand it, would produce a narrative of the 
history of “the law” that is different from more traditional legal histories. That is, 
the implicit purpose can be seen as an interest in considering the effects of the 
application of the method.
4 
 
The first section of this analysis of the effectiveness of the application will deal 
with the implicit purpose. That is, I will consider differences between the story I 
have told and normal legal history, as I understand it. After I have assessed that 
aspect of the project I will discuss how my understanding of the method may have 
affected the narrative produced in this project. 
* 
 
The Introduction to this project included a description of some of the features of 
traditional legal history. This section of the Conclusion will examine how the 
narrative produced in this project differs from normal legal history. The two types 
of histories that my narrative will be compared with are what Conaghan and 
Mansell referred to as “internal” histories and histories in which the law is seen to 
                                                 
4 As has been suggested throughout this project, there can also be seen to be a “suppressed” purpose 
behind this thesis. This “suppressed” purpose was my interest in exploring the genealogical intuition 
about the shifts in governance that have produced “modern” legal subjects.  
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change as a result of external forces. In the first instance, the narrative produced in 
this thesis can be differentiated from both, inasmuch as there is a deliberate and 
explicit application of an historical method. That is, few legal historians self-
consciously and explicitly engage with specific historical methods in writing their 
histories. One of my desires in writing this project was to reflect on the ways in 
which the application of a specific method affects the narrative produced. 
 
More specifically, the narrative in this project seems differentiable from “external” 
histories, such as those of Horwitz, on the basis that it is an attempt to develop a 
history of law from within. External histories explain changes in the law on the 
basis of external factors. Horwitz, for example, linked the changes in nineteenth 
century negligence law to the changes in the economic structures of the time. My 
inclination toward discursive understandings of society leads me to conceive of 
legal change as open to explanation from within. The application of the 
archaeological method, as understood in this thesis, suggests that such an 
explanation is available. I must add, however, that I am not claiming that my 
narrative is better because of its internal focus, only that the focus of my narrative 
produces a different story to external histories.  
 
There are also differences between the narrative in this project and the narratives of 
“internal” legal historians, such as those produced by Winfield. These differences 
are produced, in part, through the manner in which cases are treated. Unlike 
traditional, internal legal histories, using the archaeological method led me to focus 
on the whole of past decisions. That is, identifying practices of repetition led me to 
an examination of the statements of counsel, the statements of dissenting judges 
and the statements of the majority judges. The examination of all statements was a  
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function of and contributed to a greater understanding of the role of the repetition 
of past legal statements. The narrative produced in this project derived from the 
view that the practice of repetition extends beyond the repetition of the ratios of 
past decisions. A broader understanding of the role of the discursive practice of 
repetition requires that attention be paid to any past legal statement, whether it be 
from a majority or minority judgments, or whether the statement was supplied by 
counsel or one that arose in another jurisdiction. In a “normal”, traditional history, 
on the other hand, attention is on a more limited set of statements which are 
understood as the ratios of particular judgment. For example, a traditional history 
of negligence law would highlight the three sentences from Donoghue v Stevenson 
that comprise “neighbour principle” rather than examining, in detail, all the 
judgments written by the Law Lords who heard the final appeal. 
 
Another significant difference that may be identified between this narrative and 
traditional legal history is the lack of focus on “marker cases”.
5 S o m e  o f  t h e  
statements examined in this project were amongst those produced or repeated in 
relatively well-known cases and others from decisions that, on the whole, have 
been forgotten by members of the profession. The use of the archaeological method 
meant that no case, in this thesis, would be considered to be any more important 
than any other case. The focus of the application of the method was on the 
statements of the law that were available at the time of the writing of the 
judgments. Consequently, current opinions concerning the selection of statements 
that reflected the importance of particular judgments were avoided in order to avoid 
                                                 
5 This lack of focus was intended to be supported by the organisation of the discussion of the 
decisions in terms of the century in which they were decided.  
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limiting the relevance of some of the statements that were available when 
statements of the law were being produced.  
 
One of the results of the application of the method used in this thesis, and a result 
of the shift away from “marker cases”, is a characterisation of “the law” as being 
more continuous than it is usually considered to be. It is worth highlighting two 
examples of this continuity. The first is that the abolition of the writ system in the 
1830s did not immediately affect the practices of writing judgments or the 
articulations of liability contained in judgments delivered in the following decades.  
 
A second example of continuity is that particular “marker cases” seem not to have 
represented as radical a shift as may be suggested in traditional legal histories. The 
introduction of the “duty of care” in Donoghue v Stevenson (a case that is often 
cited as a major turning point in the history of negligence) did not represent a 
“magic wand” that instantaneously produced a change in the characterisation of 
liability in negligence law. Statements that expressed similar duties are evident in 
nineteenth century decisions such as George v Skivington and Heaven v Pender. 
While the case of Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks
6 can be added to the decisions 
examined in that Chapter which included statements reflecting a wider scope of 
liability than was recognised in the nineteenth century and before. Further, the 
“duty of care” in Donoghue v Stevenson did not extend much further than the 
“duty” found in George v Skivington, as is evidenced by statements in the 
judgments in Farr v Butters Brothers and Videan v British Transport Commission. 
                                                 
6 Interestingly, despite the fact that the decision was brought down in 1856, none of the nineteenth 
century decisions examined in this project made reference to it. The first reference in the cases in 
this thesis was by counsel in McDowall v Great Western Railway (but the judges in that decision did 
not refer to it) and the only other references were by one judge in Bolton v Stone and one judge in 
British Railways Board v Herrington.  
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The continuity evident in this narrative may separate it from other legal histories 
but the continuity does put this history at odds with some readings of Foucault’s 
historical methods. The relationship between my use of the archaeological method 
and expectations of the use of the method is discussed next. 
 
* 
 
It is clear from the narrative produced by my application of Foucault’s 
archaeological method that, while the story is different from traditional legal 
histories, it is not “radically different” from more familiar understandings of “the 
law”. Whether an application of Foucault’s ideas produces a “radical” perspective 
on the discourse in question may depend on either the use of Foucault’s ideas or the 
discourse examined.
7 This section will include discussion of a number of factors 
that could contribute to this. These factors include the discursive nature of the law 
itself and the role of the archaeologist. 
 
There are two significant issues that appear to merit attention in a discussion of the 
discursive understanding of the law applied in this thesis and the nature of the 
reading of the law generated. The first concerns whether the law can be understood 
as a single discourse. The second concerns whether the law is a discourse that is 
                                                 
7 Or perhaps a combination of both. A project of this scope does not allow for a complete 
assessment of all the ways in which Foucault’s ideas may be applied. I have chosen to attempt an 
understanding of one method of application and then apply that method. I have not sought to 
compare my method of application to other possible methods. I recognise that there may be 
significant differences between how I have used Foucault’s ideas and how others may choose to use 
them, therefore, I recognise that others may produce a radically different narrative from their use of 
Foucault’s ideas than I have. An attempt to engage with other such readings did not seem feasible in 
a project of this length.  
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suitable for examination through the use of the archaeological method. These two 
points will be discussed in turn. 
 
One of the assumptions made in the discussion of “the law” in Chapter Two was 
that “the law”, in the period covered by this project at least, was a single discourse. 
This assumption may now be questioned in light of the less than radical reading of 
the law produced herein. One possibility is that “the law” is a single discourse but 
that the thesis does not cover a long enough period to show any “radical” changes 
in that discourse. Support for this view might be based on the argument that the 
‘linguistic structures’
8 underlying the law between 1750 and 1972 are too similar 
for an application of the archaeological method to highlight any “ruptures”. An 
alternative view could be based on the contention that the statements of liability in 
the eighteenth century are a different ‘enunciation’, and therefore represent a 
different ‘discursive set’,
9 from the statements of liability written in the twentieth 
century.  
 
As discursive sets can be ‘established [by] the existence of a series of permanent 
and internally consistent concepts’
10 a question then arises as to how different two 
concepts have to be to represent different discursive sets. There are both similarities 
and differences in the articulations of liability written in the eighteenth and 
twentieth century. How can an archaeologist (or reader) be certain as to whether 
two groups of statements are from the same, or from different, “discursive sets”? 
                                                 
8 Gutting, G., ‘Foucault’s Genealogical Method’ (1990) 15 Midwest Studies in Philosophy 327 at 
333 
9 Foucault, ‘On the Archaeology of the Sciences’ in Faubion, J. (ed), Michel Foucault – Aesthetics, 
Method, and Epistemology: The Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 Volume Two, Allen Lane, 
London, 1998 at 314 
10 Ibid at 316  
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Foucault’s own archaeologies operate as ‘chartings of the epistemic breaks that 
account for the sudden appearance of new disciplines and the equally rapid demise 
of certain old ones’.
11 “The law”, as understood in this project, may not suggest 
either the “appearance of a new discipline” or the “demise of an old discipline”. 
That is, this continuity of “linguistic structures” of the law could indicate that, 
unlike the narrative produced in Foucault’s own work, there is no evidence that, in 
the context of the law, the ‘threshold of modernity can be placed at the end of the 
eighteenth century’.
12  
 
Yet there seems to be significant differences in the articulations of liability in 
eighteenth century judgments from those of the twentieth century that justify the 
contention and my genealogical intuition that eighteenth century judgments 
reflected an almost feudal understanding of English society relative to twentieth 
century judgments. Most of the twentieth century judgments examined in this 
project can be understood as constructing the legal subjects as self-aware, self-
disciplined subjects who were expected to live according to the dictates of 
internalised norms generally applicable in the community. This can be seen, at least 
from a Foucaultian perspective, as a “modern” understanding of society. 
 
A somewhat more radical move, at least in the context of this thesis, is to consider 
“the law” discussed in this thesis as reflecting two separate “discursive sets of 
enunciations”. Flynn has suggested that an indicator of different discourses, 
highlighted in Foucault’s work, can be found in the questions asked by the 
members of a discourse. An indicator of the epistemic break in the medical 
                                                 
11 Flynn, ‘Foucault’s Mapping of History’ at 31 
12 Fleming, M., ‘Working in the Philosophical Discourse of Modernity’ at 170  
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discourse, for example, is the shift in the questions asked by physicians. The 
question of the ‘clinician’ changed from the ‘essentialist “What is wrong with 
you?” [to] the nominalistic “Where does it hurt?”’.
13 The judges’ “question” posed 
of defendants, as evident in this project, can be seen as shifting from the eighteenth 
century “of what vocational group are you part?” to the twentieth century “did you 
behave in accordance with the standards of the ‘reasonable man’?”. This apparent 
shift may be understood to indicate that two separate “discursive sets of 
enunciations” are evident in the first and last periods examined in this project. The 
middle period can then be understood as reflecting the breakdown of one discourse 
and the emergence of another, both of which were called “law”. 
 
Another explanation for a lack of “radicalness” in this project may lie in the fact 
that the law, as understood here, is not a discourse that is easily examinable with 
the method, at least as it is understood here. There are two issues that need 
discussion in this context. First is the fact that Foucault himself only applied the 
archaeological method to the “human sciences”. Second, the archive that is 
constituted by legal judgments may not be the most appropriate archive of legal 
monuments to produce a “radical” narrative about “the law”. 
 
If the archaeological method is to be taken as best suited to an examination of the 
“human sciences”,
14 then the question that arises in this context concerns  whether 
“the law” can be seen as a “human science”. It is arguable that the ‘central idea, 
from our [Foucaultian] point of view, is that the human sciences contain a 
                                                 
13 Flynn, ‘Foucault’s Mapping of History’ at 32 
14 Smart stated that ‘Foucault’s archaeological analyses actually address a quite specific and limited 
range of discourses’ and then questioned whether the method is applicable to the ‘less controversial 
and more mature sciences of mathematics, physics or chemistry’ (Smart, Michel Foucault at 510  
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particular manner of conceiving what human beings are’.
15 That is, “Man” can be 
understood as being the focus of “human sciences”.
16 If, then, “Man” is not the 
focus of “the law”, the archaeological method may not operate in the same manner 
as it does with respect to the “human sciences”. If the law is not a human science 
then an application of the archaeological method may not serve to illustrate any 
rupture in the law and an account may not evidence any discursive disruption. This 
may not require the conclusion that this tells us nothing about the archaeological 
method, however, as it has been suggested that ‘consideration of questions [of the 
scope of application of the method] may help to clarify further the distinctiveness 
of archaeological analysis’.
17 
 
The view that the law is not a human science may be supported through reference 
to the claim that “the law” is produced and reproduced through the use of past legal 
statements. The rules of dispersion of statements seem to operate on the use of 
statements themselves. “Man” is not central to the dispersion of statements. “Man” 
cannot be central to the “Truth” of the legal discursive formation if the “Truth” of 
the formation is more closely tied to the repetition of past legal statements. The 
practices of “the law” in relation to the “human body” were highlighted by 
Foucault to good effect in Discipline and Punish. Negligence law does not 
privilege the “human body” in the same manner as legal practices of punishment.
18 
                                                 
15 Wartenberg, T. E., ‘Foucault’s Archaeological Method: A Response to Hacking and Rorty’ 
(1984) 15 Philosophical Forum 345 at 360 
16 ‘Our limited sense of the nature of human beings – as Man – gives rise to a limited awareness of 
how society structures the nature of our lives – as Men’ (id). 
17 Smart, Michel Foucault at 51 
18 The “punishment” in relation to liability in negligence is the payment of “compensation”. 
“Compensation” is not exacted from the “human body”. From the ‘dawn of the common law… tort 
liability… provided a means whereby the victim could be “bribed” into abstaining from retaliation 
by the prospect of being able to compel the perpetrator to render him [sic] monetary compensation 
for the wrong done’ (Fleming, J., An Introduction to the Law of Torts, 2
nd edition, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1985 at 1-2).   
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Perhaps the closest negligence law gets to a focus on “Man” is the “reasonable 
man”. As was suggested in Chapter Two, however, the “reasonable man” can be 
understood to function as a norm of behaviour, a legal discursive practice, rather 
than as the focus of the discourse. 
 
Another reason to believe that the law is not an appropriate object of archaeological 
analysis derives from an understanding of Foucault’s methods as questioning ‘how 
entities (including the self) become objects of knowledge’.
19 It is arguable that “the 
law”, as understood in terms of judgments, does not function in a manner that 
creates “the self” as an object of knowledge in a wider sense. That is, judgments 
may be constitutive of members of the legal discursive formation, but not of the 
wider community. The language of judgments, therefore, at least from this 
perspective, cannot include statements of the ‘emergence of “Man”’.
20 
 
“The law”, as presented in this project, might not have been a suitable discourse for 
archaeological examination for another reason. In his histories, Foucault can be 
understood to have ‘sought to reveal what is so obvious and so superficial that it is 
passed over and accepted without further comment’.
21 From this perspective, there 
is only value in revealing the obvious if it is passed over and accepted without 
comment. The practices of the legally trained may be such that the minutiae of 
decisions are not passed over. It is common for lawyers to place great emphasis on 
specific words, and specific grammatical constructions, even in judgments that 
extend for hundreds of pages. If this is the case, then the archaeological method 
                                                 
19 Sax, B., ‘Foucault, Nietzsche, History: Two Modes of the Genealogical Method’ (1989) 11 
History of European Ideas 769 at 779 
20 Kendall & Wickham, Using Foucault’s Methods at 25 
21 Deacon, ‘Theory as Practice’ at 129  
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may not be as effective in the context of the law as it is when it is applied to other 
discourses and discursive practices. 
 
Another possible similarity between Foucault’s methods and legal discursive 
practices that reduces the possibility of a disruptive reading of the law derives from 
the view that ‘Foucault’s archaeological method is designed to analyse knowledge 
without giving a privileged role to the epistemological subject’.
22 It has been 
argued that the functions of the ‘legal method’, at least as the “legal method” is 
understood by critical theorists, is to make individuals ‘become obscured and 
indeed almost disappear’.
23 From this perspective, the legal subject is removed 
from sight by legal discursive practices.
24 If this is the manner in which “the law” 
works, then an application of a method that also directs attention away from the 
individual subject may not be as effective as it would be if used to examine 
discourses in which the individual is privileged. 
 
In addition to those problems for a non-disruptive reading of the law that are 
associated with the characterisation of the discursive nature of “the law”, there are 
other factors, which relate to the role of the archaeologist in this project, that merit 
consideration. I will discuss three of these in the following section. The first is the 
range of decisions that I made in the conceptualisation, construction and 
presentation of this thesis. The second is the “qualifications” that may be required 
                                                 
22 Gutting, ‘Foucault’s Genealogical Method’ at 343 
23 Beaman, L., ‘Sexual Orientation and Legal Discourse: Legal Constructions of the “Normal” 
Family’ (1999) 14 Canadian Journal of Legal Studies 173 at 176 
24 This applies to both the individuals who appear before the court, as discussed in Beaman’s work, 
and in the way in which judges are (not) considered when past judgments are read, as highlighted in 
Chapter 3. Again, however, it must be stressed that this is how the practices of law operate in the 
use of law, it is not necessarily how histories of the law treat individuals.   
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of an archaeologist undertaking an archaeology of a particular discourse. The third, 
and perhaps the most important, factor is the very choice of the method itself. 
 
I chose to apply the archaeological method to a series of judgments because I 
considered that the cases would make a suitable archive for a Foucaultian historical 
investigation. The archive I chose, however, may be more suited, if a “radical” 
story was to be told, to a genealogical, rather than an archaeological, examination. 
Shumway has suggested that ‘archaeology is an inadequate method when used in 
isolation’ and that genealogy can ‘take into account… the power relations in which 
every discursive formation must be situated’.
25 Therefore, if I wanted to produce a 
“radical” narrative that effectively highlighted shifts in the characterisation of legal 
subjects by the legal profession, then it may have been better to have chosen the 
genealogical method.
26 
 
As has been evident in the narrative produced in this project, it is difficult to apply 
an understanding of the archaeological method without some, limited, genealogical 
intuitions. One of the original motivations for this project was to examine how the 
“duty of care” came to be a part of “the law” and how this “duty” changed the 
construction of legal subjects. Without my intuition that the “duty of care” was 
important in the changes in “the law” that represented a shift in the construction of 
society, this project
27 would not have taken the form that it did. I recognise that it is 
                                                 
25 Shumway, Michel Foucault at 101. Further, Switala has argued that ‘archaeology did not 
succeed… because it was an attempt to eliminate, rather than to describe the mutation of, the 
Modern subject’ (‘Foucaultian Mutations of Language’ (1997) 41 Philosophy Today 166 at 172). 
26 For example, as has already been suggested, a discussion of the shift from the “feudal” to 
“modern” legal subject would only be possible through a use of the genealogical method. 
27 The shift that I was interested in was the shift to a recognition of legal subjects, admittedly in 
limited circumstances, existing within relationships of “care” with other members of the 
community. This exploration of the “relationship of care” was intended to counter accusations that 
“the law” sees legal subjects as separate individuals, an accusation that, may be founded on a limited  
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my “training” in “the law” and “politics” that produced the genealogical intuition 
that contributed to this project. 
 
In addition, it is possible that the practices that constitute me as a law graduate and 
legal researcher make me unsuitable for the task of applying the archaeological 
method to “the law”. As highlighted in Chapter Three, there is a question 
surrounding the appropriate qualifications of an archaeologist with respect to her or 
his knowledge of the discourse to be examined. It is arguable that an archaeologist 
should be as separate as possible from the discourse to assist in the process of 
“revealing what is so obvious and so superficial that it is passed over and accepted 
without further comment” by those constructed within the discourse. The 
alternative argument is that some knowledge of the discourse is required in order to 
“distinguish when two different utterances are the same serious speech act and 
when two identical utterances are different speech acts”.
28 The narrative produced 
by my application of the method may suggest that I am too well-trained in the 
reading of case-law to effectively apply the archaeological method to “the law” as 
characterised in this project. 
 
One point of where my subjectification by legal practices may have adversely 
affected the application of the method is the “archive” that I chose to excavate. 
That is, one of the more significant of these decisions related to the “monuments” 
                                                                                                                                        
understanding of contract law. An archaeology of judgments highlighting the doctrine of 
“unconscionability” may have served the same purpose as this archaeology of judgments in 
negligence law. 
28 An alternative perspective would be that there are “limits” to the practices of governance in the 
training of discursive subjects. That is, no processes of subjectification are complete (for a 
discussion of this point, see Malpas & Wickham, ‘Governance and Failure’). From this perspective, 
an archaeologist’s ability to excavate a discourse in which she or he is trained may “sit” in the 
“gaps” left by the practices of the discourse.  
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that were to be excavated through the use of the method. The choice of documents 
may have been inappropriate for an application of the method. Unfortunately, none 
of the commentators on the method, nor Foucault himself, discussed what 
documents should form the archive for the purpose of an application of either the 
archaeological or genealogical method. I felt, therefore, that it was open to me to 
select any archive of legal documents that fitted the description of “statements 
controlled by a system of dispersion”. 
 
The decision to focus on a number of cases that were from a “web of decisions 
associated with” a particular case was in order to attempt to problematise the 
apparent continuity in law. More precisely, my goal was to problematise the sense 
of teleology that is evident in many discussions of law. That is, I decided use, as the 
archive, all the decisions that contributed to the final decision in order to show the 
contingent nature of articulations of liability. The decisions in the archive included 
judgments that were followed, those that were distinguished and those that were 
“overturned”. In other words, all decisions that contributed statements for repetition 
formed the “archive” of cases from which I selected the 19 for excavation. 
 
This method of selection may be open to accusations of linearity. However, I feel 
the inclusion of decisions that were not followed, and the use of both majority and 
minority judgments, could be seen to have reduced such an appearance. In addition, 
it would be difficult to examine a number of decisions without some suggestion of 
linearity. Irrespective of the relationship of a decision to any “final” decision (in the 
context of this project, the last decision was British Railways Board v Herrington)  
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there will be appearances of linearity.
29 That is, most twentieth century decisions 
will involve a reference to Donoghue v Stevenson, most decisions after Heaven v 
Pender will refer to that decision. This is likely to be true whether I focussed on 
reported or unreported judgments. As one of the fundamental legal practices is the 
repetition of past legal statements, almost all decisions will include references to 
previous cases and, in most circumstances, will include references to “marker 
cases” such as Donoghue v Stevenson. 
 
Given the inter-relatedness of decisions, another purpose for the “web of decisions” 
archive was to demonstrate that there was no suggestion of “progress” associated 
with changes in “the law”. The judges wrote their judgments using the legal 
statements available at the time. Even with the advantage of hindsight, there is no 
evidence that the judges were “working towards” some ideal articulation of 
liability. I believed that this lack of “progress” would only be evident if the 
decisions examined using the method were limited to the decisions used by the 
judges in their judgments. 
 
Despite the nature of the narrative produced by my application of the method, I still 
consider that my choice of archive represents a valid choice for an application of 
the method. A method of case selection was needed, and for the reasons highlighted 
above, I used the method that I did. Nonetheless, I recognise that a different choice 
of archive may have produced a different narrative of “the law”. 
                                                 
29 In addition, it is arguable that any discussion of more than one decision would have some 
appearance of linearity. It would be difficult to conceive of, and construct, a project that removed 
the chronological dimension from a discussion of multiple monuments (whether the monuments are 
judgments, statements of claim or statutes). Given the tendency of readers to engage with multiple 
documents with at least one eye on their chronological sequence, to construct a project that actively 
disrupts that ordering could perhaps focus too much on that disruption and detract from the reader’s 
engagement with the substantive points of this project.  
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Another decision I made that contributed to the narrative produced in this project 
was the “problem” that I chose to “solve”. As highlighted in Chapter Three, 
Foucault’s historical methods are problem-based. Perhaps the problem I selected to 
be the focus of this project was inappropriate for the method. It has been suggested 
that: 
 
Foucault is not looking for a “method” which will be superior to other 
methods in objectivity and comprehensiveness but is forging tools of 
analysis which take their starting point in the political-intellectual 
conflicts of the present. His method is an anti-method in the sense that 
it seeks to free us from the illusion that an apolitical method is 
possible.
30 
As a result, to treat the archaeological method as a method that can be applied to 
any problem in any discourse may be an inappropriate use of the method. The 
problem selected for this project, paraphrased as “how did the statements in a 
particular decision come to include the statements it did?”, may not be sufficiently 
“political” to produce the “radical” political narrative that may be expected. My 
choice, as a legally trained archaeologist, of “problem” and “archive” may have 
contributed, therefore, to the nature of the narrative produced in this project. 
 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
The purpose of this project was to attempt to apply Foucault’s archaeological 
method. It is this attempt that, for me, represents the contribution of this project to 
the field of Foucaultian, and legal, scholarship. I must repeat, however, that this 
application was intended to be tentative and that I recognise that no application of 
                                                 
30 Shiner, L., ‘Reading Foucault: Anti-method and the Genealogy of Power-Knowledge’ (1982) 21 
History and Theory 382 at 386  
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the method can be either “complete” or “final”.
31 The previous section highlighted 
possible reasons for the narrative “failing” to be as “radical”, or disruptive, as 
might be expected. This, however, can still be considered to be an exploration of 
Foucault’s ideas and, perhaps, an indicator of how Foucault’s archaeological 
method should not be applied.  
 
Applying the method to the law as a “discourse in action” was an attempt to add to 
the understanding of the law and the way that it operates in society. The use of the 
method, at least as it is understood in this project, illustrates how the law changes 
through the repetition of past legal statements. The use of the method also shows 
that the law has not progressed over the past 250 years, the law has simply 
changed.  
 
The examination of the cases in this thesis did not show that the judges were 
planning change, or were trying to “improve” the law. The judges were stating the 
law in the manner in which they were trained to do this. That is, they stated the law 
through repeating past statements of the law. The judges brought about change by 
perpetuating the practices that regulated their own behaviour. It is only through 
change that is brought about by the repetition of the practices that constitute the 
discourse that the law can change without losing its legitimacy. It is in these 
processes that the law exhibits its continuous, yet discontinuous, nature. In a sense, 
it would appear that it is only through the repetition of statements about the 
archaeological method that change, with respect to the use of the method, can come 
about. This, in effect, was my purpose in writing this thesis. 
 
                                                 
31 As was highlighted in Chapter Three, an application of the method may remove a mask or two of 
interpretation from a monument, however, “all that might be traces of other masks”.  
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